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ABSTRACT 
To what extent is it possible to attain public sector planning in 
a federal system of government? This thesis attempts to answer that 
question in a particular way by focussing on the potential for a sub-national 
unit in a federation to plan its activities. The Australian federation 
is the principal object of attention with Canada serving as a comparative 
model. 
Planning is defined as a system with the aid of various strands of 
theory, mainly political, legal and administrative, together with an 
analysis of planning process in other political systems. Federalism is 
analyzed utilizing theoretical and comparative literature, as well as 
an analysis of the actual structure and functioning of the Australian 
and Canadian federations. 
Having defined both planning and federalism as concepts, an endeavour 
is made to examine their conceptual compatibility. Then the planning 
concept, which has been formulated, is applied to the two federations, 
and recourse is had to the literature and an extensive range of 
interviews,to identify any hindrances to the introduction of such 
planning in both countries. Three of the major hindrances which emerge 
are then examined in detail, in order to assess the nature and degree of 
their intractibil ity. Reforms are suggested which would go some way 
towards overcoming such hindrances. 
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
The aim of this study is to determine to what extent it is possible 
for the units of the Australian federation to engage in public sector 
planning. It has been in gestation for many years and its origins lie in 
the author's experience as a state public servant during the 1960's - the 
so called "decade of development" - when it became readily apparent that 
there was a complete lack of forward planning by the various levels of 
government in Australia and the minimum of harmonization of objectives 
between the levels of government. 
In 1970 and 1971 the opportunity arose to study at first hand the 
experience of various nations in Western Europe, in the postwar period, 
with indicative planning as well as other developments in Great Britain, 
with public sector planning following the Plowden Report in 1961 and the 
Planning Programning Budgeting System experiments in north America which 
had followed the Johnson initiatives of the mid 1960's. 
It was only a short step to a posing of the question as to why 
public sector planning of at least one of these kinds had not taken hold 
in Australia. Arising out of research, which is elaborated upon in the 
text of this study which follows, it became apparent that there were many 
hindrances to the adoption of such planning processes in Australia, some 
of them "natural" (i.e. related to the nature of the country and its 
people) and many of them "artificial" (i.e. man-made or heavily influenced 
by the political and social structures which had been contrived). As in 
most countries,many of those hindrances were relevant to each level of 
government separately but the most fundamental hindrance was the federal 
form of government itself. 
To some extent it seemed natural that planning should be more 
difficult in a federation. After all, if one level of government, the 
national government, has to pass a large share of its resources to other 
levels of government (state and local), and is unable to determine the 
uses to which that share is devoted, then that is a monumental constraint 
upon that level of government in its forward thinking and in its 
determination of its own priorities. On the other hand,consider a level 
of government, (state or local), which must receive a very large share 
of its resources from another level of government,(national), and it 
becomes clear that forward thinking and priority determination are 
severely curtailed for that recipient government, especially when a 
proportion of the transferred resources it receives is earmarked by 
the donor government. 
There were, of course, many other elements of a federal form of 
government which, superficially at least, promised to be impediments to 
planning by its component units. For example, the fact that there are 
more sovereign units of government involved than in a unitary system 
spells trouble in itself, as does the potential conflict of those 
jurisdictions which requires the presence of an umpire (the High Court) 
to arbitrate between them. Larger families find it harder to plan their 
activities than smaller ones, or childless couples, especially if the 
parents of those larger families are liberal in their attitude to the 
rest of the family. 
Nevertheless it was clear from the literature and recounted 
experiences of other federations that planning was possible to some extent 
in a federal situation. West Germany seemed to have achieved sufficient 
harmonization between the Federal and Lander governments to achieve 
coordination of priorities and formulation of plans for the whole public 
sector of that country; India had seemingly successfully grafted a 
national planning process on to its modern federal political system; and 
even the north American federations of the United States and Canada had 
managed, for a time, to absorb the Planning Programming Budgeting System 
(P,P.B,S,) into the public sector of the national and some sub-national 
units of government albeit with varying degrees of success. 
Why then could there not be similar reforms in Australia? Why, 
indeed, had none of the post Plowden reforms in Great Britain,(which had 
introduced public sector planning into that country with its strong local 
and county structure), been copied in Australia when past history has 
revealed a tendency for all budgetary changes and most other Westminster 
modifications to be copied in Australia within a \jery short space of time? 
These questions and many others prompted the question as to why there 
had been no large scale moves to implement public sector planning in 
Australia and whether that federal system was really so severe an obstacle 
to any reform in this direction. 
1- Great Britain, Report of the Committee on the Control of Public 
Expenditure, (The Plowden Committee), London, H.M.S.O. 1961 Command 1432 
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Thus, the central hypothesis to be examined in this thesis is that 
planning, in concept and practice, is compatible with federalism in 
concept and practice. The methodology which is used here to test this 
hypothesis is quite simple. First, a model (more accurately - a system) 
of planning has been derived by a synthesis of theoretical material on 
planning and the experience of those countries which have introduced forms 
of public sector planning. Secondly, the system has been placed over, or 
applied to, the Australian federation to see how well it fits. Thirdly, 
the obstacles or hindrances which have emerged have been identified and 
analysed in an effort to determine whether they are fundamentally 
incompatible with the planning system or whether with some rethinking 
and modification they could be adapted to become partially or completely 
compatible with it. Naturally enough, it was realized from the outset 
that if enough incompatibilities or hindrances were found with the 
planning system which had been contrived doubts would have to be cast 
on the integrity and relevance of that planning system itself. 
Now if one wants to determine the validity of one's thesis or 
hypotheses or model one can apply it to the behaviour of a system and 
watch the reaction - in other words an empirical test. That was achieved 
in this study by attempting to fit the planning framework to the political, 
legal, administrative and above all financial structures which comprise 
the Australian federal system, together with the actual processes or 
functions or behaviour which take place within that structure. In that 
sense this is a structural/functional approach. The primary resources 
which have been used for this approach have included government publications, 
files, documents, agreements, statistics, addresses, articles etc. and some 
secondary sources based on these primary ones. 
However in the social sciences one has another method of testing 
the validity of a model, and that is to apply it to the perceptions of 
the actors who form part of the system under review. If one wants to 
test a theory about where the incidence of fire is greatest in a 
metropolis one can 
(a) set up a method of monitoring the incidence of 
fires over a period of time, or 
(b) rigorously question fire brigade chiefs with long 
years of service as to where most fires occur, or 
both. 
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It is not possible to employ the first method in this analysis because 
there is no public sector planning in evidence to enable any empirical 
testing; we have to attempt to make a notional application of a 
"synthetic" planning system. However,the second method has been 
adopted for this study and it has been pursued by means of comprehensive 
interviews over a period of six years, predominantly of national, state, 
and local public servants intimately involved in federal relations and 
priority determination for their own level of government, together with 
politicians, fellow academics, and others with relevant expertise. The 
emphasis has been upon public servants because they are in a unique 
position to perceive political influences at work and the manner in 
which those political influences are translated into resource allocation 
which lies at the heart of priority determination. 
Thus the study was established in 1972 and since that time 
access has progressively been gained to the necessary primary sources, 
and interviews in Australia and Canada have proceeded in a manner and 
framework which is revealed later in the text of this study. In this 
respect the author has benefited from a number of unique opportunities 
which have to be mentioned at the outset because they relate closely 
to the methodology employed. 
The Reserve Bank of Australia agreed at the outset to sponsor the 
Australian element of the project and provided funding specifically for 
travel to conduct interviews across Australia and to help with the 
formidable cost of purchasing and assembling a vast array of material 
published by national, state, and local governments in Australia -
primary source material not easy to acquire. The Australian National 
University Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations has invited 
the author to present papers to a number of seminars and symposiums 
relating to public policy formulation in federal systems. The Liberal 
Party of Australia included the author in a panel of academics to 
advise it in the development of its "new federalism" policy in the mid 
1970's, The Royal Institute of Public Administration commissioned a 
study of intergovernmental agreements in Australia and the Institute of 
Public Administration of Canada requested a paper for their recent 
national conference comparing Canadian and Australian experience of 
agreements of this kind. An opportunity was presented to co-author a 
book on government budgeting focussing heavily on the state governments 
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of Australia and the United States and the provinces of Canada, The 
Australasian Political Studies Association requested a contribution to 
a symposium on Labor and Liberal federalism policies, from the viewpoint 
of the states, and the Australian Institute of Urban Studies in its 
follow up to Habitat requested a paper on intergovernmental aspects of 
urban problems. Most importantly, the author was engaged as consultant 
by the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration on 
aspects of forward planning and resource allocation in the national 
government; by the New South Wales Premier's Department for recorrmendations 
on the attainment of planning in the public sector,(particularly for 
manufacturing), and this consultancy required comparisons with all other 
states; by the Committee for Economic Development of Australia to 
examine regulation by national and state governments of the electronic 
and printed media; and by the Australian Advisory Council on 
Inter-government Relations on a project within their general major 
reference from the Premier's Conference on the relationships which 
should exist between levels of government in the Australian federation. 
Finally,a wery generous gesture by the Canadian government, through 
its special visitor's programme, financed an extensive tour through 
Canada to interview public servants and ministers from the national 
government, six provincial governments, and a selection of municipalities, 
on the topic of this project. Whilst in Canada the author was invited 
to represent Australia and deliver a paper to an international seminar 
for ten developed countries on the problems of reconciling the activities 
of public enterprises with the public interest - a topic with a profound 
bearing on the subject matter of this project. That seminar was also 
attended by a multitude of provincial public servants and national public 
servants engaged in public enterprises and the central organs of priority 
determination, and many of them were interviewed there for the purposes 
of this study. A university research grant enabled the author to revisit 
Canada in August/September 1979 to reinterview a large proportion of 
Canadians who had been previously interviewed in an effort to ascertain 
the impact of the many developments in Canadian federalism from 1977 to 
1979. 
Each of the opportunities mentioned above has provided increasing 
access to many primary sources out of the reach to the normal researcher, 
including government files, documents and reports together with lengthy 
access to officials, also not usually accessible. These sources have 
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been gathered over the period, (often in association with projects of a 
different purpose), until such time as they were deemed to provide adequate 
information for an answer to the question posed at the beginning of this 
introduction. 
Although Australia is the main focus of attention, this is also a 
comparative study. Material from other federations has been incorporated 
where relevant but the main comparison is with Canada. It was decided 
early in the project to adopt this approach mainly because, when each of 
the major hindrances to the public sector planning in Australia was 
identified, it became important to know whether that hindrance was 
peculiar to the Australian federal experience or whether it was common 
to similar federations. As will be argued later, Canada has a federal 
system which is most like that in Australia, particularly in that it 
operates as a federation within a Westminster derived model of government 
at both national and sub-national levels. Consequently Canada was used 
as a comparison. 
However, it must be stressed that no attempt is being made to create 
a new comparative model. This study simply compares Australia with 
Canada using the framework of the "Westminster model" and the concept of 
federalism. What is understood to comprize the elements of that frame-
work is elaborated upon as the study progresses. The aspect claimed to 
be original, in particular, is the delineation of the main theoretical 
and practical features of the federalism concept of significance for the 
introduction of public sector planning (provided in Chapter 2). 
To recapitulate, the approach used here has been to develop a 
planning system, to attempt to apply it to the Australian federal system, 
to consider the concepts "planning" and "federalism" in the abstract and 
in practice, to identify any basic conceptual incompatibilities. Then 
we identify the main hindrances which emerge and single them out for more 
detailed analysis, in each case attempting to discover just what it is 
about that hindrance that frustrates the implementation of the planning 
system. Our planning system is, in effect, a model derived from the 
literature and experience of single units of government. This means that 
we are using a planning system spawned from intragovernmental experience 
and then attempting to apply it to an intergovernmental situation. That 
is to say, we are posing the question whether public sector planning as 
it is known and practised within individual political units, can be 
applied overall in a federal environment with its essential interaction 
of such units. This makes it essential to appreciate that the definition, 
or concept, of planning employed in this study remains constant throughout. 
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A few other aspects of this study need to be mentioned at the outset. 
It is meant to be an analysis of the public sector; but it should be 
realized that the public/private sector dichotomy is often a blurred one 
in most democracies, especially as public sector planning involves ^ery 
close relations with, influences, and is profoundly influenced by events 
in, the private sector. The emphasis in the study is more on the state 
or provincial governments than either the national or local governments. 
There are two reasons for this emphasis. The first is that the problems 
for local governments in most federations are basically similar to those 
which state/provincial governments face in relation to the national 
government. The second is that the problems posed by federations for 
national governments in their public sector planning are most self-evident 
than those for the lower levels. For example, it is obvious that the 
Australian or Canadian national Governments face many more difficulties 
than the national government of any unitary system simply because they do 
not have as much control over priority determination within the public 
sector of the whole nation. To put it another way, it is the state/ 
provincial governments which are the far more interesting elements for 
a study on this topic because they are more constrained, being the middle 
level of a three tiered structure having two other levels of government 
with the potential to interfere more directly with their priority 
determination and therefore interfering with their capacity to think ahead. 
This study assumes that the reader has a complete familiarity with 
the history and institutions of Australian, and to a lesser extent 
Canadian, federalism. Given the confines of the length allowed it has 
simply not been possible to give a full account of each institution or 
process being described. 
Finally, this exercise broaches a number of disciplines. Its main 
orientation is in the literature and concepts of public administration, 
although it borrows heavily from the realms of public finance, political 
science, economics (theoretical and applied) and even accounting. But 
then public administration is itself a predatory discipline. 
The first chapter defines "planning" as a system and traces 
Australian experience with public sector planning with some observations 
also on Canadian experience. The second chapter analyses various theories 
of federalism and the principal features of various federal systems in an 
effort to identify those characteristics which are basically compatible 
or incompatible with the concept of planning as defined in the first 
chapter. Each of three subsequent chapters takes up one of the major 
hindrances for a more detailed examination. 
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The concluding chapter examines the basis of the hindrances which 
emerge in an effort to determine their validity and intractability. 
Suggestions are then made for reforms which might overcome any basic 
hindrances to public sector planning. In order to be practical and 
realistic, the only reforms contemplated are those possible within the 
existing constitutional context of both federations. 
The basic assumption of the exercise throughout is that the essential 
features of a public sector planning system can be applied in concept 
and practice in democratic federations. The case study of Australia 
compared with Canada is used in an attempt to prove or disprove that 
assumption. 
IDENTIFYING THE HINDRANCES 
As already intimated the methodology employed in pursuing our 
objective includes an examination of the concept of federalism to 
ascertain aspects of that concept which appear, superficially at 
least, to be at odds with the components of our planning concept. 
This proceeds to a survey, at least in a broad sense, of the Australian 
and Canadian federal systems, using our own distillation of the theories 
of federalism, to isolate any features of these two particular systems 
which seem, on the face of it, to pose obstacles of a greater or lesser 
kind to the superimposition of our planning framework upon them. However, 
this is not adequate for our purpose and in order to assess the true 
consequences of these seemingly incompatible aspects, and, indeed, to 
identify the hindrances to the meshing of the two concepts in practice, 
we need to translate them into actual, tangible aspects of the federal 
systems we are studying. For example, it is one thing to recognize 
that the principle of divided sovereignty, (one of the main elements of 
the federalism concept), is basically at odds with the process of 
coordination of hierarchy or resource allocation, (elements of our 
planning system), but to analyse the degree and nature of that 
juxtaposition we have to study what happens "on the ground", through 
the expression of these concepts in the actual functioning of the federal 
systems. Ideally we should scrutinize all characteristics of these two 
countries for a complete inventory of the practicalities associated with 
our basic objective. However, as space and time preclude this our method will 
be to identify the major aspects of the operation of the two federations 
which appear to present the most serious obstacles; "serious" in this 
case meaning those of lasting duration and magnitude in terms of the 
volume and significance of the resources involved. How best to do this? 
As indicated earlier,the methodology incorporates two approaches -
(a) a review of all the available literature on 
the operation of these federal systems to 
determine whereabouts in the functioning of 
those systems the elements of our planning 
system breaks down and 
(b) interviews of a large number of participants 
intimately involved in these federal systems. 
In the first approach we are, in effect, looking to find which 
portions of the federal political process are likely to pose the most 
obstacles for the achievement of such public sector processes as 
forecasting, harmonization of priorities, resource allocation, 
implementation and review, and also what is most likely to impede 
coordination within the system,particularly coordination which is 
democratically accountable. Our source material for this exercise includes 
government documents, the recorded words of politicians and other actors 
in the process, statistics of various kinds, description and analysis 
by third parties including academics who have observed the federal 
systems in action,and the results of related litigation. The bibliography 
gives testament to the range and diversity of the sources. In the light 
of all this literature it is impossible to escape the conclusion that 
the centre of our attention should be upon the margin between the levels 
of government, i.e., the very point of interaction or interface at which 
problems of forecasting, priority harmonization, coordination etc. come 
into the sharpest focus,because it is at this point that the conflicts 
of federalism arise. There has been more written about this element of 
federalism than any other and, indeed, it is symptomatic of the 
uniqueness of federalism itself. Moreover, if one accepts the argument 
advanced in a later chapter, that divided sovereignty is the main 
10. 
political hallmark of federalism, the logical place to assess the problems 
of operating a federal system is at the point where such sovereignty 
clashes; and that is unquestionably at the interface of the two levels of 
government. Naturally, there are faults within each of the discrete 
units of a federal system which hinder the attainment of public sector 
planning, just as there are in a unitary system of government, and we 
shall also examine those; but in a federal system it is the interaction 
between the sovereign levels which is more dominant. There are many 
perspectives of the interaction between levels of government including 
the political, legal, administrative and financial. The distinction 
between these perspectives is in some senses a false one because, for 
example, all activity is political activity, and an administrative 
action may well have financial and legal ramifications. Nonetheless, 
it is the case that the relationships between levels of government in 
federations, and especially in Australia and Canada, tend to be conducted 
within those categories represented by particular institutions and 
actors portraying each perspective, e.g., politicians, lawyers, and 
public administrators of various kinds. 
Studies of a comparable nature to this one in either Australia or 
Canada are rare and, as mentioned later, comparative studies of these 
two countries are also particularly scarce. One major piece of research 
which is comparable in its content and methodology is Simeon's study 
of federal-provincial negotiation in Canada on three major policy 
2 issues. In that study Simeon combined a theoretical perspective based 
on literature review (especially the analogous field of international 
diplomacy), with empirical observations by means of interviews. Simeon's 
method was to interview in depth those who were most intimately involved 
in the particular issues. On this basis, his interviews concentrated 
2. R. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy. The Making of Recent 
Policy in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 1973). 
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heavily on public servants and particularly those in the central 
agencies, e.g., finance and intergovernmental affairs. Clearly this 
involved the national government but he found it adequate to study five 
provinces as representative of all provinces, those five being Quebec, 
Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia and New Brunswick. 
The criteria used for selection of these provinces were 
(a) the need for a regional distribution; 
(b) a distribution according to party in power; and 
(c) size and relative wealth; size apparently being 
in terms of both geography and population, and 
wealth referring to per capita income per province. 
Simeon's five provinces accounted for 80 per cent of Canada's population. 
The methodology employed here is basically similar in that firstly, 
there is a blend of literature review and empirical analyses; secondly, 
the concentration is on those intimately involved in the process 
under consideration, which means a heavy emphasis on public servants; 
and thirdly,a representative group of sub-national government units. 
However, as this is also a comparative study a further criterion has 
to be added to those used by Simeon in his choice of provinces,viz. 
that there has to be a similarity in the "profiles" of the Australian 
states and Canadian provinces being chosen for analysis whenever and 
wherever possible. (Note that there has never been a comparative 
study of this kind undertaken.) 
In the Australian case the criterion of representativeness is 
relatively easy to satisfy because there are only six states. Interviews 
were conducted in five of them. Western Australia being the only one 
excluded (and the two territories). Access was made easy because of the 
author's familiarity with many of the officials involved and because, 
as mentioned, some of the interviewing for this study was attached to 
interviews for other interviews under the auspices of official inquiries 
and Royal Commissions on subjects closely related to this one. 
The provinces chosen in Canada for intensive interviews were British 
Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia; but 
some interviews were also conducted in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. This 
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selection of provinces meets Simeon's criteria and it also complies with 
the comparative requirement because the sample in both countries includes 
(i) the largest and second largest state/province 
in terms of population; 
(ii) resource rich states/provinces; 
(iii) rurally oriented states/provinces; 
(iv) maritime states/provinces; and 
(v) small states/provinces in respect of both 
population and geographical size. 
It must be emphasized that the initial access to Canadian interviewees was 
made possible predominantly through the Canadian "Special Visitors' 
Programme", which had the effect of gaining access to the most senior 
officials involved;inevitably permanent heads and ministers, and it also 
meant that they were prepared to close their doors, order all telephone 
calls to be diverted, and continue the interview until it was complete 
to the satisfaction of the interviewer. It was possible for written 
material to be readily available (all interviewees had been given prior 
notice in writing of the sorts of questions and issues to be discussed), 
including a considerable amount of confidential and internal documentation. 
In this respect one should also make some observation about the readier 
access gained by researchers from another country compared with domestic 
prophets. All of these factors were equally in evidence for a series of 
follow up interviews conducted on a second Canadian visit. 
The following table gives an indication of the location of the 
interviewees. It should be emphasized that the interviewing process 
in total took six years and about half of the Canadian interviewees 
in 1977 were reinterviewed in 1979. 
Participants in the Interviews 
(A) Australia 
Number 
13, 
National government 
New South Wales government 
Victorian government 
Queensland government 
South Australian government 
Tasmanian government 
Others* 
31 
14 
8 
II 
5 
4 
11 
TOTAL 84 
(B) Canada 
National government 
Ontario government 
Quebec government 
British Columbia government 
Alberta government 
New Brunswick government 
Nova Scotia government 
Saskatchewan government 
Manitoba government 
Others* 
Number 
22 
8 
8 
7 
6 
8 
7 
2 
4 
16 
TOTAL 88 
Others includes academic, local government officials, 
political party officials, and pressure group representatives. 
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The bulk of these interviewees came from finance departments and/or 
treasuries, policy coordination departments or prime minister's departments 
or the Privy Council office, Coordinator-General's Department, Public 
Service Boards or Commissions, and especially departments and agencies 
responsible for intergovernmental relations (entities which have 
appeared increasingly in both countries in the 1970's), 
Interviews on the subject matter of this study were not suitable for 
any highly structured questions or quantitative responses. The basic aim 
was to have respondents stipulate what they saw as the main hindrances to 
the implementation of this planning system and ask them to 
apply it to their own situation -not a difficult mental exercise since 
nearly all respondents were permanent heads (deputy ministers) or 
divisional heads, or cabinet ministers themselves, and they would be the 
yery people responsible for the operation of such a planning system if 
it were introduced. The interviews were never less than one and a half 
hours and often three to four hours, without any interruption, so that 
time was available for deep probing of verbal responses and requests for 
explanatory and back-up material. It must be said that the interview 
process was slightly easier in Canada where all levels of government 
have been involved in various attempts to introduce forward planning 
and rationalization of priority determination in the recent past. Also 
most of the Canadian interviewees were familiar with the European and 
north American planning techniques referred to earlier. Thus they were 
able to grasp the concepts immediately and readily understand the object 
of the exercise. Indeed,some had themselves been concerned about the 
lack of forward thinking and rational resource allocation in 
intergovernmental relations. At any event virtually all the Canadian 
interviewees grasped the aim of the exercise very readily. The situation 
was a little more difficult in Australia where, as already outlined, 
there has been little experience with public sector planning within either 
the national or state levels, and also most of the officials have extremely 
limited knowledge of the attempts at planning for the public sector made 
in other countries. This is especially true of the state governments in 
Australia. There is another basic difference between Australian public 
servants and their Canadian counterparts, which will be examined more 
deeply later but which does have a bearing on the interview process. 
A great many senior Canadian civil servants have served in both national 
and provincial governments, i.e., there is a high degree of mobility 
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amongst middle to top civil servants between the two levels of government. 
This is not so in Australia and it means, inter alia, that Canadian civil 
servants have a readier appreciation of the role of their counterparts in 
the other level of government and even in other units at the same level in 
the case of the provinces. Both these factors were responsible for a 
somewhat smoother process of interview amongst Canadians than Australians 
although Australian respondents, for the most part, had no difficulty 
grasping the intention of the exercise once it was elaborated upon in 
more detail. In the case of all officials from both countries cooperation 
was readily forthcoming. 
The detailed views of the respondents appear in the following 
chapters, aggregated to preserve confidentiality. Here we can observe 
which broad aspects of the federal process were regarded as providing the 
severest obstacles to the introduction of the planning system envisaged. 
Amongst the numerous suggestions made by respondents four aspects in 
particular were regarded as being so vital as to dominate all others, 
they were:-
(a) Fiscal transfers from the national to sub-
national level; in particular the mixture 
of unconditional and conditional funding. 
(b) The allocation of functions and roles between 
levels of government and the difficulty of 
preserving a stable pattern in this respect. 
(c) Working with intergovernmental agreements, 
including their political, constitutional, 
and legal uncertainties. 
(d) The difficulty of maintaining accountability 
to the public through all aspects of 
intergovernmental relations and especially if 
planning processes were to be introduced. 
We examine the first three of these aspects in separate chapters 
and the issue of accountability is raised within each chapter. 
The technique is to research what available literature has to 
say on the subject and augment that by the responses of interviewees, 
followed in a concluding chapter by analysis of the main arguments 
which emerge. 
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It must be noticeable by now that the elements outlined above are 
all concerned with the interface of the levels of government in these 
two federations and this accords with our earlier observations. However, 
both the literature and the interview responses indicate that there are 
also aspects of the internal functioning of each unit within the federation 
which are not conducive to public sector planning. Some of these do 
become involved in the intergovernmental process because a unit of 
government that cannot plan its own activities is going to find it 
quite difficult to participate in public sector planning on an 
intergovernmental basis. Consequently this element also features 
in the discussion within each of the subsequent chapters. It must be 
stressed that no claim is being made that these areas/issues (viz, 
financial transfers, allocation of functions, and intergovernmental 
agreements), encompass all of the hindrances to the attainment of public 
sector planning in these federations. What is being asserted is that 
these are the major ones and that a reasonably intensive study of them will 
produce a reliable indication of the nature and scale of the 
impediments which federalism creates for any attempt to introduce 
the sort of comprehensive planning envisaged. The concluding chapter 
considers the intractability or otherwise of these impediments. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PLANNING 
In the Australian context planning is no longer a neutral word, 
mainly because it has become too closely associated in the mind of the 
public with the policies and experience of totalitarian regimes in 
second world countries in the 1950's and 1960's. This association 
resulted mainly from constant use of the word in that context by 
conservative political forces which, in appearance at least, were 
violently opposed to any form of government intervention in the 
economy and laid stress on reduction of the size of the public sector. 
For this reason alone, the word needs to be carefully defined whenever 
it is used. 
Another reason for careful definition is the fact that many 
disciplines have claimed the term "planning" for their own and have 
prefixed it with their own adjectives. Every one of those disciplines 
and its associated profession has its own body of theory, knowledge, 
and technique, often purporting to be the superior framework for 
planning a whole society. Thus there is economic planning, town 
planning, regional planning, manpower planning, social planning and 
so on. The literature on each of these is now immense. However, 
what they all have in common,is that planning is really a process, 
irrespective of the field in which it is practised or the resource 
to which it is directed. This study will use the word planning to 
mean a process, or more accurately a system. 
Systems Theory 
It is most useful to define planning as a system for a number of 
reasons. In the first place, the task before us is particularly amenable 
to the application of systems theory itself. We are seeking to apply a 
concept viz. planning, to an environment viz. federalism, in an effort 
to determine whether that concept can survive in that environment and, 
if not, then why not. If the concept of planning can be conceived 
systematically,it can also provide a rigid tool for comparative analysis 
across the two federal countries under review. Systems theory is 
18. 
acknowledged to be particularly useful for comparative purposes. It is 
also regarded as being particularly useful for empirical analysis. As 
Young states, in the context of systems thinking, the key elements of 
"an approach", and specifically, a scientific approach include 
"(a) A systematic orientation and perspective 
for cutting into a subject area, 
(b) Some statements concerning the central 
questions or types of questions that 
should be posed, 
(c) Criteria of relevance for mapping out and 
selecting data for analysis, and 
(d) Some guidelines for hierarchical ordering 
of both questions and data in terms of 
significance in any given analysis".^ 
Characteristics of various approaches to systems theory include 
such focuses as concepts that are primarily descriptive, factors that 
regulate or maintain systems, dynamic but nondisruptive change either 
through internally generated processes or responses to altered 
environmental conditions. Young sees two fundamental points of view 
regarding the basic notions of systems theory,one being as an integrated 
and generalized set of concepts, hypotheses, and validated propositions, 
and the second being as a set of techniques and as a framework for a 
systematic process of analysis. The various definitions of system, he 
maintains, embody "the idea of a group of objects or elements standing 
in some characteristic structural relationship to one another and 
3 interacting on the basis of certain characteristic processes". 
Other advantages claimed for systems theory,which are of particular 
relevance for this study,include its capacity to cope with dynamic 
patterns of interaction and not just static relationships; to achieve 
explicitness of categories so that the framework of reference will not 
shift as new "facts are introduced; to integrate variables that don't fall 
within a single discipline; to attain a degree of explicitness 
1. See for example, Morton A. Kaplan, "Systems Theory" in Comparative 
Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth, (New York: Free 
Press, 1967), pp. 150-151. 
2. Oran Young, Systems of Political Science (New Jersey: Prentice Hall 
1968), p. 98. 
3. ibid. , p. 15. 
19. 
which helps to reveal incompleteness; and to generate hypotheses 
by indicating structural similarities to other subject matters". 
Of course the use of systems theory by political scientists is really 
a relatively recent phenomenon, although Spiro traces the origin of the use 
of systems theory in political theory back to Hobbes, and says that he does 
this "to emphasize that anyone who attempts to study politics scientifically 
must at least implicitly think of politics as though it were functioning 
as some sort of system. That is, he must assume that more or less regular 
relationships can be discerned among various aspects of politics and 
between phenomena he describes as political, and certain other phenomena 
5 
not so described". 
Systems theory has found considerable use in political science in 
recent times for studies ranging from the \/ery broad overview of politics 
5A itself, as, for example, when Miller employs the approach to analyze what 
he calls "recurrent political situations" which include both situations 
and personalities; the formulation of models for understanding 
international relations; the clarification of the functioning of single 
political systems such as David Easton's extremely useful input/output 
model, which provides in turn a springboard for attempts, (with varying 
degrees of success), at international comparative studies of the 
structural/functional kind. It has also found a ready application in 
theory designed to explain the behaviour of organizations operating 
o 
within the environment of the p o l i t i c a l system i t s e l f . 
Naturally i t is d i f f i c u l t fo r us to predic t what kind of system 
the one we shall define w i l l prove to be, especia l ly whether i t w i l l be 
homeostatic, but i t must be stressed, at th i s ear ly stage, that the 
methodology being employed in th is study is in many ways the reverse of 
4, Morton A. Kaplan, op.cit. , p. 151, See also R.L. Sckoff , "Systems, 
Organisations, and In te rd i sc ip l i na ry Research" in Systems Thinking, 
ed. F.E. Emery, (Penguin, 1978). 
5, Herbert J . Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory" in James C. 
Charlesworth, op.cit., p. 164. 
5A, J.D.B, M i l l e r , The Nature of Politics (Hammondsworth Middlesex, Pel ican, 
1965) Chapter 11. 
6, David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 
1965), 
7, See for example Gabriel Almond and James Coleman ( e d s , , ) . The Politics 
of the Developing Areas (Princeton U,P., 1960). 
8, See for example Warren G. Bennis, "Organizational Developments and the 
Fate of Bureaucracy" in Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy, ed. Fred A, 
Kramer, (Mass,: Winthrop, 1941), pp. 161-184. 
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that generally encountered in systems theory. Here we are constructing 
a system, a planning system, and then endeavouring to place it in an 
environment, or two environments, to assess its adaptability, pattern 
maintenance, stability, and especially its relationship with its 
environment,so that boundary maintenance will be of significance. With 
respect to the lastmentioned factor,it is of relevance to note that 
systems theorists have conceded that the concept of "boundary" can also 
be used to apply to geographical i.e. spatial boundaries; spatial 
considerations are embedded in the structure and functioning of federations, 
Since our analysis will also seek to be longitudinal in its time 
sequence it needs the capacity, which systems theory gives, to handle 
historical change through the allowance of a dynamic relationship between 
the elements of the system. Of particular use in historical analysis is 
the by-product of systems theory - communications models. The chief 
exponent in this field, Karl Deutsch, has a number of important points 
to make for a study of this kind when he clarifies the difference between 
his feedback,(dynamic), and equilibrium,(static), approaches. In a feedback 
approach the goal situation being sought is outside the goal seeking 
system and not inside it; the system itself is not isolated from its 
environment but,on the contrary,depends for its functioning upon a 
constant stream of information from the environment,as well as a constant 
stream of information concerning its own performance. Moreover, the 
goal may be a changing one and it may change both its position and even 
its speed and direction. The goal may be approached indirectly by a 
course, or a number of possible courses, around a set of obstacles. 
As Deutsch observes, in politics, it appears as the problem of 
maintaining a strategic purpose throughout a sequence of changing 
9 
tactical goals. 
Needless to say there are some shortcomings of systems analysis 
which have to be recognized by those who seek to apply it. There is, 
for example, a strong tendency to become overwhelmed by the internal 
relationship of the system itself,and thereby lose sight of its 
relationship with its environment, which is akin to a preoccupation 
9. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press -
Macmillan, 1966), passim. 
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with means rather than ends. The goals of the system should be kept 
constantly in view, and this is related to the warning, given by many 
systems theorists, that the analyst should never overlook the fact that 
the system exists in an environment leading to the attendant difficulty 
of boundary maintenance. (Attention has been focussed on the concept 
of boundary maintenance here because it is of special relevance to the 
methodology of this thesis. In systems theory, boundary maintenance means, 
in its simplest expression, the difficulty of defining a system in such a 
way that the limits of that system are identifiable and are capable of 
being sustained when that system is examined within its environment. In 
other words, the degree to which the boundaries of the system can be 
maintained is a major indicator of the degree of integrity of the system 
itself. Thus the usefulness of the concept in this study becomes apparent 
in that we have to define a planning system whose integrity is established 
so that its boundaries can be maintained when it is applied, 
the federal environment. This is especially important when 
the planning system is going to be applied to two federal environments. 
In this context it can be seen to be imperative that the boundaries of the 
planning system remain discrete and clear or else its use as a comparative 
tool will be reduced. In short, our planning model will be the system, the 
two federations will be the environment, and the model will have to be 
formulated in such a way that it corresponds to systems theory including 
the important requirement that its boundaries are capable of being 
maintained when it is applied.) 
Other Theoretical Strands 
Whilst the rise of systems theory in political science has become 
more prevalent, it has been other strands of the progressive refinement 
of the discipline which have actually analyzed planning as a process. 
Until recently this has been a feature predominantly of public administration, 
which is regarded here as one element of the more all embracing discipline 
of political science. Whilst it is something of an oversimplification, 
it is nonetheless true, that until relatively recently political scientists 
10. See for example the cautioning on this aspect given by David Easton, 
op.cit., p. 18 and Herbert Spiro, op.cit., pp. 168-169. 
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were more concerned with the ends of politics, and those who regarded 
public administration as their speciality, emphasized the means of 
government. Both "camps" are now moving into theories of public choice 
and public policy formulation, which has served as the catalyst towards 
demonstrating that neither politics nor administration can be concerned 
solely with means but must take account of ends, and acknowledging the 
fact that political actors, (which includes government administrators), 
are positive elements in the political system of which they form a part. 
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The most interesting way to trace this development is within the 
evolution of the literature of public administration, and that, in 
twentieth century terms, begins with organization theorists like the 
Frenchman, Fayol, an industrialist who generalized from his own long 
and successful experience. For Fayol administration was but one, 
(albeit the most important one), of the six basic operations which occur 
in business, the other five being technical, commercial, financial, 
security, and accounting. This function of administration was then 
fragmented into five main aspects viz. to plan, to organize, to command, 
to coordinate, and to control. Thus planning was, for him, but part of 
the function of administration although, as Urwick points out the word 
Fayol used - "purveyance" - has been translated as "to plan" but really 
covers two functions - to foretell the future and to prepare for it.'^ ^ 
It is unmistakably clear from his formulation that he conceived of 
forecasting leading to a plan. A similar view of the place of planning 
1 o 
in his scientific management approach was provided by Taylor, and it 
also found expression in Gulick and Urwick's classic Papers on the 
Science of Administration which contained their well known acronym for 
the work of a chief executive - PODSCORB or Planning, Organising, Staff, 
Directing, Coordinating, Reporting and Budgeting. The definition of 
planning within this pattern is -
"Planning, that is working out in broad outline 
the things that need to be done and the methods 
for doing them to accomplish the purpose set 
for the enterprise".14 
A little later in their theoretical formulation Gulick and Urwick speak 
of the need to aggregate work units and the principles which can be used 
in this task. Each worker in each position could, they believe, be 
characterized by (a) The major purpose he was serving (b) the process 
he was using, (c) the person or things being dealt with or served. 
11, 
12. 
1. V^yo}^.Administration Industrielle et Generale (English edition, 
L. Urwick, The Elements of Administration, 2nd ed. (London: Pitman, 
1974). 
13. F.W. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1911). 
14. See Luther H. Gulick and Lyndall Urwick, eds.. Papers on the 
Science of Administration (New York: Institute of Public 
Administration, 1937). 
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15 (d) the place where the service was rendered. They acknowledge a need 
at times for a selection to be made as to which of the principles should 
be given precedence. Each principle had its own inherent advantages and 
in respect of organization by major purpose,the advantages are claimed to 
be that it makes more certain the accomplishment of any given broad 
purpose or project; from the standpoint of self-government, organization 
by purpose seems to conform best to the objectives of government as they 
were recognized and understood by the public; and it apparently "served 
as the best basis for eliciting the energies and loyalties of the personnel 
and for giving a focus and central device to the whole activity, because 
purpose is understandable by the entire personnel down to the last clerk 
^ M 16 
and inspector . 
Some of the dangers of organizing according to major purpose include 
the impossibility of clearly dividing all the work of governments into a 
few such major purposes which do not overlap extensively; that the thought 
of purpose will downplay emphasis on process to an extent that the 
organization will not keep up to date with new technology; that the 
contribution of single elements will be lost in preoccupation with the 
overall single purpose; the tendency to overcentralization within the 
organization; and the danger of self-sufficiency with the potential to 
drift towards independence and "even from democratic control itself". 
Urwick writing just a little later, (in the period of the second 
world war) speaks of planning as in danger of becoming a "blessed word -
one of the major curses of society" (thereby reflecting the keen interest 
in planning as a panacea for postwar development). But for Urwick 
"forecasting enters into process, with a plan or planning. The 
administrator, having made up his mind what the future holds, has got 
18 
to do something about it", unlike the postwar Utopians who, he says. 
15. ibid. 
16. Luther H. Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organisation" in Fred A. 
Kramer, op.cit. , p. 33. 
17. ibid. , p. 34. 
18. L. Urwick, op.cit., p. 27. 
24, 
seem as if they couldn't make the arrangements for a school treat without 
muddling up the buns and the tennis balls. Clearly then, planning encompasses 
forecasting plus action, the latter being dependent on the former. His 
observations about the nature of forecasting hold significance for us too 
in our exercise. It was Urwick's belief that investigation or research 
was the principle which must underlie the process of forecasting, but 
investigation itself had to be conducted in the light of certain 
intellectual principles which included -
"(a) The Principle of Determinism. Every social 
phenomenon is the result of definite and 
ascertainable causes. 
(b) The Principle of Relation. Facts which are 
to form the basis of action must be in terms 
of the environment in which the action takes 
place. This involves 
(c) The Principle of Analysis. The scheme of 
classification must be appropriate to the 
activity investigated. 
(d) The Principle of Definition. The facts must 
be stated in terms which correspond with the 
underlying sciences on which the activity 
investigated is based. 
(e) The Principle of Measurement. The facts 
must be stated in terms of definite units 
or standards".19 
It was probably during the period prior to the Depression and New Deal 
activities in the United States, that the politics-administration 
dichotomy was perceived to be both a valid description of government 
activity and a normative statement as well. As long as administration 
was regarded as a self-contained activity it was easy for principles 
of organization, such as those enumerated above, to evolve free from 
any "political interference". No wonder that planning,along with all 
the other so called activities or functions of administrators,could be 
regarded as a completely rational process. Although the Chicago school, 
and even Gulick himself,questioned the validity of the politics/ 
20 
administration dichotomy through the late 1930's, that emphasis 
continued to hold sway (particularly in other countries like Australia 
where many would contend that it still predominates academic and practical 
19. ibid. , p. 20. 
20. For a useful account of these transformations in the d i sc i p l i ne see 
Gerald E. Caiden, The Dynamics of Public Administration ( I l l i n o i s : 
Dryden, 1971). 
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discussion in the discipline). 
It was out of this questioning of the so-called principles of public 
administration that yet another stream of the discipline arose which has 
an important bearing on our attempts to understand the lineage of the 
planning concept. Writing in the late 1940's Herbert Simon attacked the 
"principles" as being superficial and pointed out that they occurred in 
pairs, like proverbs. "For almost every principle one can find an equally 
21 plausible and acceptable contradictory principle". Amongst other things, 
Simon then discounted the possibility of separating the means from the 
ends of government, and in so doing confronted the concept of rational 
decision making in government. For various reasons, said Simon, it 
was simply not possible to achieve a perfectly rational process of 
decision making in the traditional Weberian sense of means/ends 
relationships. Because of the nature of the situation, and the limited 
capacity of the actors,what could occur was only "bounded rationality" 
whereby decision makers would "satisfice" rather than maximize in their 
22 choice of a course of action. Speaking specifically of planning Simon 
distinguishes between "substantive planning",where the individual or 
organization makes broad decisions about the values being aimed at, the 
methods to be employed, and the information needed to be able to make 
particular decisions within the limits of the prescribed policy to 
implement the decisions, and "procedural planning", which involves the 
establishment of mechanisms to direct attention and information in such 
a way as to cause specific routine decisions to conform with the 
"substantive plan". In other words there is,here again,the link between 
desired goals and actual action taken to achieve those goals. As 
Simon puts it elsewhere -
"In the practical world, plans are characterized as 
'Utopian' whose success depends on wished-for 
behaviour on the part of many individuals, but 
which fail to explain how this wished-for behaviour 
will, or can, be brought about".23 
Ultimately Simon speaks of a planning process which he describes as 
a series of psychological processes which consist in selecting general 
criteria of choice,and then particularizing them by application to 
21. Herbert A. Simon, A d m i n i s t r a t i v e B e h a v i o u r , 2nd ed. (New York: 
Free Press, 1968), p. 20. 
22. ibid., passim. 
23. ibid. , p. 106. 
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specific situations. Using examples drawn from engineering he concludes 
that the planning procedure is a compromise whereby only the most 
24 
plausible alternatives are worked out in detail. 
As is now well known Simon's emphasis on decision making as the 
central element in administrative behaviour produced a veritable minefield 
of criticism which gradually built up into a body of decision making 
theory. Self,for example, claims that Simon's model is not all that 
25 different from the logic of ends-means analysis, and it is certain that 
latter day critics saw little distinction either. Caiden assesses Simon's 
efforts as an attempt to "reform the discipline of public administration 
on rationality, as opposed to the folklore of scientific principles, and 
on a logical positivist bent to behavioural ism centred on the concept of 
rational decision making that minimized nonrationality content". 
Caiden also makes the extremely important observation that Simon's 
concern with the end product of administration - decision making, coincided 
with the redefinition of public administration as a study of public-policy 
making and application. Taken together these two streams of the discipline 
represent a force of considerable importance to an understanding of the 
likely operation of any system of planning in a political environment, 
because decision making and/or policy making lies at the heart of the 
planning process. 
The contribution of the decision making theorists has been substantial, 
and each consecutive addition to theory has further refined our 
understanding of this process. Thus,for example, Lasswell writing in the 
mid-1950's,identified seven functional stages through which, he claimed, 
all decisions are processed -
24. ibid., pp, 96-97. 
25. Peter Self, Administrative Theories and Politics (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1977), p, 30. 
26. Gerald E. Caiden, op.cit., p. 46. 
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* Information (problem identification and 
information search) 
* Recommendation (formulation of alternatives) 
* Prescription (sanctioned selection of alternatives) 
* Invocation (provisional enforcement) 
* Application (specific implementation) 
* Appraisal (monitoring and review of the decision 
and its effects) 
27 
* Termination (renewal, revision, or repeal). 
This process can be seen to possess a logical sequence reminiscent of the 
sort of rational decision making which Simon explored and found to be 
possible in only a limited sense. By contrast Braybrooke and Lindblom 
believe that the obstacles confronting political decision makers 
frustrate any attempts by them to approximate the synoptic ideal and 
instead such actors exploit, in quite systematic ways, adaptive 
strategies for decision-making. The most important and commonplace of 
these strategies, they claim, is that of "disjointed incremental ism". 
The key variable for them is whether change is large or small. They 
conclude -
"It becomes clearer now why political policy, 
in its focus on increments of change, also 
shows other characteristics - it is remedial, 
serial, and exploratory To pursue 
incremental changes is to direct policy 
towards specific ills - the nature of which 
is continually being re-examined - rather 
than toward comprehensive reforms; it is 
also to pursue long-term changes through 
sequences of moves. Avoiding social cleavage 
along ideological lines, which is exacerbated 
when issues of ultimate principle are raised, 
incremental politics explores a continuing 
series of remedial moves on which some 
agreement can be developed even among members 
of opposing ideological camps".28 
Space prevents a full analysis of this theory but it is sufficient anyway 
for our purposes to focus on what Braybrooke and Lindblom call the "Margin-
Dependent choice" in their strategy,where they distinguish three salient 
27. See Harold Lasswell, The Decision Process: Seven Categories of 
Functional Analysis (College Park: University of Maryland Press, 1956) 
28. David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision 
(New York: Free Press, 1970), p. 74. 
28. 
features: 
(a) only those policies are considered whose known 
or expected consequent social states differ from 
each other incrementally, 
(b) only those policies are considered whose known or 
expected consequences differ incrementally from the 
status quo, 
(c) examination of policies proceeds through comparative 
analysis of no more than the marginal or incremental 
differences in the consequent social states rather 
than through an attempt at more comprehensive analysis 
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of the social states. 
Consequently, they conclude that "incremental evaluation is quite clearly 
different from the construction of a rational-deductive system". 
Actually the essence of this approach is probably presented more 
clearly in Lindblom's work on the policy-making process. He says that 
whilst one is tempted to think that policy is made through a sequence 
of steps, (of the kind put forward by Lasswell), this tends to view 
policy making as though it were the product of one governing mind, which 
is clearly not the case. According to Lindblom it "fails to evoke or 
suggest the distinctively political aspects of policymaking, its apparent 
disorder, and the consequent strikingly different ways in which policies 
30 
emerge". Some of the constraints which operate on rational decision 
making are later listed by Lindblom as including defining the policy 
problem, complexity and inadequate information, difficulties in 
organizing goals and values, the difficulty of agreement on criteria 
for policy, the public interest criterion, resistances to analysis, 
(including the irrationality of mankind and the bias of analysts), 
and the question of who can be trusted. 
The proliferation of public policy studies and attempts to establish 
a policy science are now so numerous as to prohibit a comprehensive 
evaluation. Each has a different perspective,and many fall somewhere on 
29, ibid., pp. 86-87. 
30, Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1968), p. 4. 
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a continuum from the notion of the completely rational policy process, 
through the highly incremental "partisan-mutual adjustment" model, 
offered again by Braybrooke and Lindblom,to the so-called science of 
31 
"muddling through" which is the focus of other studies by Lindblom, 
32 Another author in this stream, Dror, seeks to stress that all forms of 
process may be involved in decision making including the most intuitive 
32 
as well as the most rational or scientific. Etzioni attempts to put a 
similar viewpoint and offers his "mixed scanning" model as a compromise, 
and more comprehensive description of policymaking processes. 
So we have come full circle,as it were,although it must be acknowledged 
that most contributors do have fresh insights to offer such as Vickers' 
concept of the "multi-valued choice" and the need for a "balancing" as well 
as an optimizing function in all decision making, Vickers' concepts of 
"appreciative judgement", and the art of judgement,stress his central 
belief that such appreciative behaviour involves making judgements of 
34 
value no less than judgements of reality. In other words, to borrow 
another of his phrases "science is human", Friedrich sums up the view of 
many other theorists when he says that "e\iery decision is a response to 
a change in environment of the decision maker",and he goes on to make a 
clear distinction between public decisions and individual or group 
35 decisions. Writing in the mid 1960's Dye explained that neither 
traditional, (i .e. structural and philosophical),political science,nor 
modern,(behavioural),political science,had dealt directly with the content 
of public policy,whereas political scientists were currently shifting 
their attention to public policy - to the description and explanation of 
the causes and consequences of government activity, i.e., what governments 
31. See Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'", Public 
Administration Review, 19 (Spring 1959), pp. 78-88. 
32. Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (Penn.: 1968), and 
Yehezekel, Dror, Design for Policy Sciences (New York: American 
Elesevia, 1971). 
33. Amitai Etzioni, "Mixed Scanning: A 'Third' Approach to Decision 
Making", Public Administration Review, 27 (5) (December 1967), 
pp, 385-392. 
34. See Geoffrey Vickers, Value Systems and Social Process (Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1968), and also The Art of Judgement (London: 1965). 
35. Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Decision-Making, Public Policy and 
Planning", Canadian Public Administration XIV(I) Spring, 1971. 
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do, why they do it, and what difference it makes. Whereas the policy-
maker is decision-oriented, the policy scientist is theory-oriented. 
According to Dye,one factor contributing to these differing perspectives 
is the symbolic use of policy or the fact that individuals have perceptions 
of government action and consequent attitudes towards it. "What 
governments say is as important as what they do, and policy analysts must 
acknowledge this fact so that they don't become solely preoccupied with 
examining the actions of government. This is an element which Edwards 
and Sharkansky are also at pains to emphasize. For them it is public 
opinion which serves as just as important a constraint on policy makers 
as all the other aspects which have already been outlined by other 
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authors. 
In a preface to a comparative analysis of public policies. Rose 
formulates a model of political change which bears reasonably close 
resemblance to processes we have already encountered. Public policy, he 
says, is best conceived in terms of a process rather than in terms of 
policymaking, because the policymaking framework is narrow. He 
concentrates upon the decision-making stage of the policy process. His 
model involves the following -
* The initial state 
* Placing a condition on the agenda of 
political controversy 
* The advancement of demands 
* Reviewing resources and constraints 
* Shifting from non-decision to decision 
* The content of choice 
Implementing policies 
The production of outputs 
Impact upon society 
* The routinization of feedback 
* Deroutinizing a stable state (the second step in 
another cycle of the policy process, once again 
placing a condition on the agenda of political controversy). 
36. See Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis (University of Alabama Press, 1976). 
37. George C. Edwards III and Ira Sharkansky, The Policy Predicament 
(San Francisco: Freeman, 1978). 
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He then builds on this framework to develop four models of public policy, 
the static, cyclical, linear, and discontinuous. Thus it can be seen that 
the key element of his process is that it is sequential and systemic. 
One difficulty with most of these theorists of deciston-making and 
policy making is that one cannot be sure whether they are, at all times, 
simply describing a process which they believe to be empirically observable, 
or whether they are not also making a normative judgement and arguing that 
the process they identify is the one which ought to be employed. This is 
a familiar problem in the social sciences, and whilst it doesn't matter for 
our purposes, it can be important if one is tempted to assume that theories 
abstracted from certain political systems or cultures or situations or 
policy "fields" can be transplanted into others. 
One recent school of thought which confronts this question of polemic 
versus analytic ("what is" rather than "what ought"), is the "new public 
administration". We have not the space to analyze all aspects of this 
product of 1970's, but suffice to say that it rejects strongly the public 
administration as means approach and argues that analysts ought to pay 
careful attention to the impact of public policies and not just their 
processes. It is also, they claim, important to recognize that the values 
of the policymaker, (including the administrator), are an important 
ingredient in determining the policy outcome. As one prominent 
American writer put it "To define public administration as 'the 
management of men and materials in the accomplishment of the purposes 
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of the state' will not do for a number of reasons". We might say that 
the overwhelming concern of the new public administration is that 
government bureaucrats be enmeshed in their environment to such an extent 
that they are irrevocably bound to a continuous but flexible quest for 
policy that is in the public interest. It is also the recognition that 
public servants should have goals; these goals should be related 
to efficacy rather than solely equity and/or efficiency; which leads to the 
assertion that the goals of government bureaucracies will correspond automatically, 
38. Richard Rose, ed.. The Dynamics of Public Policy (London: Sage, 1976), Ch. 1. 
39. D. Waldo, "Scope and Theory of Public Administration" in Theory and 
Practice of Public Administration: Scope^ Objectives^ and Methods^ 
ed. J.C. Charlesworth, (Philadelphia: Monograph 8, American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, 1968). 
as it were, with the public interest or the social optimum 
32. 
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It is also this concern over the intermingling of means and ends in 
public policy which has led political scientists to venture into 
association with other disciplines. (The old associations with concepts 
of scientific management have already been mentioned,as well as 
analogies and models borrowed from engineering, natural science, psychology 
etc.). The most recent example of this phenomenon is the "public choice" 
school, comprised of economists who realize the imperfections of their 
models of economic behaviour caused by political intrusions, and 
political scientists who have long been on a quest for more rigorous 
conceptualizations of terms like "the public interest", "optimum resource 
allocation", "flexibility", etc. Some people would no doubt argue that 
this merely represents an inevitable eventual return of the two 
"disciplines" to the fold of "political economy" itself, from which they 
were hived off over two centuries ago, but whatever else the movement 
may represent, its significance for this analysis is that it is an 
attempt to understand the nature of the processes of resource and value 
allocation, and therefore the determination of priorities, which lies at the 
heart of any planning process.41 
It is clear from the above resume, albeit a brief one, that a 
significant body of theory exists of relevance to the concept of planning. 
Some of the characteristics of interest about this theory include the 
fact that it tends to be culture bound in the sense that each author 
portrays policymaking,or decision making,according to the manner in which 
it takes place within his own political system. Then there is a certain 
40. For works which give some insight into the New Public Administration 
see, F. Marini, Towards a New Public Administration: The Minnow-
Brook Perspective (New York: Chandler, 1971); D. Waldo, ed.. 
Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence (Chandler, Scranton, 
Penn., 1971); F.A. Kramer, ed., op.cit.; and "The New Public 
Administration", Public Management, 53(11) (November 1971). 
41. For a sample of public choice theorists are Kenneth J. Arrow, Social 
Choices and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951); Anthony Downs, 
An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957); James 
M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1962); William Niskanen, Bureaucracy 
and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine, 1971); Vincent Ostrom, 
The Intellectual Crisis of American Public Administration (University 
Of Alabama Press, 1973). 
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uneasiness about whether each author is merely describing process or 
engaging also in polemic and advocating that the process outlined ought to 
be the one adopted. One discernible trend in the sequence of this 
theoretical refinement is that writers have come to acknowledge more 
explicitly the political nature of the environment within which their 
particular model or system is to operate. This leads to another highly 
significant factor, that the distinction between means and ends is 
becoming much more blurred,and theorists have recognized the effects of 
the process of policy making upon the content, or outcome, of that policy. 
In particular, the old dichotomy between politics and administration, so 
prominent a feature of the literature of public administration is now all 
but forgotten. 
At any event the key terminology nowadays in the disciplines which 
relate to this study includes words like priorities, choice, optimal, 
public interest, functional, goals etc. These words in themselves convey 
an impression of order or system or purpose,and bear testimony to the fact 
of the usefulness of speaking about government in the systems context. 
All the world's a stage and the men and women are the players, and all the 
world is also a system - a social system - of which the public sector is 
a sub-system with its own players and resources. In that sub-system it 
is financial resources which are usually paramount especially as other 
resources, notably human and physical, become translated eventually into 
fiscal terms. Hence, this study is about a system - a planning system -
and that system lays particular emphasis on finance and so we shall be 
using data and language related to money for the most part. What has to 
be recognized is that social systems unlike those of the natural sciences 
are open rather than closed systems. In other words,it is precisely 
because we are dealing with human activity,that the activity will not 
always be completely rational in the sense that it will not always 
conform to patterns or laws. For this reason our planning system, like 
all systems derived in the social sciences,cannot be expected to be 
infallible in its predictive capacity. 
34. 
Comparative Studies 
It can be demonstrated empirically that those governments (or political 
systems) which have entered into and sustained some form of planning, be it 
planning for the whole society or just for the public sector, have 
ultimately refined their planning processes until they resemble systems 
of action. The countries which have entered into this form of planning 
can be divided fairly clearly into four categories* The first group comprizes 
those with command economies, e.g., U.S.S.R., China, the Soviet bloc, which 
began the modern day process of planning for fixed periods in the sense of 
establishing targets and manipulating the society towards the achievement 
of those targets. Having complete political control over all resources 
is the unique feature of these countries,and they have gradually settled 
into regular cycles of planning,usually for five year periods. Then there 
are the third world or developing countries which have desired rapid 
economic and social development,and have employed planning as a means 
towards that end. In these cases the objectives are clear, limited,and 
strongly desired,creating the necessary preconditions for coordination and 
unity of effort to allow for government coercion in planning mechanisms. 
Moreover planning in developing countries has often been encouraged by 
developed donor countries who want to see some sort of blueprint for 
future progress in the countries to whom they are giving aid. Whatever 
the reasons,various developing countries now have clearly identifiable 
systems of planning which have lasted over many planning periods, even 
when the targets of the plan have not been met. Apart from the actual 
experience of developing countries, the theories which have been 
developed to describe their process of development portray the planning 
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experience in a systemic manner. 
42. See for example, J. La Palombara, Bureaucracy and Political 
Development (Princeton University Press, 1963); G. Almond and J.S, 
Coleman, eds.. The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton 
University Press, 1963); L.W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1966); F.W. Riggs, Administration in 
Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964); A.O. 
Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1958); and M.J. Esman and J.D. Montgomery, 
"Systems Approaches to Technical Cooperation: The Role of 
Development Administration", Public Administration Review, 
nn (5) (September/October 1969). 
* There would be five categories if we also considered countries 
which adopted planning processes in war-time, but our concern here 
is with planning attempts which have been sustained. 
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Next there are the countries of Western Europe which have 
experimented with indicative planning. France is probably the most 
notable example although there are others such as the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Sweden. In the case of France it is not without significance 
that the impetus for such planning began when the French economy was 
devastated in World War II,and the goal of reconstruction was of major 
importance,and Marshall Funds were on hand to assist. It was in that 
environment that Jean Monet was able to translate earlier theories about 
the role of the state into a positive and coherent planning framework 
in a democratic free enterprise context. The significance of this 
development is that prior to the advent of Monet style indicative planning 
there were only two choices or models available in respect of planning -
one being the command economy and the other being some sort of extension 
of traditional annual budgeting. Indicative planning was a new middle 
way and in France, after three planning periods,the system of planning 
emerged incorporating a preparation phase, an elaboration phase, and an 
implementation phase. Even when the plans missed their targets and 
various participants disagreed with the content of the plan,and even 
as it became transformed from the narrow economic first plan to the 
broad social seventh plan, the natural process or system of planning 
remained intact, based as it was on Monet's belief that it is necessary 
to raise people's expectations and remove uncertainty to ensure that 
resources go into pursuits that will be productive in the long term. 
A planning process in which there is widespread participation gives 
that assurance. 
Speaking in the context of the experience of economic planning 
experiments in developed democratic countries, Friedrich makes the 
observation that -
"The clamour for planning, misunderstood as 
technicalization of value-related decisions 
and policies, is ill-conceived. Planning 
only makes sense, to repeat it once more, 
within the context of rational decision 
making based upon prevailing, in other 
words, communal, values and beliefs".^'^ 
43. Carl J. Friedrich, op.cit. 
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Friedrich also addresses himself to the question of the potential for 
democratic planning and concludes that it is feasible given basic 
common objectives in the society,and mechanisms to ensure the 
accountability of the planners. Shonfield expresses the same sentiment 
when he says that economic planning,of the kind adopted in France,is the 
most characteristic expression of the new capitalism,and whilst it reflects 
the determination to take charge rather than be driven by events, it has 
democratic elements built into it - "the recognition of certain limits 
which the spontaneous choices of free people necessarily impose on the 
activity of planning however benevolent and wise its intent". These 
limitations, he says,are of two kinds; limits on the range of behaviour 
that can be regulated and also on the manner in which these decisions 
can be translated into fact. Shonfield's definition of planning is 
"the attainment of specific objectives of a long range character" and 
44 by long-range he means 4-5 years. 
Finally, there are those countries like Britain, and occasionally 
the United States, that have endeavoured to inject more forward thinking 
into their public sector by way of an extension of the annual budgeting 
cycle. Notionally it is these examples which hold most interest for us 
because it is" a public sector planning model we are endeavouring to 
construct, rather than one which spans the whole economy. In Britain, 
whilst attempts to introduce an indicative planning system for the 
whole economy during the 1960's failed rather miserably, more success 
has been achieved in the public sector as witnessed by the report of the 
44A Plowden Committee in 1961, marking a turning point in thinking about 
allocation of resources and priority determination. The Committee 
recommended that each annual appropriation should be considered not so 
much in the light of last year's apportionment but in relation to the 
total amount of public resources available for the coming year and for 
subsequent years. The "forward looks" in public expenditure, spanning 
a rolling quinquennium,are not really a plan,it is true,because they are 
only projections and not commitments, but they do represent a regular 
cycle or system of forward projection which came a result of British 
Treasury initiatives plus the stimulus of a 1969 House of Commons select 
committee. They are now embodied in the P.E.S.C. (Public Expenditure 
44. Andrew Shonfield, Modem Capitalism (O.U.P., 1969), p. 121. 
44A. Great Britain, Report of the Committee on the Control of Public 
Expenditure, London H.M.S.O., 1961, Command 1432. 
37. 
Survey Committee) and P.A.R. (Programme Analysis Review). This is quite 
definitely a system of public sector forecasting which gets close to 
being a planning system, because it is intimately linked to the political 
process itself through the Select Committees on Expenditure, who use the 
projections for their deliberations on the annual budget, and feed some 
sort of information about political priorities into the executive and 
its administration, which prepares the forecasts. Interviews conducted 
in Britain in association with this study revealed that the five year 
public expenditure projections definitely influence annual budgetary 
frameworks, and that a healthy relationship has developed between the 
British Treasury and the members of parliament. Moreover, the long term 
has now become a much stronger aspect of resource allocation, (although 
it is not terribly evident from records of parliamentary proceedings), 
and it is clear that when politicians are presented with a long term 
picture which reflects priorities between components of the public 
sector, they are capable of adapting to a perspective longer than the 
current week. The British P.E.S.C./P.A.R. can be regarded very much as 
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a model for public sector planning in Westminster style governments. 
The fundamental elements of the system outlined by Clarke in 1971 
remain basically unchanged -
"PAR and PESO should be seen as one very large 
operation, consisting of a number of stages, 
designed to enable the government to: 
(a) create an overall strategy across the whole 
range of those of its policies which involve 
significant use of resources. 
(b) establish the objective of each department and 
the priorities between them, considered over a 
five year period, and in particular to determine 
which are the marginal objectives, affected by 
small changes up or down in the resources 
allocated to the department. 
45. References worth consulting on the British system include Samuel Brittan, 
Steering the Economy (Middlesex: Pelican, 1964); Peter Else, Public 
Expenditure Parliament and PPB (London: PEP Broadsheet, 522, 1970); H. 
Heclo and A. Wildavsky, The Private Goverrment of Public Money (London: 
Macmillan, 1974); John Garrett, The Management of Government (Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1972); Sir Richard Clarke, New Trends in Government (London: 
H.M.S.O., 1971); Sir Samuel Goldman, The Developing System of Public 
Expenditure Management and Control (London: H.M.S.O., 1973); Ann 
Robinson, Paj>liament and Public Spending; the Expenditure Committee of 
the House of Commons 1970-76 (London: Heinemann, 1978); David Coombes 
(ed.), The Power of the Purse (London: PEP Allen & Unwin, 1975); 
Maurice Wright, "Public Expenditure in Britain: The Crisis of Control", 
Public Administration, 55, 1977, 143-70; P.K. Else & G.P. Marshall, The 
Management of Public Expenditure (London: Policy Studies Institute, XLV, 
no. 580, March 1979). 
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"(c) determine the allocations between the 
departments, and so provide the resource 
framework within which each department 
can work. 
(d) ensure that departments keep within their 
allocations, both of money and of civil 
service manpower. 
(e) have an effective means of making day-to-
day decisions within this framework of 
overall strategies, departmental objectives 
and priorities, and departmental allocations. ,46 
The systematic nature of the process is clear from the above 
description. Similarly, the P.P.B.S., (Planning Programming Budgeting 
System), as it became fully fledged in the United States between 1965 
and 1971 on a mandatory basis, and afterwards on a voluntary basis, was very 
definitely a systematic attempt at projection and resource commitment for 
the public sector,despite the polemic which has ensued attacking it and in 
its defence. Similarly, the surprising revival of zero base budgeting 
under the Carter administration,although short of the comprehensiveness 
of the former P.P.B. concept,is nonetheless evidence of a desire for 
systematic thought about priority determination reflected through resource 
allocation. Indeed P.P,B.S.,in its conceptual framework,is probably the 
best example of a system of planning for the public sector yet devised, at 
47 least for democratic conditions. Perhaps the nature of P.P.B.S. is still 
most clearly understood from the words of President Johnson who, in 
introducing the system on a mandatory basis throughout the executive of 
46. Sir Richard Clarke, op.cit., p. 42. 
47. Basic references worth consulting which explain P.P.B.S. system 
include David Novick, ed., Programme Budgeting: Programme Analysis 
and the Federal Government (Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1965); David 
Novick, Current Practice in Program Budgeting (P.P.B.S.): Analysis 
and Case Studies Covering Government and Business (New York: Crane, 
Russak, 1973); Peter Else, op.cit.; Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, 
op.cit.; Fremont Lyden and Ernest Miller, eds.. Planning Programming 
Budgeting: A Systems Approach to Management (Chicago: Markham, 1967); 
A.J. Robinson and James Cutt, Public Finance in Canada: Selected 
Readings (Toronto: Methuen, 1969); Charles L. Schutlze, The Politics 
and Economics of Public Spending (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969); 
Allen Shick, "The Road to PPB: The Stage of Budget Reform", Public 
Administration Review, XXVI (4) (December 1966), pp. 243-258; Aaron 
Wildavsky, "Rescueing Policy Analysis from PPBS", Public Administration 
Review, XXIX (2) (March/April 1969), pp. 189-202. 
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the United States government in the mid 1960's, expressed the hope that 
the system would enable public decision makers to -
"(1) Identify our national goals with precision 
and on a continuing basis; 
(2) Choose among the goals the ones that are 
most urgent; 
(3) Search for the alternative means of reaching 
those goals most affectively at the least cost; 
(4) Inform ourselves not merely on next year's 
costs, but on the second, and third, and 
subsequent year's cost of our programmes; 
(5) Measure the performance of our programmes to 
ensure a dollar's worth of service for each 
dollar spent.4o 
The programme budget,as it evolved, came to comprise a number of 
49 features which I have described elsewhere. They include presentation 
on functional lines, concern with outputs rather than inputs, expression 
as far as possible in quantitative terms, a "zero-base" or fresh 
exercise in resource allocation each cycle, and most importantly, 
allocations projected over a number of years i.e., multi-year costing. 
It is a planning system, and this means it is concerned with the 
formulation of long-term strategies for public expenditure. It is also 
a programming system,which entails the grouping of governmental outputs 
into classifications so that programmes with common objectives are 
considered together. The vital aspect of being a budgetary process 
means that having established plans,and structured prograrrmes according 
to their outputs, those aspects are then related to the budgetary process; 
it is here that policy is translated into fiscal action. It is also 
a system, a continuing process,which persistently reviews past results, 
formulates new plans, and translates them into another annual budget. 
48. Robert H. Haveman, "The Analysis and Evaluation of Public 
Expenditures: An Overview", The PPB System, Vol. 1 (Washington D.C.: 
1969), p. 6. 
49. See Kenneth W. Knight and Kenneth W. Wiltshire, Formulating 
Government Budgets: Aspects of Australian and North American 
Experience (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), 
Chapter 4. 
40. 
A Planning System 
In our attempts to build a planning system we have been assisted 
materially by the theory and practice of government as revealed in the 
literature and experience of a number of comparative countries. In this 
respect Friedrich's portrayal of the symbiotic nature of the theory/ 
practice relationship is particularly attractive -
"...decision making, policy and planning are closely 
tied and...under contemporary conditions of advanced 
industrial society, as well as in under-developed 
countries, these three processes cannot be considered 
in isolation. All depend upon a considerable measure 
of rationality, but it seems important not to over-
estimate this aspect. Whether it is a matter of 
individual decisions or group decisions, and whether 
they are public decisions or not, decisions are 
related to known alternatives, and tend in the last 
analysis to become dichotomic... Planning procedures 
are, of course, particularly striking evidence of the 
complex character of nondichotomic decision-making. 
Public policy also is usually adopted in facing a 
multi-faceted reality in which a number of alternative 
ways of dealing with environmental challenges are 
handled. Planning is often involved in effective 
policy-making as the very process of sorting out such 
alternatives. And the opinion which sees an insoluble 
conflict between planning and democracy is untenable. 
Experience has shown further that the voters have a 
sense of appreciation for objective achievements. The 
electorate at the same time recognizes that there are 
other technical problems, and it reacts sharply when 
the values and beliefs of the community are at stake. 
If the often heard claim that planning is incompatible 
with democracy or with a free society is therefore 
untenable, contemporary evidence suggests that they 
both presuppose planning under contemporary conditions. 
Hence planning and public policy are least likely to 
be defective under such conditions as only democracy 
and freedom can provide".^^ 
It is true that we have examined none of the polemic surrounding the 
planning notion, but this is simply because we are committed to the 
development of a planning concept that can be applied to the 
processes of federalism within two federal polities. It may 
well be that various authors can demonstrate the fallacy, or even danger, 
of planning attempts in all sorts of political hindrances, and it is 
clear that all political systems present obstacles of varying degrees of 
50. Carl J. Friedrich, op.cit. 
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significance for planning. But our sole concern here is with the 
hindrances to planning which are found in federalism. So we require 
a definition of planning that is rigid in its construct, but capable 
of meaningful analysis of its environment. 
The ideal solution would have been to utilize a definition of planning 
which had already been formulated especially if it had been derived from 
practical experience. Since there has been no sustained planning, of the 
kind we have outlined, in either Australia or Canada, we cannot look to 
those sources for such a construct. To borrow the framework of the 
experiments of the most similar political systems, e.g. Britain with its 
P.E.S.C./P.A.R. concept and America with its P.P.B.S., is not appropriate 
because those models are narrower than the framework we require. 
A search through the literature for such an operational definition 
also proved fruitless because the definitions which are offered are either 
too vague or not sufficiently comprehensive to be of use in the rigorous 
analysis of the Australian and Canadian federations, which is our objective. 
For example, F.A. Bland called his textbook, the first public administration 
text in Australia, Planning the Modem State, but nowhere in that book did he 
provide an operational definition of planning; rather he seemed to equate 
it with forecasting. Andrew Shonfield, in his significant work Modem 
Capitalism, which still contains the best description of indicative planning 
mechanisms in Western European Countries, gives no actual definition of the 
planning concept. We might take the definition of planning provided by the best 
authority on P.P.B.S., David Novick, because P.P.B.S. was actually 
introduced in Canada, albeit for a short period. Novick says, "Planning is 
the production of the range of meaningful potentials for selection of 
50A 
courses of action through a systematic consideration of alternatives". 
A little later he adds "In planning one seeks a continual review of 
objectives and the means for their attainment". Consider, for example, 
Friedrich himself, whose arguments have provided an enormously valuable 
underpinning for our understanding of the concept of planning. He barely 
offers any actual definition of planning and the closest he comes is to 
50A. David Novick (ed.). Program Budgeting (Harvard U.P., 1965), p. 91. 
50B. ibid., p. 103. 
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say that "... planning is a policy of very great complexity. Planning 
seeks to inter-relate various aspects of a field of public policy or 
maybe several aspects, an obvious example being economic and social 
50C planning". A similar definition is offered by Lindblom,who calls 
planning "the interrelation of policies". David Easton's 
monumental work on systems theory does not even mention planning; Urwick, 
who places great emphasis on planning and its virtues, regards it mainly 
50E 
as a method; Herbert Simon just calls planning a "complex chain of 
50F 
activities". Rather than prolong this point we can turn to one of 
the best synthesizers of administrative theories, Peter Self, who discusses 
planning in relation to decision making, in relation to theories of 
polycentricity,and in relation to particular parts of the public sector. 
The closest he comes to a definition is when he is contrasting the 
planning process with the political process. He says "Planning requires 
a harmonisation of interests along systematic lines and on a fairly 
J . T L • II 5 0 G durable basis . 
It becomes obvious that no available operational or theoretical 
definition is adequate for our purposes. Therefore one has been 
constructed. It has been conceived as a system and the system presented 
below purports to draw from the twin strands of (a) related theory, 
especially as it has emerged in the twentieth century, and (b) practical 
experience of governments in various parts of the world,predominantly in 
the post World War II period. 
So, when the word planning is used hereafter, it refers to the 
following system -
50C. Carl Friedrich, op.cit., pp. 8-9. 
500. Charles Lindblom, The Policy Makijic Process (Englewood Cliffs N.J., 
Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 9. 
50E. See L. Urwick, The Elements of Administration (London: Pitman, 1974), 
p, 26. 
50F. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour (London: Free Press, 1965), 
p. 3. 
50G. Peter Self, Administrative Theories and Politics (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1977), p. 157. 
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(A) Forecasting 
The first element in any planning system is forecasting. 
Unfortunately there is a tendency to equate forecasting with 
planning. Thus when government agencies prepare population 
projections or likely economic trends, they often speak as if 
these are plans. They are not; they are merely forecasts. It 
is worth noting that forecasting is not necessarily a neutral or 
objective exercise. The values of the expert performing the 
projection can be built into the techniques used, the population 
growth rates and family sizes thought likely to eventuate, the 
period over which debt charges and interest rates should be 
discounted etc. Therefore care needs to be taken that any value 
judgements on which forecasts are based are made explicit. 
(B) Formation of Priorities 
After forecasts have been completed an attempt can be made to 
form priorities in the light of that data. Often forecasts are 
prepared on a number of sets of assumptions. One of them assumes 
no deliberate attempt to change natural phenomena, and the forecasts 
are made on the basis that natural trends will be allowed to continue. 
Other sets of projections can then be prepared assuming different 
scales and different types of intervention in natural developments. 
It is not necessary for the forecasts to have been prepared on these 
alternative patterns but it does aid the formation of priorities 
by narrowing the options. Naturally the forecasters need some 
guidance upon which to base the projections which involve intervention 
and this is discussed under (E). The formation of priorities is an 
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"all-in" exercise which also contains heavy overtones of 
value judgement. In a democratic system it ought to be carried 
out by representative and accountable politicians rather than 
by bureaucrats alone,or otherwise valid accusations of technocracy 
will follow, i.e., government by public servants predetermining 
public policy. 
(C) Allocation of Resources 
Once broad priorities or objectives are determined,it remains 
to secure the means of attainment of those priorities,and the manner 
in which governments do this is to allocate financial resources. 
This is very definitely a political function because it is in the 
actual process of resource allocation that values become most explicit. 
It is interesting to note that one definition of economics is the 
allocation of limited resources to unlimited ends, whereas a definition 
of political science is the authoritative allocation of values. A 
corollary is that in any society the allocation of public resources 
reflects the values of that society, and in a democracy that allocation 
must be an authoritative one. In a Westminster system that authority 
comes, in principle at least, from the elected representatives,who 
remain subject to dismissal if their allocation of resources does 
not find favour with the majority of the population. (We shall 
examine the practical flaws in the Westminster model as they affect 
this process later). 
(D) Implementation 
It is only when forecasts, priorities, and ultimately resource 
allocation are implemented that they can be called a plan. Forecasts 
or projections that are never implemented,or acted upon,remain solely 
as forecasts or projections. In long term planning it is essential 
to consider what means will be used to implement the plan. When it 
is public sector planning that is being considered the obvious pattern 
is that the annual financial appropriation procedures should be the 
method used to implement the various phases of the long term plan. 
Thus it becomes largely a function for administrators with political 
oversight. 
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(E) Review 
This final element is what moulds all of the foregoing 
processes into a system. There has to be a review mechanism which 
is brought to bear, either continuously or sporadically, to ensure 
that the system is heading towards the set objectives, that the 
objectives are still worthwhile and realistic, and that there are 
no better alternative means of reaching those objectives. Again, 
in relation to the public sector of any particular government 
system, the best review technique is to monitor the progress of 
the plan continuously in the light of public sector activity 
(especially the annual budget), and also to engage in a wholesale 
review of the components of the plan after each year's appropriation 
of resources. This process can be performed by administrators and 
politicians acting in concert. The review then provides feedback 
to the forecasters who are involved in drawing up the projections 
for the next phase of the planning cycle, (element A) and so the 
whole system continues dynamically. 
The above planning system thus comprises five processes each of which 
is performed in sequence and is linked to the subsequent process. It 
could be questioned whether each of them is necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Clearly, for example, the review process will take account of developments 
in all of the previous four processes. It is not necessary for each element 
to be discrete for the system to be valid, but, for the most part, each of 
them should be visible as a separate entity,if only because of the 
different posture of the actors in each process,irrespective of whether 
they are the same actors throughout. It is contended that the above 
planning system can be applied to any resource or sector or organization. 
In this study it is used mainly in relation to financial resources of 
the public sector. It has been used in the analysis of events in the 
Australian, Canadian, and other federal systems. It is the concept which 
has been used in all the interviews associated with this study. In other 
words, in the effort to determine whether the political units of the 
federation could engage in public sector planning - this system is what 
is meant by the word "planning". It is the fixed element in this study, 
the independent variable. 
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Planning and Democracy 
As we have already observed, there is one further element of 
planning which is worth dwelling upon albeit briefly; planning is a 
51 
concept which is often painted as being anti-democratic. It is true 
that most planning processes tend to concentrate an undue amount of 
policymaking in the hands of a progressively declining number of people 
unless this tendency is checked. Most of the western countries referred 
to earlier have found considerable difficulty in maintaining a high level 
of public participation, and indeed interest,in planning processes. There 
are many reasons for this and most of them relate to the fact that the 
required expertise to make informed judgements about the future is not 
distributed widely amongst the community, especially given the growing 
complexity of society,and the commensurate complexity of government 
required to regulate that society. This, and other factors, explains 
why parliaments have not been particularly effective in this process. 
However it appears that there are more fundamental aspects of planning 
which explain this phenomenon. This is because the inherent nature of 
planning conceptually produces the following sequence -
(i) Planning means coordination. Aspects such as priority 
determination and allocation of resources are by their 
nature mental and physical constructs,which make 
coordination of decision making ultimately essential, 
irrespective of which person or group of persons makes 
those final choices. 
(ii) Coordination means hierarchy. If there is to be 
coordination inevitably some person or organization 
must do the coordinating. Normally, this need not 
necessarily mean a hierarchy of ranking or status in 
respect of the coordinator versus the coordinated,but 
when it is a political system about which we are 
51. There is a long list of literature of a polemic nature on this theme 
most of it related to the notion of economic planning for the whole 
economy or society, and a great deal of it written in response to the 
growth of totalitarian regimes in the first half of the twentieth 
century and the immediate postwar period. See for example, F.A. Hayek, 
The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 1944); L.C. Robbins, Economic 
Planning and the International Order (London: Macmillan 1937); 
M. Polanyi, The Concept of Freedom (London: Watts, 1940); John Jewkes, 
Ordeal by Planning (London: Macmillan, 1948); Barbara Wootton, 
Freedom Under Planning (London: Allen and Unwin, 1945). 
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speaking, the very act of coordination symbolizes and 
indeed institutionalizes, a hierarchical relationship. 
(iii) Hierarchies tend to produce elites. Every pyramid must 
have its apex and wherever there is a hierarchy there 
must, by definition, be a pinnacle to that hierarchy. That 
pinnacle is the elite and whilst it is true that the elite 
remains connected to its lower members, in political systems 
there are profound tendencies for each elite to become 
removed from the other members of the hierarchical relationship. 
(iv) Elites are fundamentally anti-democratic. For the reasons 
outlined above the sheer presence of an elite is an 
inhibition to the attainment of mass participation in 
decision making or even the supply of information. 
The assertion being made here is that coordination ultimately 
produces an hierarchical relationship and institutionalizes that 
relationship between the actors involved. This need not necessarily 
mean that the process of coordination has to proceed in a totally 
hierarchical manner, with superior and inferior participants. Indeed 
coordination can be achieved through informal as well as formal means 
and the more informal the mechanism, the less hierarchical the situation 
will appear. It follows that there can be gradations of the 
hierarchical relationship thereby affecting the sharpness of the 
pinnacle referred to in (iii), and affecting, in turn, the degree of 
elitism produced, which in itself determines the degree of democractic 
participation. 
In other words this four step process should be seen as a framework 
for describing a relative process rather than an absolute one. 
If one follows this reasoning through then it follows that planning, 
by its nature, tends to be anti-democratic. However, it is contended here 
that although this means planning can never be fully democratic (in the 
ancient Greek sense of the word democratic), it can be more or less 
democratic. It is axiomatic that democracy should be a time-consuming 
process involving, as it does, consultation and dialogue. It is therefore 
inevitable that the more democratic and open a planning system is, the 
slower and more complex it will be. Now the system of planning which has 
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been formulated earlier does not of itself admit to any particular degree 
of democratic involvement. Naturally democracy is a desirable end, but in 
the course of discussion of the topic of this study viz. planning and 
federalism, no attempt is made to stipulate any necessary or minimum 
democratic component, other than to raise the particular problem of 
accountability which would result from superimposing the planning system 
we have derived on the federations under review. Nonetheless this aspect 
of planning needs to be kept in mind because we shall see, in the next 
chapter, that it is fundamentally at odds with many of the inherent 
characteristics of federalism as it is popularly conceived. 
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The Planning Experience of Australia 
As intimated earlier, Australia has had little experience of the 
comprehensive style of public sector planning being discussed. 
Nonetheless there have been various attempts during certain periods of 
Australian history to plan activity for some portion of the public sector 
and they ought to be kept in mind as an important component of the back-
ground to our study. We will refer to them below albeit in brief terms. 
However, the impression must not be given that there has been no interest 
in planning in Australia; indeed there has always been a lively debate 
about the concept. But when planning has been the subject of debate in 
this country, the discussants have inevitably been referring to total 
planning, most often economic planning, for the whole economy and not just 
the public sector. This highlights another important factor that 
Australians, when speaking about planning, are not always talking the 
same language. The word "planning" has always meant different things to 
different groups so that some, for example, simply mean forecasting, whilst 
others mean the total control of all resources, and yet others are 
envisaging something in between these extremes. For the purpose of the 
short historical analysis below we will accept all or any of these notions, 
recognizing that none of them correspondsto the systemic conceptualization 
of planning which we have defined,to be employed later in this study. 
The second half of the nineteenth century is the phase of Australian 
history which began to see significant moves to establish infrastructure 
throughout the continent. This was the era of railway development, 
construction of roads, bridges, harbours and the various public utilities. 
A good deal of this infrastructure had to be financed and constructed by 
public activity because the large size of the nation, together with the 
relatively small and scattered population, made it an uneconomic 
proposition for private capital. A good deal of this activity in public 
works was undertaken by statutory corporations, entities which Australia 
pioneered and which provided the necessary political and administrative 
freedom for forward planning. Each of these works projects required a 
52. Kewley points out that the statutory corporation was an early adoption 
in Australia to avoid entanglement of the Crown in development activity. 
The Crown, he says, was an unsatisfactory legal entity especially for 
commercial transactions. Moreover Crown activity invariably meant 
political activity whereas the desire was to keep politics out of 
development. See T.H. Kewley, "Some General Features of the Statutory 
Corporation in Australia" Public Administration, {Sydr)ey),l'^l, no. 3, 
March 1957. 
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lead-time, often up to ten years, and so considerable forethought had to be 
brought to bear regarding the supply of capital in the first instance and 
then the supply of manpower and materials. However despite the fact that 
each of these projects required individual planning, there was no concerted 
effort to coordinate all of the works projects occurring in each colony. 
More significantly there was virtually no coordination of works projects 
between colonies, and each government conducted its own loan raising and 
construction programme independently of the others. In relation to current 
expenditures, and revenue raising, these were days of small government and 
balanced budgets,and governments would fix rates of taxation and other means 
of revenue raising according to the expected spending for the coming year. 
Naturally the different desires and wishes of each colony gradually became 
evident and by the first world war were reflected in quite different rates 
of taxation, especially income taxation, and levels of indebtedness, between 
the states. At the time of federation little thought was given to any need 
for the new national government to engage in forward planning - indeed the 
expectation in 1901 was that the new national government would remain 
extremely small, as witnessed by the provisions of the Braddon Clause in 
53 the Constitution. It was also the case that most of the public sector 
activities which required large capital expenditure and forethought, 
remained as state functions under the division of powers, including 
railways and the bulk of the provision of economic and social infrastructure 
e.g. irrigation, harbours, roads, education and health. The colonies had 
not wanted to hand over many of these functions because of the potential 
54 for pork-barrelling within them. 
The first world war saw some attempts at national coordination of 
policymaking,and priority determination,as well as the shifting of resources 
into the war effort, but it was not a technological war and Australia was 
not threatened. So there was little emphasis on capital expenditure and 
hence only minor attention to the forward planning of resources. 
53. Under this clause. Section 87, mistakenly named after the Tasmanian 
Premier, the expectation was that the new national government would 
be able to exist on the income from one quarter of customs and excise 
duties. At the time of federation, the main source of revenue to the 
colonies was customs and excise duties, and the key question for the 
draftsmen of the national constitution was what proportion of this 
revenue should be guaranteed to the states if the Commonwealth were 
given a monopoly over such revenue raising. The Braddon Clause required 
the Commonwealth to distribute to the states three-quarters of its net 
customs and excise revenues. It was to apply for ten years and then 
be reviewed. 
The obvious major exception being defence although defence expenditure 
was very small anyway at that time. 
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The period from the first world war to the end of the 1920's in 
Australia saw a rapid escalation in government borrowing,and progressively 
more marked differences in rates of taxation and levels of indebtedness 
between the states and also the Commonwealth government which had begun to 
enter various fields of taxation and engage in some capital works programmes. 
The establishment of a voluntary loan council in 1923,and the permanent 
Australian Loan Council in 1927,(examined in more detail in Chapter 2 ) , 
provided the most significant move ever made in this country towards 
introduction of the sort of planning under discussion. Although the 
coordinated borrowing programme was formulated for only one year ahead, 
there was nonetheless for the first time something of a bird's eye view, 
across the whole nation, of capital resource 
allocation for the public sector. Moreover, because of the lead-time of 
public works projects, the Loan Council each year had a reasonably accurate 
picture of the level of future commitment involved in the continued 
financing of these public works. Allocations of loan funds, however, 
continued to be on a spatial rather than a sectoral basis, reflecting 
regional priorities rather than national ones. 
Naturally enough the advent of the Depression shifted thinking away 
from any long term considerations and emphasis shifted to short term 
expedients directed at creating employment,or at least reducing unemployment. 
Government revenues were cut, public service wages were reduced, and loan 
programmes contracted. Eventually out of this crisis a number of proposed 
methods of bringing about recovery were mooted under the guise of being 
"plans" e.g. Premiers Plan, Niemeyer's Plan, the Lang Plan. The concept 
which eventually gained sway was in many respects akin to the basic premise 
of the theories of John Maynard Keynes, to come a little later. Theodore 
and others proposed the use of the public sector works programme as the 
means of generating employment, and even took this theory a step further 
by proposing that governments keep a string of public works projects at 
the ready, so that they could be brought into phase at the exact time 
required,(i.e. when a lull appeared in employment growth), and also in the 
exact locations required. The introduction of this sequential and spatial 
element to the projection of public sector capital expenditure probably 
represents the first conceptual formulation of a planning framework in 
Australia,even if it was introduced for pragmatic reasons. Irrespective 
of the motivation, it worked, and towards the end of the 1930's entities 
known as Coordinators of Works began to appear in most states of Australia 
and in the Commonwealth 
49. 
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Coincidentally there was during the 1930's a bitter academic debate 
occurring about planning as a concept. To a large extent it reflected the 
dispute occurring in Europe between the polemic of Hayek, Wootton and 
others. It was clearly associated with the notion of planning for the 
whole economy, not just the public sector, but its principles were still 
readily applied to the activities which were occurring in the Australian 
public sector. It was at this period that the word planning came to be 
associated with the policies of the Soviet governments and it conveyed the 
meaning of government control of the whole society. Amidst that sort of 
polemic there was little room for any advocacy of planning solely for the 
public sector. It was all or nothing; planning or free enterprise. 
The Australian debate was best recorded in the Shann 
and Copland volume The Battle of the Plans which contained documentation 
of the rival proposals for combatting the Depression put before the Premiers' 
56 
Conference in mid 1931. These so-called plans were,of course,only methods 
of ensuring a return of stability in prices and employment primarily through 
progress towards a balanced budget. On April 25th 1931 the Loan Council 
passed a resolution "That Australia must aim at securing a balanced budget 
57 by the end of June 1934". Most of the debate on these plans was launched 
in economic terms. One commentator observed that the so-called Battle of 
the Plans evidenced a "pathetic weakness which a democracy almost inevitably 
exhibits in a time of crisis and the inability of its rulers to confess 
(TO 
that they have made mistakes". 
55. The concept of public works coordination had arrived much earlier in 
some states as for example in Queensland where a Bureau of Industry 
had been created in the early 1930's to fulfil this and other 
functions. See B.M. Molesworth, "The Bureau of Industry in Queensland" 
The Economic Record, June 1933; C. Lack, Three Decades of Queensland 
Political History (Brisbane: Government Printer, 1960), passim. 
56. E.O.G. Shann and D.B. Copland, The Battle of the Plans (Sydney: Angus 
and Robertson, 1931). 
57. The Loan Council also established a sub-committee to report on action 
to be taken to achieve this objective which consisted of three 
Premiers and the co-option of Professors Copland, Giblin, 
Melville and Shann,who were asked to form a Working Committee with 
the Under Treasurer from all States except New South Wales, which did 
not participate. The sub-committee presented to a Loan Council 
meeting and then a Premiers' Conference in May and June of 1931. 
58. J.P. Abbott, "The Battle of the Plans", Australian Quarterly, 
September 14th 1931, p. 111. 
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The plan finally adopted by the Premiers' Conference 
of 1931 consisted, amongst other aspects, 
of five elements relating to reduction of government expenditure, increased 
taxation, and reduced interest rates both government and private. 
Describing the agreed solution Bland and Mills made a pertinent comment 
when they stated that -
"hastened by the complexities which the discussion 
of the proposals revealed, the Conference avoided 
any decision which would limit the freedom of the 
several Governments to make the reductions in 
whatever way they deemed equitable, though they 
did declare that the carrying out of any one part 
is dependent on the carrying out of all parts".^9 
The authors also add the pregnant observation that "the action finally 
taken was belated, and only adopted when it was obvious that a complete 
breakdown in public finance was imminent". 
Lyons objected to the fact that the measures agreed upon at the 
Premiers Conference had been termed a "National Rehabilitation Plan". 
He believed that the restoration of budgetary equilibrium, although an 
important step, could only be the first step in the immense task of 
national reconstruction. Lyons also saw considerable difficulties with 
the concept of using public works as the long term remedy -
"Public works programmes as factors in eliminating 
the worst affects of trade depression require long-
range planning. At the present time we are 
thoroughly unscientific in the manner in which we 
approach this problem A scientific public 
economy would ensure that the public works would 
be planned well in advance of the unemployment 
emergency, and that a reserve would be created 
to pay for them".60 
The debate about planning figured prominently in various conferences 
held in the 1930's. Fisher, an advocate of economic planning, claimed 
that the essential ingredients for a plan were (a) that it should have 
a purpose, and (b) that purpose should be known and understood. Most 
planners, he argued, became preoccupied with the means of the plan although 
59. F.A. Bland and R.C. Mills, "Financial Reconstruction. An Examination 
of the Plan Adopted at the Premiers' Conference 1931", The Economic 
Record, November 1931, p. 166. 
60. Hon. J.A. Lyons, "The National Plan - And After", Australian 
Quarterly, September 14th 1931. 
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he conceded that there was still no universally accepted answer to the 
question of what the proper purpose should be for a general economic plan. 
According to Fisher planning also presupposed, in relation to the units 
whose activities were destined to make the plan effective, a considerable 
measure of control in so far as their actions impinged upon the plan. This 
also led to the necessity for the absence of violent change in the methods 
of work which the plan was likely to require. However Fisher went on to 
fii 
state unambiguously that planning and economic freedom are incompatible. 
Many of those sentiments were echoed just a year later by Mauldon who drew 
on West European experience, especially with the use of Economic Councils, 
and observed that "The relationship between an Economic Council charged 
with the conscious planning of the country's economic future and the 
sovereign political legislature will assuredly in no country be settled 
on the economists' terms alone. Moreover, in the constituting of such a 
focal agency the vexed question whether expertness or representativeness 
should give it its dominant character has to be worked out to a workable 
CO 
conclusion". Despite these difficulties Mauldon was in favour of 
establishing some sort of Australian body to obtain a coordinated overview 
of economic knowledge,because he saw existing advisory mechanisms to 
Commonwealth and State governments as too specialized and fragmented for 
the purpose of considering economic and social problems as a whole. He 
called it a "focal agency for advice and planning". The question of its 
representativeness,and how it would span both levels of government, would 
have to be determined, and it could well be necessary to establish two 
such groups, one representative and one expert, to advise the 
Commonwealth cabinet in the first instance. 
Melville records that at a 1934 conference of the Australian Institute 
of Political Science, there was general agreement that planning of some 
kind was inevitable and, on the whole, desirable, but there was no 
64 
agreement about what kind of planning was needed. At that conference, 
61. See Allan G.B. Fisher, "Fundamental Presupposition for Successful 
Economic Planning", The Economic Record, October 1932, pp. 88-98. 
62. F.R.E. Mauldon, "Some Implications of Economic Planning", 
Australian Quarterly, June 14th 1933. 
63. ibid. 
64. L.G. Melvi l le, "Plans and Planners", Australian Quarterly, 
December 14th 1934. 
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Salter had presented a picture of a planned society as an "ordered society". 
Portus suggested that the tests of a planned society were that (a) it 
involved long range, conscious planning ahead, and its purpose must be 
clear, (b) it must not be opportunist, and (c) the planning must not be 
partial. Giblin made the significant remark that planning of the kind 
which was being espoused was only "better planning". He continued, "we 
are committed to planning, which in its broadest sense means only applying 
foresight and reason to our economic activities". For Macmahon, parliament 
was an inadequate device for debate of planning details,and the actual 
administration of a fully planned economy could best be achieved through 
the use of statutory corporations, and Ross took the argument a step further 
by saying that the only planning worth having was socialist planning. For 
his part Melville regarded the important question as being what it is that 
we ask of a planned society. The various things we expect are often 
incompatible especially the requirements for an increased standard of 
living, less economic fluctuation and complete freedom. More particularly, 
"some may prefer more political liberty even though it involves less 
economic liberty. Others would prefer economic liberty to political 
65 liberty". No two standards, said Melville, are likely to be the same, 
and so we cannot expect a society to conform to any particular logical 
pattern. The conflicts, he felt, would be settled politically either by 
compromise, tyranny of the majority or a minority, or by the marginal 
voter in a democracy whois so unintelligent apathetic or shallow that he 
does not know his own mind on the matter. 
The publication of F.A. Bland's Planning the Modem State in 1934 did 
much to advance the cause of public administration as a discipline but very 
little to refine the Australian concept of "planning". Indeed the choice 
of title was an unfortunate one for what was essentially a collection of 
lectures rather than a treatise on planning. Bland said that his book 
was an attempt to "sketch plans for the machinery which would give us at 
once a parliament capable of exerting a 'control on behalf of the people', 
and a public service quick to appreciate and ready to meet the novel needs 
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of our complex society". Bland canvasses the views of Wooton, Polanyi, 
and Hayek, and it is clear that he too perceived planning as an all 
65. ibid. 
66. F.A. Bland, Planning the Modem State (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1945). 
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embracing process of control over the whole community, and he does not 
consider planning solely for the public sector, (which is disappointing 
given the title of the volume). Bland went some way towards justifying 
this omission in the second edition,published in 1945,when he explained 
that in the early 1930's in Australia,planning was held to mean the 
rationalization of methods and machinery of government to meet the 
demands of the social service state, whereas in 1945 the word had come to 
mean "the deliberate choice of the method of central direction of all 
economic effort". 
The second half of the 1930's in Australia,as elsewhere,saw an 
increasing intellectual and practical concern with the area of public 
finance,and in particular the role of the budget in influencing economic 
activity. In a 1935 review of Australian public finance Hytten revealed 
that the Premier's plan had only been policed closely in the first year or 
so,and after that each government was left to arrive at its deficit as it 
thought suitable. The superior taxing powers of the Commonwealth had 
made it difficult for the states to tax lower incomes,and the Commonwealth 
super tax made it equally difficult to get much more out of the higher 
incomes. State public debt charges had risen, and although budgets had 
not been balanced,these deficits had been reduced to one eighth of the 
anticipated deficit in 1931/32. Moreover sinking fund payments had been 
continued unlike the situation in other countries. The considerably more 
favourable result for the Commonwealth budget by the mid 1930's, compared 
with the situation of the states, culminated in a Constitutional 
Conference in January 1935 at which proposals were discussed to redistribute 
revenue sources between the Commonwealth and the States. The three 
proposals were to give the States 50 per cent of customs and excise revenue 
in lieu of existing vertical transfers, to exclude the Commonwealth from 
income tax, and to give the states concurrent power in respect of excise. 
All of them failed. Hytten concluded that "for good or ill we are 
definitely drifting towards an increase in Commonwealth functions at the 
expense of state functions". Whilst the Commonwealth was passing some 
funds on to the states for unemployment relief and rural rehabilitation, 
the basis of cooperation seemed to be that "the Commonwealth will find 
the funds if the states will devise means of spending them, which is 
surely an insecure foundation for a long range policy". 
67. T. Hytten, "Australian Public Finance Since 1930", The Economic 
Record, March 1935. 
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Other authors also chronicled the trends in public finance 
during the 1930's, including the conscious move towards deficit financing 
late in the decade, and it is fair to say that the role of the public sector 
in a mixed economy gained considerable attention during this period, and 
the need for government intervention to achieve stability and growth was 
68 
widely recognized. However, the debate about planning was unresolved, 
intellectually at least. Some authors took up passionately pro-planning 
69 
stances but their support tended to wither as the economy began to 
recover. Those who opposed planning were, for the most part, less vehement 
in their viewpoint and were prepared to concede the need for more 
rationalization and refinement of existing government/community 
relationships in order to improve fiscal standards of living, and welfare 
generally, but stopped short of any strict public controls to achieve 
these longer term aims. Gratten probably summed up the situation at the 
end of the decade when delivering an address entitled "The Future in 
Australia", he said -
"For forty years now Australia has been busy 
filling up the outlines of the scheme of 
development laid down more or less unconsciously 
in the latter quarter of the last century. 
Since this has been carried forward according 
to the principles of capitalism, increasingly 
the tilt of the social balance in this country 
has been in favour of the owning-producer, 
and since the world war that tilt has become 
confirmed".'^ 
The second world war marks a milestone in Australian thinking about 
public sector planning. It was a technological war and so it required a 
large amount of capital expenditure, and when eventually Australia was 
directly threatened, it highlighted many of the deficiencies in the 
country's infrastructure including, in particular, the rail and road transport 
system, regulated by the states for the most part, and not particularly well 
coordinated across the nation. But the main effect of this war, in this 
context, is that it unified the aspirations of the nation towards one 
68. See for example, F.A. Bland, "Bigger and Better Budgets", Australian 
Quarterly, September 1936, and "Crisis Finance", Australian Quarterly, 
December 1939; C.G.F. Simkin, "Budgetary Reform", The Economic 
Record, December 1941. 
69. See for example, Edward Masey, "Aspects of Planning", Australian 
Quarterly, June 10th 1934. 
70. C. Hartley Grattan, "The Future in Australia", Australian Quarterly, 
December 1938, pp. 23-24. 
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purpose and thereby provided the rationale for centralized resource 
allocation in the public sector - the basic requirement of any planning 
system. There are, of course, far too many elements in Australian war 
time history for us to be able to recount them here, but some of the more 
significant can be mentioned. Paramount, of course, was the massive 
planning apparatus established to prosecute the war, including a range 
of regulatory devices such as price control, rationing, manpower planning, 
exchange control, capital issues control, economic stabilization measures 
etc. 
The year 1940 saw the establishment of the Commonwealth Department of 
Labour and National Service which had a Reconstruction Division for 
consideration of the necessary postwar measures which would be required. 
In 1941 the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Social Security suggested 
some sort of social plan would be necessary when peace arrived, and the 
committee quickly moved its emphasis from the planning of social security 
to the need for economic planning as a whole in order to attain social 
security. Then came the November 1942 resolution at the Labor Party 
Conference that there be immediate planning for national postwar 
reconstruction, and a twin recommendation that the government should 
appoint a minister whose sole duty would be to proceed immediately with 
the preparation of a comprehensive scheme of postwar reconstruction, and 
to coordinate the work of all federal and state government agencies in 
this field. This was followed by the announcement, (by Curtin), in 
December 1942, that Chifley would be Minister for Postwar Reconstruction 
as well as Treasurer, and the appointment in January 1943 of Coombs as 
Director-General of Postwar Reconstruction, a department assembled mostly 
by recruitment from outside the public service (Coombs had been director 
of rationing). Its activities are recounted by Hasluck in the following terms 
"When the department was fully organised it functioned 
both through its own departmental staff of executive 
officers, research officers and technical officers 
and with the aid of commissions on rural reconstruction, 
housing and secondary industries, a national works 
council and standing committees, composed of representatives 
of various interested departments and organisations, to 
deal with re-employment, demobilisation and reconstruction 
training. By comparison with some other wartime creations, 
the department did not build up an unduly large staff of 
its own but sought to use and to coordinate the work of 
existing departments and agencies alongside it in 
the structure of administration. 
55A, 
In one of his earliest statements about the new portfolio, 
Chifley said that the main function of reconstruction 
would be positive - to create conditions in which there 
would be jobs for all those willing to work and to guide 
production into channels which would give to the people 
the things necessary for a higher standard of living. 
They would also seek to give benefits and protection to 
those individuals who did not achieve economic security. 
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"Among particular matters he mentioned were 
rehabilitation of primary industry, decentralisation 
of industry, housing, slum clearance, a national 
works programme (including water conservation and 
extension of electrical facilities) and better 
nutrition. In another statement he enlarged on the 
theme of decentralisation by some remarks on 
planned regional development. 
His reference to a national works programme was 
followed by a discussion with State Ministers and 
in July a Premiers' Conference decided to establish 
a National Works Council to determine post-war 
works policy. Proposals for works from all parts 
of Australia would be coordinated and fitted into 
a comprehensive plan to be carried out in various 
stages, the most urgent being restorative works 
needed for the civil community to resume activity. 
'No estimate can be given in broad terms of the 
money needed', said Chifley, 'but the only limit 
to the operation of Australia's internal economy 
after the war will be the availability of manpower 
and materials'. 
Animating all the planning was the doctrine of full 
employment. 'The primary aim of our post-war 
economic policy must be a high and stable level of 
employment', Chifley said on more than one occasion. 
Work, as well as being available, should be adequately 
rewarded and directed towards worthwhile ends. It 
meant raising consumption of those now on low incomes, 
improving the environment by housing, town and country 
planning, modern transport and social services. 
'Above a i r , he said, 'it means placing permanently 
within the reach of every one of us freedom from 
basic economic worries, the realisation of some of 
our ambitions for personal development, and the 
opportunity of bringing up happy, healthy, well-
educated families'. This was the yardstick by which 
he would measure plans coming to him from the 
commissioners and comnittees. 
For all this there must be planning and there must be 
some controls, 'fairly heavy' tax rates, some regulation 
of the use of resources to avoid competing demands 
for materials and labour, and the ending of monopolistic 
or other restrictionson output".'! 
It was at this time also that a link was announced between the 
establishment of the postwar reconstruction apparatus and a proposed 
Constitutional Convention to consider the transfer of powers by the States. 
Now this attempt at a vertical transfer of powers to the central government 
is of great importance to the topic of this whole study,because it is a 
71. Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945 (Canberra: 
Australian War Memorial, 1970), pp. 511-512. 
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vivid illustration of the hindrances to public sector planning created 
by the federal division of power in Australia. The incident recurs as 
an example throughout subsequent pages for this reason - in a time of war 
a planning system,of the sort we are envisaging,becomes imperative,but the 
required determination of priorities and allocation of resources is slowed 
down immeasurably because the necessary coordination of decision making 
is frustrated by the existence of divided sovereignty over the resources 
required, or in many cases the fact that the level of government required 
to make the decisions has no sovereignty at all, short of some sort of full 
declaration of national emergency powers. Clearly it is not a problem to 
bedevil a unitary country. 
To enable it to have the fourteen powers thought necessary,the 
national government of the day tried to mount a referendum but this was 
initially blocked by a hostile Senate. An effort was then made to have 
the states transfer the powers,and a couple did, but most wanted substantial 
amendments or insisted on watering down the proposals. The Constitutional 
Convention which was held did not help at all and disintegrated along party 
lines. Ultimately, after some compromise, a referendum proposal passed 
through the parliament. The basic issue in the propaganda for the 
referendum was "plan or chaos". In the words of the case in favour of 
the referendum -
Do we as a people take our future boldly into our 
own hands and shape it with the tools we have 
fashioned in the furnace of war, or do we leave 
it to the blind forces of economic anarchy? 
On August 19th 1944 the referendum was defeated. There was a Commonwealth 
majority for "no"; only South Australia and Western Australia said "yes" 
and both Queensland and New South Wales said "no", despite the fact that 
the governments of those two states had earlier adopted the transfer of 
powers bill. 
These events thus led to an abandonment of attempts to transfer 
powers,but they did produce another highly significant government action; 
a policy statement which represents the closest Australia has come to the 
concept of a total blueprint for the future of the nation. On May 30th 
1945 the national government published its White Paper on Full Employment. 
Amongst other things it provided for a national housing programme, a 
plan for land settlement, public works advanced planning, training schemes 
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for ex-service personnel, a national wide employment service, a plan for 
the restoration or expansion of key industries, controls over scarce 
resources, and checks on inflationary price rises. The means by which 
these aims were to be achieved were the various price and quantitative 
control mechanisms which had been imposed on war time, including price 
control, allocation of materials, controls in capital expenditure, import 
licensing, and some rationing. The institution mainly responsible for 
oversight of these aspirations was the Department of Postwar Reconstruction. 
It was the very retention of these economic and physical control 
mechanisms which played a large part in the defeat of the Chifley 
government in 1949,together with other attempts at more national controls 
including the attempt of that government to nationalise the banking system 
which itself fell foul of Section 92, the cornerstone of Australian 
federalism, preventing any interference with interstate trade. When 
handed a referendum the people rejected any changes which would allow a 
nationalization of banking,and shortly after they also rejected the Chifley 
government itself, electing the Menzies Liberals who promised, inter alia, 
to dismantle the many control mechanisms which had survived to 1949, 
Naturally enough the war time period also produced a good deal of 
literature associated with the concepts of planning, mostly in relation to 
controls, employment, and curtailment of freedom, with some attention to 
likely postwar developments. As Prest wrote in 1942 "It is freely 
asserted, and apparently widely and sincerely believed, that our war-time 
experience of Government control and economic planning will be of value 
after the war, when planning for war will be replaced by planning for 
peace and prosperity, or as some people prefer to put it, by planning 
72 for 'full employment'". In a further contribution to the semantic 
difficulties surrounding the focus of our study,Prest describes the 
Australian war time condition as one in which "centralized bureaucratic 
73 
planning has replaced individual planning". 
72. Wilfred Prest, "War-time controls and post-war planning". The Economic 
Record, December 1942, p. 211. For other perspectives on the 1939-1945 
period see T. Hytten, "Wartime Financial Policy", Australian 
Quarterly, March 1940; E.J. Tapp, "Planning and Democracy", 
Australian Quarterly, September 1945. 
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Without question the two elements of government activity which were 
examined most closely in the literature were the full employment objective, 
and the preparations for postwar reconstruction. Merry and Bruns, in a 
comparison of the British Canadian and Australian white papers on full 
employment, observe that there was a widespread feeling in the three 
countries "that there would never again be the marked variations in activity 
resulting in heavy unemployment", and the three governments had accepted 
"as a responsibility of government the need to take positive steps to affect 
any deterioration in business conditions and to set up machinery for 
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providing work for all". They comment that none of the three "plans" 
was a complete blueprint of post-war adjustment and development; each was 
little more than a statement of principles. Although they all had a common 
objective, the means of attaining that objective differed. Nonetheless all 
three white papers agreed that the items of expenditure most liable to 
sudden fluctuation, thereby affecting employment levels, were private and 
public capital expenditure. However, the Australian strategy placed most 
emphasis on the role of public capital expenditure in encouraging private 
capital expenditure and maintaining a steady total amount of public 
expenditure. This, say the authors, was in line with Australia's 
traditionally heavy emphasis on public capital expenditure. (The Canadian 
emphasis was on the private sector and in Britain public expenditure was 
seen as a make-weight to step in only when private expenditure declined). 
For all its emphasis on public capital expenditure, the Australian white 
paper did not follow the British concept of a five year plan of capital 
works projects sufficiently flexible to be brought on stream when and 
where necessary to counteract cycles in private capital expenditure. 
Public reaction to the Australian white paper was mostly unfavourable 
because it depended on continuing restraints. It was painted by some as 
totalitarian, but was not debated in the parliament. Waters credits 
Copland as having made the most eloquent statement of opposition to the 
proposals. "Copland argued that the fundamental conflict between freedom 
and security should always be kept in the foreground and insisted that 
people did not want to have their lives planned for them by anyone". 
74. D.H. Merry and G.R. Bruns, "Full Employment: The British, Canadian 
and Australian White Papers", The Economic Record, December 1945, 
p. 223. 
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Copland also objected to the term "full employment" and claimed "a 
certain minimum pool of unemployed was the only alternative to labour 
regimentation, price control, and the fixing of maximum as well as 
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minimum wages . 
So much was written and spoken about postwar reconstruction in 
Australia that it is difficult to do justice to the diversity of opinion 
which prevailed. We are, of course, only interested in the contribution 
of this body of literature to conceptions of planning. Coombs spoke of 
the many problems in postwar absorption of people to civilian life, 
including various social tensions. He also dwelt on the unity which had 
typified the Australian people during the war and in one (oft-quoted) 
passage declared -
"Everybody's vision of the new Jerusalem is, of 
course, different from his neighbour's, but 
through them all or at least through the vast 
majority there run common themes which may be 
summed up in the objectives of employment, 
rising standards of living, development and 
security".76 
In relation to the second of these three aspirations. Coombs observed 
"There is, therefore, an increasing demand that economic organization 
should be planned consciously to provide a rounded life". Coombs 
expressed the personal opinion that it would be possible for Australians 
to be master of their own economic destiny after the war although there 
would be many dilemmas to be confronted and a considerable rearrangement 
of priorities. He concluded thus -
75. W.J. Waters, "Australian Labor's Full Employment Objective, 1942-45" 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 16, 1970, p. 64. 
However, it should be remembered that Copland was the government's 
economic adviser and played a major role in -the development of the 
White Paper on full employment. 
76. H.C. Coombs, "The Economic Aftermath of War" in Post-War 
Reconstruction in Australia, ed. D.A.S. Campbell, (Sydney: 
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77. ibid., p. 81. 
61. 
"There are two ways of looking at the post-war 
problem; the one is to regard the situation as 
a mass of problems and difficulties to be resolved. 
The other is to see the very confusion and 
flexibility of the situation as an opportunity to 
promote economic and social developments. Opportunity 
for dramatic steps forward occur but rarely in the 
lives of men. 
The choice before us is to go back or to go on, to 
attempt to rebuild the so-called 'free' economy 
based hereupon individual choice, freedom of 
enterprise, unemployment, and the alternation of 
booms and slumps; or to go on, by the use of the 
knowledge and experience we have built up during 
the war to an economy, still predominantly one of 
private ownership and enterprise, but with an 
increasing responsibility on the Government for 
the allocation of resources, the prime purpose 
of which will be the achievement of social 
objectives of a high and stable level of 
unemployment, of rising standards of living for 
all people, of the development of our national 
resources and security and opportunity for the 
individual. 
My thesis may be summarily stated: The aftermath 
of war is economic confusion and social instability. 
But the war, too, has left us an inheritance of 
experience of economic administration and a 
consciousness of the power of social effort to 
achieve. If we are clear upon the objectives 
we seek and face boldly the dilemmas presented 
by a changing world, we have an opportunity to 
move consciously and intelligently towards a new 
economic and social system. 
We have an opportunity to bring within the field 
of human decision changes which up to now have 
been brought about by the blind forces of history. 
Whether this opportunity will be taken depends 
upon our boldness in applying our experience and 
our consciousness of common purpose".78 
Speaking in the same forum, Copland saw postwar measures of long 
term economic policy which placed strong emphasis on a national works 
programme,each component of which,would have a number of objectives and would 
especially be directed into channels which were socially desirable 
but would not be adequately developed by private enterprise. He also saw 
a concomitent need to develop the administrative ability and economic 
expertise of the public service,to make these longer term strategies 
78. ibid., pp. 98-99. 
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possible. The reaction to both Coombs and Copland's papers showed a 
marked antipathy to "planning" which was, for the most part, equated with 
on 
controls and loss of freedom and enterprise. 
Just a few years later, reviewing two British books on planning by 
Jewkes and Harrod, Copland had cause to refute the central argument against 
planning viz. that it necessarily implied the state determination of 
investment and its distribution, of occupation, of consumer's choice, and 
the destruction of private property leading to national self-sufficiency. 
(This thesis had its antecedent in Hayek's Road to Serfdom). Copland 
spoke rather of a "free economy working within the framework of social 
control'! This involved concentration on the frontier between civic and 
market economies, a moving frontier, which now had to be discussed in 
the light of advancing techniques of control, of improved administrative 
machinery and of the higher social aspirations of all organized communities. 
Copland actually equated his "system of free enterprise working within the 
framework of social control" with "planning on broad general principles", 
and outlined a number of obstacles which would have to be overcome. The 
problems, he said, raised "questions of political science beyond the realm 
of pure theory in economics, and it is futile for the economist to 
01 
endeavour to discuss them in a vacuum". 
It was Mauldon, writing in 1949,who produced probably the most lucid 
overview of the attempts at planning in the 1940's. He used Cole's 
criterion of planning for his evaluation viz. -
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"People are apt to talk as if economic systems must 
be wholly planned or wholly planless whereas, in 
fact, no system is either of these things... Though 
planning is a matter of degree, the essential 
difference between mainly planned and mainly 
unplanned economies is that in the one case there 
is a general plan regulating the character, as 
well as the total amount, of production and 
employment, whereas in the other there is not". 
In the Australian case, Mauldon felt that the debate had crystallized too 
much into the plan or no plan stereotype. Eggleston's analysis of 
government activity in Victoria {state Socialism in Victoria) proved in 
a pragmatic way that Australians did not live in a planless society, but 
Mauldon's general conclusion was that "Australia, during most of the decade 
before the Second World War, notwithstanding some decisive developments 
towards comprehensive controls* and the resumption of traditional 
development programmes,** cannot be said to have been an economy guided by 
any 'general plan regulating the character, as well as the total amount of 
production and employment'. We doubtless desired opulence, but no case 
for the use of a 'general plan' as its guarantor had been convincingly 
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accepted on the level of executive action by governments". However, 
it was Mauldon's view that Australia did have a planned economy for the 
last two years of the second world war, and in that period there was one 
overriding purpose in the planning, and that purpose was accorded an over-
whelming unanimity of support. It was a pragmatic development and its 
acceptance did not have to "wait on any doctrinal or theoretical 
justification of over-all planning". He saw Coomb's Joseph Fisher lecture 
in June 1944 as the first such theoretical "straw in the wind to indicate 
how Keynesian doctrine was to play its part in high quarters"; and the 
white paper on full employment was the first occasion on which there had 
been set down "the lineaments of general plan for the Australian economy 
in a time of peace; for, as a prescription for peace, it went far beyond 
83 the requirements for the change-over from war to peace". As for the 
* He listed as examples the Premiers Plan, International Conmodity 
arrangements, the Gentleman's Agreement, and the growth of the 
Cormonwealth Bank's power to control exchange rates and interest rates. 
** including subsidies and other aids to producers he claimed. 
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closing few years of the decade, the postwar period, Mauldon observed that 
it was not possible to answer "yes" or "no" to the question of whether the 
Australian economy was mainly planned -
"What we have been witnessing in the last three and 
a half years is an unequal tug-of-war between the 
will to plan and the forces to be brought into 
subjection to the plan. The plan was, I believe, 
on the whole wisely conceived in terms of its 
objectives, of its recognition of major 
difficulties to be faced, and most of its 
prescriptions. But it was essentially an 
economists' plan. That means it could not embrace 
the strategy of politics which might, or might not, 
be necessary for its fulfilment, nor could it be 
expected to prescribe the psychological and moral 
adjustments needed if the plan was to control. 
We have, indeed, had to witness a weakening of 
the defences of over-all planning since the end 
of the war. The economy today is much more 
suffused with governmental interventions than 
it was before the war, but it would be to put 
a strain upon the language to say that it is 
'mainly planned' in the sense that there is a 
masterful control of economic forces".84 
From 1949 to 1961 the word planning almost ceased to exist in the 
vocabulary of the government. The Liberal-Country Party coalition, with a 
strong free enterprise platform aimed at reduction of all forms of 
government intervention, and reduction of the size of the public sector, 
symbolized by Menzies' efforts to reduce the size of the Commonwealth 
Public Service by 10,000, a goal which was achieved over five years by non 
replacement of wastage. Clearly, this was an environment hostile to any 
form of planning, even if confined to the public sector, and Menzies and 
his colleagues went further, picking up the catch cries of the 1930's and 
reviving the old association between the word "planning" and totalitarianism, 
and doing it extremely effectively. The Australian economy was performing 
very well,especially as a result of the Korean war boom, America and Britain 
were progressing reasonably well without any elaborate planning mechanisms, 
and Australia, like most of the western world,spent the 1950's talking of 
industrialization, economic growth and development, exports, and even 
decentralization - all of this within the general emotional and economic 
environment of postwar reconstruction, free of the restrictions of war time. 
84. ibid., p. 15. 
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Within the arena of federal financial relations Menzies retained the 
centralized system of uniform taxation and the 1950's saw most Premiers' 
Conferences centring around often bitter pleas for the "return" of such 
taxing powers to the states. The Menzies government could see the benefits 
to themselves and to the people of a system of one government imposing and 
collecting income tax at uniform rates across the nation,although in a fit 
of pique he once offered the states the return of the power only to find 
them politely declining the offer. A detailed examination of the federal 
consequences of uniform income tax is given in the next chapter but it 
should be noted here that this created a profound vertical imbalance in the 
Australian federation which, from the point of view of the states, took 
away the largest single component of their revenue raising, and,they claimed, 
caused inevitable difficulties in forecasting and resource allocation. 
The distribution of the income tax revenue became a frequent issue. 
Menzies made a rather uncharacteristic move in 1954 which is of 
considerable interest because it seemed to fly in the face of his opposition 
to both centralism and planning. He argued that, in relation to state 
public works for development, because the Commonwealth was responsible for 
raising large sums of money, it ought to assume some responsibility for its 
expenditure. The 1954 policy speech contained this statement -
"Just as we claim no right to interfere in state 
affairs, so do we say that if we, the Commonwealth, 
are to assume the burden of finding for state works 
many millions out of the taxpayer's money we have 
a duty to the taxpayers to see that the selection 
of works to be done should be guided by their 
true order of national importance. We will 
therefore ask the states to cooperate in the 
creation of a small advisory body of highly expert 
persons to serve as a national development 
Commission, acting in association with the 
Department of National Development, to report to 
both Commonwealth and States upon the economics g^ 
and relative importance of particular proposals". 
85. Sydney Morning Herald, May 6th 1954. 
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(Interestingly, many of these concepts were repeated by Whitlam in the 
period 1972-75 and denounced as socialist and centralist). As Curtis 
suggests, Menzies' notions struck at the very principle of a federal 
compact and in particular the right of states to decide regional 
oc 
interests. (Commonwealth grants to the States for Universities had 
commenced in 1950). The idea of determining truly national priorities 
for public works projects was not new, and it had worked reasonably 
successfully on a more limited scale in relation to the Development and 
Migration Commission, and for a short period through the wartime national 
Coordinator of Works. Nothing much came of this new proposal, and it faded 
into the background, but it was not long before the same philosophical basis 
found its expression in various specific purpose grants to the states 
originated by the Menzies government a few years later. 
The decade of the 1960's produced in Australia quite a different 
situation. In 1961 an overheated economy produced the response of a 
credit squeeze from the national government more severe than had been 
known hitherto. The political result was an election where the Liberal-
Country Party Coalition came perilously close to defeat winning by only 
one seat and then only on Communist Party preferences. The Menzies 
government thus became concerned about the severity of economic fluctuation 
and was persuaded to instigate a "Committee of Economic Enquiry" appointed 
in February 1963. The Committee had broad terms of reference and comprised 
87 
an eminent and influential team headed by James Vernon. The Committee 
submitted their report but the Menzies government refused to make it public, 
thereby fuelling speculation about its contents. When it was finally 
released it became obvious that the Vernon Committee had been extremely 
impressed by the various indicative planning mechanisms in Western Europe 
as well as the role of the Economic Council of Canada. It was the concept 
of interaction and dialogue between the public and private sectors, which 
these overseas examples had accommodated, which attracted them, although 
they were obviously impressed by the economic growth rates of those 
countries as well - especially France and the E.E.C. in general. So the 
Vernon report placed strong emphasis on the need for economic growth but 
not as an end in itself; rather as a means to achieve other economic and 
social aims. Naturally the report contained many recommendations, but for 
86. H. Curtis, "Planning for National Development", Australian Quarterly, 
September 1954, pp. 52-53. 
87. The complete Committee was J. Vernon (Chairman), J.G. Crawford (Vice-
Chairman), P.H. Karmel, D.G. Molesworth, K.B. Myer. 
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our purposes the most interesting was proposed machinery for a permanent 
Advisory Council on Economic Growth,which was quickly construed as a desire 
for attention to forward thinking and appropriate resource allocation. The 
Menzies government managed to ignore the report, because when it was finally 
released,the economy had picked up quite well again and the concerns 
expressed by the Vernon Committee by that stage gave the appearance of being 
mere academic debate. 
The Vernon Committee believed that institutional changes since 1945 
had helped to fill some of the gaps which had made a national economic 
policy difficult to carry out before the war, and they mentioned specifically 
stronger legally constituted central banking, the High Court ruling of 1957 
on uniform taxation, cooperation between Commonwealth and State governments, 
and machinery for government consultation with representative bodies of the 
private sector in the formulation of both general and specific economic 
oo 
measures. In providing the Vernon Committee with its terms of reference 
the Menzies government stated its economic objectives as being "a high rate 
of economic and population growth with full employment, increasing 
productivity, rising standards of living, external viability, and 
stability of costs and prices". The Committee regarded economic growth 
as central to all the other objectives but strongly emphasized that the 
seven objectives stated by the government were interrelated in a very 
complex way. They were quite critical of the government's past emphasis 
on the short term and its attendant "stop-go" policies. In relation to 
government expenditure the Committee made this pertinent comment -
"We do not comment at length on the nature of fiscal 
policy. We think it is generally accepted that 
government expenditure, by state and commonwealth, 
cannot easily be quickly adjusted, consistent with 
efficiency and the interests of long-term development, 
and it is principally on the revenue side that 
manipulative steps have to be taken. The difficulty 
is that under the system of annual budgets in which 
rates of taxation are fixed for a whole financial gg 
year, the possibility for flexibility is limited". 
88. Report of the Committee of Economic Inquiry, Volume 1 (Melbourne: 
Wilkie, 1965), p. 3. 
89. ibid., p. 432. 
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But on public investment a completely different picture -
"As public investment constitutes over one third of 
total investment, it is essential that it be planned 
with due regard for economy. There is scope for 
more co-ordinated long-term planning of public 
investment between the states and the commonwealth 
and for more detailed investigation of the projects 
involved. Subject to this, we believe that there 
is room for extension of the 'specific purpose'Q^ 
type of commonwealth assistance to the states". 
And in respect of the concept of planning -
"we would not, however, suggest anything in the nature 
of a national economic plan involving individual industry 
targets for Australia, as this would require elaborate 
machinery and, in all probability, a considerably 
higher degree of government intervention in the 
economy than would be acceptable in this country. 
...Nevertheless we would see merit in periodical 
statements by the Government that long-term 
policies will be directed to the achievement of a 
certain rate of economic growth".^1 
A little later the Committee went on to stress the importance of governments 
always taking long term trends into consideration in its decision making 
and the experience of other countries was cited in this respect, but nowhere 
were the means of ensuring that this happened spelt out. Perhaps the nearest 
they came to this was the recommendation for an Australian Advisory Council 
somewhat similar to the Canadian Council. They did not comment on the form 
which such a Council would take but its principal functions would include -
"To report as required on particular subjects. 
To prepare an annual review of growth experience 
and long-term prospects. 
To maintain a constant review of and advise on 
trends in overseas investment, development 
problems and any other matters that might be 
referred to it for special attention. 
To undertake, commission and encourage research 
bearing on its field of responsibility, and to 
public research papers".92 
90. ibid. , p. 437. 
91. ibid. , p. 450. 
92. ibid., p. 453. 
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The committee saw the main advantages of such a body being that it would 
provide for a constant yet independent review of long term trends, leading 
to better public understanding of those trends, and the interdependence of 
economic factors which must otherwise lead to dissension between various key 
economic interest groups in the community. The advisory council, they felt 
should be comprised of people chosen for their ability and not as 
representatives of groups; it should be small; have no executive powers 
or responsibilities; with a strong secretariat; and confine itself to 
medium and long term matters. 
The Vernon Report also made a number of significant observations about 
public investment in Australia which went very much unnoticed. There were 
major problems in planning and organizing public investment in the Australian 
federation, they said, and the root of the problem was that although state 
and local governments undertook 80 per cent of public investment, they 
were responsible for raising only part of this amount, because a large part 
of such funds was raised by the Commonwealth under Loan Council borrowing 
programmes, as well as Commonwealth money provided directly under specific 
purpose payments. They went on to make the following pertinent observation -
"9.44 In our discussions with State Governments, we 
noted considerable variation in the degree of forward 
planning of public investment by state authorities and 
in the nature of the planning methods adopted. In most 
cases, state electricity, water, railway and road 
authorities had plans for expenditure for five to ten 
years ahead. However, in some states, even medium 
term planning for education and health appears to be 
lacking. We do not propose to comment further on state 
planning, but we felt the need for a greater degree of 
coordination between states and commonwealth in this 
field".93 
The Vernon committee thought that because specific purpose grants took place 
outside the Loan Council, and involved the Commonwealth directly in the 
problems of the States, they should therefore provide a basis for joint 
commonwealth-state planning of particular projects. However this in 
itself was dangerous, from an overall point of view,because a project by 
project approach increased the tendency to ad hoc bargaining and 
arrangements. 
93. ibid., p. 242. 
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Most of the public response to the Vernon Report focussed on the 
economic content and little attention was directed to the machinery 
recommendations. Menzies labelled the suggestion for a special project 
Commission as useless and an advisory Council as anti-democratic but, as 
was pointed out by at least one author, the existence of these bodies would 
have reduced the government's options and forced it to justify taking any 
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actions against those recommended by such bodies. 
Although the main attempt of the decade to propagate some thinking 
about economic planning had fizzled there were a number of developments 
occurring at this time in the public sector quite unobtrusively. The 
Defence Department, like so many of its counterparts in other countries, 
had moved to five year forward strategies and the determination of annual 
fiscal appropriations in the light of those five year forward projections. 
The post office, late in the decade introduced its own form of the Planning 
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Programming Budgeting System, and,especially in the area of telephone 
installations,began quite sophisticated projections of population 
movements and associated industrial and domestic location patterns. Many 
of the intergovernmental grants and agreements (a lot of them established 
by the Menzies government itself), moved to either a quinquennial system, 
(e.g., roads and housing),or a triennial system,(universities),of resource 
allocation, and even in other areas,such as education and science, annual 
conditional grants were prepared in the light of longer term frameworks. 
These intergovernmental arrangements are analyzed in later chapters but 
their planning perspectives should be noted here. Meanwhile the Loan 
Council continued,as always,to regard annual public works commitments in 
the light of longer term lead-times,although there is substantial evidence 
to show that capital expenditure grants by the national government were 
influenced more by political pork-barrelling than any thought of efficient 
national resource allocation, especially after the various lessons of the 
94. See "Policies for Economic Growth: The Vernon Report - A Review", 
Australian Quarterly, December 1965, pp. 11-25. For an impassioned defence 
of economic planning and concern about the cost of state-rightism to economic 
growth, see R.O. Hieser, "Australian Economic Policy-Making", 
Australian Quarterly, December 1964, pp. 36-48. For an economic 
appraisal of the assumptions in the Vernon Report see B.L. Johns 
"Growth Prospects for the Australian Economy to 1975", Australian 
Quarterly, March 1966, pp. 26-44. 
95. See Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Control in the A.P.O. , 
June 1970. 
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near election defeat in 1961 where it became clear that there was not a
uniform spatial distribution of support for the national government.
There had been some quite pronounced moves by almost all Australian
States in the 1960's to promote industrialization and,in some cases,
decentralization, predominantly by means of carrots rather than sticks.
Preferences were given by all state governments in their own tendering
to "local" firms, a typical pattern being five per cent for firms in that
state over interstate firms, and a further five per cent over international
firms. State governments also fiddled with freight rates, road tax charges,
and especially the provision of cheap land and government guaranteed finance,
in an effort to move industry, but with very limited success~ It seemed to
take a long time for state governments to realize that secondary industry
was not particularly mobile and that, at any event, tertiary industry
made almost two-thirds of the labour forc~ and the largest tertiary industry
of all was the public sector directly under their own control. Indeed state
government employment in Australia has long comprised over sixty per cent
of all government employment. Despite their willingness to intervene in
the market place to influence the private sector to move in desired sectoral
and spatial directions, state governments rarely seemed to consider the
possibility of injecting planning into their own departments and
instrumentalitie~ despite the fact that such action might well have been
more readily effective.
Thus the decade of the 1960's can now be seen as the "decade of
growth" and in Australia it was a period when development, growth,
industrialization, and all related concepts, held preeminence in practical
and academic discussion. More than one writer pointed out that this
growth which was indeed occurring, and being discussed, was taking place
without the benefit of any coherent overall policy. Writing in 1965 Davies
asked a number of related questions viz. "Must the Admiral of the Ship of
State steer by instinct and tradition, trimming his sails to the political
winds of change or can he maintain a relatively steady course to achieve
his set objectives?" and "whether it is possible for the Australian
community to agree on what is meant by 'national (or public) interest"'.
Davies observed (yet again) that there was now no national plan of public
works arranged in order of overall priorities, and "The Commonwealth
cannot enforce its will on overall priorities (assuming that it possesses
a clear conception of such overall priorities, which may be a considerable
*For an account of the measures adopted in one state, Queensland, see Kenneth
Wiltshire, Portuguese Navy: The Establishment of the Queensland Department
of Industrial Development, Brisbane, Royal Institute of Public Administration
1974. '
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assumption). Davies went on to decry the role of the Commonwealth's 
Department of National Development and demonstrated how it failed to 
achieve coordinated development strategies across the federal system. 
In the process he brought to light the fact that the states failed to agree upon 
the Menzies 1954 election promise (which we encountered earlier) for a 
National Development Commission to study public works proposals, and 
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they would not agree to it. In another extremely perceptive article, 
Davies highlighted the hindrances posed by the federal system to national 
development in Australia. He emphasized that, in Australia, the states 
have the main role in development and much is conveyed by his simple 
statement that "National development preceded federalism". He effectively 
conveyedthe inconsistent attitude of the non Labor parties to this question 
by pointing out that in 1957 the Country Party was advocating in its 
platform "Concentration in one planning authority of the Commonwealth and 
state bodies associated with development, accompanied by machinery to 
determine the priority of projects"; however a national government Liberal 
minister declared in 1965 "In this Federation, it will never be possible 
for the Commonwealth to set an order of priorities for all developmental 
works. The States have their own funds and they have the right to say how 
97 those will be used". Some other writers analyzed one portion of the 
public sector to demonstrate the manner in which intergovernmental 
fragmentation of jurisdiction prevented national development in that area. 
Transport figured largely in this exercise and Whitlam,in 1968, 
effectively demonstrated the political and constitutional difficulties 
involved in formulating any coherent national transport policy,when he 
pointed out, inter alia, that there were nine federal ministers, six 
state governments (each with at least six instrumentalities), and 
hundreds of local authorities, involved in regulating the various modes 
go 
of transport. 
96. A.J. Davies, "National Development", Australian Quarterly, 
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Developments of the Seventies 
In the 1970's there were a number of developments within both the 
Commonwealth and state governments which represent fragmented moves 
towards the sort of public sector planning system we are envisaging. The 
one with perhaps the greatest potential was the introduction of forward 
estimates by the Commonwealth Treasury. Their origin is difficult to 
pinpoint from the public record,but their appearance does mark an 
important step because of previous opposition from the treasury to 
forward planning for either public or private sectors. Experience in 
other countries has shown that, if the treasury can be converted to 
planning,the task of introducing a planning framework throughout the 
public sector is expedited. There had been an informal method of three 
year projections of public expenditure commenced in 1965,but they were 
never regarded as firm,and covered only trends in outlays under existing 
policies requiring no cabinet involvement. Weller and Cutt trace the 
beginning of the present forward estimates arrangements to a letter from 
the Treasurer to his colleagues in March 1971. In that letter, "he 
emphasized the shortcomings of the budgetary process and the existing 
schemes and pointed out the need for ministers 'to consider policy and 
expenditure proposals within a framework of the government's known and 
anticipated forward commitments and the resources possibly available... 
99 to meet these commitments'". It would be unrealistic, however to 
presume that the initiative for this move lay personally with the 
Treasurer. The first collection of more formal forward estimates was 
made in October 1971 and they differed from their predecessors in that 
they covered new policies which ministers firmly intended to bring 
forward, were scrutinized in detail by treasury divisions, and were 
updated for policy changes and decisions taken in the annual budget. 
Most importantly, each Minister was now required to indicate that he 
approved the Estimates as a fair representation of his view. The new 
forward estimates were prepared on a rolling three year basis, costs and 
prices were to be assumed as constant at the levels prevailing at the 
time the estimates were prepared (with the treasury itself making any 
necessary adjustments), and the Estimates were not to be regarded as 
firm or unchangeable with opportunities being given throughout the 
99. Patrick Weller and James Cutt, Treasury Control in Australia (Sydney: 
Novak, 1976), p. 70. 
year for a review of the f igures . 
74, 
100 
The Whitlam government, after assuming office in December 1972,embraced 
the concept of forward estimates into its programme and established, in 
early 1973, a Committee of Ministers to consider reports on forward estimates 
submitted by the Treasurer, and serviced by a new entity called the Priorities 
Review Staff which is analyzed later. The impetus for reform in this 
direction was further stimulated in the 1973-74 budget speech which included 
a statement on changes in budget format and presentation. According to 
the document, "the principal change was the introduction of a functional 
classification of budget outlays and receipts and its use as the main 
framework for the detailed discussion of budget policy proposals" In 
addition, national accounting classifications were consistently adopted in the 
Budget Speech and Statements for the definition of outlays and receipts. 
The aim of the new presentation was stated as being "to improve the 
presentation of budget data in order to provide better information for 
decision-making processes of the Government and to provide generally a more 
useful framework for the consideration of policies and their expenditure 
implications... The basic aim of the new functional classification is to 
bring together outlays with like objectives or purposes. In this way it 
aims to reveal more fully information on the nature of Government 
activities, the share of resources devoted to particular objectives and 
to facilitate assessment of the effectiveness of outlays in meeting 
objectives".^°^ 
However the ostensible purpose of the forward estimates was not made 
public until the advent of the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration in 1973, and indeed, the forward estimates themselves have 
never been made public. In a submission to the Royal Commission on 
Australian Government Administration the Commonwealth Treasury said as 
follows -
100. James Cutt, "Program Budgeting", Royal Commission on Australian 
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Appendix IC, p. 83. 
101. Commonwealth of Australia, Treasurer's Budget Speech 1973-74, 
Canberra. Statement No. 8 Changes in Budget Format and Presentation. 
102. ihid., p. 112. 
75. 
"The major purposes of the forward estimates are 
to enable the economic management implications of 
current and proposed programs for future growth 
of public spending to be clearly presented to the 
Treasurer and the government and, secondly, to 
provide a framework within which a full consideration 
of longer-term issues of resource allocation (both 
between the public and private sectors and within 
the public sector) could be undertaken by 
government".103 
Cutt gleaned a third objective from the Treasury papers, viz. "to promote 
flexibility rather than rigidity in public expenditure policy and decision 
making. It is clearly felt that the 'incremental ism' of the existing 
system locks in expenditure decisions, and that greater room for 
104 
manoeuvre would be obtained under the forward estimates procedure". 
In January of 1974 the Treasury prepared an internal paper dealing 
with problems which had been encountered in preparing forward estimates of 
105 
government outlays. In that paper the Treasury claimed that the basic 
objective in establishing procedures for the collection of forward estimates 
was to enable the government to assess, against the background of resources 
available in the economy, its commitments and priorities, and to take action 
that would allow expenditures to be directed towards the fulfilment of 
those priorities and the achievement of its longer term objectives. The 
paper explained that under the existing procedures for annual budgeting 
the size and shape of total expenditure had always been determined largely 
by previous decisions. Given the short time available to effect changes 
in many expenditure programmes such as payments to the states and other 
special appropriations, little could be done to make changes which would 
be effective in the budget year. However, it was not envisaged that 
forward estimates would ever replace the annual budget, the paper said, 
and also added that "guidelines that are the outcome of a forward 
estimates exercise at any one time cannot, and certainly should not, be 
taken as irrevocable commitments not susceptible to adjustment at relatively 
short notice". 
103. Treasury Submission to the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration, Attachment B, 2d. 
104. Cutt, op.cit. , p. 83. 
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The key featureof this Treasury paper was the list of problems which 
had been encountered in the preparation of the forward estimates, and this 
list is highly instructive for our purposes. The first problem was the 
lack of "hard" data on likely developments which had caused line departments 
to fall back on rough trend analysis usually based merely on an extra-
polation of past trends. Mention was also made of the fact that the 
estimates for capital works were prepared more or less in isolation from 
estimates from the remainder of each programme, with the consequence that 
the relationship between capital costs and the programme objectives became 
obscured. Then there was the "taper problem" i.e., the tendency for 
departments to pack everything into year 1 with lesser estimates for years 
2 and 3 reflecting the bargaining nature of the old budgetary process and 
the mental predisposition of public servants to think only one year ahead. 
This,in turn,was linked to an organizational dilemma in that the bulk of 
the estimation task was falling on the shoulders of the finance staff of 
the departments and, whilst these people were highly skilled in costing 
and control of expenditures, they were not usually fully informed of the 
details of policy development,and did not have the time or training to 
carry out detailed studies of new policy options and the factors underlying 
expenditure growth. Another difficulty was the timing of forward 
estimates preparation which clashed with the timing of requests for the 
budget,especially in December/January,when recreation leave was at its 
peak! Yet another identifiable technical difficulty was the fact that a 
proportion of the expenditure of many departments involved requirements to 
be met by other departments, for example in office facilities and equipment. 
A more conceptual difficulty lay in the task of distinguishing between 
"new" and "continuing" policy expenditure related to a large extent to 
the difficulty of interpreting cabinet decisions. 
These problems notwithstanding,it was only a short time before the 
Commonwealth Public Service Board introduced a system of manpower forward 
estimates under the highly deceptive title of "manpower planning". The 
system was similar to that of the financial forward estimates, but the 
programme format used for manpower was different from that used by 
Treasury and little attempt was made to make them comparable. The Public 
Service Board, like the Treasury,never attempted to make a formal link 
between the forward estimates and the upcoming budget and the manpower 
forward estimates,in particular,were always seen as something of a sham 
because the government retained the use of staff ceilings, a very blunt 
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short term instrument,which tended to override any true long term 
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consideration. 
Naturally, the new government in December 1972 produced a number of 
profound changes and some of them are relevant to our analysis. The ALP 
platform had promised machinery for indicative planning but nothing came 
of that in the life of the Whitlam government. What did eventuate was 
the Coombs Task Force which conducted a review of the continuing expenditures 
of the previous government in order to see which programmes had outlived 
their purpose,and where savings could be made to make room for spending on 
public sector spending which Labor was anxious to increase in specific 
sectors. The report of that committee represents perhaps the most rational 
reappraisal of government priorities from first principles ever conducted 
in Australia in modern times,and it found many government programmes whose 
objectives had either been met long ago,or were no longer relevant or worth 
pursuing. Another innovation of the Whitlam government was the establishment 
of a Priorities Review Staff, mentioned previously, which was supposed to 
be modelled on the Central Policy Review Staff (The Rothschild Think Tank) 
in Great Britain. However it was not directly modelled on its British 
equivalent because it was not tacked on to cabinet as a whole,and so did 
not really have the macro view of public sector priorities necessary to 
comment laterally and objectively about resource allocation over all 
government activity on any long term thinking which was capable of being 
implemented. The positioning of the Priorities Review Staff under the 
Prime Minister was a sensible beginning, and its first report Goals and 
Strategies was a good attempt at a think tank role,but it was soon to 
be shunted to other ministers and given narrower assignments relating to 
particular parts of the public sector, and so it lost the macro viewpoint 
and the priority advisory role, as well as the leverage of the Prime 
Minister. One of the main difficulties,(which is important as it is 
illustrative of Australian political and administrative culture), was that 
members of the Labor caucus itself, all seemed unable to come to grips with 
the concept of a government appointed body engaging in constructive 
criticism of government policies from first principles, a concept which 
other countries have found to be essential to public sector planning. 
106. For a detailed description of the attempts at manpower forward 
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A similar fate befell the Whitlam government's attempts at open government 
with a media unaccustomed to interpreting internal discussion within 
government in a sophisticated way, and so painting a picture for the 
public of disharmony and inability to coordinate policy. This was 
accentuated by Labor government moves to establish a number of Commissions 
of an advisory nature to supplement advice emanating from the public 
service - traditionally the exclusive source of policy advice. In those 
policy areas where the Labor platform was strong and well thought through, 
programmes with long term aims emerged and often were linked with inter-
governmental agreements of the same nature (we examine them in subsequent 
chapters). By the same token,some of the older established longer term 
intergovernmental agreements began to break down,especially when non-Labor 
state governments objected to the changes being made to them by the Labor 
national government for ideological reasons. 
The Whitlam government had also, early in its life, established a 
number of Royal Conmissions including the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration chaired by Dr. Coombs. That Royal Commission 
brought down in 1975 a number of findings which were conducive to public 
sector planning including a recommended Department of Industries and the 
Economy, DINDEC, which would be concerned with the longer term relationships 
between the public and private sector and economic development in general. 
Nothing came of that proposal. The Coombs Commission was also powerfully 
attracted to the concept of the financial and manpower forward estimates 
which had by that time been somewhat refined by the Treasury and the Public 
Service Board. Indeed they saw these systems as the key to efficient 
forward planning of resource allocation and recommended their development, 
together with the cessation of short term expedient controls over public 
sector growth such as staff ceilings. Towards the end of the Whitlam 
government, the Jackson committee on manufacturing found a malaise in that 
sector and dim prospects for the future, and as part of the solution 
recommended the establishment of tripartite machinery for government, 
business, and trade unions. A touch of indicative planning was set up 
independently for the housing sector, and a variety of urban and regional 
programmes with a strong planning component were well underway, including 
growth centres, when the Whitlam government suddenly lost office in 
November 1975. 
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Whilst in opposition in the national pariiament, the Liberal/National 
parties took the opportunity to formulate some new policies in a 
comprehensive manner for a number of areas of government activity. One 
of these was a "new federalism" policy the details of which are examined 
in the next chapter. This policy provided as its overall thrust for a 
greaterdevolution of government activity from the national government to 
lower levels of government with a commensurate emphasis on increased 
revenue raising by the lower levels of government as well. In itself this 
aspect of the new federalism policy was bound to be policy fragmentary, but 
other aspects such as the continuation of various intergovernmental 
ministerial conferences, the establishment of some new ones, and provision 
for an Advisory Council for Inter-government Relations, allowed for a 
retention of mechanisms for the harmonization of policies between the levels. 
On coming to government in 1975,the Eraser government virtually copied 
the style of the Whitlam government in appointing a committee of review 
chaired by Sir Henry Bland, (and including a state public servant), to advise 
on rearrangement of national government resource allocation to take account 
of the policy and ideology of the incoming government. However, unlike 
the Coombs Task Force, the Bland Expenditure Review Committee's report was 
never published so it was difficult to know at the time whether the process 
of their review involved a fresh appraisal of public sector resource 
allocation from first principles. An analysis of the findings of that 
committee drew heavily on submissions which were made to it by all the 
state governments, and its basic terms of reference included heavy stress 
on the Eraser government's desire to shift expenditure to the states and 
make them more responsible politically for the resources they dispersed. 
We now know that the main thrust of that Bland Committee Report was to 
reverse the trend of national domination which had occurred through the 
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use of special purpose grants and advisory commissions. 
Since 1975 there have been very few substantive policy decisions by 
the Eraser government which bear any resemblance to public sector planning 
as we have defined it. The findings of many inquiries,each of which 
108. See C.P. Harris, Relationships between Federal and State Governments 
in Australia, Advisory Council for Inter-government Relations 
Information Paper No. 6 (Canberra: A.G.P.S., 1979). 
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pointed towards the injection of more rationality into government priority 
determination and forward thinking, were ignored or shelved or received 
slow and cumbersome deliberation by cabinet committees backed up by the 
usual laybrinth of interdepartmental committees in Canberra. The forward 
estimates in particular, whilst still continuing, are now regarded by all 
participants as little more than an academic exercise. Both Labor and 
non Labor ministers proved to be unable or unwilling to rank order programmes 
within their own portfolios, and the Eraser government has been at pains to 
distance itself from any notion of planning, thus maintaining the party's 
old ideological predispositions. The government also claims that if the 
forward estimates were regarded as a planning document, the public would 
misunderstand the need to alter the estimates from time to time,and falsely 
accuse the government of missing its targets. The net effect is that there 
is still only the vaguest of links between the forward estimates and each 
annual budget,so that the forecasting element is not linked to any 
implementation device,and so cannot be regarded as planning according to 
A f- •^ - 109 our definition. 
An official of the national Department of Finance, speaking in 
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1978, admitted that the forward estimates had not been used in quite 
the way that was intended in the textbooks. He claimed that their main 
purpose now was "to provide a framework in which ministers can take 
decisions affecting the level and composition of budget outlays", and 
"the first year's data of these forward estimates have become advanced 
'bids' for funds in the year imnediately ahead". This was because of the 
usual bureaucratic difficulties we have observed earlier but also because, 
in his words, "Governments have shown no inclination to frame three-year 
budgets". Interestingly, he saw the new House of Representatives 
Standing Conmittee of Expenditure, (established in 1976) as having caused 
greater evaluation of the purposes of government spending, but if one 
examines the report of that committee it can be seen that such review, 
though fresh and valuable in its own right, is conducted on a programme 
or sector review basis and not across the whole public sector. 
109. For other more detailed comment on the problems of the forward 
estimates see Patrick Weller and James Cutt, op.cit., pp. 70-73 and 
Patrick Weller, "Forward Estimates and the Allocation of Resources" 
in Public Service Inquiries in Australia, eds. R.F. Smith and 
P. Weller, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), 
pp. 203-218. 
110. B.W. Eraser, "Recent Developments Affecting the Outlay Side of the 
Commonwealth's Budget" in Recent Developments in Budgeting, ed. 
R.L. Mathews, pp. 1-10. 
Part of the difficulty faced by the Eraser government has been that 
the economic situation of the late 1970's has produced common thinking in 
the Western world that public sector cutbacks are one of the key strategies 
for attacking the inflation rate, and it is very difficult to implement a 
policy of devolution of public expenditure to lower levels, when the size of 
that public expenditure has to contract appreciably (according to the 
government's economic policies at any rate). Nonetheless, there have been 
a number of programmes devolved to the states, strong suggestions of moves 
to block funding rather than programme funding, and some agreements reached 
at intergovernmental meetings for responsibility sharing. All of these 
developments have further fragmented public policy making and given the 
appearance of ad hocery,especially when combined with a number of stop/start 
procrastinations in relation to income tax indexation, temporary income tax 
surcharges, medibank levy, pension indexation, family trusts, sales tax 
exemptions etc. Not all of these have direct federal implications but 
they provide powerful evidence of a drift well and truly away from 
rational public policy making and planning. 
Developments in the Australian States 
During the 1970's there have been a number of innovations,introduced 
by some of the state governments in Australia,designed to at least stream-
line public policy formulation and in some cases to engage in forward 
thinking. The Victorian Treasury has for some time engaged in what it 
calls "forward looks" in loan expenditure. These are examined in 
later chapters but the essential feature of them is that government bodies 
are required each year to project their loan requirements on a three year 
and six year basis. The forward looks are not published,and are not the 
subject of executive action by the government,but they serve as a framework 
for annual allocations despite the fact that there is only limited 
participation within that state government in such annual allocation. 
Another significant development in Victoria has been the establishment of 
a State Coordination Council which comprises the permanent heads of the 
main state government agencies and is serviced by a secretariat in the 
111. These developments are outlined briefly by R.G. Webster, "Recent 
Victorian Developments which affect forward works planning" in 
Recent Developments in Budgeting, ed. R.L. Mathews, pp. 15-20. 
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premier's office. This body provides at least for communication around 
the government of coming programmes and their likely impact on various 
sectors. It has no executive power. The Victorian Treasury in the mid 
1970's amalgamated its Consolidated Revenue Fund and its Loan Fund to 
produce one single Consolidated Fund thereby reducing the fragmentation 
in government accounting,and also making it easier to identify complete 
resource allocation across the public sector, or at least that part of it 
which comes within the state budget. Despite recommendations from the 
112 Bland Committee on Victorian Government administration, which would 
have resulted in a reduction in the number and autonomy of independent 
statutory bodies in that state, and a much greater degree of central 
coordination especially over environmental matters, very little action 
has been taken in this respect and Victoria still has the lowest 
proportion of its government workforce under the Public Service Act and 
a very low proportion of government expenditure coming within the budget 
sub-sector. Specifically the first report of this (Bland) Inquiry had 
this to say -
"6,17 A major issue in the years ahead will be the form 
and structure of public administration and the machinery 
of government best designed to secure that the optimum 
in public administration is achieved. 
6.18 If strategic planning has long had a place in the 
fields of foreign affairs and defence and its importance 
has in latter years come to be recognized in large scale 
industrial and commercial enterprises, it has only recently 
had attention for its application to government at large. 
6.19 The shortcomings of the annual budget have long 
been noted. The predilection of governments to react to 
day to day pressures is notorious. If there should be 
well formulated long term objectives, it may often 
be a matter of chance that the decisions taken in 
response to temporal and sectional pressures neatly 
fit into the long term objectives. 
112. There were four reports of the Bland Inquiry titled Report of the 
Board of Inquiry into the Victorian Public Service (Melbourne 
Government Printer). The first and second reports were 1974, the 
third and fourth in 1975. For reviews of these reports see Jean 
Holmes, "The Victorian Inquiry" in Public Service Inquiries in 
Australia, eds. R.F. Smith and P. Weller, (St. Lucia: University 
of Queensland Press, 1978). 
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"6.20 Yet the formulation of long term policy objectives 
cannot proceed in any abstract way. It depends on the 
analysis of wide ranging data including available 
resources - personnel and physical - and calls for 
selectivity and determination of priorities. Essential 
are inputs from many disciplines, the weighing of 
benefits against costs and an overlay of political 
value judgements. The United Kingdom has responded 
to this problem by appointing a small multidisciplinary 
Central Policy Review Staff, housed within the Cabinet 
Office under the supervision of the Prime Minister, 
working for Ministers collectively."113 
Despite the attention which Sir Henry Bland drew to the need for 
planning in the Victorian public sector, his reports contain no actual 
recommendation directed towards this end. One particularly significant 
development in Victoria was the establishment in the late 1970's of a 
Public Bodies Review Committee, a joint parliamentary committee to review 
the operations of the numerous non-ministerial organizations in the public 
sector of that state. The Committee was given a brief to recommend 
rationalization of the activities of these organizations with an unusual 
power in that its recommended changes would be tabled in the House and 
would be implemented, unless parliament acted to the contrary within a 
fixed period of time. At the time of writing the first report of this 
Committee had been tabled and promised considerable changes in the 
direction of eliminating many of these organizations and reallocating 
their functions and making them more accountable. 
In South Australia the Corbett Inquiry Report of 1975 had little 
to say about public sector planning itself, although it did dwell on some 
of the prerequisites for such planning, particularly central coordination, 
reduction of the number of administrative units of government and 
establishment of priority oversight machinery. The last mentioned factor 
became crystallized in their recommendation of a broader use of the 
South Australian Priorities and Planning Advisory Committee, a central 
body comprised of a minister and the heads of the central government 
agencies ostensibly to advise that government on the macro allocation of 
113. ibid.. First Report, p. 44. 
113A. Public Bodies Review Committee, First Report to the Parliament on the 
Activities of the Public Bodies Review Committee (Melbourne: 
Government Printer, December 1980). 
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resources and hence the determination of priorities. However, in reality, 
114 
according to most commentators, it has fallen well short of that ideal. 
A Department of Economic Planning and Development was established a little 
later to stimulate the private sector and strengthen the industrial base 
of that state's economy. The South Australian Treasury has moved to the 
concept of a two-year budget, the only Australian state to do so, (although 
funds are still actually allocated annually), and there were firm intentions 
to move gradually even further into public sector planning through longer 
term capital and recurrent spending. 
In reviewing developments and systems of procedures in South Australia 
in the 1970's the Under Treasurer of that state has described them as 
falling into three main groups -
114. See for example Dean Jaensch, "The South Australian Inquiry" in R.F.I. 
Smith and Patrick Weller (eds.), op.cit., pp. 70-88. 
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'(a) Those concerned primarily with improving forecasting 
with the objective of facilitating planning and 
getting better use of resources. These involve 
systems in which Treasury has taken the initiative 
in respect of both the loan and revenue budgets. 
(b) Broader reviews of government activity bearing on 
the budget process. These have been introduced in 
more recent times and involve the participation of 
departments other than Treasury - those of the 
Public Service Board, the Auditor-General and the 
Premier, in particular the Board. 
(c) Those dealing with the review of appropriation and 
accounting processes, of budget papers and presentation 
of material to Parliament and of financial legislation". 115 
He saw one of the most important innovations in the first category as 
being the Loan Guidelines Doctment,vihich is the name given to the papers 
which bring together the material relevant in forecasting capital programmes. 
He described it as "a rolling programme in which each year sets out Treasury's 
estimates of the capital funds likely to be available to the Government 
in future years (either through loan programmes approved by Loan Council 
or from recoveries of moneys spent previously), which has regard to the 
probable movements on Revenue Account (that is to say whether Revenue 
Account may support Loan Account or require support from it), which 
assesses and comments on the departmental requirements as advised, and 
which sets out proposed allocations for departments within the constraints 
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of the overall funds likely to be available". It was claimed that this 
process had been useful to cabinet in determining relative priorities for 
expenditure because it made the options clearer. It had also helped 
departments in their planning. It eliminated the "end of year 
syndrome" because funds were allowed to be carried forward from year to 
year. However, there had been a tendency for the guidelines to be regarded 
as firm intentions rather than estimates and a promise of the allocation of 
funds. It has been South Australian experience that it is more difficult 
to forecast their Revenue Account than their Loan Account,and an explanation 
offered is that whereas available funds for capital purposes can be 
115. R.D. Barnes, "Recent Developments in Budgeting in South Australia" in 
Recent Developments in Budgeting, ed. R.L. Mathews, p. 34. 
116. ibid. 
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estimated more confidently, in the recurrent area a State government can 
influence the total availability of funds by its own efforts in taxes, 
fees, and charges. It could be that departments who are aware of this 
find it harder to cut back expanded or new services. It is also true that 
there is a much greater variety of services to be financed through a 
Revenue Account. For these and other reasons the South Australian government 
endeavours to view recurrent and capital funds together and not isolated 
into the two separate accounts. 
New South Wales had experienced a review of its machinery of government, 
(borrowing on Canadian experience in Ontario in the early 1970's),under 
Premier Tom Lewis,and the results promised some rationalization of the 
cabinet and administrative structure, but the loss of government in the 
state by the Liberals meant that these reforms were not implemented. "^ ^^  
The Wran government took some swift action after gaining power in 1976 to 
strengthen the policy coordination role of the Premier's Department and 
reining in the statutory corporations, especially in relation to the large 
sums of money they held in trust funds. Moves were also set in train 
to begin a slow process of amalgamation of local authorities by means of a 
Boundaries Commission. To date there has been no wholesale streamlining 
of the machinery of government or instalment of forward planning processes. 
The New South Wales Under Treasurer claimed, in 1978, that three or five 
year programming in both the capital and recurrent areas had been established. 
The government, he said, had provided two year allocations to departments 
and authorities on the capital side, thereby giving them a three year forward 
period with firm allocations for the current year and forecasts for the 
following two years. However, this procedure had not been adopted for the 
recurrent budget and he was deeply skeptical of the value of such a concept, 
although he paid lip service to the usefulness of forward estimates in what 
he called "planning and preparing for future financial policies and budget 
strategies". He did make the important observation that many decisions made 
in one year's budget committed the budgets in future years, and capital 
expenditure decisions also carried major budget implications for the future. 
117. For an analysis of the suggested N.S.W. reforms see B. Moore. 
"Machinery of Government Changes in New South Wales", Public 
Administration, {Sydney), XXIV(2), June 1975. 
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e.g., hospitals, gaols and welfare homes. (One example given was a 
teaching hospital complex whose running costs would exceed its capital 
118 
costs after only two and a half years0 
However the greatest promise of reform in the public sector lies in 
the work of the Review of New South Wales Government Administration 
established by the Wran government soon after coming into office,and being 
conducted by a single commissioner Professor Peter Wilenski. At the time 
of writing only an interim report had been publicly issued but many of 
its recommendations have already been implemented. Space prevents a 
comprehensive analysis of this report, but a number of its comments were 
extremely pertinent to this study and must be mentioned. There was seen to 
be a major deficiency in the area of policy formulation and programme 
review, and recommendations were made for a Priorities Review Unit "to 
examine priorities from the point of view of government as a whole and 
analyze issues without a vested interest in the outcome". (This 
recommendation was influenced by the issues of the C.P.R.S. and the 
AustralianP.R.S. in providing a macro viewpoint across the whole public 
sector). Other recommendations on this aspect included the need for policy 
units within departments and agencies, the retention of some control 
and review of policy in the Premier's Department, and the sporadic use of 
task forces to respond to urgent situations which cross departmental 
boundaries. In relation to budgeting the report observed "Not all 
control and management and planning should take place within the budget 
cycle " because of the fear of overloading. It suggested that some sort 
of machinery for review of priorities and evaluation of programmes should 
be established in close proximity to the budget process so that the 
results could be fed into budgetary decisions. The report lamented the 
fragmentation and lack of central control of the New South Wales 
government budget,as well as the distinct separation of the current and 
capital elements of the budget, and observed that the budgetary process 
itself was purely incremental in nature. 
118. N. Oakes, "Budget Developments in New South Wales" in Recent 
Developments in Budgeting, ed. R.L. Mathews, pp. 11-14. 
119. Directions for Change, Interim Report of the Review of New South 
Wales Government Administration, Sydney, 1977. 
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The Review made some incisive remarks about forward estimates with a 
short examination of experience in Britain and at the Australian national 
government level. The report concluded -
"2.41 Forward estimates, i.e., estimates of expenditure 
in years beyond the current one, are an essential 
element in good budgetary procedures. They can generally 
assist the preparation of the current budget by showing 
the future implications of current decisions, where the 
government is going, and what room there is likely to 
be for new programmes. 
2.42 Much, however, depends on their method of preparation 
and presentation. Forward estimates can become simply 
a 'wish list' which gives a distorted picture of likely 
future trends or they can lock expenditure into ongoing 
programmes 
2.46 With British and Australian experience in mind, 
it would seem that the simplest and most valuable role 
for forward estimates in New South Wales would be to 
provide reliable information to Ministers and officials 
on the estimated future costs of ongoing programmes of 
expenditure under existing policies. Providing the 
government with a clearer picture about the future 
implications of current activities and intentions under 
current policies would assist decision making on the 
current year's expenditures and be a tool for choice 
rather than a pre-emption of it".120 
The report also advocated a better presentation of public accounts data 
for the state including the use of programme and output classifications. 
In relation to specific recommendations in this area the report of the 
review stated that there were six areas where change was essential -
". Clearer and more formal expression of government 
priorities in a form that can give budgetary decisions. 
. The development of means to ensure that ongoing 
programmes compete with new ones for resources. 
. The development of a comprehensive State Capital 
Budget. 
. Increased emphasis on policy analysis and programme 
evaluation to feed into budgetary decisions. 
. Moves towards bringing capital and recurrent 
expenditure budgets closer together. 
. Improvements in information systems and better 
presentation of data".121 
120. ibid., p. 39. 
121. ibid. , p. 44. 
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To achieve these aims the report recommended inclusion of all semi-
government bodies in the budget sector, establishment of a special 
Capital Works Unit in the Treasury, three year forward estimates to 
cover both capital and recurrent programmes, an earlier budget cycle, 
and new review and management processes. A little later, especially in 
relation to public works, the report draws attention to the lack of 
coordination of policies within the state government and the need for 
greater physical and economic forecasting, land use and corporate planning. 
Some caustic remarks were passed about earlier attempts in New South Wales 
at corporate planning whereby agencies were asked to identify their 
objectives, the means to achieve those objectives, and the constraints 
likely in meeting them over the next three, six, and ten years. The 
exercise had proved fairly useless because there was no overall meaning to 
the total exercise, the "plans" were extremely variable in quality and 
the bulk of them were just "motherhood" statements. 
There have been very few developments in any other states in the 
direction of public sector planning. Queensland has had a long history of 
the existence of separate administrative machinery for capital works 
expenditure. Commencing with the Bureau of Industry in the depression 
period,capital works were seen as having a prime role in the stimulation 
of overall economic development. At the end of the 1940's, a Coordinator 
General of Works was established subsuming the Bureau and reinforcing the 
separation of the oversight of public capital expenditure from recurrent 
expenditure,but with little attention to any firm forward coordinated plan. 
In relation to recurrent expenditure, the Queensland Treasury, like most 
state treasuries in Australia, has long resisted any attempts at firm 
forward estimates or other planning processes, although progress has been 
made on fiscal relationships between central agencies and departments and 
effective external and internal auditing including efficiency audits. 
For a short while in the 1970's Queensland instituted a system of regional 
coordination involving local governments grouped by region in direct 
communication with the Coordinator General of Works and hence the Premier, 
but this was abandoned in 1977. 
In 1975 Queensland established a Priorities Review Committee, comprising 
the permanent heads of the four key central coordinating departments, 
ostensibly to obtain an overview of the prospective budget before it was 
finally formulated, but to date that committee has only been concerned 
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with small savings in certain specific items such as travel and the use of 
government vehicles. Queensland remains the only Australian state not to 
have had a major review of its public administration in the 1970's. At 
the time of writing, such reviews were taking place in Tasmania (the Cartland 
review), and Western Australia, (inquiry announced by the Premier on March 
3rd 1978). 
It is highly significant that all of the inquiries into state government 
administration in Australia in the 1970's have recommended rationalization 
of the structure of government by means of a reduction in the number of 
units of government, more central oversight of statutory authorities, better 
communication between various parts of the administration, centralization 
of priority determination, and the need for more refined advice on broad 
policy options to cabinets. They have, however, had little to say about 
federal-state-local relations or, more particularly, the role of parliament 
in the light of their suggested reforms of the machinery of government. It 
is true that during the period of the Whitlam Labor national government, 
the Australian state governments paid much closer attention to their own 
allocation of resources and tightened up the oversight of priority 
determination across their own public sectors considerably. This was 
epitomized by the creation of units within the Premier's Departments of 
all state governments to handle the oversight of federal-state relations, 
but this new central oversight was never more than a loose and temporary 
arrangement in any state,and with the passing of the Whitlam government 
both the units and the policy coordination they symbolized have fallen 
into relative disuse. 
In Retrospect 
From this albeit brief consideration of Australian experience it is 
clear that there has never been a system of planning of the kind we have 
defined. In relation to Australia as a whole the nearest situation arose 
in the second world war when all levels and units of government were drawn 
into a highly coordinated framework supervised from a central point. When 
an attempt was made to transfer certain powers between levels of government 
to provide for a formal centralization of power to facilitate planning 
for postwar reconstruction, it failed. Thus any coordination and joint 
priority determination between levels of government in Australia has had 
to be performed on a cooperative and informal basis. Attempts at planning 
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within each level of government have been limited and sporadic for other 
reasons. In respect of both relationships between levels of government, 
and developments within one level of government, the hindrances to the 
attainment of public sector planning have been as much political as they 
have been administrative or economic. 
There are lessons to be drawn from the planning attempts we have 
observed arising out of Australian experience -
(a) They have all been piecemeal attempts in the sense 
that they have been directed at pragmatic solutions 
to specific problems, and have never been part of any 
comprehensive framework for the whole public sector. 
(b) All of the attempts have been ad hoc. Whenever a 
planning mentality has emerged,and appropriate decision 
making and administrative structures have been devised, 
it has always been as if the architects and participants 
sensed the arrangements would only be temporary and 
were only required because of "abnormal" circumstances. 
(c) The vast bulk of planning attempts in Australian history 
have been micro attempts. That is to say, they have 
been concerned with only one sector of government activity 
and often only a portion of that sector. The few attempts 
made on a macro basis e.g. the Priorities Review Staffs, 
or other central priority review mechanisms,have become 
quietly diverted into one or two sectors or have only 
dabbled in a marginal way across the public sector or 
focussed on a single resource or item of expenditure. 
(d) Every move towards public sector planning has been a 
short term consideration. They have either been directed 
at a problem or economic or social situation which was 
relatively shortlived. Where the system has been 
established with a permanent intention, it has usually 
lasted only for a couple of years. 
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(e) Just about all of the planning machinery ever created 
in Australia has been advisory. It has rarely been 
given any executive powers or, more importantly, 
linked to any implementation process whereby the 
forecasts being made could be put into effect. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FEDERALISM 
I: The Concept of Federalism 
Here we shall be concerned with the concept of federalism and, in 
particular, whether it seems to possess any conceptual characteristics 
which would present inherent hindrances to implementation of the planning 
system previously outlined. 
There is no comprehensive theory of federalism although there is a 
multitude of definitions of "federalism", a score of more single descriptive 
frameworks, and a plethora of different "types" of federalism, all of which 
involve the use of a preceding adjective e.g., "cooperative federalism", 
"coordinate federalism" etc. Federalism theory is still evolving and it 
is interesting to look at some aspects of that evolution. 
In the first place each theory has arisen within the confines of a 
particular discipline. Thus, for many, it was the lawyers and specifically 
constitutional lawyers who pioneered this area, (at least in twentieth 
century terms). Wheare's classic study is usually the starting point for 
other modern day theorists, most of whom take great delight in proving his 
federalism concept inapplicable to particular federations or components 
of them, or who seek to find internal incompatibilities in the construct 
of the Wheare formulation, or object to its static two dimensional portrayal. 
It has been predominantly political scientists and sociologists who have 
spearheaded this revulsion from the legal perception of federalism as 
exemplified by writers such as Friedrich, Livingston, Riker, Wildavsky, 
and most recently Davis. However these authors have proved just as 
discipline-bound and their theories sit easily only within the boundaries 
of their own terminology. They are also just as adept as constitutional 
lawyers at simply borrowing models derived from other aspects of their 
discipline, and attempting to bring them to bear,(unrefined and unmodified), 
on federalism. The above comments are just as applicable to economists 
and here it has been mainly within the sub-discipline of public finance 
that writers like Musgrave, Scott, Breton, Prest and Cutt have sought to 
iploy theories of allocation, stabilization and distribution, derived from em 
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unitary systems or in relation to only one level of government, to the 
situation of split levels of public revenue raising and expenditure typical 
of federations. This leads to a quite naive approach whereupon most of 
these economic theorists seem to regard federalism as an aberration from 
the simple world of centralized resource allocation and it is, therefore, 
not surprising that they regard the solution to the federal "problem" as 
a mere harmonization of allocation and distribution decisions. Other 
disciplines, notably geography and history, have derived theories of 
federal ism,mostly tangential to the mainstream of their curricula, and 
certainly with the same "blinkers" strapped firmly in place. Public 
Administration, to the extent that it is a discipline, is able, by its 
amorphous nature to make use of all these other bounded approaches, and it 
rests closely to (or within) political science in claiming to be able to 
subsume other disciplinary approaches to the extent that the political 
system can ultimately cap all other sub-elements of the process of resource 
and value determination. Nevertheless there still is no overarching theory 
of federal ism,even from political scientists,and the theoretical literature 
still consists of a bibliography of remnants each to be found in the call 
numbers and shelves of discrete disciplines. 
A second related aspect is that although federalism theories,1 ike all 
social science theories,are a blend of intellectual derivation and 
empirical observation, they tend to comprise more of the latter than the 
former. That is to say,federalism theories seem to be derived more from 
abstractions with strong roots in observations of particular federations, 
than from any logically derived conceptions based on abstract notions of 
the state or society as a whole. Thus there have been no "ideal-types" 
presented. Each theory reads more like a comparative framework constructed 
to fit at least one, but often more,federal systems. This appears to lead 
to a third feature which is an observable nationalistic streak in many of 
the theories. Perhaps this is unavoidable because the United States of 
America is obviously the outstanding example of the modern era of federalism 
and few writers on federal theory are able to ignore it, so that any theory 
derived must at least fit the United States. To a less appreciable extent 
most of the theories also reflect something of the characteristics of the 
system in which the author resides or knows best. Maybe this is simply a 
reflection of the fact that there is a variety of federal systems 
throughout the world. 
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Fourthly there has been, at least in the theories developed in the 
1950's and 1960's,an aura of uncertainty about the future and stability of 
federalism as a practice and as a concept. It has often been described as 
a temporary phenomenon, a phase through which politics pass on the way 
towards becoming unitary systems or on the path to structural breakdown. 
This fear is not to be found in more recent theories,perhaps for the simple 
reason that federations appear to have established their endurance - most 
of them at least. But this earlier hesitancy in the literature has led to 
a fifth, more basic,conflict amongst theorists viz. the question of whether 
federalism theories ought themselves to be static or dynamic. Now the 
conceptual stance of Wheare and many other constitutional lawyers is 
unmistakably static in that they saw federalism as a system pervaded by a 
series of constant relationships between its parts, and clearly delineated 
formal relationships at that. In all probability this simply reflects a 
lawyer's view of the world, any world. The contribution of the other 
social sciences, and particularly political science and sociology,has been 
to depict federalism as a dynamic concept with relationships which may 
change in something of a kaleidescopic manner,those relationships being 
caused by informal as well as formal aspects of the system with any 
necessary equilibrium occurring naturally but above all dynamically. 
Obviously, the dynamic theories lose a little in precision,but they have 
the advantage of explaining the functioning as well as the structure of 
the federal system,and thus are able to accommodate descriptions of shifts 
in the relationships between parts of the system, the question of when a 
federation ceases to be a federation notwithstanding. 
The aspects outlined above seem to be applicable to most theories of 
federalism but the decade of the 1970's has seen literature bedevilled by 
other "problems". Generally speaking these stem from the desire by authors 
to attempt to apply general theories of political, economic, or social 
behaviour to systems which are federal without taking account of the 
uniqueness of federalism itself. The most noticeable aspect of this trend 
is the new literature of "intergovernmental relations" which seeks to 
provide an umbrella discussion framework which can subsume and even replace 
the older notion of "federalism". In the process, however, it loses sight 
of such important features as the divided sovereignty in federal systems 
between national and sub-national units and, since most of the writers in 
this school are Americans, it tends also to neglect the intrinsic difference 
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between republican and monarchical forms of government,and most importantly 
the special problems of reconciling the somewhat irreconcilable conceptual 
differences between the principles of accountability under the Westminster 
model of government and the inherent notions of federalism itself. It is 
perhaps understandable that this lastmentioned point escapes an American or 
European writer, but a Canadian or Australian potential theorist is well 
aware of the difficulties that are presented in trying to enmesh the 
separation of powers and the division of powers. That question certainly 
exercised the grey matter of the founding fathers of those two federations 
many of whom might well be regarded as federalism theorists of their day. 
These factors render any general theories of intergovernmental relations as 
suspect for our purposes here,especially if they are purporting to relate 
to central/local or central/regional relationships in unitary countries 
as well. 
However the absence of any single overarching federalism theory need 
not be a major obstacle in the identification of the characteristics of the 
federalism concept. It is a relatively straightforward,(though tedious), 
exercise to compare various theories of federal ism,irrespective of their 
origin, and identify a number of aspects common to most of them and in this 
way build up a reasonably comprehensive picture. The following seem to be 
the key common points relevant to our task. 
(a) Federalism clearly involves divided sovereignty, a concept unknown in 
a unitary system. It has long been observed that one of the unique 
characteristics of federalism is that both national and sub-national units 
are elected by the same people, and to the extent that sovereignty can be 
equated with the "will of the people",this gives rise immediately to a 
situation where each level can claim a mandate from the same people. The 
notion is further complicated because federations are typically created in 
a manner whereby pre-existing sub-national units are perceived to spawn a 
new national unit. (To the best of my knowledge there is no federation 
where a pre-existing national unit created new sub-national units and 
then voluntarily shared its sovereignty with the new level). 
This aspect of federalism has always caused a great deal of bother to 
theorists. Davis is of the opinion that the ancient Hellenic civilizations 
did not represent an association of sovereign entities in terms of the 
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autonomy which characterizes twentieth century federations. Indeed the 
\jery concept "sovereignty" was still being defined during the time of the 
mediaeval leagues because the meaning of the word as it had evolved during 
the time of the Holy Roman Empire was no longer applicable. As Davis 
observes, whilst the power of the King, like that of the Roman Emperor was 
indivisible, that was of no use in a more fragmented Empire -
"What is the case, however, when there are two 
claimants to ultimate power? Plainly, if the 
power of a gun cannot resolve the matter, or 
if the force of arms and the force of belief 
are equally matched, then the ingenuity of a 
canonical jurisprudence, inspired by a 
remarkable instinct for survival, composed 
the rationalizations and the formula ofo 
reconciliation in a theory of duality". 
The notion of duality has persevered to the present time and there are 
many modern day theorists who see federalism, for example, of dual 
citizenship flowing from divided sovereignty. (This of course plays havoc 
with foreign policy when it is usually required that one government speak 
on behalf of each nation). 
Naturally enough the concept of duality or divided sovereignty was 
anathema to political theorists of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
such as Bodin,who saw stability and authority as mainstays of a 
monarchical system, then being challenged by republicans, as stability 
brought about by authority which was centralized, absolute, and 
3 
indivisible, and personified of course in the Sovereign himself. Similar 
difficulties plagued the philosophical argument of Althusius and his 
corporate theory of the state. Once again Davis expresses the dilemma 
very clearly -
1. S. Rufus Davis, The Federal Principle (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978), pp. 29-31. 
2. ibid. , p. 41. 
3. For further elaboration and arguments as to why the Swiss League still 
represented a single sovereign state see Davis ibid., pp. 43-47. 
4. ibid. , pp. 47-54. 
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"The reconditioning of civic culture from the 
experience of sovereignty personalized in a 
monarch to the depersonalized sovereignty of 
a constitution, and from an indivisible to a 
divisible sovereignty, however, cannot be 
affected before time, circumstance, and 
necessity; and time, circumstance and 
necessity cannot be replicated in any test 
tube known to man".^ 
Davis argues that the American situation in the late eighteenth century 
provided the time, circumstance, and necessity. Indeed the early years 
of the American federation saw nationalists arguing for a concept of 
undivided sovereignty,whilst states-rights advocates preferred to argue 
that the constitution had effectively divided sovereignty between all the 
constituent units of the federation - a situation which still prevails 
very much today (especially in Australia and Canada as we shall see in 
the next chapter). 
A completely different perspective on this aspect of the question is 
provided by Friedrich who argues that "sovereignty" is the wrong word to 
use when speaking of federalism. As he says "no sovereign can exist in a 
federal system; autonomy and sovereignty exclude each other in such a 
political order. To speak of the transfer of part of the sovereignty is 
to deny the idea of sovereignty which since Bodin has meant indivisibility' 
For Friedrich the idea of a compact is inherent in federalism,and the 
"constituent power" which makes the compact takes the place of the 
6 
sovereign. 
As Sawer points out the theories of coordinate sovereignty and 
separate action were powerful in the United States u n t i l well in to the 
twentieth century, as symbolized in Bryce's factory analogy in his 
American Commonwealth. The system, Bryce sa id , was 
5. ihid. , p. 73. 
6. Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice 
(London: Pa l l M a l l , 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 8 . 
7. Geoffrey Sawer, Modem Federalism (Carlton: Pitman, 1976). 
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"like a great factory wherein two sets of 
machinery are at work, their revolving 
wheels apparently intermixed, their bands 
crossing one another, yet each doing its 
own work without touching or hampering 
the other".8 
Sawer describes the transition of the sovereignty concept in America 
by pointing out that the originality of the American solution lay in the 
fact that under the arrangements of 1787 the centre could operate directly 
on the citizen and not merely on the regional governments, as had been the 
case with the mediaeval and early Leagues and Confederations. He points out 
that, at this time, 
"the argument that sovereignty belonged not to any 
government but to the people... suited the spirit 
of the Revolution, and accorded well with the 
natural law and social contract theories which 
influenced popular attitudes as well as learned 
commentary in the eighteenth century. ...In a 
phrase current at the time, only the people had 
'perfect sovereignty'. If so, then centre and 
region were in their mutual relations co-ordinate, 
neither superior to the other, and the Constitution 
as a whole was valid because of its popular basis". 
Sawer points out that even in the United States application of this 
doctrine was ambiguous because the Constitutional Conventions were not 
a gathering of the people as a whole but rather the people organized 
9 
tn States. 
What then, did the English theorists make of the notion of divided 
sovereignty? The starting point is usually Dicey's attempt to compare 
unitary and federal systems where he observes, not without a certain 
degree of wistfulness -
8. James Bryce, American Commonwealth (London: Macmillan, 1914), 
Vol. 1, p. 432. 
9. op.cit. , pp. 7-8. 
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"The distribution of all the powers of the state 
among coordinate authorities necessarily leads 
to the result that no one authority can wield the 
same amount of power as under a unitarian 
constitution is possessed by the sovereign. A 
scheme again of checks and balances in which the 
strength of the common government is so to speak 
pitted against that of the state government leads, 
on the face of it, to a certain waste of the energy. 
A federation therefore will always be at a dis-
advantage in a contest with unitarian states of 
equal resources".10 
This view of the coordinate nature of federalism finds its clearest 
expression in Wheare's writings, as we shall see shortly, but Wheare 
rarely directly confronts the divided sovereignty problem. His "federal 
principle", rather, speaks of a division of powers; his "test of a 
federal government" again speaks only of dividing powers; his so called 
"prerequisites of federal government" speak in terms of communities which 
desire division of government for different functions; and the word 
"sovereignty" does not appear at all although the concept is implied in 
his discussion of secession, war, foreign relations, and economic affairs. 
One is forced to conclude that Wheare either regards "sovereignty" as a 
concept not worth discussing, or else he is equating it with the terms 
"power" and "government". Indeed, in the writings of most theorists, the 
sovereignty concept appears indirectly and later twentieth century writers 
seem to accept the notion of divided sovereignty without any philosophical 
equivocation. Thus both Livingston and Duchacek speak of the territorial 
aspect of federalism and strongly imply that spatial integrity creates a 
12 division of sovereignty. Riker speaks of dual citizen loyalties which, 
he says,maintain the "federal bargain" but that itself, he points out, is 
13 
a mere tautology. He also employs the concept of "autonomy" in a way 
10. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of Law of the Constitution 
(London: Macmillan, 1915), 8th edition, pp. 171-172. 
11. See K,C, Wheare, Federal Government (0,U,P,, 1963), 4th edition, 
(Wheare's concept of federalism owed much to Quick and Jarran). 
12. See William Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1956), and Ivor D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism. The 
Territorial Dimension of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston, 1970), 
13. See William H. Riker, Federalism, Origin, Operation, Significance 
(Boston: Little Brown & Co,, 1964), Chapter 2. 
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which smacks strongly of the notions of sovereignty. Birch uses the term 
14 
"authority" seemingly as a substitute for "sovereignty", Grodzins says 
that federalism is a device for dividing decisions and functions of 
government,but it is interesting that three of his four causes of dispersed 
power in a federal system are (i ) the fact that states existed before the 
nation, (ii) distrust of the central power, and (iii) pride in locality and 
15 
state nurtured by the nation s size and variations of history. (Those 
factors are now recognized ingredients of modern day tangible expressions 
of "sovereignty"). 
In a detailed attempt to study sovereignty in federal systems Sharma 
comes to the conclusion that such sovereignty assumes three aspects - the 
location of sovereign authority, the doctrine of nullification,and the right 
of seccession of the units from the union. In relation to the first of 
those,he believes that there is both a theoretical and practical way to 
answer the question of the location of sovereignty. From a strictly legal 
point of view, Sharma observes "a federation is the result of the 
cumulative consent of not only the states but their citizens as well". 
Without the consent of those citizens the states cannot part with their 
sovereignty to establish a new government, and this is the view held by 
the nationalistic theory of federation. Another school, according to 
Sharma, holds that the parties to the pact that brings the federation into 
existence are the states,in their capacity as separate communities, and it 
is these states that are the real source of federal authority. There is a 
third view, says Sharma, which is that sovereignty lies in the Authority 
authorized to amend the Constitution. After canvassing the proponents of 
each of the three views,and practical experience with them,(especially in 
the U.S.A.),Sharma comes to the conclusion that sovereignty in a federation 
is located in the individuals of all the states taken as a whole and nowhere 
else; that there is no division of sovereignty, only a "bifurcation of 
activities"; and the third viewpoint simply resolves itself into the 
familiar question of a majority having to respect the rights and wishes 
r • . 16 
of a minority. 
14. Anthony H. Birch, "Approaches to the Study of Federalism" in American 
Federalism in Perspective, ed. Aaron Wildavsky, (Boston: Little 
Brown & Co., 1967). 
15. Morton Grodzins, "The Federal System" in Aaron Wildavsky, ibid. 
16. See B.M. Sharma, Federalism in Theory and Practice (Chandausi: 
Bhargova & Sons, 1951), pp. 99-109. 
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Those three views of sovereignty can be reasonably accepted as the 
basic divisions of opinion about federal sovereignty which prevail in the 
later twentieth century,even if Sharma's own view of their relative 
importance is left in the balance,not to mention his delightfully vague 
expression "bifurcation of activities". 
We have spent some time on this aspect of divided sovereignty because 
it is of the most fundamental importance to our particular exercise to 
marry the concepts of planning and federalism. The notion of divided 
sovereignty will recur often throughout this study because it is the basic 
causal political factor of the major hindrances to attainment of public 
sector planning in a federation,and the theoretical notion of divided 
sovereignty will be given practical expression with Australian and 
Canadian examples. For the moment we can observe that the concept of 
divided sovereignty also leads to -
(b) An attempt to delineate areas of jurisdiction for the national and 
sub-national units and so seal them into watertight compartments, more 
commonly known as the division of powers. This concept, as we have 
already observed, has a long history and it is perhaps best crystallized 
in Wheare's portrayal of the federal units being, as he put it, "within a 
17 
sphere, coordinate and independent". This is commonly regarded as 
"coordinate federalism" and,although it is the subject of much speculation 
and attack by other theorists,there are few who would not see some sort of 
division of powers as characteristic of all federal systems. It is the 
question of what that division symbolizes,and its precise nature and 
endurance,which causes most of the debate. 
It is true that Wheare admits of the possibility of many variations 
in the manner in which the powers are divided, and in a concluding chapter, 
he acknowledges the dynamic nature of the power division, e.g., "It will 
have been obvious from the preceding chapters that an ideal division of 
powers between general and regional governments has not always been 
achieved in modern federations and that it is difficult to make 
readjustments in some cases. Yet the federal principle does not prohibit 
17. K.C. Wheare, op.cit., p. 10. 
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such readjustments. And, if they can be made, then there will be sufficient 
1 o 
unity to cope with modern economic life". However his prescription of 
the prerequisites for federal government,and the accompanying tests of 
federal government and model organization,convey a much more static and 
two-dimensional picture of federalism. 
It is this aspect to which other writers, especially non-legal ones, 
take exception. Livingston, for example, a sociologist, deplores the 
dominance of the legal view of federalism, stating, as might be expected 
that "the essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional or 
institutional structure but in the society itself. Federal government is 
a device by which the federal qualities of the society arearticulated and 
19 protected". For Livingston,federalism is a relative,and not an absolute, 
term and his "division" of activity is somewhat different -
"Federal government is a form of political and 
Constitutional organization that unites into a 
single polity a number of diversified groups or 
component polities so that the personality and 
individuality of the component parts are largely 
preserved while creating in the new totality a 
separate and distinct political and constitutional 
unit".20 
Livingston then observes that the problem of federalism is to make the 
instrumentalities fit the society beneath, but it is not long before he 
admits that "the real key to the nature of a federation is in the 
distribution of powers .... 
federalism implies the existence of two coordinate 
sets of government operating at two different 
levels in two different spheres".21 
Sawer has as one of his basic federal principles the following -
18. ibid. , p. 244. 
19. William Liv ingston, op.cit., p. 2. 
20. ibid. , p. 9. 
21. ibid. , p. 10. 
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"The power to govern is distributed between the 
centre and the regions in such a way that each 
set of governmental institutions has a direct 
impact on the individual citizens and other 
legal persons within its area of competence".22 
Friedrich, the political scientist,argues that -
"....federalism should not be seen only as a static 
pattern or design, characterized by a particular and 
precisely fixed division of power between governmental 
levels. Federalism is also and perhaps primarily 
the process of federalizing a political community, 
that is to say, the process by which a number of separate 
political communities enter into arrangements for working 
out solutions, adopting joint policies, and making joint 
decisions on joint problems and, conversely, also the 
process by which a unitary political community becomes 
differentiated into a federally organized whole".23 
Davis, on the other hand, regards a division of powers as implicit in 
the concept of federalism itself. He says the division can be viewed 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively and argues that it doesn't 
really matter how the distribution is done, as long as it's done. There 
24 is no a priori principle. By contrast,in Piker's concept of federalism 
as a bargain,he says that the division of powers has little or nothing 
25 to do with maintaining that bargain. 
Other writers seem to insist that the division of powers must be 
between levels of government which have territorial dimension. In other 
words it is the fact that powers are being divided spatially as well as 
jurisdictionally that appears to hold importance for them. 
There are,of course,a number of writers who emphasize that the 
coordinate federalism concept and its division of powers has become greatly 
out of touch with modern empirical experience whereupon it is not always 
22. Geoffrey Sawer, op.cit. , p. 1. 
23. Carl J. Friedrich, op.cit., p. 10. 
24. See Rufus Davis, "The 'Federal Principle' Reconsidered" in Aaron 
Wildavsky, op.cit. 
25. ibid. , p. 58. 
26. See for example, Rameah Ri t ta D iksh i t , The Political Geography of 
Federalism (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 10 and Ivor D. Duchacek, 
op.cit. , pp. 12-14 and p. 192. 
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possible to have a clear division of functions. Morton Grodzins'culinary 
image of federalism as a marble cake,rather than a layer cake,is the best 
example and we shall be confronting the truth of this phenomenon empirically 
in later chapters, but even Grodzins still affirms that this main focus is 
on the "purpose of federalism" which, he says, is the distribution of power 
27 between central and peripheral units of government. 
These examples drawn from various theorists are sufficient to 
demonstrate the pervasiveness of the concept of a division of power as a 
common element of federalism, and for most of them a consequent division 
of powers specifically enumerated,although most would agree that there 
need be no fixed prescription to determine the precise division, or where 
the residual power should lie. The vast majority favours a flexible 
division of powers capable of being rearranged according to changing 
circumstances, and even those who seek to espouse the futility of trying 
to divide public functions between levels of government are nonetheless 
admitting the universality of the practice. 
We shall devote a major part of this study to the division of powers 
in the two federations under review because it is clear that the division 
of powers is the major expression of divided sovereignty, which,as we have 
commented,appears to stand in clear contradiction to our concept of planning. 
Sufficient to note at this stage that the very idea of attempting to create 
discrete areas of activity for each of the participants in a dynamic 
federal system obviously and immediately gives rise to the possibility of 
conflict over jurisdictional territory between those participants, and this 
leads to another common theoretical construct, the -
(c) Existence of an umpire to resolve questions of sovereignty over 
disputed claims to functions, revenue, even spatial territory itself, and 
all other resources. This umpire is usually a court which relies on written 
documents (a Constitution and possibly other documents), together with 
customs and conventions; but it need not be a court as long as its role is 
regarded as legitimate by all the participants and its decisions are binding 
upon them all. 
27. Morton Grodzins, op.cit., p. 256,et fol. 
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As might be anticipated constitutional lawyers place a great deal of 
stress on this factor in the functioning as well as the structure of 
federalism. Two of Sawer's basic federal principles are the following -
"The constitution provides rules to determine 
any conflict of authority between centre and 
regions, where but for the conflict the activity 
in question would have been within the competence 
of each of the conflicting authorities. Theoretically 
the rule could favour either regions or centre, and 
could vary with the subject of power; in all known 
cases the general rule is that the centre law prevails. 
The distribution of competence between centre and 
regions is interpreted and policed by a judicial 
authority which can make authoritative determinations 
as to the validity of governmental acts (including 
legislation) where these are alleged to be beyond 
the competence of the centre or a region, or where 
the conflict rules referred to have to 
be applied".28 
Later Sawer points out that the composition and operation of the court can 
vary from federation to federation but its function remains the same. The 
point is that most federal systems accept the principle of judicial review 
and "the possibility of such review is the most reliable sanction for the 
preservation of a federal structure. Such review can be effective only if 
law and the decisions of Courts are habitually observed and treated with 
29 
respect". 
Wheare's view is that the Constitution, written or unwritten must be 
supreme if a government is to be federal, and by this he means that the 
terms of the agreement which establishes the general and regional governments, 
and distributes powers between them, must be binding on those governments. 
Moreover the last word in settling disputes about the meaning of the division 
of powers must not rest either with the general government alone or with 
the regional government alone. He goes on -
28. Geoffrey Sawer, op.cit., p. 1 
29. ibid. , p. 127. 
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"This necessity has been recognized by the founders 
of most federal systems, but they have not always 
applied it with complete consistency. Moreover, 
when they have established some institution with 
power to decide disputes about the division of 
powers, they have not confined its jurisdiction 
merely to that part of the federal Constitution; 
on the contrary they have given it power to decide 
the meaning of the whole Constitution - an increase 
in authority which is not logically necessary for 
federalism".30 
Wheare also observes the tendency in most federations for such a dispute -
settling body to be appointed and be dismissable by the general government, 
and this had resulted in Supreme Courts or their equivalent being accused 
31 from time to time of undue partiality to the general government. 
Other writers have expressed the "umpire" role in slightly different 
ways. Livingston remarks that the need for such an institution arises 
because the terms of the distribution of functions can,at best,be only very 
general,and difficulties will be encountered in applying them to concrete 
32 
situations. Speaking of three essential characteristics of a federal 
constitution, Sharma includes a special position for the judiciary as the 
third characteristic which, he says, is a natural response of the first 
two viz. the supremacy of the Constitution and the co-existence of two 
governments. It is necessary, says Sharma, that there be some agency to 
"uphold the constitution and keep the two governments within proper 
33 limits". Paul Freund expresses the opinion that a federal system 
presupposes diversity and must cope with corresponding tensions. Once 
the "general pattern" is validated by the Court, he says, "the structure 
and balance of forces both private and public, which shape the federal 
system,are left to the working of politics. Thus the courts may be 
conceived as umpires determining what kinds of contests are permissable, 
leaving the choice of contests and the detailed rules to be worked out 
by the immediate participants". 
30. Kenneth Wheare, op.cit. , p. 58. 
31. ibid. , p, 59. 
32. William Livingston, op.cit., p. 10. 
33. B.M. Sharma, op.cit., p. 35. 
34. Paul A. Freund, "Umpiring the Federal System" in Federalism Mature 
and Emergent, ed. Arthur W. MacMahon, (New York: Doubleday, 1955), 
p. 161. 
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This leads us to a recognition of the fact that the legal process for 
arbitration of territorial and functional disputes is insufficient for the 
resolution of all political confl icts, and there is a need also for-
(d) Mechanisms for the political allocation of powers and resources, which 
can be found as for example with conferences of ministers and first ministers, 
through to the high degree of informality present in pressure groups, parties 
and the media through which issues are processed, these groups reflecting in 
turn the federal nature of the system in their own modus operandi. The most 
forceful writer on this aspect is unquestionably William Riker who attaches 
vital importance to the party system as the key element in maintenance of a 
federal system. He says -
"Whatever the general social conditions, if any, that 
sustain the federal bargain, there is one institutional 
condition that controls the nature of the bargain in all 
the instances here examined and in all others with which 
I am familiar. This is the structure of the party system, 
which may be regarded as the main variable intervening 
between the background social conditions and the specific 
nature of the federal bargain".35 
Sawer is more cautious about the role of parties. He says that it is 
exceptional for political parties to have as a genuine independent objective 
the maintenance of the federal system. They often proclaim support for 
federalism, Sawer observes, but this is usually because at the particular 
time the federal distribution of power favours some other objective which 
the party wants to achieve. He goes on to point out that in the politics 
of federalism most parties operating at the centre, or the centre components 
of parties operating at both the central and regional level, are inevitably 
driven by circumstances to seek some increase in centre powers. However, 
"there is an important counter-factor, operating in all federalism, and 
that is the extent to which national political parties are forced by the 
mere existence of the federal system to take on a federal shape and be 
influenced by the vested interests of region governments in their own 
existence'.' As part of an investigation into administration in federal 
systems Watts comes to the conclusion that the effectiveness of a federation 
35. William H. Riker, op.cit., p. 136. 
36. Geoffrey Sawer, op.cit., pp. 120-121. 
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depends not just on the Constitution,but also on the operation of the 
political parties and the executives especially the public services -
"the way in which the political parties operate will determine whether 
interstate cohesion or conflict is accentuated The effectiveness and 
stability of the federation will depend on whether the public services 
provide effective administration and upon their leadership in contributing 
to cohesion and collaboration between levels of government within the 
37 federation". 
Livingston sums up the origin of these institutions by pointing out 
that the fractionizing of power that is part of the character of federalism 
also opens the way for the creation of independent decision making bodies, 
(conferences of first ministers, royal commissions, fiscal bargaining 
conferences etc ) , which, he observes, appear to be perfectly compatible 
with federalism but are quite out of harmony with the assumptions of a 
38 
parliamentary system. We shall have much to say about this aspect in 
later chapters, 
(e) Federalism also seems to involve some degree of heterogeneity of the 
population of the nation. Earlier writers saw cultural differences as the 
main element of that heterogeneity exemplified by racial, linguistic and 
other variations, but more modern theorists see geographical factors as 
equally divisive aspects even if the geographical factor is solely one of 
distance whereupon, in territorially large federations, spatial considerations 
can at times prove to be just as significant as cultural ones. The bulk of 
theorists see the creation of a federal system as a response to the diversity 
which already exists in the society for which the federation is to be created. 
This was the essence of Dicey's description of federalism as being motivated 
by a desire for union without unity. It is reflected in the provisions 
made in many federations to prevent one regional government from interfering 
with another, or even an explicit protection of minority groups, especially 
when those minority groups happen to be spatially concentrated. For that 
39 
37. Ronald L, Watts, Administration in Federal Systems (London: Hutchison, 
1970), p. 14. 
38. William S. Livingston, "Canada, Australia, and the United States, 
variations on a Theme" in Federalism Infinite Variety in Theory and 
Practice, ed. Valerie Earle, (Illinois: Peacock, 1968), pp. 113-114. 
39. Consider for example Grodzin's causes of dispersed power in a federal 
system, mentioned earlier. 
40. A.V. Dicey, op.cit. , p. 137, 
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and other reasons Dikshit believes federalism is the most geographically 
expressive of all forms of government. It is, he points out, based on the 
existence of regional differences or a sense of locality. Also, because 
of the dual political organization and the grant of substantial regional 
autonomy,the regions remain highly articulate and that means that spatial 
interactions in a federation, unlike other forms of government, are most 
clearly recognized. This means that federalism starts with a tacit 
recognition of the immutability of regional personalities and spatial 
political interactions are recognized and provided for. 
One of Duchacek's "ten yardsticks of federalism" is the question 
"Are the component units immune to elimination of their identity, 
42 (outdating or postdating the union), and authority?" But he later refines 
his so called model by considering "extraconstitutional reality" and 
immediately produces what he calls the problem of "federal assymetry and 
polyethnicity" -
"The component units that the Constitution views 
as somewhat equal for the purpose of government 
are now... highly different in size and population, 
possessing different economic and political powers, 
and manifesting unequal interest in the way in 
which the federal system is supposed to operate. 
This problem of assymetry may sometimes lead 
either to intrafederal hegemony or to explosion, 
especially if such assymetry is compounded by 
linguistic, ethnic, racial or religious differences 
coinciding with territorial subdivisions. These 
differences are often exploited by external 
interference".43 
A good many writers have commenced their analysis of this heterogeneity 
in federal systems with the uncompromising statement of Livingston that 
it is only societies in which social diversities are geographically 
44 
distributed which can properly be called federal. Watts, for example, 
takes issue with the logic of this argument and says that even where there 
are no regionally localized interests, a territorial distribution of power 
within a federal structure might be advocated simply as a means to limited 
41. Rameah Ritta Dikshit, op.cit., p. 10, 
42. Ivor D. Duchacek, op.cit., p. 207. 
43. ibid., pp. 277-278. 
44. Wi l l iams. L iv ingston, op.cit., p. 2. 
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government and the prevention of tyranny within a plural society. He adds 
that 
"Although all the new federations have contained 
sectional groups which were geographically distributed 
rarely have these coincided precisely with the 
regional political units. In the first place, 
social diversities have not generally been 
territorially segregated so exactly that regional 
political boundaries could mark off completely 
homogenous units. People just do not arrange 
themselves like that. (In Canada, he points out, 
not all the French Canadians live in Quebec). 
Secondly, even where social diversities are 
basically regional in their distribution, the 
geographical location of historical, racial, cultural, 
economic and other social interests may not coincide 
precisely with each other. Territorial diversities 
may operate at several different geographical levels: 
some may coincide fairly closely with the actual 
regional political units, others may correspond to 
groups of states or provinces, while still others .r 
may represent divisions within individual territories". 
None of this, of course, is to deny our basic proposition which is that 
federations typically contain some measure of heterogeneity in their 
populations however that heterogeneity is expressed or grouped. And,as we 
observed,the federal structure has usually been tailored with at least 
some view towards accommodating their diversity. Of course it may also 
be true that the federal structure once established serves to reinforce 
or even ferment such diversity. As Livingston says -
"The Constitution, which endows the states with 
the characteristics of diversity, treats them 
indiscriminately, and thus tends to create 
diversity where none previously existed". 
(f) Perhaps the most crucial aspect of all for the preservation of federal 
systems, despite the oscillations which occur within them, is the existence 
of a balance of power. Virtually all modern theorists acknowledge that 
balance of power to be a dynamic balance and that means that there must 
exist methods of altering the balance of power. In the words of Friedrich -
45. R.L. Watts, New Federations Experiments in the Commonwealth (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1966), pp. 67-69. 
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"Federal relations are fluctuating relations in the 
very nature of things. Any federally organized 
conmunity must therfore provide itself with 
instrumentalities for the recurrent revision of 
its pattern or design. For only thus can the 
shifting balance of common and disparate values, 
interests, and beliefs be effectively reflected 
in more differentiated or more integrated relations' 46 
Some of the most popular techniques identified in the theory (and practice) 
of federalism include -
(i) A formal amending process, often by means of referendum, differing 
in nature between federations, but present in all of them. 
Livingston argues that in such an amending process the sub-
47 
national units as separate entities must play a part. This 
is an ambiguous statement and certainly not in accord with many 
modern federations. He expresses the thought a little more 
concisely when he says that it is "generally agreed" that the 
central legislature cannot be permitted to amend the Constitution 
48 by itself and he does raise many pertinent questions. Sawer 
expresses it this way in the fourth of his "basic federal 
principles" - "The distribution of competence between centre 
and regions is affected by a constitution (usually written) 
having a fair degree of rigidity, so that its basic terms are 
'entrenched' - that is, cannot be amended at the sole discretion 
49 
of the centre or any region or combination of regions". 
Wheare points out that in virtually all federations the process 
of amending constitutions is a different process from that of 
50 
amending their ordinary laws, and Macmahon makes the extremely 
interesting observation that the structure and constitutions of 
the sub-national units themselves are very rigid, and thus 
51 
rarely amended. 
46. Carl J, Friedrich, op.cit., p. 7. 
47. William S. Livingston, op.cit., p. 14. 
48. For example he asks inter alia; Does the fact that a government is^ 
federal make necessary a certain kind of amending process? Should it 
be possible for the constitution to be changed with the consent of less 
than the whole number of component units? What is the relation between 
the amendment procedure and the doctrine and practice of majority rule? 
If democracy be equated with the rule of majorities, can it be said 
that federalism is inconsistent with democracy? 
49. Geoffrey Sawer, op.cit. , p. 1. 
50. Kenneth Wheare, op.cit., p. 209. 
51. Arthur W. Macmahon (ed.), op.cit., p. 18. 
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(ii) Interpretations of the Constitution by the umpire or court 
can in reality also be a method of altering the balance of 
power between the levels of government. We have already 
examined this aspect. 
(iii) A process whereby the sub-national units of government are 
given representation in the parliament of the national level. 
This is usually achieved by means of a second chamber spatially 
elected (or appointed) to represent formally, or through tokenism 
at least, the wishes of spatial electorates which usually 
coincide with the boundaries of each sub-national unit. 
Interestingly this process is not the one through which the 
reverse flow occurs and the process of national influence 
over sub-national units is usually through some less formal 
mechanisms. 
Ronald Watts states as his first requirement for federal 
stability that -
"the federal structure must enable the political 
desires for regional diversity to express 
themselves adequately. If this opportunity is 
inadequate seccession and fragmentation is 
likely to result...."52 
Duchacek has as the sixth of his ten yardsticks of federalism 
the following -
"Is the collective sharing in federal rule 
making adequately secured by equal representation 
of unequal units in a bicameral system?"53 
It should be noted that Duchacek unlike most writers raises 
firmly the spectre of equal representation for the sub-national 
units; most writers are content to settle for mere representation, 
Livingston believes that practice is convenient but 
not, he argues, essential. He sees it as important that the 
quality of statehood is represented and would not agree with 
writers who believe this feature to be the distinguishing mark 
52. Ronald L. Watts, Administration in Federal System, p. 13. 
53. Ivor D. Duchacek, ov.cit., p. 207. 
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of federalism. It does not figure as one of Sawer's basic 
federal principles and he notes in passing that this type of 
upper house has been on the whole a disappointment, at least 
55 
from the federal point of view. He also makes an astute 
observation that the failure of the Australian Senate to act 
as intended is a move towards coordinate federalism, not away 
from it. Wheare's answer to the question of whether this is 
an essential feature of federalism is probably best for our 
purposes -
"the right answer seems to be that equal representation 
of the regions in the upper house is not essential 
logically for a government if it is to be federal, but 
at the same time it is often essential if federal 
government is to work well".^6 
Wheare's sentiments can be applied equally well to the next 
concept which is 
(iv) A process whereby the interests of the sub-national units in the 
federation are seen to be represented in the executive of the 
national government. This is identified as a power-brokerage 
method by only a few writers but as we shall see it has assumed 
particular importance in Canada and Australia. That is 
undoubtedly why the second half of Duchacek's sixth yardstick 
of federalism reads -
"What are the Constitutional provisions for 
collective sharing in the executive and 
judiciary rule implementation".^' 
Livingston observes that although there is no standard type of 
executive in a federal system nearly all admit some federal 
58 qualities, whether it be the electoral college method of 
selecting a U.S. President, or the deliberate attempts by 
Canadian and Australian Prime Ministers to compose a cabinet 
54 Wi l l iams. L iv ingston, op.cit., pp. 10-11, 
55. Geoffrey Sawer, op.cit., p. 1 1 . 
56. Kenneth Wheare, op.cit., p. 88. 
Ivor D. Duchacek, op.cit., p. 207. 
Afilliam S. L i v i n g s t o n , op.cit. , p. 11 . 
57 
58 
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according to regional and even religious interests. 
(v) Provisions for a temporary, and in some cases permanent, 
interchange of powers, often written explicitly into a 
Constitution and capable of being initiated by either level, 
i.e. by the executives of either level. 
(vi) Fiscal provisions, usually contained in a written constitution 
but, more often than not, so vague as to allow a constant ebb 
and flow of fiscal dominance to take place largely free of the 
possibility of legal challenge. Davis points out that the 
dividing of fiscal resources between levels of government is 
not unique to federalism and every system of territorial 
delegation involves the distribution of money and criteria 
for that purpose. What is peculiar to federal systems, he says, 
is -
"the notion that every division of tax sources 
should keep faith with two ideals: to assure 
each government sufficient monies to do what 
it is (or what it is believed to be) 
constitutionally responsible for, and to assure 
each government 'independence' (i.e. the 
independence befitting its 'coordinate' status) 
in deciding how and in what order to spend its 
moneys. These are probably irreconcilable 
expectations "59 
Watts emphasizes the importance of federal finance and says it 
is significant in three ways: (a) it affects the allocation of 
administrative responsibilities; (b) it affects the political 
balance; and (c) the assignment of fiscal and expenditure 
powers will determine which governments are able to use those 
instruments to control the economy. For his part Wheare is 
adamant in pointing out that respect for the so-called federal 
principle requires in practice that both general and regional 
governments must each have under its own independent control 
59. S. Rufus Davis, The Federal Principle, p. 151. 
60. Ronald L. Watts, Administration in Federal Systems, p. 115, 
115. 
financial resources sufficient to perform its exclusive 
functions. One can see immediately the difficulty if it 
is insisted as Wheare does, that each level must have these 
resources "under its own independent control". Note that Davis 
was content that each level should have sufficient resources, 
the qualitative nature of those resources and the derivation 
of them notwithstanding. Wheare has here laid down a very 
harsh condition. 
Clearly all analyses of federalism are agreed on the importance 
of financial relationships to the power balance which is inherent 
in federal ism,even if they differ in their perspectives of it. 
(vii) Executive or administrative arrangements created in order to 
secure necessary intergovernmental harmonization of action for 
a whole variety of purposes. It has only been in recent times 
that this has been recognized as an important channel for 
maintaining a power balance in federations and so there is 
little theoretical material in relation to it. The problem 
is that most theorists have relegated administrative relations 
a passive role as,for example,when Watts says that the 
administrative relations in each federation are shaped by the 
character of the society, the institutional structure of the 
CO 
federation, and the p o l i t i c a l processes in the federat ion. 
More recent country studies by Smiley, Simeon, Richardson, 
Wi l tsh i re , and others reveal rather that the administrat ive 
relationships may a f fec t the p o l i t i c a l re la t ions and so a l t e r 
the power balance, i .e . an act ive ro le rather than a passive one. 
61. Kenneth Wheare, op.cit., p. 93. 
62. Ronald L. Watts, Administration in Federal Systems, p. 10. 
63. See Donald Smiley, Canxtda in Question (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 
Ryerson, 1976), Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), J.E. Richardson, 
Patterns of Australian Federalism (Canberra: Centre for Research on 
Federal Financial Relat ions, Monograph No. 1 , 1973), Kenneth 
Wiltshire (ed . ) , Administrative Federalism, Selected Documents in 
Australian Intergovernmental Relations (St. Lucia: Universi ty of 
Queensland Press, 1977). 
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(viii) A balance of electoral and pressure group activity. (We shall 
be making some observations on this aspect in another 
context). It is a moot point as to whether this is a cause 
or consequence of the very federal power relationships which 
exist,but there can be no doubt that the balance of power in 
federations,and shifts in it,can be markedly influenced by the 
electoral process and those who would prey upon it. 
(ix) The ability to create new sub-national units of government or 
to amalgamate existing ones. Provision is made for this in all 
federal systems but it is not always a flexible affair. The 
constitution inevitably prescribes a formal process to achieve 
these ends. 
(x) Provision for the separation of power for each unit at each level, 
to keep all the elements of the federation democratic,and to 
prevent associated intrusions into the division of power. In 
some federations this concept has been extended so that one level 
can prevent the infringement of civil liberties in another level. 
Sawer argues that in some countries the separation of powers 
affects the division of powers, and he also believes that the 
effective judicial protection of guaranteed individual liberties 
is more likely to occur in the federations,!ike Australia and 
Canada, because of the control over government activity at even 
the highest levels which the federal system itself gives to the 
• • 64 judiciary. Friedrich recalls an analysis by Montesquieu, which 
finds expression in Article IV of the American Constitution, that 
federal republics ought to be composed only of republics.^^ 
Of course the separation of powers takes on a different form in 
a Westminster model of government. 
These factors then can be regarded as aspects common to most theories of 
federalism all of which have a profound bearing on our attempt to reconcile 
the concept of planning with the concept of federalism. If one reviews 
the above factors it becomes clear that, conceptually at least, "federalism", 
however defined theoretically is marked by a number of features which include 
64. Geoffrey Sawer, op.cit., p. 14. 
65. Carl J. Friedrich, op.cit., p. 14. 
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* A lack of coordination 
* Presence of diversity 
* A deliberate lack of unity and uniformity 
* Fragmentation 
* A multiplicity of political, legal and administrative 
mechanisms, institutions and processes 
* A balance of power which is dynamic but is emphasized 
as static 
* Separation of powers. 
At first glance this list, describing what appear to be intrinsic features 
of the federation concept, would seem to be diametrically opposed to the 
components of the planning concept formulated in the previous chapter. 
The very language of federalism is the antithesis of that used in 
conceptualizing planning and it may be that we have struck immediately at 
the root cause of our dilemma. 
However, it must immediately be emphasized that the theories of 
federalism also stress, by contrast, a number of cormion elements which seem 
more akin to notions of planning. At the most basic level there is the role 
of federalism in reconciling diversity in some matters with unity in others, 
and especially that of reconciling diversity and equality which is the key 
factor in distinguishing federal from unitary government. Some more 
specific elements include at least the following -
(a) A guarantee of the mobility of resources is invariably provided 
which seeks to ensure complete freedom of movement for resources, 
ideas, concepts, etc. around all parts of the federation. This 
is seen in its most explicit form in the provisions relating to 
interregional commerce and trade, but it can also be reflected in 
the allocation to the national level of functions such as migration, 
currency, weights and measures, broadcasting, censorship etc. 
(b) Although the allocation of responsibility for economic affairs is 
usually divided between the national and sub-national levels, the 
nature of the economic powers given to the national level is generally 
broader and superior to those given to the sub-national level. 
Moreover, it is common for some economic powers to be concurrent 
with an inevitable accompanying proviso that national law will prevail 
in cases of conflict. This is not to deny some role in the regulation 
of economic activity to the sub-national levels, and at times a quite 
significant role, - it simply means that the national powers are 
qualitatively superior. In the words of Watts -
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"The sharing of responsibility for economic affairs 
between levels of government has necessitated a 
variety of arrangements. Sometimes economic matters 
have been placed under concurrent jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, often there have been complex subdivisions 
spelt out in much detail in legislative lists or in other 
sections of the constitutions allocating certain aspects 
exclusively to one tier of government or the other. In 
most of these federations the central government has been 
assigned relatively broad or at least concurrent powers 
over trade, commerce, industry, labour, communications, 
sources of energy, science, industrial research and 
statistics. Thus, in most cases, the central governments 
have possessed sufficient scope for comprehensive planning 
and for the promotion of economic development".66 
(c) Accompanying the specific division of powers some sort of residual 
power is indicated so that, other than powers explicitly mentioned, 
the remaining functions of government are intended to accrue to one 
level of the federation. 
(d) A provision is invariably included in the Constitution giving one 
level of government virtually complete dominance in the event of a 
national emergency, (notwithstanding the more difficult question as 
to which level should have the power to determine when such a 
national emergency exists let alone the criteria to be employed). 
(e) As we have already observed, most federal constitutions invariably 
contain an inbuilt guarantee preventing any one unit of the 
federation from destroying other units or the whole system. 
(f) As also mentioned earlier there is provision made for an umpire in 
all federations to resolve disputes between levels of government, 
but it is significant that there is but one umpire. 
(g) Then there are the natural factors which led to federation in the 
first place,and which can reasonably be assumed to retain some impetus, 
and still point to the need for some degree of central oversight. 
Various authors have differing lists of such factors and each seems 
to emphasize different aspects, but most tend to include geographical 
proximity and even contiguity of the units, the need for one voice in 
international relationships, the fear of external aggression, 
66. Ronald L. Watts, Administration in Federal Systems, pp. 99-100. 
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(admittedly weaker in some federations than in others), the 
expectation of economic advantage, sheer patriotism and national 
sentiment often coupled with republican or at least independent 
aspirations, social and cultural bonds often caused by homogeneity 
of cultural background. 
Some writers have concentrated heavily on this aspect seeking to 
determine, in particular, why various societies chose to unite in 
the form of federalism rather than another form. Riker, for example, 
speaks of two basic predispositions towards the federal "bargain". 
These are the "expansion condition", caused by politicians who, for 
variousreasons,seek to expand their territorial control, and the 
"military condition", under which politicians who accept the bargain 
are willing to do so because of some perceived external military-
diplomatic threat or opportunity. By contrast, Wheare offers a 
number of suggestions as to why communities have been led to desire 
union. They include a sense of military insecurity and the consequent 
need for common defence, a desire to be independent of foreign powers, 
and a realization that only through union could independence be 
secured, a hope of economic advantage from union, some prior political 
association of the communities concerned, geographical neighbourhood 
and a similarity of political,(and presumably social), institutions.' 
Watts also lists some of these as relevant for most newer federations 
and adds the need for administrative efficiency, a community outlook 
based on race, religion, language or culture, the influence of 
history, the character of political leadership, the existence of 
successful older models of federal union, and the influence of the 
69 United Kingdom government in Constitution-making. 
(h) A final factor, so often overlooked in federalism theories,and 
admittedly not present in all federal systems,is an attempt to 
provide an equal standard of government services throughout the 
federation. Here we are referring mainly to equality in economic 
68 
67. William H. Riker, op.cit. 
68. Kenneth Wheare, op.cit. , p. 37. 
69. R.L. Watts, New Federations, Chapter 3, 
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terms although the more general aspect of protection of the 
interests of minority groups is also relevant. In the former 
case the most noticeable tangible expressions are the various, 
often cumbersome,schemes for horizontal fiscal equalization. 
In the case of the latter, there are often constitutional provisions 
entrenched in such a way as to prevent minorities being discriminated 
against by any unit of the federation or even all of them acting in 
concert. It may well be that the dominance of American writers on 
federalism theory, or writers who look mainly to the American model, 
have been responsible for the downplay of the concept of spatial 
equality since that has been much less an issue in the United States 
than in most other federal systems. We shall examine the phenomenon 
of equalization in depth in later chapters,but it should be noted 
at this point,that any desire for such spatial equalization has 
inevitably resulted in more centralization of resource allocation 
because it is usually regarded as an appropriate function to be 
performed by a level of government "higher" than the one to be 
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equalized. 
In view of all the factors outlined, and no doubt others not considered, 
it becomes apparent that the attempt to superimpose the concept of planning 
upon the concept of federalism is fraught with a number of basic difficulties 
including the many centrifugal political forces we have observed to be at 
work in federations. On the other hand we have also encountered a number 
of countervailing centripetal forces. The question is whether the one 
can offset the other, but more particularly whether the hindrances-inherent 
in the federalism concept-to our planning concept,are so severe as to be 
impossible to overcome. This will be the prime consideration in the analysis 
which follows in subsequent chapters and these conceptual points will be 
tested in a more empirical manner particularly in relation to the two 
federations under review. Also,it now becomes easier to understand why no 
comprehensive definition of "federalism" is possible,and it would seem much 
more profitable to take Sawer's approach and speak instead of a "federal 
situation". Whatever else federalism may be,it is certainly a political 
system characterized by a unique balance of power,which in turn is 
markedly influenced by a diffusion of sovereignty throughout its component 
70. West Germany is a notable excention. 
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units. Friedrich's summation seems the most apt for our purposes -
"Federalism is more fully understood if it is seen as 
a process, an evolving pattern of changing relationships 
rather than a static design regulated by firm and 
unalterable rules".71 
II: The Practice of Federalism 
Having considered the conceptual difficulties involved in meshing the 
notion of planning and that of federalism,it is now necessary to assess the 
more specific and tangible hindrances by means of empirical analysis, in 
this case by way of an overview of these two federal systems. 
There have been few attempts to compare Australia and Canada which is 
surprising in view of the marked similarities which exist between the two 
countries. Both are large geographical entities with a relatively small 
population which was originally predominantly from the British Isles 
especially the hardy pioneer races from Scotland. The notable difference 
of course is the presence, in Canada, of a distinctive French province,and 
the need for accommodation of different cultures;a factor which Australia 
does not share. Both countries, however, have built up their populations 
by a deliberate and aggressive immigration effort concentrating mainly on 
European nations. Both paid little respect to the worth of the indigenous 
races of their lands. In the two countries the population is scattered and 
natural geographic features including distance itself, serve to create a 
feeling of isolation from the main nucleus of activity,which in Canada is 
the "Torontreal" axis,and in Australia is the Melbourne-Sydney axis. Both 
countries span about 40 degrees in latitude and over 40 degrees of longitude. 
More than three-quarters of the area of both countries is not settled. 
Economically there are many similarities as both countries are rich in 
rural and mineral resources, reasonably industrialized, but with a 
concentration of secondary and tertiary industry in the axes mentioned, 
often established behind protective tariff barriers. Transportation is a 
71. Carl J. Friedrich, op.cit., p. 173. 
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major problem in both countries,with extremely long distances involved in 
transporting primary and secondary commodities from source to market. 
Canada has the added disadvantage that,whi lst the nation is basically an 
east-west conglomerate,the natural flow of economic ac t iv i ty would often be 
north-south with close trading relationships between bordering areas of 
the U.S.A. These factors also make mass communications a d i f f i c u l t and 
expensive operation leading again to the feeling of isolat ion between parts 
of the country. Such aspects have been accentuated in both countries in 
the latter part of the twentieth century as many of the new discoveries 
of mineral resources have been in re lat ive ly remote areas,or at least in 
areas which possessed only a minimum amount of existing infrastructure. 
Naturally i t is the aspect of government which holds most interest for 
us here. The fundamental s imi lar i ty is that both countries are federations 
seeking to function with a Westminster model of government. I t is this 
combination which lies at the heart of many of the aspects we shall be 
considering subsequently and, indeed, i t is this \/ery factor which is the 
reason for the comparison of the two systems. In both countries there is 
a relatively small number of basic sub-national units (six states and two 
territories in Australia, ten provinces and two te r r i to r ies in Canada) 
although there is a prol i ferat ion of local government units. The size of 
the states/provinces varies enormously, the largest state in Australia 
having about eight times the population of the smallest state,and in 
Canada a comparable ratio of seventy to one. In terms of geographic areas 
there are enormous variations between the size of the Australian states 
and the Canadian provinces. 
The Canadian federation is 34 years older than the Australian which 
accounts for one significant difference between the federations in that a l l 
the present Australian states existed in the form of colonies at federation, 
whereas,in Canada,more than half the existing provinces came into being as 
legal entities after federation in 1867. In present day terms i t is possible 
to compare various Australian states with Canadian provinces, in a 
superficial way at teast. New South Wales and Victoria have a close parallel 
with Ontario, all being large in population and containing the bulk of the 
"ation's industrial act iv i ty and tending to take a "fatherly" att i tude to 
smaller states/provinces. Western Australia has many s imi lar i t ies with 
•"itish Columbia in the sense of a feeling of isolat ion and western isolat ion 
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at that, including a lagging time zone. Western Australia and Queensland 
are also economically similar to Alberta and to a lesser extent Saskatchewan 
because of their large areas and rich mineral deposits,and their attendant 
desire to exploit them and claim full jurisdiction over them. The problems 
of Tasmania are akin to those of the maritime or even the Atlantic provinces 
in the sense of depressed economic activity, if not their charm, resulting 
in part from the fact that in both countries these were areas of early 
settlement. It can be argued that there is no strict Australian equivalent 
of Quebec,although in respect of relationships with the national government 
Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania and in recent years Queensland, 
have formed a close parallel. 
These, however, are superficial aspects. It is necessary to consider 
features of the two countries in greater depth, not only to understand the 
dynamics of the two federal systems, but also to identify the elements of 
both systems which bear upon our attempts to identify the characteristics 
of each or both that would serve to hinder or help the attainment of some 
degree of public sector planning. We shall begin by using the comparative 
framework derived in the previous chapter from a synthesis of various 
theories of federalism. 
Like all modern federations both Australia and Canada have written 
constitutions, although there are some differences in the content of the two 
documents which will shortly become apparent. They are also slightly 
different in nature, the British North America Act being a formal Act of 
the parliament of the United Kingdom whilst the Australian Constitution 
although also a statute, stands more as a constitutional document in its 
own right in the sense that formal constitutional changes are reflected in 
changes to that text, whereas the British North America Act is, strictly 
speaking, only the dominant constitutional enactment. In addition, the 
Canadian constitution has not been formally patriated. 
Sovereignty in these two federations is split between the national 
and sub-national units. Both levels of government are elected on a common 
basis of universal suffrage, with compulsory voting in Australia. The 
Australian Senate is elected popularly whilst the Canadian Senate is 
appointed,and five of the six Australian states have upper houses most 
of which are democratically elected, whereas all Provincial parliaments in 
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Canada are now unicameral. All of the provinces/states in the two systems 
have their own constitutions over which they remain the virtually unrestricted 
custodians. Whilst the Lieutenant Governors of the Canadian Provinces are 
formally appointed by the Governor General,and constitutional provisions exist 
for the Governor General to disallow provincial legislation, the situation 
today is, in reality, more akin to that of the Australian states where the 
Queen appoints the Governors on the recommendation of the state government 
and there are no powers of reservation or disallowance for the Governor 
General over the state governors. An attempt is made in both countries to 
divide powers between the two levels of government and this will be examined 
below. In both cases local government is the constitutional preserve of the 
states/provinces. However it has been factors other than these formal 
constitutional provisions which have drawn attention to the divided 
sovereignty of the two nations and in this respect the issues which have 
arisen have been remarkably similar in the two countries. They include 
disputes over resources, especially mineral resources where the sub-national 
units are able to present a legally based case for ownership and/or control. 
It is also reflected in attempts by the sub-national units to forge 
international links of various kinds with other nations with, and more 
often without,consultation with their own national government. In Australia 
there is also a constant reversion by the states to the argument that they 
pre-existed the national government and indeed created it,(an argument not 
legally valid but politically persuasive),and in Canada a similar situation 
has arisen when Ontario and Quebec and more recently Alberta have sought 
to demonstrate, rather effectively at times, that "their" economic 
management is becoming nearly as important as the economic management 
exercised by the national government. But the sovereignty argument reaches 
the point of crescendo when it is land which is being discussed and here 
the states/provinces maintain a jealous and even mystical attachment to the 
two-dimensional contents within their legal boundaries. It is in the third 
dimension that their claims to sovereignty are more limited and in both 
countries attempts by sub-national units to assert sovereignty over resources 
below the land, below the sea and in the air have met with only partial 
success. Nonetheless, on the ground, their sovereignty has been well 
recognized in theory and in practice. We could go on through numerous 
examples drawn from the two federations to demonstrate the point, but 
sufficient has now been said to demonstrate that the concept of divided 
sovereignty exists in these two federations, and as will be seen later, 
"•t is a fundamental stumbling block to the basic ingredients of our planning 
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system. That can be seen in the extreme in the Australian case when the 
states have claimed sovereignty over such things as the hours of daylight, 
meteorites that fall from the sky, and the morals and values of their 
population. 
As is the case with most modern federations,both the Australian and 
Canadian constitutions attempt to create a division of powers between the 
two levels of government. This is examined in detail in a subsequent chapter 
because it has proved to be one of the major hindrances to harmonization of 
priority determination between the two levels of government. Here we can 
note that the attempted power division is neater in the Australian case than 
in the Canadian. In the Australian Constitution section 51 is the major 
focus for the delineation of powers, and the founding fathers tried to follow 
the American example by specifying the powers of the new national government, 
as well as some concurrent powers, and then leave the residual powers to 
the states. As will be explained later, this attempt to secure the levels 
of government into watertight compartments has not really worked for a 
variety of reasons but it has been at least more explicit than the Canadian 
attempts under sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act because 
the Canadian founding fathers, in their "wisdom", virtually spelt out a 
list of powers for each level of government. Their admonition that the 
national list was to be by way of example only has done nothing to resolve 
the resulting confusion. There are also concurrent powers and the residual 
powers accrue to the national government which is held to be an outcome of 
the belief,in mid-nineteenth century Canada,that a strong national government 
was necessary to militate against the possibility of an American style civil 
war which the Canadian founders believed had come about because of the fact 
that too much power had been given to the American states under that 
constitution. A further complicating factor in the Canadian case lies in 
the preamble to section 91 of the British North America Act which allows 
the national government to "make Laws for the Peace, Order and good 
Government of Canada'; and then in the preamble to section 92 the provinces 
are able, inter alia, to oversee "all matters of a merely local or private 
nature in the Province". One does not have to be a constitutional lawyer 
to see the difficulties that both these nebulous phrases would pose when 
conflict was occurring about authority over particular government functions. 
However the net result is that there is not really a great difference 
in the way the powers are formally divided in the two federations. In both 
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federations the main s ta te /prov inc ia l functions are education, health and 
welfare, law and order, and various facets of industry regu la t ion , i ndus t r ia l 
relations, and indust r ia l development. Immigration and agr icu l tu re are 
concurrent f ie lds in Canada but in agr icu l tu re the s i t ua t i on is s imi la r to 
that in Australia in that the states share pol icy determination wi th the 
national government a lbe i t in an ex t ra -cons t i tu t iona l manner. Only a few 
of the differences are major but even they do not involve control of large 
scale public resources l i k e l y to a f fec t publ ic sector planning. The main 
differences are the national control of r a i l t ransport in Canada compared 
with predominantly state control in Aus t ra l i a , the national control of 
criminal law in Canada compared with state control in Austra l ia,and the 
more unified jud ic ia l system in Canada. 
An overview of the main government functions which f a l l to the sub-
national units of both federations reveals some important charac te r i s t i cs , 
(a) Those functions are more l i k e l y to e f fec t the daily l i ves of the 
people, (b) They are more visible functions and therefore more p o l i t i c a l . 
(c) Thus they are functions more amenable to po rk -ba r re l l i ng , (d) They 
are items which involve heavy capi ta l expenditure as well as recurrent 
expenditure, (e) Much capi ta l expenditure is not capable of generating 
income to service i t s repayment,(e.g. schools, hospi tals and j a i l s are not 
in normal circumstances highly revenue producing), ( f ) I t fol lows that 
these functions w i l l be debt producing ones fo r the states/provinces. 
(g) The functions of the sub-national governments are in t imate ly involved 
with the provision of in f rastructure,and i t has been the provis ion of 
infrastructure which has been the burden of the twent ieth century fo r 
governments of both countries (and, i t might be added, has furnished the 
major opportunity for public sector planning). 
I f the al locat ion of government expenditure funct ions is bas ica l ly 
similar between the two federat ions, the same cannot be said in re la t i on 
to the allocation of revenue ra is ing po ten t i a l . The di f ferences w i l l be 
explored in more depth in l a te r chapters and here we shal l note only the 
major differences in terms of t he i r p rac t ica l e f fec t at the present t ime. 
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The basic point to be made is that the Canadian provinces are more 
financially independent than are the Australian states. This lesser degree 
of vertical imbalance comes about primarily because the Canadian provinces 
have direct access to a broader range of revenue measures. Statistics 
presented in Chapter 5 show that, on average, the Canadian provinces are 
dependent on the national government for about one quarter of their total 
funding compared with the average figure of over one half for the Australian 
states. The difference in the degree of imbalance can be explained by two 
main characteristics, (a) The Canadian provinces apply their own income 
72 taxes, both personal and corporate, and (b) The Canadian provinces are 
able to levy some taxes at the point of wholesale/retail which in Australia 
would fall foul of the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government 
73 
over "customs and excise duty". Indeed it is these two factors which 
give the Australian federation a higher degree of fiscal vertical imbalance 
than most other federations of the world. Reasons for this situation will 
be examined in subsequent chapters but it can be noted here, in a preliminary 
way, that public sector planning in the systematic way we are contemplating, 
can be expected to be more difficult for sub-national units of a federation 
the greater their dependence on handouts from a higher level, particularly 
in relation to the mixture of conditional and unconditional funding in the 
fiscal transfers between the levels of government. By contrast centralized 
financing should make national level planning easier to implement. This 
aspect is examined in depth in Chapter 6. 
Both Australia and Canada have an "umpire" in the form of a High Court 
which, inter alia, hears disputes of various kinds between the levels of 
government especially disputes about sovereignty over functions, resources, 
and revenues. The Courts in both countries are appointed in effect by the 
4.- •, 74 
national government although there is nowadays at least an informal 
practice of consulting with the states/provinces before appointments are 
made. Whilst it is not legally correct to say that the High Courts are 
the final arbiter of constitutional disputes, in practice very few attempts 
72. Australian states still have the power in theory to levy income taxes 
but the operation of the uniform taxation arrangements since World War 
II has seen the practice of the national government levying all income 
tax, personal and corporate, on a uniform basis, and transferring portion 
of the tax pool to the states. 
73. There has been some inconsistency in the Australian High Court's 
judgments. One view now accepted in Australia is that state governments 
cannot levy taxes which fall at the point of wholesale, because such 
taxes or levies are deemed to constitute excise duties, an exclusive 
power of the Commonwealth Government under the Constitution, 
4- Strictly speaking, they are appointed by the national parliaments. 
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are made to appeal beyond them on matters of intergovernmental disputes. 
Legal historians point to clearly defined periods in the history of both 
countries when the High Courts showed a consistent leaning towards one or 
other level of government and this has formed the basis of one of the main 
criticisms levied at the Courts. Another criticism, which is examined 
in more depth in a later chapter, is the inconsistency of High Court 
judgements,and yet other criticisms relate to the failure of both Courts 
to give advisory opinions or depart from the text of the constitutional 
document in seeking to interpret its intention. Depite these shortcomings 
it can be observed that the Courts have proved to be a key element in the 
shift of the balance of power between the levels of each federation, but 
it ought to be emphasized that they have mostly been forced into this 
situation because of the inability or unwillingness of the political 
system to resolve the questions of intergovernmental rivalry which are 
resolved eventually through litigation. 
In both countries there exists a variegated pattern of institutions 
for the allocation of power and resources throughout the federal system. 
Without question the most apparent of these in both federations has been 
the so called Premiers' Conferences in Australia and its Canadian equivalent 
the Conference of First Ministers, It is this device through which most 
of the vertical fiscal imbalance is rectified largely by means of 
negotiations around formulae on revenue sharing and longer term agreements 
on public sector spending in the aggregate and by major programme categories. 
Ironically, these conferences in both countries are without constitutional 
foundation, and widespread controversy exists over their effectiveness as 
a process for the intergovernmental allocation of resources, but there can 
be no doubt that they are the single most important political device in 
intergovernmental relations and they come in for close scrutiny in later 
chapters. The Australian Premiers' Conference is closely associated with 
another institution, the Loan Council, which, in effect, coordinates all 
loan raising for the public sector as a whole and therefore virtually 
determines the size and distribution*of government capital expenditure 
I'or the three levels of government. The coordination is formal,and all 
levels must adhere to the Loan Council's decision, and it is for this 
reason that one can say that there is no Canadian equivalent, (indeed there 
IS no equivalent in any other federation), although it is true that in 
Canada there exists an unwritten agreement that a higher level of government 
would always guarantee the loans of a lower level. Consequently it can be 
0 in general the distribution between projects; rather the distribution 
between states. See Chapter 5. 
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said that in Austral ia, and to a lesser extent in Canada,there exists a 
high degree of coordination of government capi ta l ra is ings , and the 
Premiers' Conferences provide a looser and more haphazard coordination of 
revenue sharing and respons ib i l i t y sharing. These governmental i n s t i t u t i ons 
are mirrored in turn by a co l lec t ion of other p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i ons and 
processes including p o l i t i c a l pa r t i es , pressure groups, and, in pa r t i cu la r , 
the media. I t is important to note t h a t , in both countr ies, a l l of these 
institutions are structured and operate on a federated basis themselves so 
that they serve to reinforce the federal character of the society and i t s 
governments. For example a l l of the major p o l i t i c a l part ies are organized 
on a strong state/provincial base as are the pressure groups. More 
importantly a l l of the major newspaper chains, te lev is ion and radio networks, 
in both Australia and Canada operate very much on the p r inc ip le of ed i t o r i a l 
autonomy at the s tate/prov inc ia l l e v e l . Thus i t is the pract ice for the 
media to reinforce spat ial l o ya l t i e s ,o r at least present most p o l i t i c a l 
bargaining from a spat ial perspective. 
This leads to a consideration of yet another important aspect of these 
federal systems and one in which there is a wider d i f ference in cu l tu ra l 
and geographical features w i th in the nat ion. There is no true Austral ian 
equivalent of Quebec. Nor does the geographical concentration of non Anglo-
Saxon immigrants in Austral ia have the same p o l i t i c a l s igni f icance as i t 
does in Canada. In short there is more cu l tu ra l homogeneity in Austra l ia 
and more diversi ty in Canada. These,of course,are general izat ions based 
solely on race and i t can be argued convincingly that on other cu l tu ra l 
grounds there is more heterogeneity in Aust ra l ia than appears to be the 
case at f i r s t glance. This is caused pr imar i l y by the sheer geographical 
size and diversity of the country,whereupon those who l i v e large distances 
from the main Sydney/Melbourne/Canberra axis have come to regard the i r 
interests as alien to those of other Aus t ra l ians , in the same way that those 
in the west regard the i r needs, aspirat ions and l i f e s ty les,as d i f f e ren t 
from those who l ive in the east, or those in the t rop ics view with some 
suspicion those who l i ve in cool temperate parts of the nat ion. Canada 
too experiences exactly the same phenomena which are the product of a 
large country spanning many la t i tudes and meridians wi th t he i r associated 
time zones. When i t is p o l i t i c s which is being considered,the question is 
not so much whether people are c u l t u r a l l y d i f f e r e n t throughout the nat ion, 
but whether they perceive themselves to be so, and the larger the distances, 
the weaker the processes of nationwide communication, the more l i k e l y these 
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perceptions are to take hold as they undoubtedly have in Australia and 
Canada. 
As mentioned in the previous section all dynamic federations are 
characterized by a balance of power between the sovereign units and various 
means for the alteration of that power balance. In Australia and Canada 
there certainly exists such a power relationship between the national and 
sub-national units of government,and there has been an oscillation around 
and about that balance,especial ly in the period since World War II. Various 
methods exist in both federations for alteration of the political relationship 
of the sovereign units and we shall consider some of the more apparent ones. 
Both federations make provision for formal amendment of their constitutions, 
but the Australian amending process involves a direct vote by the population 
at large whereas the Canadian constitution does not contain a general 
amending clause or a procedure for amendment - the parliament of the United 
Kingdom becomes the amending agency although it now does so only on Canadian 
initiative. Technicalities aside, the result is that there have been more 
amendments to the Australian constitution than to the Canadian, which have 
affected the power balance between levels, although considering Australian 
experience one could not consider eight referendum proposals passed out of 
thirty-six put, as being particularly significant either. Moreover only 
three of the eight Australian amendments really qualify under this criterion, 
and they are the 1946 social services powers for the national government, 
the 1927 amendments instituting the national takeover of state debts and 
providing for the operation of the Loan Council, and the 1967 amendment 
giving the national government control over racial groups, specifically 
aborigines, which has turned out to be a damp squib because the national 
government has refused to accept full responsibility for aboriginal policy. 
Interestingly neither in Australia nor Canada are the state or provincial 
governments accorded a formal role in the actual launching of referendum 
proposals,although amendments in both countries are contained in legislation 
which must pass the respective Senates, and in Australia, in the 1970's a 
number of amendments have originated out of Constitutional Conventionsat 
which the states have been strongly represented. Also,in both countries, 
there is often an informal practice of consulting the state or provincial 
governments before a decision is made to introduce the requisite legislation 
into the national parliament. Generally speaking it can be said that the 
constitutional amending process has not proved to be of great significance 
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in altering the federal power balance in either country. 
In the Australian and Canadian federations there was little attempt by 
the founding fathers to give the sub-national units a voice in decision 
making by the national government,except for the creation of national upper 
houses to represent state/provincial viewpoints. If one examines all the 
key institutions in both countries which determine resource and value 
allocation,one will find very little formal provision for the membership 
of those institutions to be appointed or at least approved by the state or 
provincial governments, and that includes membership of the bench of the 
High Courts which are the supreme legal determinants of the power balance 
between levels. Admittedly there are, once again, informal consultations 
which take place in this respect,but suffice to say that the founding 
fathers saw the Senates as the main avenue through which a sub-national 
voice would be heard on decisions made at the national government level. 
There are, of course, significant differences in the composition and 
operation of the two Senates the most notable being the direct election of 
the Australian Senate compared with the appointment,(by the national 
government in effect), of the Canadian Senate. There are rarely any Canadian 
national ministers drawn from the Senate a practice which is common in 
75 Australia. In a formal sense both Senates have similar powers or, more 
correctly, similar curbs placed on their powers and it seems for example 
that both the Australian and Canadian Senates can block supply; they can 
certainly delay it. What is of most interest to us here is whether these 
upper houses of the national parliament do in fact serve to represent 
regional interests. It has become popular sport to decry this aspect of 
the Australian Senate and to argue that party politics have turned the 
Senate into a duplicate of the lower house, solely because there are 
hardly any actual divisions along state lines in the upper chamber when it 
comes to formal voting. But as I have argued elsewhere this is a 
75. Indeed attempts are made by most Australian Prime Ministers to ensure 
a geographical balance in their Cabinet of Ministers in the Senate as 
well as ministers in the House of Representatives. 
76. See Kenneth Wiltshire, "Australian State Participation in Federal 
Decisions" in Federalism in Australia and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, ed. R.L. Mathews, (Canberra: A.N.U. Press, 1980); see also 
J.R. Odgers, Australian Senate Practice (Canberra: A.G.P.S., 1972); 
L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government (Melbourne: Longman, 1973); 
Campbell Sharman, "The Australian Senate as a States' House" in The 
Politics of New Federalism, ed. Dean Jaensch, (Adelaide: A.P.S.A., 
1977). 
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superficial approach and it overlooks a vast array of informal and 
tangential Senate activity such as the lobbying which takes place on a 
spatial basis in the caucus of each major political party, the reluctance 
of national governments to bring in legislation which overtly or covertly 
discriminates against particular geographical parts of the country for fear 
of reprisals in the Senate, the power of state political figures within 
their party machine over endorsement of Senate candidates, not to mention 
the actual formal requirement for state governors to issue writs for a 
Senate election advised, of course, by their state governments. There are 
few Canadian parallels to these habits simply because Canadian senators are 
appointed but it should be noted that the appointment process nowadays 
incorporates much informal consultation with provincial authorities. There 
have also been many suggestions in recent years for reform of the Canadian 
Senate including some from the major political parties,and it seems inevitable 
that Canada will soon have a reformed Senate which will be more geographically 
representative,and whose membership will probably be partially determined 
by provincial parliaments, if not the electorate directly. In effect it 
will be a Senate which will be seen to be a house for the provinces. This 
will affect the power balance even if only in the informal manner which 
occurs in relation to the Australian Senate. It ought also be noted that 
the Australian Senate is seen just as much as an institution for the 
protection of states against each other, (especially small states against 
large states),as for the protection of all states against the national 
government,as reflected most explicitly in the electoral weightage which 
is a result of equal, or near equal, regional representation for sovereign 
units. It can safely be said that the Senates of both countries will loom 
in importance as power brokers between the levels of government in these 
federations in the near future. 
There can be no doubt that in both federations it has been the area 
of fiscal relationships that has been the most dynamic aspect of the 
intergovernmental power balance. To some extent this has been due to 
77. Many reforms of this kind were suggested by the Trudeau government 
immediately prior to its defeat by the Progressive Conservative 
Clark government in 1979. At the time of writing no changes of 
this kind had been introduced. 
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national economic events which have sometimes produced demands for the 
services of one level of government at a much faster pace than demands for 
the services of the other, and at other times economic conditions have 
favoured the revenue raising mechanisms of one level of government more than 
those available to the other level. For example the growth of population 
attendant upon economic growth in the postwar period has caused enormous 
pressures on infrastructure most of which had to be provided by state/ 
provincial governments, whereas the energy crisis of the late 1970's has 
produced a demand for resources the royalties and taxes on which tend to 
belong mostly to the states/provinces. The constitutions of both Australia 
and Canada allow for a somewhat flexible pattern of financial relations. 
In Australia the states at present have no direct access to a reasonably 
stable percentage of income tax, despite the fact that that percentage has 
78 
varied from quinquennium to quinquennium. The Australian states have no 
current claim to company tax which is solely the preserve of the national 
government^ The states are also precluded from the bulk of indirect taxes 
because the Australian Constitution allocates "customs and excise duties" 
to the national government, and the High Court, in its wisdom or otherwise 
has tended to brandmost wholesale taxes as an excise duty. Arising out of 
a little horse-trading early in the 1970's, the states gained payroll taxes 
and have been making great use of them ever since. The other major sources 
of revenue for states are royalties on minerals, stamp duties on business 
transactions, taxes on motor vehicles, gambling and drinking. 
The Canadian situation as a whole is different in that the provinces do 
levy their own income and corporate taxes, and so are much less dependent 
on transfers from the national government than are the Australian states. 
The British North America Act allows the national government to raise money 
by "any mode or system of taxation", whereas the provinces are restricted to 
"direct taxation within the province in order to the raising of a revenue 
for provincial purposes", and this latter provision results in a pattern of 
taxation for the provinces which, (apart from income and corporate taxes 
already mentioned), is not greatly different from that of the Australian 
states. The Canadian provinces do have a more extensive power to tax 
78. Under the Eraser government's "new federalism" arrangements the states had 
received a fixed percentage share of income tax, about 40%, 
but this was passed on to them only after it has been collected by the 
national government. 
*The Constitution does allow the states access to company tax and the 
power was used by the states up to 1942. 
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mineral resources than do the Australian states because of the 
legal situation in Canada whereby provinces have sovereignty 
over below-surface territory in a different manner from that 
which the Australian states possess. However it is 
not the allocation of revenue raising powers which has been the main 
source of a shifting power balance in federal financial relations in the 
two countries. Rather, it has been the mechanisms for transfer of finances 
between levels. The Canadian Constitution is virtually silent on this 
aspect and so fiscal transfers are simply the product of political 
negotiation between the national and provincial governments. By contrast 
the Australian Constitution, under section 96, allows the national government 
to make "grants" to the states on "such terms and conditions as it sees 
fit". This provision, and other factors as well, make the transfer of 
finances from national government to state governments a political bargaining 
process with the odds stacked more heavily on the national government than in 
Canada. Nonetheless it is true to say, that in respect of the shifting power 
balance in the all important area of federal finance,it is the sphere of 
fiscal transfers between levels which is the focal point for examination 
and this area is explored in depth in a later chapter. In both countries 
these transfers are negotiated through intergovernmental forums which have 
evolved for the purpose, the key one being the Australian Premiers' Conference 
and the Canadian Conference of First Ministers which have already been 
mentioned. 
Apart from the fiscal considerations there are other formal aspects 
of the constitutional structure which provide explicitly for a shifting 
power balance between the levels. Australia, for example, has a 
constitutional provision for the interchange of powers between the levels 
of government, with the duration of the interchange being decided by the 
79. Section 96 of the Australian Constitution says -
"During a period of ten years after the establishment 
of the Commonwealth and thereafter until the parliament 
otherwise provides, the parliament may grant financial 
assistance to any state on such terms and conditions 
as the parliament thinks fit". 
It was a clause inserted at a Premiers' Conference merely as a safety 
valve to allow periodic ad hoc allocations from the Commonwealth to 
any state with special circumstances. 
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donor government. This facility has been used very sparingly although 
there has recently been a serious revival of interest in this concept to 
the extent of draft legislation, arising out of the deliberations of the 
Constitutional Convention. There is no formal provision for the interchange 
of powers in the Canadian Constitution. Both Australian and Canadian 
constitutions make provision for the incorporation of new territory into the 
federation and for the creation of new sub-national units by the 
fragmentation of existing ones; these are of course difficult and time 
consuming processes and such events have rarely occurred,except,of course, 
for the creation of new Canadian provinces in the twentieth century and 
recent talk in both countries about the movement of certain territories 
towards sovereignty as states or provinces. By the same token it needs to 
be emphasized that there is no formal provision in the constitution of 
either Australia or Canada for any unit to leave the federation. Western 
Australia voted to secede in 1933 but this did not eventuate,* and the 
considerable debate which has surrounded Quebec's threatened secession 
has cast little light on how it might technically be achieved. 
It was mentioned in the previous chapter that there is present in some 
federations a desire to ensure equality of access to government services 
throughout the country,as well as a desire to protect the interests of 
minority groups. Both traits are evident in Australia and Canada,and in 
respect of public finances both countries have devised fairly elaborate 
horizontal equalization schemes in an"attempt"to ensure that the standard 
of government services provided by any state or province does not fall 
below that provided elsewhere in the federation owing to factors beyond 
the control of that state or province. Australia's equalization scheme 
for state governments involves a state having to apply for a special grant 
before it can be considered to be truly a "claimant state", and its claim 
80. Section 51 subsection (xxxvii) gives the national government power over 
"Matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, 
but so that the law shall extend only to States by whose 
Parliaments the matter is referred, or which afterwards 
adopts the law." 
For an analysis of the operation of this section and other attempts 
to refer powers between levels see J.E. Richardson, op.cit., pp. 92-97. 
Following the Western Australian vote the matter was referred to the 
imperial Parliament in London which decided it had no jurisdiction and 
3t the Constitution made no provision for secession. 
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is assessed by an independent s tatutory body, the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission which compares that s ta te 's revenue ra is ing capacity and 
expenditure needs with those of the two "standard" s ta tes, (New South 
Wales and V ic to r ia ) , and f i n a l l y recommends to the national government the 
amount of the special grant needed to make i t possible for the claimant 
state to match the average f i s ca l standard of the standard states. The 
Canadian equalization scheme has the same object ive but completely 
different methodology, whence a formula is used to compare the revenue 
earning capacity of a l l provinces, (based on 29 selected taxes) , with the 
average for a l l provinces. The resu l t is the so cal led "have", and 
"have not" provinces. The national government makes payments to the 
"have not" provinces. Thus i t can be seen that the Canadian system 
does not exp l i c i t l y take account of expenditure d i f f e r e n t i a l s , only 
revenue raising po ten t ia l , thereby presumably assuming that fo l lowing 
revenue equalization, comparable standards of service may be achieved 
by equal per capita expenditures. Other Canadian f i sca l t ransfers do 
not necessarily contain equal izat ion elements at a l l and in some cases 
are counter-equalizing. These, of course, are not the only elements of 
horizontal equalization in the two countr ies. There is a component of 
horizontal equalization in some of the f i sca l t ransfers between levels 
although i t needs to be real ized that each intergovernmental programme 
contains i t s own, ( inev i tab ly d i f f e r e n t ) , formula for such "equal iza t ion" . 
However, despite the fact that the amounts of money involved in the formal 
equalization scheme are dwarfed by the amounts involved in other i n te r -
governmental f iscal t rans fers , i t is the equal izat ion schemes which are 
the most v is ib le and therefore the most p o l i t i c a l , and which brand a 
state as "claimant", or a province as "have" or "have no t " , which then 
becomes part of that state or province's advantage or handicap in the 
processes of po l i t i ca l negotiat ion between that government and the national 
government, and also i t s counterpart uni ts of government at the sub-national 
level. The po l i t i ca l perception may thus be qui te contrary to the economic 
reality. For example claimant States in Aust ra l ia are not necessari ly 
States with the lowest f i sca l capaci ty , but may be claimant simply because 
of an inequitable share of tax sharing and spec i f i c purpose grants. 
There has, in recent years, been some questioning in both countr ies 
of the very worth of horizontal equal izat ion schemes and especia l ly of the 
methods being used to achieve th i s ob jec t ive . In Canada th i s has been 
exacerbated by the energy c r i s i s whereby cer ta in energy resource-r ich 
provinces have become so disparate in t he i r publ ic f inance performance as 
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to skew the whole equalization formula. For example i t was clear by the 
end of 1979 that, unless the formula were modif ied. Alberta would be the 
only "have" province and a l l of the other nine provinces, including 
Ontario, would become "have not" provinces. 
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A complete review of the full picture of relativities between all Australian 
states being conducted by the Commonwealth Grants Commission through 1978-
1980, as part of the national government's new federalism policy promised 
81 
to overcome these problems to some extent. There are, of course other 
dimensions to the fiscal equality question than the ones we have considered. 
Section 99 of the Australian Constitution, together with Section 51, 
subsections (ii) and (iii), effectively preclude the national government 
in any of its taxation from discriminating between states or parts of 
82 
states. There is no Canadian equivalent of this requirement, but it 
would be a brave Canadian national government which levied its taxes at a 
differential rate from province to province. Perhaps the strongest protest 
related to horizontal equalization in both countries in recent times has 
been the argument that the horizontal equalization processes do not take 
full account of the effect of the uneven geographical impact of tariff and 
subsidy policy, transport freight and passenger rates, monetary policy and 
national government spending; nor does it take account of the uneven 
contribution of different geographical regions to export earnings. Cries 
of this sort are heard most frequently from states like Queensland and 
81. For an elaboration on some difficulties on the conduct of this 
relativity review exercise see R. Else Mitchell "Fiscal Equality 
between the States: The New Role of the Commonwealth Grants Commission", 
Australian Journal of Public Administration, XXVIII (2), June 1979; 
Russell Mathews, Australian Federalism 1979 (Canberra: Centre for 
Research on Federal Financial Relations, 1981); R. Else Mitchell, 
"The Australian Federal Grants System and Its Impact on Fiscal 
Relations of the Federal Government with State and Local Governments", 
Australian Law Journal, 54, August 1980; Russell Mathews, The 
Distribution of Tax Sharing Entitlements Among the States, Reprint 
No. 31 (Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, 
1979); Russell Mathews, Regional Disparities and Fiscal Equalization 
in Australia, Reprint No. 30 (Canberra: Centre for Research on 
Federal Financial Relations, 1979). 
Section 99 says -
"The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of 
trade or commerce, or revenue, give preference to one 
State or any part thereof over another State or any 
part thereof". 
Section 51, speaking of the powers to be given to the national 
government, says, inter alia, -
"(ii) Taxation; but so as not to discriminate between 
States or parts of States: 
(iii) Bounties on the production or export of goods, but 
so that such bounties shall be uniform throughout 
the Commonwealth". 
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Western Australia, and provinces like British Columbia, Alberta, and
Saskatchewan, who argue that they contribute heavily to exports and
therefore foreign exchange earnings but are highly disadvantaged by
tariff and national transport policies which concentrate industry in
Sydney/Melbourne or Torontrea1, and monetary policy which is applied
uniformly across the nation but formulated on the basis of conditions
prevailing in the two largest capital cities and often not appropriate
for the rest of the country. This sort of attitude is, of course,
based on a confused view of fiscal equalization and economic
equalization, which are different issues, but it has nonetheless a
superficial political appeal and has led to states and provinces making
attempts to protect their own spatial interests. To this end Australian
states and Canadian provinces have dabbled with tapered freight rates,
preference for government tendering to Iloca1" suppliers, tax concessions
of various kinds etc. all of which provide something of a hindranGe to the
mobility of resources around the nation.
The equalization issue is also reflected, as indicated, in the
protection of minority groups and here the Australian experience can in
no way match that of Canada with its constitutional language, religious,
and racial safeguards, and attempts at a Bill of Rights. Australia has
none of these devices and, indeed, national government attempts to enforce
equality of treatment of any kind is dependent on the goodwill and
cooperation of the states which is not always forthcoming. In relation
to aborigina1s the national government has, since a referendum in 1967,
had the power to oversee their welfare but has been unable, unwilling,
or both, to take full account of that responsibility.
The factors which have been outlined to date represent some of the
key characteristics of the two federations we are examining which hold
significance for attempts by any of the sub-national units of those
federations to engage in public sector planning. They are characteristics
closely related to the divisive and fragmented nature of these federal
systems and so it might be anticipated, as noted in the previous chapter
that they will provide hindrances to any planning attempts. There are, of
course, other features which differ between the Australian states themselves,
and the Canadian provinces too are not identical in all respects. For
example the very machinery of government often differs markedly in structure
and functioning. In Australia no state has the same cabinet portfolio
groupings as another, the composition and operation of parliament and its
committees are different, and the extent of the use of statutory corporations
differs significantly, as does the relationship between state and local
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governments. The public service structure and the departmental profiles 
are also different from state to state. One state, Queensland, is 
unicameral and in the other five states the franchise for election of 
upper houses differs, and their role in parliamentary activity also differs. 
One state, Tasmania, uses a completely different method of voting for its 
parliament compared with that used for the lower houses of the other five 
states. Some states have seen fit to alter the constitutional position of 
their governor in a bid to entrench their sovereignty. The point need not 
be laboured here because the consequences of these fundamental differences 
will be explored in later chapters. The Canadian provinces also are quite 
different in many of these aspects. Provincial parliaments are all elected 
to five year terms compared with three year terms in Australia despite an 
evident tendency for them to go to the polls after only four years. In 
respect of the other machinery of government aspects the Canadian provinces 
also differ quite markedly. 
So much then for the differences. It will be recalled that, in the 
previous chapter we also noted, in the literature, that there are 
characteristics common to most federations which serve to bind them together 
and, in so doing, provide a measure of coordination and hierarchy which 
serves to offset the other divisive aspects. One of these is the guarantee 
of a mobility of resources within the whole federation,preventing any sub-
national unit from erecting economic or social barriers around its territory. 
This was uppermost in the minds of both the Australian and Canadian founding 
fathers who feared the continuation of customs duties being levied by some 
states/provinces on goods entering their territory, and at differing rates 
too, which opened the prospect of goods entering the country in the state or 
province with the lowest rate of duty. Three basic moves were made in both 
countries to solve this problem on federating. Firstly,customs duties were 
abolished between states and between provinces; secondly,the national 
government was given power over customs duties to ensure equal rates of 
duty on goods entering the country at any point; and thirdly,and most 
importantly a clause was added to the constitution guaranteeing freedom of 
trade and movement around the federation. Section 92 of the Australian 
Constitution says -
"On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, 
trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, 
whether by means of internal carriage or ocean 
navigation, shall be absolutely free". 
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Section 121 of the British North America Act says -
"All Articles of the growth, produce or manufacture 
of any one of the provinces shall, from and after 
the union, be admitted free into each of the other 
provinces"• 
In Australia, further strength was added to this intention by providing for 
the establishment of an Interstate Commission which would ensure that no 
state discriminated against another by means of its transport or other laws 
but when that body started to show its teeth the true politics of federal is 
came into play and by 1920 it was no longer in existence despite the fact 
that the appropriate clauses in the Australian Constitution Sections 101-
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103 to this day proclaim that "there shall be an Interstate Commission". 
These provisions, of course, are not the only ones which serve to protect 
the mobility of resources. The fact that in both Australia and Canada 
control over immigration, currency, coinage, weights and measures, posts 
and telecommunications, census and statistics, defence, external affairs, 
patents, copyrights, and marriage and divorce etc. is also a guarantee of 
the mobility of resources,people,and ideas,around the federation if only 
because it prevents sub-national units gaining control of these powers 
which could be used to thwart the ideal. 
Needless to say this aspect of the practice of federalism in both 
countries has proved to be extremely contentious, striking, as it does, 
right at the heart of the sovereignty of the sub-national units. There 
has been an enormous amount of litigation brought before the Courts over 
the question of interstate/interprovincial trade,some of it resulting in 
puzzling and inconsistent decisions. Generally speaking the protection 
of mobility has been preserved,although the Australian states and the 
Canadian provinces have found many legal ways to defeat the objective. 
83. For an analysis of the operations of the Interstate Commission see 
J.F. Richardson, op.cit., pp. 71-82. Section 101 of the Australian 
Constitution says -
"101. There shall be an Interstate Commission, with such 
powers of adjudication and administration as the 
Parliament deems necessary for the execution and 
maintenance, within the Commonwealth, of the provisions 
of this Constitution relating to trade and commerce, 
and of all laws made thereunder". 
m 
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Some of their methods come about quite naturally and as a result of the 
division of powers. For example in Australia the fact that the state 
governments have power over railways, education, health, industrial 
relations, and law and order, has led to quite different systems in each 
of these fields with quite different standards, so that mobility of both 
people, conmodities, and concepts, is made difficult although not impossible. 
A parent will be reluctant to move to another state to take up employment 
if it means that children will have to face a quite different education 
system with different standards and emphases. A labourer may find a shift 
elsewhere difficult if the award wages and conditions are of a lower 
standard in the new location. The price and availability of hospital beds 
varies from state to state and may give cause for concern to the sick or 
elderly contemplating movement. 
However not all state actions to defeat the idea of national mobility 
arise from purely natural aspects of the federal division of powers. 
Australian states, (and Canadian provinces), have from time to time 
employed numerous other devices including preferences to companies "resident" 
in that state for state government tendering, company law provisions 
including takeover law, taxation concessions including for example 
concessional charges or even the complete abolition of payroll tax, stamp 
duty, road tax, rail freight charges, and death duties, or the availability 
of housing or low interest capital with repayment holidays. These devices 
are often used to protect already existing residents of a state, to 
discourage them from leaving the state, and if possible to encourage new 
residents to enter from other states. The controls, or incentives need 
not be monetary alone,and all Australian states for example compete for 
capital and migrants through offices of Agents General overseas by 
offering information and service. The laws governing portability of 
pension and leave entitlement rights of state public servants can, and do, 
have a profound effect on the mobility of public servants from state to 
state and from Commonwealth to state. 
There have been attempts by states to use other forms of legislation 
to protect local inhabitants and industry including, in more recent times, 
consumer protection legislation, but usually the High Court has been firm 
in negating other state laws when they serve to interfere with the 
mobility of resources across state boundaries. It must also be realized 
that the constitutional provisions which protect interstate mobility have 
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another important effect in that they place limits on the degree of 
government intervention into the private sector by both national and state 
governments. For example no national government in Australia would be able 
to nationalize any industry completely if that move interfered with the 
freedom of interstate trade and commerce,as the Chifley government found 
in relation to banking in 1947. By the same token state governments can 
regulate industries only to the extent of their intrastate activity,as is 
demonstrated by the failure of various state marketing boards to control 
the sale of produce interstate. 
It can be observed that the mobility question is not a settled one 
giving rise to much uncertainty in both federations under review, and 
uncertainty is the antithesis of planning. The point being made here is 
that when mobility is regarded as an essential ingredient of federalism 
it creates a variety of centripetal forces with accompanying coordination 
and hierarchical decision making and regulating patterns, placing the sub-
national units in a subordinate relationship to a national power, but not 
necessarily that of the national government. 
As we noticed in the last chapter, most federations also contain other 
means of providing a hierarchical relationship between the national and sub-
national level. Australia has no parallel to the definite superior/ 
subordinate dichotomy of the Canadian Governor General and the provincial 
Lieutenant Governors including the formal power of reserving legislation. 
However both federations do make provision for the dominance of the 
national level in cases of emergency, guarantees to prevent any unit from 
destroying other units or the whole system, and the granting of a residual 
power to one level. In respect of the lastmentioned the Australian 
Constitution gives defined powers to the national government and residual 
powers to the states, whereas the Canadian Constitution gives residual 
power to the national government. We shall examine later what difference, 
if any, these provisions have made to the actual functioning of the two 
federations; all we are doing here is noting that a hierarchical 
relationship exists. 
Another and most important element of coordination and hierarchy in 
the two federations comes via the existence of one umpire over disputes 
between the two levels. That umpire, the High Court thereby assumes a 
decisive and authoritative role in distributing power throughout the 
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federation. With respect to Australia this point must be qualified by 
noting that,as a result of aggressive legal action, the states have kept 
open an avenue of appeal to the Privy Council from their own Supreme 
Courts and there still exists a slight possibility of an appeal from the 
High Court to the Privy Council on specific matters, but to all intents 
the Australian and Canadian High Courts have assumed the role of an 
arbiter in the power struggle between the units of the federation. As 
long as it remains an authoritative arbiter that provides quite a degree 
of centralization and coordination in a fragmented system. 
When it comes to considering aspects of these federations which are 
unifying in principle and practice one can, of course, point to various 
factors which led to federation in the first place, and most of these are 
common to both Australia and Canada. They include geographic proximity 
of the sub-national units, fear of external aggression, benefits of economic 
integration, national identity especially vis a vis the United Kingdom, etc. 
There is also the concept which we have already examined, common to both 
countries, of a desire for equal treatment by, and access to, government 
activity. Because spatial areas, like human beings, are basically unequal 
in their resources and potential, such desired equality must, of necessity, 
be forced equality. It is an axiom that enforced equality leads to 
centralization of decision making because individual units of the 
federation have neither the capacity, nor knowledge, nor the altruistic 
stance,required to consider all components of the nation equally. Thus, 
the task invariably falls to a central agency, once again, an arbiter, 
usually at the national level although not necessarily part of the 
national government. The process of equalizing resources, values, and 
opportunity in both Australia and Canada has produced a variety of 
centralized institutions which stand in a superior relationship to the 
sub-national units. In Australia this facet is most clearly symbolized 
in bodies like the Commonwealth Grants Commission, the national film and 
literature censorship boards, and various other statutory commissions in 
particular sectors. Naturally the decisions of all of these bodies is 
not regarded as authoritative by all of the states all of the time, but 
they have become entrenched,by and large, as the agents of "equalization" 
of government activity with a good deal of accompanying formal or informal 
power over the states. Other manifestations of this attempt at equality 
of treatment for various spatial units include the exactly,(in the 
Australian case),and attempted,(in the Canadian case), equal 
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representation in the Senate,as well as the attempt by Australian and 
Canadian Prime Ministers to regionalize their cabinets so as to include 
all or most states/provinces in a task easier to accomplish in Australia 
than in Canada. 
This chapter has provided an overview of those features of the 
Australian and Canadian federations of relevance to our efforts to 
determine the amenability of the two systems to public sector planning. It 
has not dwelt on many other characteristics of the two systems not 
considered relevant to this task. However enough has been said to 
demonstrate a basic similarity in the structure and functioning of 
these federal systems in the broad. In the next chapter we proceed to 
identify more narrowly the specific aspects of both systems which appear 
to present the severest hindrances to the introduction of the various 
components of our planning system. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DIVISION OF POWERS 
It is obvious why the division of powers in a federation is such a 
fundamental hindrance to the attainment of public sector planning on a 
national basis. It is the hallmark of all federal systems and, more to 
the point, it is the most visible, (and therefore symbolic), evidence of a 
division of sovereignty; an indication that the jurisdiction of government 
over a geographical entity (nation) is split between different governments, 
all of which are legitimate, and all of which are held to be supreme in 
relation to the powers that are specifically assigned to them under the 
federal compact. Such an arrangement is right at the margin or interface 
of intergovernmental relations and is bound to present obstacles to such 
notions as harmonization of priorities, allocation of resources, forecasting, 
coordination etc. and all the other components of our planning system. 
However, as it is divided sovereignty, one might expect each unit of the 
federation to have autonomy over at least the functions which come within 
its ambit, and so possess the ability to plan for each of those functions, 
and across the range of them. As will be observed,this depends on how 
discrete each of the assigned functions of government is, and more 
especially, how watertight the unit of government can be made in its 
relations with other units. At any event the point to be confronted here 
is that the division of powers in a federal system immediately creates a 
chasm,or at least a border, a functional dividing line as well as the 
familiar spatial dividing line and the question is - can planning in all 
its dimensions be achieved across this line, this border, this chasm. 
That would be a hard enough question to answer if the line were a static 
one as it has long been assumed to be; it is much harder still if the 
division of powers or allocation of functions is dynamic. It must be 
realized from the outset, that the concept of a neat division of powers 
stems in turn from the belief that there is some sort of fixed and proper 
relationship between levels of government, which is itself a product of 
what is known as coordinate federalism which was discussed earlier. 
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The idea that there can be fixed criteria for allocation of functions 
between levels of government stems primarily from those who view federalism 
from a functional perspective in the first place,and who believe that a 
federal system ought to be one where each level is compartmentalized in the 
sense that it is given a clearly defined package of tasks to perform. Those 
functions are to be mutually exclusive so that there should be no direct 
interpenetration between levels. This is not to deny that any one level 
will have a political influence over the activities of another level; 
indeed all federations make institutional allowances for this to happen. 
But the overwhelming desire is to make it perfectly clear to citizens which 
level of government is responsible for a particular function so that 
accountability of that level can be direct and unequivocal. Under such a 
coordinate system it is essential that the administration of any level of 
government concern itself solely with the assigned functions of that level 
and not enter in any direct way the functions of another level. It is not 
unlike the process which takes place within each level of government in an 
attempt to maintain a clear separation of activity between the legislature, 
executive,and judiciary. Thus it is held to be democratic, efficient, and 
rational government. 
Now it is clear from the literature that this is the sort of federal 
system envisaged by the Australian founding fathers and which they attempted 
to lay down in specific terms in the Australian Constitution as witnessed 
by Section 51. (It is exemplified even more clearly in the British North 
America Act at Sections 91 and 92). Consequently, it is not surprising 
that this notion continues to pervade popular belief about Australian 
federalism,especially given the mystique which has been built up about 
the wisdom of the founding fathers. It continues its grip in a large amount 
of current literature especially that emanating from parliamentary and 
other political sources; and it is in many ways the basis of Australian 
Constitutional Law,since the Courts are forced to assign functions on the 
basis of legal interpretation because the political process has negated its 
responsibility in this regard. 
Thus it is essential to understand what the criteria of coordinate 
federalism are, despite the fact that,it will be argued, this form of 
federalism is no longer a reality or even a possibility in Australia. 
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Although it may sound trite, coordinate federalism seeks to give to 
national government functions which are national in character, to state 
level things which are appropriate to the state level, and to local 
government the things which are local. Obviously the whole question would 
be answered then and there if some easy way could be found of defining 
what the characteristics of national, state and local functions were. In 
political terms, that is where the rub comes in since there must be room 
for value judgement in ascribing such characteristics. 
It only remains to make an observation which is tautological but 
fundamental to an understanding of this problem viz. that one's conception 
of the proper allocation of functions between levels in a federal system 
cannot help but be predisposed by one's conception of federalism itself. 
And the key element here regarding conceptions of federalism is the nature 
of the relationships between the national and sub-national spatial units. 
For example, the very notion that there is some sort of fixed and proper 
relationship between levels of government is itself a product of what is 
known as coordinate federalism as defined by Kenneth Wheare -
"By the federal principle, I mean the method of 
dividing powers so that the general and regional 
governments are each, within a sphere,co-ordinate 
and independent".1 
William Riker asserts that the notion that each government has the 
authority to make some decisions independently of the other, still admits 
a great many actual constitutional arrangements, and, in fact, federal 
constitutions can be arranged in a continuum according to the degree of 
2 
independence one kind of the pair of governments has from the other kind. 
Geoffrey Sawer prefers to speak of a federal situation -
"that is a situation where geographical distribution 
of the power to govern is desired or has been achieved 
in a way giving the several government units of the 
system some degree of security - some guarantee of 
continued existence as organisations and as holders 
of power".-^ 
1. K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (O.U.P., 1963), p. 10. 
2. William H. Riker, Federalism, Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co., 1964), p. 5. 
3. Geoffrey Sawer, Modem Federalism (London: Pitman, 1976), p. 2. 
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Daniel Elazar claims that no single definition of federalism has proved 
satisfactory because of the difficulties of relating theoretical 
formulations to the evidence gathered from observing the actual operation 
of federal systems. He adds this highly pertinent statement -
"As a political device, federalism can be viewed 
more narrowly as a kind of political order animated 
by political principles that emphasize the primacy 
of bargaining and negotiated co-ordination among 
several power centres as a prelude to the exercise 
of power within a single political system and stress 
the virtues of dispersed power centres as a means 
for safe-guarding individual and local liberties".4 
We don't need to exhaust all the definitions and theories in order to make 
a single point which is evident from those above. Neither the coordinate 
concept of federalism, a static, legal concept, nor the modern and dynamic 
political concepts, envisage an actual division of discrete and complete 
functions between levels of government. They speak instead of the 
allocation of power and this in turn implies that there has to be some 
kind of coordination of those powers if a democratic federal system is to 
remain a system. This is in itself a political process, or a bargaining 
or negotiating process. In the recent words of Rufus Davis -
"The exclusive hallmark of every constitutional 
system which purports to be federal, however, 
is the presence of an explicit 'division' of 
legislative power in the constitution. 
A 'division of power', however, is an artificial, 
an imperfect, a generalized, a linguistic, a 
skeletal thing. Political life simply cannot be 
perfectly or permanently compartmentalized. 
Players, resources, beliefs, issues, the language 
of politics, the name and the dimension of things, 
the ways of persuasion and coercion all change, 
sometimes dramatically, but more often as 
imperceptibly as the changing voice of address 
and communication between aging parents and growing 
children. However ingenious constitutional 
draftsmen may be in composing a 'division of power' 
that will work for and beyond their time, their 
words can rarely be more than approximate, crude, 
and temporary guides to the ongoing or permissible 
political activity in any federal system".5 
4. Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism, International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 
5. S. Rufus Davis, The Federal Principle (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978), pp. 142-143. 
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Identifying problems caused by the division of powers 
The main aim of this chapter is to pinpoint the problems for 
planning caused by the federal division of powers. This involves a 
review of the literature on the subject from both Australian and Canadian 
sources, together with the results of the interviews conducted in both 
federations. However, to set such a discussion in its proper context, 
we shall first examine the historical background to the divisions of 
powers, and the actual wording of the constitutions. 
To conduct this exercise we shall be heavily dependent on the actual 
words of various authors who have analyzed this problem, because one of 
the key issues involved in relation to a federal division of powers, is 
the very language which is used to describe that division. For the 
framers of any constitutional document, such language is difficult to 
conceive and, moreover, its meaning tends to alter with the passage of 
time. In the words of Bailey -
"The satisfactoriness (or otherwise) of the division 
of powers in any federal constitution will therefore 
probably depend a good deal on circumstances which 
may have been difficult, or even impossible to 
foresee when the Constitution was being framed, I 
mean the extent to which the needs of the community 
will demand common action (e.g. uniform regulation) 
in matters left to the states, and the degree of 
readiness for such common action which the states 
will exhibit at any given time. The same problem 
arises where powers with respect to a given subject 
matter are divided between commonwealth and states -
as for example in trade and commerce, including 
shipping and navigation, where the division takes 
place, as it were, at the state boundary, the 
Commonwealth having power with respect only to 
interstate operations. Opinions differ widely as 
to the success of the Australian division of powers, 
largely because opinions differ as to the extent to 
which unified action and direction are desirable in 
the matters concerned".6 
6. G.V. Portus, ed.. Studies in the Australian Constitution (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1933), pp. 34-35. 
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In relation to Canadian experience the same problem was confronted 
by the Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 
probably the most far-reaching federal review ever conducted. The 
Commission expressed it this way -
"The vital core of a federal constitution is the 
division of legislative powers between the central 
authority and the component states or provinces. 
This division represents the compromise between the 
forces which make union possible and those which 
inhibit the formation of a close union. It marks 
the limits of what can be done by common agreement 
and the extent to which the separate states must be 
permitted to differ and work out their own destinies .. 
.... the amount of care in phrasing the division of 
powers in a federal scheme will prevent difficulty 
when the division comes to be applied to the variety 
and complexity of social relationships. The different 
aspects of life in a society are not insulated from 
one another in such a way as to make possible 
mechanical application of the division of powers. 
There is nothing in human affairs which corresponds 
to the neat logical divisions found in the constitution. 
Therefore, attempts to exercise the powers allotted 
by the constitution frequently raise questions as to 
its meaning in relation to particular circumstances".' 
Finally, to emphasize the problems caused for planning by the division 
of powers, the words of Else-Mitchell -
"Central to the constitutional and legal problems of 
national planning and intergovernmental relations 
is the division of powers under our federal system. 
This denies the full legislative authority to the 
Commonwealth in fields in which it may consider 
national planning and development to be warranted 
and at the same time deprives the states of the 
requisite funds to undertake those tasks themselves".° 
7. Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 
Book 1, Canada: 1867-1939, Ottawa, 1940, pp. 30-31. 
8. Public Administration (Sydney), XXVIII(l), March 1969, p. 20. 
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The Background to the Australian Division of Powers 
Australia is a federation and like most, if not all, federations, it 
operates on the basis of a division of powers between three levels of 
government. As it has a written constitution, that division of powers is 
specified in a constitution, at least as far as the allocation of functions 
between the Commonwealth and state governments is concerned. The 
Constitutions of the states themselves, which consist for the most part of 
legislation enacted in the nineteenth century at the time each colony 
gained self-government, and amended since then from time to time, contain 
no written specific allocation of powers between state and local government, 
but rather simply assert the sovereignty of state government over local 
government. 
The Australian Constitution, whilst delineating the powers of the 
Commonwealth and state governments contains in its wording virtually no 
accompanying criteria to illustrate the division of powers which is made 
there. The founding fathers of the Australian federation did not bother 
to leave to posterity the reasoning behind the way they allocated the 
powers of government in the federation they created. Very few of the 
historical works or biographical material relating to the period to 1901 
make reference to the actual division of governmental powers between the 
levels of government. Sir John Quick, writing in 1919 makes this 
important observation -
"In deciding upon the distribution of powers, the 
Australian Federal Convention was guided, not only 
by the model of the United States Constitution, but 
by special considerations. It was thought that there 
should be reserved to the States all powers affecting 
private rights, municipal functions, local interests, 
resources, and trade; that they should control the 
administration of justice and local governing 
communities, and have free opportunity for internal 
development and local option, and choice in internal 
affairs. To the Commonwealth were ceded such powers 
as are of a truly national Australian character, 
whether relating to commerce, industry, finance, 
economics, defence or external affairs. It would 
have been a great calamity had the Convention drawn 
up an instrument of government intended to last as 
the citadel of national life for all time merely in 
a haphazard manner, without reference to fundamental 
and guiding principles.... 
...The success of the Commonwealth as a whole depends, 
not so much on the legislation and activity of the 
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"Federal Parliament as upon the legislation and 
activity of the state parliaments. They have 
reserved to them the right of controlling all 
domestic institutions, the home life, the 
education, the land and primary resources of 
Australia, from which are derived the springs 
of our national life, domestic, social, 
industrial and commercial 
...The powers left to the states are of a 
purely local, domestic and provincial character, 
and were left to them because it was believed 
that the Parliaments of the states, having 
special knowledge of local conditions, could be 
better trusted to solve local problems. 
To the Federal Parliament were assigned powers 
permitting legislation of a uniform character, 
operative throughout the length and breadth of 
Australia. It was not intended that this 
Parliament should pass laws applicable to parts 
of Australia only. The power of dealing with 
local questions and the making of local 
differentiations, in accordance with territorial 
differences and conditions, was left to the states. 
The text of a federal power is this: will its 
exercise yield laws of general application, suit-
able to every part of the Commonwealth, and 
capable of application throughout the States? 
Where there must be a variety of laws or regu-
lations, differing with parallels of latitude, or 
according to local conditions, their enactment is 
best left to the states. The fundamental 
distinction between a federal law and a state law 
is that the first must be universal and general in 
its application, and the second applicable to local 
circumstances. A power that must be exercised 
differentially is not a federal power, and should 
be left to the states".9 
Quick illustrates his principles by the trade and commerce power which, 
he believed,would operate quite simply in that trade and commerce 
conducted within a state would be regulated by that state government 
and only when it transgressed a state boundary would it become subject 
to Commonwealth jurisdiction. 
The Hon. Sir John Quick, The Legislative Powers of the Commonwealth 
and the States of Australia with Proposed Amendments (Sydney: Law 
Book Co., 1919), pp. 308-310. 
153. 
Norris in his work The Emergent Commonwealth traces some thoughts 
of the founding fathers pertinent to allocation criteria. Barton in 
1897 had modified the resolutions of the 1891 convention for brevity 
and simplicity and stated that the first of the principal conditions 
of federation was -
"That powers privileges and territories of the 
several existing colonies shall remain intact, 
except in respect of such surrenders as may be 
agreed upon to secure uniformity of law and 
administration in matters of common concern". 1^ 
Norris then makes the following observation which is extremely pertinent 
to an understanding of the difficulties of discerning the origin of the 
criteria for power allocation in Australia -
"While the method of dividing the powers was 
never in doubt, members said little about the 
specific powers the central parliament should 
actually receive. Many delegates were well 
read in Constitutional history and thoroughly 
versed in the precedents of existing federal 
constitutions. In 1890 Griffith submitted the 
first list of legislative powers (derived largely 
from the American Constitutions, and the British, 
North American and Federal Council Acts) and 
comparatively few substantive additions or 
alterations were made later. Delegates 
apparently assumed that federal constitutions 
necessarily contained such powers, and most were 
content to leave questions of this nature to the 
experts. They seldom challenged the desirability 
of the presence of the great majority of 
Commonwealth legislative powers (or the absence 
of others) which eventually found their way mainly 
into sections 51 and 52 of the Australian 
Constitution. The handful of powers that dele-
gates debated tended, therefore, to be those which 
they considered the most important the more 
contentious, the new additions, and the obscure".H 
10. Quoted in R. Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth (Melbourne University 
Press, 1975), p.4. 
11. ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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Griffith continued to defend his list of Commonwealth powers. 
Not one of them, he said, had caused a colonial government to fall, 
and none of them was specifically concerned with the domestic affairs 
of the states. State functions included almost all matters which had a 
direct bearing upon the social and material welfare of the people. 
Quick and Garran give an excellent account of how the original 
colonies acquired more power vis-a-vis the Queen's representative and 
they provide a resume of imperial legislation which had enhanced the 
power of the colonies before 1850 and this reminds us that the later 
proposals for federation or union were related to developments leading 
to colonial self-government in this period. It is worth noting their 
comment that, apart from provisions allowing New South Wales to set 
electoral machinery for Victoria, the new Victorian colony was given 
the same powers and restrictions as applied in New South Wales. In 
other words, from the moment of the creation of the second colony in 
Australia there was no hierarchy between them, although the new position 
of the Governor-General in New South Wales is not elaborated upon. 
The first formal moves towards Australian federation came of course 
in the form of British Secretary of State for Colonies, Earl Grey's 
schemes suggested to the colonies in his famous despatch of July 31st 1847, 
In it he included, inter alia, the idea previously raised by Governor 
Fitzroy, of a General Assembly to deal with matters of common Australian 
interest. This was the key passage -
"The principle of local self-government (like 
every other political principle) must, when 
reduced to practice, be qualified by many other 
principles which must operate simultaneously 
with it. ...For example, it is necessary that, 
while providing for the local management of 
local interests we should not omit to provide 
for a central management of all such interests 
as are not local. Thus, questions co-extensive 
in their bearing with the interests of the 
Empire at large and the appropriate province 
of Parliament. 
But there are questions which, local as it 
respects the British possessions in Australia 
collectively, are not merely local as it respects 
any of those possessions. Considered as 
members of the same Empire, those colonies have 
many common interests, the regulation of which, 
in some uniform manner and by some single 
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"authority, may be essential to the welfare of them 
all. Yet in some cases such interests may be more 
promptly, effectively, and satisfactorily decided 
by some authority within Australia itself than by 
the more remote, the less accessible, and in truth 
less competent authority of Pariiament".12 
Grey then went on in his despatch to name some of the interests he 
thought would be common to all the colonies including import and 
export duties, conveyance of letters, roads, railways and other 
internal communications traversing two or more colonies. 
The reception to Grey's suggestions was hostile and William 
Charles Wentworth spearheaded resolutions to oppose them on the grounds 
that Grey's suggestions for a central legislature would jeopardize 
the position of New South Wales. 
The next development of relevance was the 1849 Committee of the 
Privy Council which suggested, inter alia, that one Australian 
Governor should be Governor-General, there should be a uniform tariff, 
and a General Assembly with powers over ten topics which they 
specified. However, no grounds were given for the powers which had 
13 been selected. This however had 
the departure of Governor Fitzroy. 
little impact especially after 
In 1853,Wentworth's Constitutional Committee in New South Wales 
came up with a recommendation for a General Assembly for "intercolonial 
questions", and listed off eight specific heads of power for that body. 
Again, no rationale is given but Quick and Garran do note that Wentworth 
only had in mind a means of securing "uniform legislation on a few 
14 
matters of common interest". A committee appointed in Victoria in 
1853 to draft a new Constitution for that colony also touched on the 
question, and said that there were questions of such vital intercolonial 
interest that provision should be made for occasional invoking of a 
General Assembly, but rather than list powers for that General Assembly, 
they proposed instead that it only have power to legislate on matters 
15 
submitted to it by the colonies. 
12. John Quick and Robert Randolph Garran, The Constitution of the 
Australian Commonwealth (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1901), p.81. 
13. ibid., p.85. 
14. ibid., p.91. 
15. ibid., p.92. 
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From 1834 to 1863 there were sporadic moves which produced some 
attention to the division of powers. Dean-Thomson said in Britain in 
1856 that there were "seven great questions" that should be submitted 
to a representative federal assembly and he named them. Wentworth 
now living in England drew up a draft bill in 1857 which expanded on 
the Dean-Thomson list."^ '^  Duffy in 1857 in Victoria had a select 
committee look at the possibility of union, and suggested a conference 
be called of delegates from the colonies to delineate powers, whilst in 
New South Wales in the same year, a select committee suggested that a 
new General Assembly could have power to legislate on "all intercolonial 
subjects which might be submitted to it by the legislatures of two or 
18 
more colonies interested in no other subject". A South Australian 
select committee in 1857 thought a federal legislature would be premature, 
but felt that there were many topics where the colonies had a common 
interest and where uniform legislation would be desirable. They added a 
19 
few powers to the list which had been around. 
Between 1863 and 1880 there were debates on the tariff and inter-
colonial conferences. These conferences, say Quick and Garran, were 
not adequate, but provided the only means of securing "uniform 
legislation and concerted administration on the subjects of common 
20 
concern". One such conference on postal services led to suggestions 
of the establishment of a federal council. At an intercolonial 
conference in 1880-81, Parkes submitted a basis for uniform duties of 
customs and excise and this moved to broader recommendations including 
a Federal Council to deal with all intercolonial matters. 
It was the fear of external attack that prompted colonies to think 
of defence as a common function, and it was Griffith who pressed in 1883 
for a Federal Australasian Council to deal with defence, pacific 
relations, the influx of criminals, regulation of quarantine, and any 
other matters referred by the Queen or any of the colonies. But the 
Council was to have limited membership and although it had some 
legislative powers it had no effective financial or executive 
21 
powers. The Colonial Conference 
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of 1887 suggested an Imperial Officer be appointed to report on defences 
of the Australian colonies. Major General Edwards reported in 1889 and 
suggested federation of the forces by many means and added "a uniform 
gauge for railways" to his list of defence reorganization. 
On October 1889 Parkes was to use this defence report to urge 
federation in his famous Tenterfield Speech,after which he proposed 
a convention of delegates, and clearly envisaged creation of a central 
government modelled closely on that existing in Canada, but no powers 
were mentioned.^~^ There followed of course, in 1891, Parkes' famous 
resolutions which served as the basis for the debates of the Convention. 
They really ought to be repeated here -
"1. That the powers and privileges and territorial 
rights of the several existing colonies shall 
remain intact, except in respect to such surrenders 
as may be agreed upon as necessary and incidental 
to the power and authority of the National 
Federal Government. 
2. That the trade and intercourse between the 
federated colonies, whether by means of land 
carriage or coastal navigation, shall be 
absolutely free. 
3. That the power and authority to impose custom 
duties shall be exclusively lodged in the 
federal government and parliament, subject to 
such disposal of the revenues thence derived as 
shall be agreed upon. 
4. That the military and naval defence of Australia 
shall be entrusted to federal forces, under one 
command". 
Quick and Garran comment on these resolutions that "The fundamental 
principles of union thus laid down were - intercolonial free trade, 
a federal tariff, federal defence, and the reservation of provincial 
rights in provincial matters ... They were based, beyond all doubt, 
on a comparative study of the Constitutions of the United States and 
Canada".2^ 
22. ibid., p. 117. 
23. ibid., pp.118-119. 
24. ibid., pp.125-126. 
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Unfortunately,the proceedings of the sub-committees of this 
Convention were private,so it is not possible to delve directly 
into the minds of the founding fathers especially those who drew 
up the actual constitutional document including the delineation 
of powers. Again,the reaction from the colonies to the draft 
constitution which was produced reveals some disagreement about 
certain items of power, but no explicit rationale for determining 
which level of government should have that power. 
The so called 'popular movement' had approached the question of 
assigning powers between levels of government but with little 
evidence of any overarching criteria in mind. The 1892 financial 
panic,it is claimed,had shown plainly that the prosperity of each 
colony was bound up with that of the others. Perhaps the leading 
force in the pro-federation movement was the Australian Natives 
Association,and in January 1890 just before the Conference convened 
by Parkes, the Association passed resolutions which included a specific 
list of 15 powers that should be given to a new federal legislature 
including defence, federal court of appeal, pacific relations, 
naturalization, uniform customs duties, railways, post and telegraph, 
public debt, federal revenue, division of any colony, marriage and 
divorce laws, insolvency, quarantine, coinage, and patents copyrights 
and trade marks. It added that all legislation "affecting provincial 
affairs" should be left to each colony but apart from that gave no 
25 
rationale for any or all of the powers so enumerated. 
Dibbs, the Premier of N.S.W. drew up a unification alternative 
in 1894 and proposed, inter alia, federal control over debts, 
railways, and land revenues, as well as a list of other powers. 
His concepts were rejected completely and Quick and Garran reveal 
no surprise. They say "The immense area of the different colonies 
and their climatic and industrial condition make the preservation 
25. ihid., p. 151. 
26. ihid., p.156. 
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of their individuality highly important; whilst they also offered 
a strong argument against entrusting unlimited powers to a central 
government which, in the nature of things, cannot have complete 
knowledge of, nor complete sympathy with all the different local 
11 27 
requirements of the different colonies . 
At the Adelaide session of the convention in 1897 the legislative 
power of the proposed Commonwealth parliament was extended, but the 
railway power was confined to defence purposes only. No clear 
explanation of the related reasoning is given. It was suggested that 
only by giving power over the River Murray could the problem of the 
conflict of riparian rights between the neighbouring states be resolved. 
Reaction from the colonies centred mostly on debates on narrow areas 
which affected that colony alone. 
At the Melbourne Convention in 1898 an interesting debate 
ensued over whether the Murray River system was "national" in character, 
and whether both navigation and irrigation involving that river 
were a national matter. There was disagreement here. As Quick and 
Garran note -
"The debate proceeded mainly, however, on the 
recognised assumption that navigation - at least 
inter-state navigation - was a federal power, 
incident to the control of trade and commerce, 
whilst irrigation and conservation were state 
powers incident to the control and management of 
the land. The difficulty remained, that the two 
powers might possibly conflict. Irrigation and 
conservation works in the states if uncontrolled 
by the Commonwealth, might destroy the navi-
gability of the rivers; whilst navigation 
regulations of the Commonwealth, and more 
especially works for maintaining or improving 
the navigability of the rivers, might seriously 
interfere with irrigation and conservation".28 
In relation to railways,an opinion was expressed that it was disastrous 
to federalize the control of railway rates unless the financial 
responsibility of management were also federal ized,and profound 
disagreement over control of railway rates led to increased powers for 
the proposed federal interstate commission. The Commonwealth was given 
power over invalid and old age pensions after substantial debate 
which is not analyzed in any depth. 
27. ihid., p. 157. 
28. ibid., p.195. 
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The remaining steps towards ratification of the Constitution reveal 
little else in terms of argument relevant to division of powers. At the 
last minute Sir John Forrest,for Western Australia,agreed to join the 
federation but wanted the federal government to have powers to construct 
a transcontinental railway so he wouldn't require the permission of 
South Australia for its construction and its route in that colony. The 
few objections which Westminster did raise,and some of which were 
accommodated,had only marginal relevance to the division of powers 
between the Commonwealth and the states,except perhaps the retention of 
appeals to the Privy Council where a dispute over such allocation should 
arise. 
The Australian Constitution 
In the words of Sir John Quick -
"One of the fundamental features of the Federal 
Constitution and the one which has been the subject 
of most controversy and most judicial decisions is 
the system of distribution of legislative powers 
between the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the 
state parliament. To effect such a distribution 
under a Federal Constitution it is necessary to 
divide the possible field of legislation by 
description of the various subject matters. 
Generally speaking the Australian Constitution, 
following the model of the Constitution of the 
United States, has given specific subject matters 
to the Federal Parliament and the residue of 
possible subject matters to the state Parliaments. 
This method of distribution leaves the states a 
mass of exclusive powers which cannot be invoked 
or interfered with by the Federal Authority and it 
also leaves to the states, in addition to their 
exclusive powers, certain concurrent powers as to 
matters within federal sphere to pass laws not 
inconsistent with federal laws". 29 
There are two things worth noting about this statement; firstly it proceeds 
from the assumption that it is necessary to divide legislative competence 
by actually apportioning subject matters by which of course is meant 
discrete government functions, and secondly, it gives no clue whatever 
as to how that division is to proceed. Quick does add that one of the 
key methods of deciding which powers the states would retain was that 
U was assumed they would retain most of the powers they had had as colonies. 
29. Sir John Quick, op. oit., pp. 268-269, 
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That was expressed in Section 107 which provided that "Every power of 
the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a state shall 
unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament 
of the Commonwealth, or withdrawn from the Parliament of the state 
continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth". 
This might be construed as a post-federation guarantee of state's 
rights and so,in a sense, a division of power in their favour. It is 
not the only such provision in that first constitution. There are 
other provisions which retain for each state the right to have direct 
communication with the Queen on state matters, which continue the 
state constitutions in effect except so far as they are inconsistent 
with the constitution of the Commonwealth, which continue state laws 
in force until inconsistent provisions are legally made by the 
Commonwealth Parliament, which guarantee equal representation in the 
Senate and minimum representation in the House of Representatives, 
which allow State Governors to issue writs for Senate elections, and 
which require the Governor of a state concerned to be notified of 
vacancies in the Senate. 
In relation to the judicial system the national elements were 
determined by making the laws of the Commonwealth binding, by allowing 
the High Court to determine appeals from state courts on questions of 
state laws, through the original jurisdiction of the High Court in 
some matters, and as far as the Federal Parliament has the power to 
nationalize state courts by investing them with federal jurisdiction. 
But there are elements reserved for the states here too. The 
constitution preserves state laws which are not inconsistent with 
Commonwealth laws, it gives state courts exclusively original and 
primary jurisdiction over matters involving state laws, and it 
provides that the trial, or indictment, of an offence against any law 
of the Commonwealth shall be held in the state where the offence 
was committed. 
The powers of the federal government are most clearly enunciated 
in Section 51,and to a lesser extent Section 52,of the Constitution. 
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Quick and Garran make the important observations that -
"looking down the sub-sections of Section 51, we 
find that in many of them the principle of duality 
is expressly recognized, and the trade and commerce 
power is confined to inter-state and foreign trade 
and commerce, and it is hedged in (Chap. IV) with 
a number of minute restrictions to prevent 
injustice or discrimination between states. The 
federal power of imposing taxation and granting 
bounties is similarly hedged about with conditions 
for the protection of the states. In sub-section X, 
the power over fisheries is confined to waters 
beyond territorial limits. ...In sub-sections xiii 
and xiv, the powers as the Banking and Insurance 
also contain a reservation of states rights. In 
sub-section XXXV power to deal with conciliation 
and arbitration is only given to the case of inter-
state industrial disputes and so on. In all these 
cases, the duality of interests is recognized "in 
the very gift of the power of the federal parliament, 
and the distribution of power is thus essentially 
federal. But in most of the sub-sections this 
nice analysis is not found. The advantages of 
uniform legislation, especially in matters relating 
to commerce, have prevailed, over the sentiment 
of local independence; and we find that if a subject 
has, on the whole, a national aspect, it is handed 
over unconditionally to the national legislature. 
Thus posts and telegraphs, defences, quarantine, 
currency, weights and measures, bills of exchange 
and promissory notes, bankruptcy and insolvency, 
copyrights, patents and trade marks, naturalization 
and aliens, trading and financial corporations, 
marriage and divorce, and other subjects are made 
unconditionally national. No state reserves any 
rights with respect to its internal posts and 
telegraphs, or of marriages between its own 
citizens, all these subjects are not federalized 
but nationalized - or at least, the power to 
nationalize them is given to the federal parliament" .'^^ 
Of course Quick and Garran also annotate the individual sub-sections of 
Section 51 and it becomes quite apparent that there is considerable room 
for difference of opinion for what each sub-head actually means, though 
they might appear quite self-evident to the layman. There are numerous 
examples of this, but for illustration we might look at one of Deakin's 
letters to the Morning Post, where he expresses a belief that the power 
30. John Quick and Robert Randolph Garran, op.cit., pp. 339-40. 
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over posts and telegraphs means the Barton government could "put down" 
a state running lotteries, and also become master of the state rail-
ways by obliging them to carry the mail and then submit their charges 
for doing so to arbitration in the event of any dispute. As he added 
in a later letter "One cannot have an omelette without breaking eggs 
31 
nor a federal union without sacrifice of state independence". Another 
perspective on the same question occurs in respect of social policies 
with the Commonwealth government, not long after federation, interpreting 
the social welfare powers listed much more widely than had the conventions 
of the 1890's. Norris comments on this aspect -
"The sharpest contrast between the Convention 
delegates, who framed the Constitution, and the 
Commonwealth politicians who came to implement 
it, was the presence in parliament of a Labor 
party, which, as it happened, held the balance 
between Free Trade and Protection. ... The 
two specific social powers - arbitration and 
pensions - became part of the Constitution only 
after persistent attempts on the part of their 
sponsors ... Yet federal legislation soon 
strained the Constitution for its limits ... 
Therefore Labor, committed to a definite platform of 
social reform directly and indirectly influenced the 
orientation and course of legislation by 'auctioning' 
its votes to obtain measures close to its interests. 
Social issues came to the fore".32 
Another even more remarkable aspect arose in relation to the power 
over industrial relations, because the new Commonwealth politicians 
quickly realized that it was not much good having power over the tariff, 
and free interstate trade, when different factory standards could exist 
in each state. Higgins introduced the first ever motion by a private 
member in 1901, for the Commonwealth to acquire, subject to the con-
currence of the states "full power to make laws for Australia as to 
wages and hours and conditions of labour". Quite a lot of commonwealth 
politicians who, at the constitutional debates of the 1890's had 
argued vehemently that industrial relations was a state matter, including 
Prime Minister Barton, now warmly supported Higgins. Said Barton - "the 
effects of internal free trade and the uniform tariff would be 'crippled' 
unless the national parliament also had power to deal uniformly with 
the conditions of employment throughout Australia". Another member 
31. Alfred Deakin, Federated Australia (Melbourne U.P., 1968), pp.56-66. 
32. R. Norris, op.cit., p. 130. 
marvelled at the "miraculous conversion that had taken place' 
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Section 52 of the Const i tut ion began with the preamble that 
"The Parliament s h a l l , subject to th i s Const i tut ion have exclusive 
power to make laws fo r the peace, order, and good government of 
the Commonwealth with respect to . . . . " . Whilst in some federations 
this phraseology "peace, order and good government" has been regarded 
as i t s e l f conferring very wide scope on the level of government to 
which i t is ascribed, in the Austra l ian case i t was regarded j u s t as 
common verbiage and the three areas that fol lowed were considered the 
v i ta l portion of the Section. 
Space does not permit a complete examination of every one of the 
powers spec i f i ca l l y al located in the o r ig ina l cons t i tu t ion exclusively to 
the Commonwealth, concurrently between the two l eve l s , or exclusively to 
the states. Also, we have not examined the way powers of ra is ing 
revenue were a l located. Suff ice to reemphasize that in th is document:-
(a) There was, even, in 1901, some ambiguity about the meaning 
and extent of various government funct ions. 
(b) In the event of inconsistencies in laws between the two 
levels commonwealth law would prevai l to the extent of the 
inconsistency. 
(c) There was l i t t l e provision fo r the in terpenetrat ion of the 
two levels and less fo r the states to oversee the Commonwealth 
than vice versa. 
(d) There was already some suspicion tha t some of the powers at 
one level were inconsistent wi th other powers given to the 
same leve l , and more important ly , that there were important 
linkages between functions assigned one level and those 
assigned to a d i f f e ren t l e v e l ; which promised to cause 
practical d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
(e) There was no spec i f ic mention of local government. 
(f) \lery few words ind ica t i ve of anything resembling c r i t e r i a 
for al locat ion of funct ions appear in the actual wording of 
the f i r s t Const i tu t ion. 
Thus i t becomes clear that,even from the moment of i t s proclamation, 
the f i r s t const i tut ion was bound to become a document establ ish ing rules 
for a dynamic re la t ionship between levels of government and not a s ta t i c 
one. This is extremely important f o r the question of the d iv is ion of 
powers. No bet ter , or more prophetic statement of the s i tua t ion could 
be given than that of Quick and Garran themselves -
33. ibid., pp. 190-191 
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"Whilst the life of the Commonwealth will begin with a 
clear differentiation of function and status, as between 
it and its corporate units, the states, it does not 
follow that the outlines and objects of that differentiation 
will be distinctly and permanently preserved. There will 
be, at the outset, a clear demarcation of spheres, a 
clear delimitation of powers separating the central 
government from the state governments, but the initial 
law must not be regarded as expressing a relationship ^4 
as unchanging as the laws of the Medes and the Persians". 
Comparable Canadian Experience 
The distribution of powers between the three levels of government 
in the Canadian federation differs in two basic respects from the 
Australian situation. Firstly the British 
North America Act, specifies the powers of the provinces and grants 
residual powers to the Central or Dominion Government. Secondly, 
the founding fathers of the Canadian Constitution saw fit to enumerate 
a list of powers for the dominion government as well, originally for 
illustrative purposes only, but the complications of having two lists 
of delineated powers in the one constitution has caused enormous 
difficulties for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that 
the functions are not mutually exclusive and have become progressively 
less so with the passage of the years. Another difficulty which 
arises is caused by the fact that the preamble to the list of Dominion 
powers in Section 91 of the BNA Act states that the national parliament 
shall make laws for the "peace, order and good government" of Canada, 
and also adds that the central government powers cannot concern them-
selves "with matters of a local or private nature". Interpretation of 
these phrases has bedevilled many a legal political and administrative 
effort to determine which level of government should possess a particular 
power, because it is strikingly obvious that a vast array of matters 
can affect the peace, order and good government of a country, and very 
few actions of any government do not in some way or other impinge on 
local and private affairs. The exclusive powers of the provinces are 
listed in Section 92 of the BNA Act. Education is treated as a special 
case, in Section 93,and old age pensions, and agriculture also come in 
for special treatment. 
34. op.cit., p.340. 
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Founding Fathers 
There is really no Canadian equivalent of Quick and Garran to guide 
us through the events leading to Canadian Confederation so one is forced to 
rely on a scattering of historical works. It seems clear however that,as 
in Australia, there was no profound attempt to conceptualize criteria for 
the allocation of specific powers between the levels. Rather the Canadians 
were keen to place the weight of legislative potential with the central 
government as they interpreted the civil strife in neighbouring America to 
have been largely an outcome of the undue power possessed by the sub-national 
units in that federation. 
Creiqhton attributes the formal distribution of powers to Brown,and 
35 to him also the fact that two sets of powers were presented. However, 
Macdonald had a model which he had sought to follow and which strongly 
favoured the proposed central government. Macdonald declared that "we have 
given the General Legislature all the great subjects of legislation", and 
Gait remarked of the central government's powers that "amongst them would 
be found all that could in any way be considered of a public and general 
character". When introducing the British North America Act into the House 
of Lords, Lord Carnarvon stated - "The real object which we have in view is 
to give the central government those high functions and almost sovereign 
powers by which general principles and uniformity of legislation may be 
secured in those questions that are of common impact to all the provinces". 
The attitude of the founding fathers to the powers of the provinces was 
that they should include "generally all matters of a merely local or 
private nature in the province". It also seems that the costs of federation 
were a significant issue and the founding fathers were influenced by a desire 
to ensure that the cost of the local, (i.e. provincial and municipal), 
governments would be small because, said Gait, "it would not do to affront 
the intelligence of the people and tell them we had devised an expensive 
37 kind of machinery to do a very insignificant amount of work". G.P. Browne 
points out that the Canadian founding fathers had another basic difficulty 
in delineating powers, and that was to ensure that the provinces kept control 
-DO 
over cultural matters. 
35. Donald Creighton, The Road to Confederation (Toronto: Macmillan, 
1964), p. 118. 
36. Wilfred Eggleston, The Road to Nationhood (Toronto: Oxford U.P., 
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37. ibid. , p. xi. 
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Stanley credits Tache with having conceived the first basis for 
the distribution of powers and says that Tache allocated to the 
federal parliament most powers which finally emerged, and everything 
relating to "family life" to the provinces. He also reveals that 
many of the founders could see the fault of enumerating a list for 
both levels of government. Says Stanley -
"From the evidence offered by Joseph Pope, it would 
appear that the delegates at no time seriously 
attempted to define the scope of the enumerated 
items or their possible overlapping, beyond George 
Brown's suggestions that the courts of each province 
should decide what is Local and what General 
Government jurisdiction, with Appeal to the Appeal 
or Superior Court."39 
Stanley adds that "the colonial delegates had believed the enumerated 
powers to be mutually exclusive; only agriculture and immigration, 
which had been included among the powers assigned to both federal and 
provincial legislatures seemed to provide any real problems, and these 
were deviated by giving federal legislation in respect to these matters 
40 precedence over that of the provinces'. 
It is Smiley who gives the most lucid account of the original 
distribution of powers in Canada. Some of the key criteria he observes 
from the relevant literature include the concern of the fathers in 
economic matters to make an implicit distinction between activities 
associated with land and activities associated with commerce, and,on 
the basis of this distinction, they allocated powers to the provinces 
and the Dominion respectively. Smiley states that there has never been 
a satisfactory explanation of why the framers of the Act resorted to 
such an enumeration. It seems that the provinces were given matters 
in which the traditions of the English speaking and French speaking 
groups were significantly different while the Dominion received matters 
with little cultural significance. The other broad class of subjects 
which the founders gave the provinces were those matters which had been 
39. Quoted at G.F.G. Stanley "Act or Pact? Another Look at Confederation 
in Confederation, ed. D.G. Creighton et.al., (University of Toronto 
Press, 1967), p.115. 
40. ihid., p.116. 
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the responsibility of local governments: As to the national powers. 
Smiley says -
"The powers conferred on the Dominion were deemed 
necessary to secure military defence, the eventual 
inclusion of all remaining British territories in 
North America within Canada, and the establishment 
of an integrated national economy".41 
These were, says Smiley, the "nation-building and nation-maintaining 
powers", and together with others they were also the costly functions 
of government and the allocation of revenue powers had to be 
adjusted accordingly. With respect to the judicial system, which was 
to be a single one for both levels, it seems that the founders believed 
that,although the two levels would legislate and administer independently, 
42 
the judicial system would operate through cooperation. 
The Constitution 
Apart from some of the factors which have emerged above, there are 
a few other portions of the wording of the British North America Act 
which reveal some criteria regarding the role of levels of government. 
Although education was assigned to the provinces,the central government 
was made the protector of educational rights of denominational 
minorities against provincial encroachments. Law enforcement was 
divided,giving criminal law enforcement only to the central government 
to respect longstanding guarantees to Quebec from 1774 onward,so that 
the provinces were given exclusive power over "property and civil rights 
in the province" i.e. civil law. The provinces could not amend 
legislation affecting the status and position of their Lieutenant 
Governor, in fact, the vice regal representatives in the province were 
in a hierarchical and subordinate relationship in many ways to the 
Governor General of Canada. Section 92 says provinces can levy direct 
taxes,but it is in order to raise revenue for "provincial purposes", and 
they can borrow money, but on the "sole credit of the province". They can 
establish and run hospitals and like institutions but not "Marine 
Hospitals". They have control over "Municipal Institutions". Their 
public works power cannot apply to communications and transport mediums 
connecting the province to another province or country or extending 
41. D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976), 
p.5. 
42. ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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beyond the limits of the province, and also "such works as, although 
wholly situate within the province, are before or after their execution 
declared by the parliament of Canada to be for the general advantage 
of Canada or for the advantage of two or more of the provinces". Other 
powers mentioned like marriage, property and civil rights, administration 
of justice etc. are to be carried out solely "in the province" and the 
incorporation of companies is restricted to those with "provincial 
objects". Section 92 actually concludes with the powers of the provinces 
over "Generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the 
province". 
The federal government was empowered by Section 94 to make 
provision for uniformity of all or any laws relative to property and 
civil rights in three of the provinces and also court procedure in those 
provinces. In old age pensions the federal power was not allowed to 
affect any provincial legislation "on old age pensions", (later changed 
to prevent interference with provincial laws in "any such matter"). In 
Agriculture and Immigration the powers are concurrent with federal 
legislation superior, but it should be noted that the national government 
can legislate in these areas, and indeed in any of the areas of its 
power in all or any one of the provinces. The federal government can 
acquire provincial public property for defence purposes. 
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iPS^nrKjrom the literature 
As mentioned earlier there has been a wealth of both Australian and 
Canadian literature dealing with various aspects of the division of powers. 
A complete review of that literature has been undertaken for this study 
but space precludes the presentation of the results of that review in 
anything but summary form. A more complete analysis of the major 
literature contributions, which have a bearing on the particular subject 
matter of this study,is provided as an appendix. It includes a resume of 
the deliberations of such Australian sources as the 1929 Royal Commission 
on the Constitution, the 1959 Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Constitutional Review, various Constitutional Conventions, and major 
academic treatises symposiums and textbooks. Canadian sources covered 
include the 1950 Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial 
Relations and its copious commissioned studies, academic treatises and 
texts, and some of the material related to the constitutional review process 
of the late 1970's. That literature appears to present the following 
basic problems as arising from the existence of the division of powers 
in the two federations, 
(a) Difficulties in achieving uniformity in the provision 
of government services. Examples arising from the literature 
include company law, marriage and divorce law, health, roads, 
43 
aviation, transport, navigation and shipping. 
(b) Problems in ensuring the equitable provision of government 
44 
services throughout the whole nation. 
(c) Confusion for the clients of government; difficulties in 
fulfilling community expectations (especially in the welfare 
area); distortion of political accountability to citizens; 
and undue increases in the cost of litigation for citizens 
45 
against governments. 
43. 
44, 
See Commonwealth of Austral ia , Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution (Canberra: Government P r in te r , 1929), pp. 74, 173-174, 
204, 206-207, 223-227, and Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Report of the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review 
(Canberra: Government Pr in te r , 1959), pp. 50-61. 
See for example R.L. Mathews, e d . , Fiscal Federalism: Retrospect and 
Prospect, Canberra, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relat ions, 
Research Monograph No. 8, pp. 115-115 
^^- See for example Commonwealth of Aust ra l ia , Report of the Royal 
Corrmission on the Constitution, pp. 151, 153, 244, 247. 
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(d) Legal confusion in functions designated as concurrent under 
the constitution,and especially in relation to High Court 
interpretations in such cases. This problem is particularly 
evident in Canadian literature because of the effect of the 
existence of two sets of enumerated powers in Sections 91 
and 92 of the British North America Act, alluded to earlier.'^^ 
(e) In various forms the concept of spillovers appears frequently 
in the literature together with the problems of coping with 
such spillovers because of various forms of divided jurisdiction. 
The somewhat related problem of coping with mobile resources 
1 • ^ 47 IS also raised. 
(f) A wide variety of concerns about the smooth functioning of the 
economy have arisen because of the federal division of powers. 
These include many viewpoints such as the general fear of 
overgovernment, the growth of the whole public sector, the 
4-ft 
complexity of the economy, and general control of the economy. 
(g) A number of authors have highlighted the fact that because of 
the division of powers,taxing powers are separated from spending 
powers inducing all levels of government to be politically 
49 irresponsible and engage in "buck passing". 
(h) The inducement to public servants to build up a parochial 
power base behind their share of the division of powers has 
50 been noted, especially in the Canadian literature. 
46. See J.A. Corry, Difficulties of Divided Jurisdiction, A Study prepared 
for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Appendix 7, 
1939, pp. 7-9. 
47. See Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, p. 221; R.L. Mathews, ed.. Fiscal Federalism: 
Retrospect and Prospect, pp. 117-118; G.V. Portus, ed. , Studies in 
the Australian Constitution, pp. 34-39. 
48. Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, p. 244; R.L. Mathews, op.cit., pp. 114-120. 
49. R.L. Mathews, op.cit., p. 119; J.A. Corry, op.cit., pp. 8-9. 
50. J.A. Corry, op.cit. , pp. 9-10. 
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(i) The division of powers, it is claimed, can also lead to 
gaps in government powers overall and even, in the words of 
51 
one author, to "zones of anarchy". 
(j) There is a good deal of concern expressed in the literature 
over the actual wording used in the constitution to describe 
the division of powers. The concern is as to its vagueness, 
and hence ambiguity, leaving considerable potential for 
conflicting interpretation. One particular aspect of this 
general concern relates to the way in which the wording of 
the constitution has resulted in fiscal powers being able to 
be used to override the actual explicit division of government 
functions between the levels stipulated elsewhere in the 
•^^  ^ . 52 constitution. 
These then are some of the basic difficulties caused by the 
division of powers which appear to be relevant to our consideration of 
the hindrances to public sector planning in federations. The specific 
public functions which are most often mentioned in the literature as 
53 being bedevilled by the division of powers include trade and commerce, 
54 55 56 57 
navigation and shipping, industrial relations, health, roads, 
51. See Proceedings of the Australian Constitution Convention (Sydney: 
Government Printer, 1973), p. 278; Gordon Greenwood, The Future of 
Australian Federalism (Carleton: Melbourne U.P., 1943); J.A. Corry, 
op.cit. , pp. 8-9. 
52. See Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 
Book 1, p. 31; R. MacGregor-Dawson, The Goverrment of Canada (University 
of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 90-93; J.R. Mallory, Social Credit and 
the Federal Power in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 1954), p. 25; 
R.L. Mathews, op.cit. , p. 115. 
53. Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, p. 86; G.V. Portus, ed. , op.cit., p. 57. 
54. Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, p. 86; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Report of the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review, pp. 60-61; 
Proceedings of the Australian Constitutional Convention, op.cit., p. 278. 
55. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Joint 
Committee on Constitutional Review, p. 133. 
55. Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, pp. 173-174; Sidney Sax, "Australian Health Services -
Development and Problems", Public Administration (Sydney), XXXIV(3), 
Sept. 1975, pp. 227-230. 
57. Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, p. 204. 
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aviation, company law, aborigines, restrictive trade practices, 
, 62 , . ^ - 6 3 , 64 , -^ 65 , ^. , family law, defamation, transport, education, and offshore resources. 
Some other tangential aspects of the division of powers which were 
raised in the literature include the potential for dividing powers 
between levels on a legislative/administrative basis within functions, 
(often known as a horizontal power division); the need for a division 
of powers as a defence against centralization and totalitarianism; the 
relationship between the size of the units of government and the 
division of powers, (so that a power is not devolved to a unit incapable 
of coping with it); the role of local government and its potential 
role; and the confusion to the traditional division of powers caused 
by regional ism. 
58. ibid., pp. 206-207. 
59. ibid., pp. 74, 206-207, 208-212; Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Report of the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review, 
p. 112; Geoffrey Sawer, "Seventy Five Years of Australian 
Federalism", Australian Journal of Public Administration, XXXVI(l), 
March 1977, pp. 8-11. 
60. Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, pp. 219-220. 
61. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Joint 
Committee on Constitutional Review, p. 133. 
62. Proceedings of the Australian Constitutional Convention, op.cit., 
passim. 
63. ibid. , p. 278. 
64. E.G. Whitlam, "National Transport Planning: Political and 
Constitutional Problems", Australian Quarterly, 1968, p. 46. 
65. C. Sanders, "Higher Education - State or Commonwealth?", 
Australian Quarterly, Dec. 1950, passim. 
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The Contribution of the Empirical Analysis 
V i r tua l l y a l l of the above points which have been made in the 
l i terature were confirmed by the interviews which were conducted for 
this study. In par t i cu la r , a very large number of funct ional f i e lds 
of government a c t i v i t y were i d e n t i f i e d in which the d iv is ion of powers 
posed basic problems fo r coordinat ion. There seems l i t t l e point in 
simply recounting yet fu r ther examples of the same points made 
in the l i t e ra tu re and, in any event, i t w i l l be observed that the 
bulk of the l i t e r a t u r e we have surveyed has been contr ibuted by 
"pract i t ioners" in the two federal systems and hence gives empirical 
viewpoints. 
However the interviews which were conducted stressed a number of 
extremely important points re la t i ng to the d iv i s ion of powers which 
appear only sporadical ly in the most recent l i t e r a t u r e on Austral ian 
and Canadian l i t e r a t u r e , f o r the very good reason that these aspects 
are a product of only r e l a t i v e l y recent developments and emphasis 
in intergovernmental re lat ionships in the two countr ies. Let us now 
consider them beginning wi th the most basic recent phenomenon. 
(a) The Dynamic Nature of Federalism and the move Towards Organic 
Federalism 
I t became clear from the interviews conducted that the 
Australian and Canadian federations are no longer coordinate, for 
various reasons, most of them re lated to the growing interdependence 
of parts of the economy and soc ie ty , and the need for substant ia l l y 
increased government in tervent ion in general. The actions of each 
level of government have s i gn i f i can t e f fec ts on other levels,and there 
are, moreover, a considerable number of government functions which 
are now performed by more than one l e v e l . V i r t u a l l y a l l respondents 
believed that coordinate federal ism in the old s ty le was no longer 
a possib i l i ty because of the very interdependence of a l l spat ia l 
and functional elements w i th in the nat ion. 
This notion has a lso, of course,been i d e n t i f i e d in the l i t e r a t u r e , 
and more so in Canadian w r i t i n g than Aus t ra l ian . For example. 
Smiley says that "Canada l i k e other federat ions has moved away from 
'classical federalism' in which each level of government performed 
the responsibi l i t ies assigned to i t by the cons t i t u t i on in re la t i ve 
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isolation from the other. In the contemporary world, both the 
citizens and constituent governments of federations have become 
so interdependent that if some matter within the sphere of 
public decision is of concern only to particular state or 
provincial communities, it is not crucial even to those communities". 
Various other Canadian writers have elaborated on this aspect 
confirming the trend with examples. They include, at least, 
Simeon, Black and Cairns, Corry, Johnson, Trudeau, Pearson, Pepin, 
Johnson, Hodgetts, and a variety of official inquiries.^^ 
In relation to Australia, Mathews speaking of developments in 
the 1970's,says -
"To those outside the political conflict, it 
had long been apparent that the growth and 
complexity of the public sector, the inter-
dependence of decisions taken by the 
different planes of government, differences 
in the availability of information, and in the 
degree of political responsiveness, and the 
need to accommodate a varying mixture of 
national, regional, and local interests, were 
all combining to give decision making in the 
public sector an intergovernmental or multi-
plane dimension. This made it inappropriate 
for governments to base their actions on 
premises of coordinate or coercive federalism, 
or even on cooperative federalism where 
cooperation was regarded as an option for 
autonomous governments affecting only the 
policy fringes".67 
Reid expresses it this way -
"Nowadays the scale of governmental inter-
vention in our everyday lives, and the scale 
of federal functions vis-a-vis state and 
local functions, make the theories of strict 
governmental independence patently false".68 
66. See for example Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy 
(University of Toronto Press, 1973), p.41; Edwin R. Black, 
Divided Loyalties, Canadian Concepts of Federalism (McGill-
Montreal-Queens U.P., 1975), p.2; J. Peter Meekison, ed., 
Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality (Toronto: Methuen 1963), 
passim; Paul Fox, Politics: Canada, 2nd edition, (Toronto: McGraw-
Hill, 1966), passim. 
67. Publius, op.cit., pp.16-17. 
68. R.L. Mathews, ed.. Intergovernmental Relations in Australia, p . 23 . 
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These observations have been supported and verified by writers such 
as Sawer, Menzies, Crisp, Spann, Knight, Anderson, Mackintosh, 
69 
Hawker, and Giblin. 
The weight of all these comments is to suggest that both 
Australia and Canada have left a situation of coordinate 
federalism, (if they ever really occupied it in the first place), 
and have moved into a situation of what has been described as 
organic federalism. The era of coordinate federalism,with its 
emphasis on a division of discrete governmental powers between two 
levels,is held to have been applicable only in a situation of 
minimum government activity in general, and simple activity at that, 
in a society without the modern methods of resource mobility. 
At any event, the respondents in this survey saw a rapidly 
increasing number of public sector activities, once the preserve 
of one level of government only, now becoming intergovernmental 
through methods of shared funding and/or shared responsibilities. 
Moreover there were other by-products of this changed inter-
governmental relationship including what I have termed "linkages" 
and "overrides". (Those were not terms used by any respondent; they 
are concepts I have derived from the accounts of activity described 
by respondents.) 
(b) Linkages 
I t has become very evident in Austra l ia and Canada that there 
are links between functions of government,some of them so strong 
that alterations to any aspect of the conduct of one function 
induces immediate and d i rect reaction to others. This may have 
been covertly recognized at the time of confederation but subsequent 
events have c l a r i f i e d i t . These aspects emerged out of the interviews 
conducted for this study. 
69. See for example L.F. Cr isp, Australian National Government 
(Melbourne: Longman, 1970); See Robert Menzies, Central Power in 
the Australian Commonwealth (London: Casse l l , 1967); Geoffrey 
Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Coio'ts (Melbourne U.P. , 1967) 
and Federation Under Strain (Melbourne U.P. , 1977); C.A.N. 
Hawker, "Towards Federal Equi l ibr ium", Australian Quarterly, 1937; 
R.N. Spann, Government Administration in Australia (Sydney: Allen 
and Unwin, 1979); K.W. Knight, "Federalism and Administrative 
Efficacy" in R.L. Mathews, ed . , Intergovernmental Relations in 
Australia (Sydney: Angus and Rober tson, 1974); L.F. G i b l i n , 
"Federation and F inance" , Economic Record, Nov. 1926. 
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In the first place the general health of the economy in its 
broadest sense affects a multitude of functions of government, 
irrespective of whatever level of government performs them. The 
rate of inflation, level of employment, economic growth, interest 
rates, volume of money in circulation, exchange rates etc. all 
affect the performance of many government functions. It makes no 
sense to say simply that the national government should have 
responsibility for economic management, and then assume that "economic 
management" is a discrete government function exclusive to the 
highest level of government. Some other more direct linkages 
include the following, by way of illustration -
(a) Navigation - irrigation - conservation: It is impossible to 
control the navigability of streams without affecting the 
availability of water for irrigation and consequently the 
conservation of water and other resources and possibly the 
ecology. Yet in most federations, including Australia, 
different functions in this linkage are allocated to 
different levels of government. 
(b) Trade and Commerce - Industrial Relations: The control of 
interstate trade and commerce is profoundly affected by 
differing levels of wastes and different factory or industry 
standards in each state. But these functions are split 
between levels too. 
(c) The linkages of land: Controls over land will have an 
automatic commensurate impact on property matters, town 
planning, pollution, food supply, ethnic groups with any 
land rights, public and private transport, peace and order, 
mineral royalties etc. Land is such a basic resource that 
the government which controls it is in a powerful position 
to influence other functions of government even if it does 
not control them. 
(d) Police linkages: Obviously the control of the police force 
gives any government a superior advantage when the question 
of allocating other functions arises. Take the control of 
flora and fauna, road safety, and even (as claimed in some 
of the literature) the control of aboriginal reserves. 
(e) The linkages of education: These linkages are almost limit-
less. Education is connected with libraries, television, radio, 
language, investment in building and equipment, building up 
of national expertise, research defence, and so on. Then there 
are the educational, exhortative or extension aspects of almost 
all functions of government. Obviously it makes little sense 
to assume that any one level of government in a federation has 
complete control over the education function. 
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(f) Linkages of Marriage and Families: It will be singularly 
frustrating for any level of government which controls marriage 
and divorce if it does not also control in some degree, 
adoption, fostering, property settlements, illegitimacy, 
maintenance, succession and most matters connected with the 
family, including the courts to hear the disputes on these 
subjects. The family is so basic and interconnected a unit 
that it almost has to be legislated for as a unit so that the 
linkages of each of its parts can be taken into account when 
fiddling with any one component. 
(g) Immigration linkages: The government controlling the nature 
and level of immigration will overtly or covertly influence 
the provision of all the social infrastructure throughout the 
nation especially in Australia as immigration has been such a 
large element of our population increase. That means that 
immigration is linked to employment, schools, hospitals, housing, 
utilities, welfare functions and so on. Conversely the rate 
of development of a region will in turn affect the demand for 
immigrants. 
(h) Industry and employees: Dislocation will be caused if one level 
of government controls the fortunes of the industry, i.e. the 
capital and ownership, and another controls the employees. 
Consider the present situation in Australia where the national 
government seeks to relocate employees to factories and state 
governments endeavour to shift factories to employees. Or the 
effects of the Commonwealth government in negating attempts by 
states to decentralize industries through payroll tax concessions. 
Industries are inextricably linked to their employees, 
especially, of course, if they are labour intensive. 
We could go on for a long time looking for linkages. The ones above 
have caused most trouble in the Australian federation. 
Other more recent ones include the question of 
whether, to control civil aviation properly,the national government 
should control the whole manufacturing process for aeroplanes; the 
use of powers over radio and television in controlling cigarette smoking, 
a health function, and the conduct of elections; the effect of 
income tax and company tax in breaking up properties; the use of 
control over posts and telecommunications to control lotteries or 
racing or pornography; the question of whether the level of government 
which controls defamation should also have those matters heard in 
its courts or those of another level of government; the impact of 
a state not conforming to daylight saving on interstate travel time-
tables, national radio and television broadcasting, and national 
elections; the power of customs officials over the actual final use to 
which goods will be put; the overarching importance of health controls 
in relation to other functions like sanitation, garbage, irrigation, 
water and sewerage; the importance of the control of shipping and 
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bridges over rivers, motorboat behaviour, overhead cables, pollution, 
obstruction by hulks, moorings; river lighthouses and ocean light-
houses; the link between the control of areas offshore and land 
based jetties,which raises the point that vessels that explore or 
fish in Commonwealth waters will probably have to ultimately tie 
up on state land, or the question of whether states can build jetties 
below the low water mark; the profound effect in the past of rail-
ways, and now motor cars, on land settlement; the question of 
whether pre-schools are a health function or one related to education 
and sport; the many facets of care of the aged including the real 
connection between domicilary care and institutional care each of 
which is often given to different levels of government; the question 
of whether a casino or hotel or ground transport company is so 
closely linked to the operations of airlines as to be regarded as 
part of the airline function.''^ 
The list is probably endless because we live in a social system 
which is, by definition, linked throughout its parts. Some of the 
linkages are stronger than others. The difficulty can also come in 
applying any geographical or spatial dimension to the same government 
functions such as having one level of government control interstate 
shipping and ocean lighthouses, and another controlling intrastate 
shipping and river lighthouses. That is another linkage. 
There is no need to labour the point. It has been mentioned 
because it has bedevilled any attempts by the courts or governments 
to maintain a perfect coordinate system of federalism, and because 
it must be kept firmly in mind when playing about with reallocation 
of functions, especially in relation to those functions which are 
basic and have so many linkages spreading from them. 
Small wonder that the Rowell-Sirois Commission thought it best, 
in Canada, to speak of a primary role and a secondary role in so many 
public functions thereby recognizing that many levels may have some 
interest in each function. 
70. Some of these have been familiar in Australia for many years, see 
for example Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Royal 
Conmdssion on the Constitution, pp. 86-87. 
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The concept of linkages is not 
well defined in the l i t e r a t u r e of Austral ian or Canadian federalism 
probably because such linkages are, fo r the most par t , in tang ib le 
and thei r ef fects are most apparent to prac t i t ioners working in any 
of the three levels of government. They do ar ise in an oblique 
manner in some wr i t ings including those of Davies, Peachment, 
Reid, Baxter, Heydon, E lse-Mi tche l l , G i b l i n , and McGregor-Dawson.''•^ 
(c) Overrides 
It became apparent,through the interviews, that all aspects of 
the division of powers and the working arrangements of intergovernmental 
relations brought about by the organic state and its linkages, have in 
some periods been thrown into disarray by events, 
or goals, or even concepts, which assumed special importance to the 
whole of the nation. To illustrate, many respondents stated that the 
energy crisis of the late 1970's had transformed the debate about, 
and practical operation of, the proper function of the levels of 
government, because that crisis was regarded by all as so dominant 
as to require that the interaction of levels of government should 
occur in the manner best suited to coping with the situation. Those 
respondents with long memories recalled exactly the same attitude 
about the war of course, and then postwar reconstruction. What 
actually happens then, is that these events or concepts subsume all 
other considerations. For example even to say that a function of 
government is "vital" is almost the same as saying it must supersede 
all the normal deliberations about intergovernmental relations for 
it, and to describe a problem as being "of national importance" 
virtually precludes even considering which level of government should 
perform it. These were some of the examples which came out of the 
interviews -
71. See for example A.J. Davies, "Australian Federalism and National 
Development", Australian Journal of Politics and History, XIV(l), 
April 1968; Allan Peachment, "Patterns of Conflict Resolution 
in Australian Federalism", Politics, VI(2), November 1971; 
R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, 1967); L.F. Giblin, op.cit.; Hon. Mr. Justice 
Else-Mitchell, Essays on the Australian Constitution (Sydney: 
Law Book Co., 1961); P.R. Heydon, "Cooperative Administration 
in Immigration", Public Administration (Sydney), XXIV(47), March 
1965; Articles "National Planning and Intergovernmental 
Relations", Public Administration (Sydney), XXVIII(l), March 1969, 
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War: the question that arises in war time is where should 
a function of government be placed to best aid the war 
effort and in that sense all the other criteria become 
forgotten (not completely, as the wrangling between 
levels of government over the Australian transfer of 
powers proposals in World War II reveals). 
Postwar reconstruction: A single goal or task, it usually 
means a gravitation of power and coordination to the 
national government even if actual functions are not 
transferred. Thus housing and education are no longer 
housing and education - they are postwar reconstruction. 
Development, and Northern Development: If this objective 
is desired keenly enough the question becomes which level 
of government can achieve it as quickly as possible. 
Free enterprise: If the overriding aim throughout the 
nation is to stimulate free enterprise,it becomes a 
question of which government has the greatest potential to do 
this, and also probably an argument for greater diffusion 
of functions through all the levels. 
Controlling the economy: If it should be thought that 
economic management were the dominant need of the moment, 
or the period, subordinate levels of government might 
acquiesce in transferring some or all of their functions 
to a higher, national level, if only for a stipulated 
period. 
Planning: Since planning requires coordination and 
allocation of resources across the whole public sector, it is 
inevitably regarded as appropriate to a higher level of 
government. 
Energy crisis: To the extent that a sudden shortage in 
energy sources, coupled with uncertainty about future 
sources, dominates concerns of all levels of government 
it will also assume, for the duration of the "crisis'l, an 
overbearing influence on intergovernmental discussions. 
Quality of life. Civil Liberties, national image, 
national self-sufficiency in oil or food or some other 
resource, democracy. They are all further examples of 
override criteria which have been raised in the literature 
and,indeed,in the course of events. Those who argue for 
their primacy are arguing for them to be the sole,or at 
least dominant and embracing,criteria to be used in 
determining the allocation of functions. Obviously 
they are override criteria because of their nature, 
being causes or ideologies or aims which span a vast 
array of government functions. 
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The reason that override criteria have been mentioned here is that 
they are a criterion, a super criterion, for use in the allocation 
of functions and in that sense it is probably best to deal with 
them first, where they do exist, because they will be such a 
magnetic reference point that they will swamp all attempts to 
consider functions of government in the light of the normal criteria. 
Better to be aware of them and consider their nature at the outset of 
the reallocation process. 
(d) Roles not Functions 
The Rowell-Sirois Commission, some forty years ago, thought it 
best in Canada to speak of a primary role and a secondary role in 
many public functions, thereby recognizing that many levels have 
some interest in each function. As indicated,most respondents 
interviewed believed it was no longer practicable to secure levels of 
government into watertight compartments together with their electors 
and clients. It does not necessarily mean that all functions of 
government will be shared by two or three levels, but it is likely that the 
most expansive,(and probably the most expensive), ones, which touch 
the most people, will be, and many other related functions as well. Thus 
it seems to have become accepted, in both federations, that the 
emphasis will have to shift from attempts at allocation of discrete 
government functions between levels of government to the allocation 
of roles that each level of government will perform in their shared 
responsibilities. The question now becomes that of how to define such 
"roles" and indeed the thorny question of what the concept "role" means 
in this context. None of the respondents could cast much light on 
these aspects but there have, in recent years, been a number of 
suggestions emanating out of various reviews of elements of the federal 
systems. We shall consider them in more detail in the conclusion,but 
three outstanding examples from Australian experience which can be 
mentioned here are the report of the Bailey Task Force on Coordination 
in Welfare and Health, the Holmes Report on Care of the Aged and the 
JIA 
Infirm, and the Report of the Bland Inquiry in 197b. The Bailey 
report spelt out rules for the three levels of government in welfare 
and health, adding that it was not realistic to set out clearly,and 
7lA Australia, Task Force on Coordination in Welfare and Health 
(Chairman P. Bailey), Second Report, Canberra, AGPS, 1978; 
Committee on Care of the Aged and the Infirm (Chairman A.S. Holmes), 
Report, Canberra, AGPS, 1977; The Bland Report was never published. 
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in a way that would be operative in a l l instances, the precise roles 
which the Commonwealth, the s ta tes, and local bodies should exercise 
in the welfare/health f i e l d . Their object ive was not so much 
constitutional "pu r i t y " as a sensible a l loca t ion of funct ions, given 
the present s i tua t ion , and an ordered rea l locat ion where change was 
desired. The Bland Report is worthy of close consideration also 
because i t represents the only attempt ever made in the Austral ian 
federation to obtain the view of the states about the role of the 
various levels of government. We shal l encounter elements of the 
Bland report in l a te r chapters. In te res t ing ly enough, in no instance 
did a state suggest that any funct ion then undertaken sole ly by the 
Commonwealth should be t ransferred in whole or in part to the s ta tes , 
and no state functions were suggested fo r a t ransfer to the 
Commonwealth, not even rai lways. Also, the states did see a number 
of areas where the Commonwealth ro le should be expanded. 
(e) The View of the People 
A number of respondents were concerned about the publ ic confusion 
caused by the d iv is ion of powers. Many saw th is confusion being 
in tensi f ied, not reduced, by the s h i f t to consideration of the roles 
of levels in shared funct ional areas. None made any serious suggestions 
as to how th is problem could be overcome but we consider the problem 
in more depth in a l a te r chapter. Of course the l i t e r a t u r e of 
Australian and Canadian federalism confirms substant ial confusion and 
a commensurate lack of accountab i l i ty brought about by the d iv is ion 
of powers. This is probably more evident in the case of Aust ra l ia 
which has the device of the referendum to help tes t publ ic perceptions. 
Writers such as Parker, Part r idge, Har r i s , Whitlam, Cr isp, Davis, 
Menzies, Peachment and Reid, and Smiley, have a l l addressed 
themselves to th is question. I t was one of the key preoccupations of 
the most recent proposals fo r cons t i tu t iona l change put forward by the 
Trudeau government j us t before i t s downfall in 1979. That review noted 
as fact that the overlapping of respons ib i l i tes and j u r i s d i c t i o n s 
had made i t d i f f i c u l t for c i t i z e n s , and indeed governments, to know 
which government was responsible fo r dealing wi th a par t i cu la r problem 
area of public concern. For Austral ians, Parker only adds to the 
confusion by the expression of his opinion -
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"I submit for discussion the view that the people 
as such, have no fixed or even long-term views about 
the Federal Constitution or about the distribution 
of legislative powers under it, because federalism 
and its legal implications are a mystery to the bulk 
of them". /2 
In Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that,both conceptually and in practical 
terms,the division of powers in a federal system is a fundamental 
impediment to the attainment of the coordination and harmonization 
necessary to achieve an environment in which priority determination 
based on forecasting,and leading to allocation of resources, 
implementation of that allocation, and a review of the process,could 
be achieved. That is to say,the division of powers is the first and 
primary hindrance or obstacle that must be overcome to achieve the 
sort of planning we envisage. These hindrances are made the more 
complex because of the shift we have observed in the dynamic 
federations of Australia and Canada towards organic federal ism,and 
it becomes clear that, to make our planning system work,some mechanism 
will be required to determine the role of each level of government in 
various components as well as the totality of each federal system. 
That is attempted in our conclusion. Also, in the remaining chapters, 
some specific by-products of the division of powers e.g. fiscal 
transfers and intergovernmental agreements, are examined in depth 
to gain a more practical view of the hindrances already touched 
on, and others which have arisen in the attempts through these devices 
to span the chasm presented by the division of powers, and reconcile 
the sovereignty of the participating units in each federation. 
In the meantime, and as a prelude to what is to follow,we can 
recapitulate some of the more significant points made in this chapter, 
and also raise a few pertinent questions. 
72. Australian Institute of Political Science, Federalism in Australia 
(Melbourne: Cheshire, 1949), p.151. 
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Virtually all of the current political science and public 
administration literature in Australia and Canada declare it to 
be a futile exercise to attempt to identify rigid criteria by 
which allocations of complete functions of government can be 
permanently assigned to a particular level of government. That 
sort of exercise is deemed to belong to an era of the past century, 
the age of coordinate federalism when government itself was small, 
unobtrusive, and uncomplicated, and nations and their parts were 
undeveloped. 
There is no literature available to us which reveals the 
actual criteria used by the founding fathers of the two federations 
in concocting their allocation of powers,generally or specifically. 
The literature and the interviews reveal that even if criteria 
are formulated, people will then disagree about the meaning of those 
criteria. 
There is considerable dispute as to whether a review of the 
allocation of functions in a federation can proceed prior to, or 
separate from, review of the revenue arrangements* This is because 
it is generally seen as being easier,in practice,to adjust revenue 
sharing because little in the way of legislation or constitutional 
amendment is involved, compared with such difficulties in shifting 
functions around. Also, many government functions are, in themselves, 
revenue producing, so the relocation of those functions automatically 
rearranges the pattern of revenue sharing. Then again, some functions 
are considerably more expensive that others and that must bring the 
question of revenue capacity into play for the level of government which 
will be the recipient of the function. There is also the question 
of the potential expense, gross or net, of each function which may be 
of crucial importance with respect to funding. Finally, in this 
regard,Section 96 of the Australian Constitution,and the provisions 
for a reference of powers between levels, can be seen as direct 
alternatives,and the question of whether to realign revenue sharing 
or responsibility sharing must become fundamental and explicit. 
"'This line of argument is rarely encountered in the literature and 
did not arise in the interviews but it does represent a legitimate 
alternate view of the process of federal [lower division. 
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There are some other fundamental questions which arise and should 
be answered before any attempt is made to be definitive about criteria 
for allocation of functions -
(a) Can the same criteria be employed when discussing allocations 
between Commonwealth and state levels, as between state and local, 
or, if practically possible, between Commonwealth and local? 
(b) If there do happen to be any immutable perfect criteria available, 
why is it that the same function is often performed at different 
levels in different federations? The answer has to be that 
different cultural settings may alter the criteria,which cannot 
therefore be internationally, or comparatively, immutable or 
perfect. 
(c) Should criteria be concerned with actual functions of government 
or the objectives of those functions? Generally speaking it 
has been found necessary to look at the functions, i.e. processes 
of government, themselves,rather than their objectives, if only 
because the former are more precise,but it must be acknowledged 
that the objectives of the functions are very important and they 
lead to what I have called "linkage criteria" and "override 
criteria" which have appeared in the practical experience of the 
Australian and other federations. 
(d) Should criteria be directed tov;ards complete functions of 
government or sub-elements of particular functions? The founding 
fathers, of course, attempted in the main, to allocate complete 
functions although exceptions were made in Australia where, for 
example, trade and commerce was divided according to whether 
it was intrastate, or interstate; as were industrial disputes; 
fisheries were divided according to territorial limits; and in 
Canada some elements of education were hived off to protect 
minorities. 
(e) Some functions unquestionably have a fuller meaning than others 
when they have to be translated into laws,as compared with the 
simple mention of their title in a Constitution. There is thus 
no complete symmetry between individual functions because 
of the sheer problem of language,which in some cases can express 
a single government activity in a single word, but in other 
cases has to express a range of government activity in a single 
word. 
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(f) Should functions be considered before spatial elements in a 
federation? To put it simply, what should you get right first, 
the geographical or numerical size of the unit of governments 
or the sharing of functions? The obvious problem is that to 
tackle function allocation first may well mean allocation of 
government activity to a unit of government whose size is 
completely inappropriate to fulfil that function. On the other 
hand, to tackle size first pre-empts the allocation of the 
functions. The literature of regionalism, new states, and 
local government is bedevilled by this problem. 
(g) Should the allocation of functions be regarded as a zero sum 
game? That is to say, is the allocation of a function to a 
level of government a win for that level and a loss for 
another? This may be so in many cases, especially in political 
terms, but the viewpoint adopted here is that this ought not to 
be always the case. 
(h) Should you start from some broad notion of the sovereignty of 
each level of government rather than seek to allocate each 
function piecemeal? Much of the debate in the Australian 
literature seems to seek to regard a level of government as 
sacrosanct, or sovereign, or untouchable,and if this attitude 
pervades the process of drawing up criteria,it will become 
quickly clear that none of the three levels of government 
will sanction any loss of functions, although each will welcome a 
gain of any function. 
(i) Perhaps the most important point to make, and it is one which 
is overlooked in most of the literature itself, is that there 
must ultimately be a trade-off between criteria themselves. 
Most people who approach the question of the allocation of 
functions assume that each of the criteria will provide a total 
answer pointing the one way. As the Rowell-Sirois report in 
Canada was at pains to point out, some of the criteria will 
suggest allocations of functions to a higher level of government, 
and some to a lower level. Or, in the words of F.A. Bland,it may 
be necessary to make a choice between low standards and 
autonomy, or high standards and unification. Maybe this is the 
greatest contribution which the literature of political science 
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can make to this exercise, viz. to emphasize ever so strongly 
that the process of delineating criteria together with the 
ultimate trade-off between them is in itself a political 
process. If that is recognized and accepted at the outset 
it may save a lot of blood, sweat, and tears. A compromise 
is easier to make when it is accepted that there must be a 
compromise. 
It only remains to repeat, that one's view of the allocation of 
functions between levels of government in any federation, wil1 be basically 
and fundamentally influenced by how one defines and views federalism 
as a concept itself. It has been said that there are over 110 defined 
types of federalism but we have distinguished between only two viz. 
coordinate (meaning also static) federalism, and organic (meaning 
dynamic federalism and 1 iterallyanything that is not coordinate 
federalism including cooperative, coercive, or coordinative federalism). 
The reason for using this distinction is that the very notion that there 
are criteria for allocation of functions came out of the concept of 
coordinate federalism,and as coordinate federal ism means, by and large, 
static, or fixed relationships, it seems appropriate to regard that 
as the basic departure point for every other brand of federalism 
which implies a more dynamic relationship and, one may assume, dynamic 
or at least flexible criteria. In the words of Mathews -
"At the time the American, Canadian and Australian 
federal constitutions were devised good government 
was weak government. ... In such a situation it was 
relatively simple to devise a constitution in which 
powers were divided vertically along functional 
lines There was very little overlap in the 
allocation of expenditure functions; such overlap 
as occurred in the Australian Constitution may be 
traced to the fact that by the 1890's governments 
were at last beginning to take an interest in social 
and economic questions ... our federal constitutions 
were thus based very clearly on the concept of divided 
responsibility of independent levels of government 
each exercising authority and providing services in 
functional fields that were designated by drawing 
vertical boundaries between jurisdictions. What 
has happened during recent years to change this 
situation? The main factors have been the extension 
of the range of government activities and the growth 
of the size of the public sector. These in turn have 
been occasioned by the growing strength and complexity 
of the economy and by community acceptance of the 
need for governments to provide greatly expanded 
services and economic controls ".^^ 
73. R.L. Mathews, ed., op.cit. pp. 115-116, 
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CHAPTER 4 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
An examination of intergovernmental agreements is essential in this 
exercise because of the seemingly paradoxical truth that the need for 
such agreements arises basically because of problems caused by the 
division of powers and split sovereignty, and yet these agreements are 
one of the key methods used in both federations to broach that division 
of powers,and harness that divided sovereignty. It is logical to assume 
that intergovernmental agreements, being the major tangible evidence of 
linkages between national and sub-national levels of government, could 
be a prime vehicle for the introduction of planning into a federation. 
After all, in such agreements we have the most visible and practical 
form of coordination between the two levels of government and so, it 
might be assumed, a ready vehicle for the introduction of processes of 
joint priority determination and its accompanying resource allocation. 
Unfortunately there is very little by way of literature on inter-
governmental agreements to allow lessons of experience to be deduced. The 
reason is basically that such agreements have taken place on an ad hoc 
basis in particular narrow segments of the public sector, over the past 
fifty years or so, and it has only been comparatively recently that even 
governments have come to realise the scale of their involvement with 
other units of government through this device. This particular aspect 
of the nature of intergovernmental agreements also makes our task of 
researching them so much more difficult, because it is so hard to form 
an overview of them. In essence it requires that we visit a large 
number of them individually in an attempt to form a consolidated picture. 
As a consequence this chapter will be heavily dependent on straight-
out primary sources and especially the interviews which have been conducted. 
This, in turn, is appropriate, because this particular aspect of federalism 
is one in which there has been a pronounced administrative input for reasons 
which will shortly be explained. We shall proceed by examining, first of all, 
the reason for agreements coming into being, and then inquire into the 
nature and purpose of agreements, followed by an analysis of the various 
methods used in making these agreements operative. Finally we shall 
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endeavour to locate the problems which have arisen in the implementation 
of agreements, and this ought to present us with a total perspective of 
the hindrances and/or achievements of this particular entity so typical 
of federalism at the operational level. In particular, of course, we 
shall be interested throughout to determine the potential of introducing 
public sector planning in view of the experience and opinion which is 
confronted. 
The Reason for Agreements 
Intergovernmental agreements come into being because of a number of 
factors but the basic reason, as intimated earlier, is because the 
coordinate, or layer cake, federalism envisaged by the Australian and 
Canadian founding fathers can no longer exist, despite their attempts to 
lay down specific powers for each level of government as we have already 
witnessed in section 51 of the Australian Constitution and sections 91 and 
92 of the British North America Act. The federal systems of Australia and 
Canada are no longer coordinate as the actions of each level of government 
have significant effects on other units and, moreover, there are many 
government functions which are nowadays performed by more than one level. 
It is this latter area which has spawned the device of the intergovernmental 
agreement* 
Quite apart from natural developments which render any division of 
power less relevant, the key fact to be borne in mind is that when it is 
government functions being considered political influences are paramount. 
But underpinning the politics of the power division are a number of less 
obvious factors including the vast improvement in twentieth century 
communications,whereupon citizens can now more easily compare the 
performance of their local or provincial government with that of others, 
which makes it harder for any single unit of government to stand apart 
from its counterpart units at the same level. Added to this is the fact 
that citizens in both Australia and Canada no longer "vote with their 
feet" as much as they used to. People will not travel far in search of 
employment or better living conditions these days, and demand that both 
these commodities be brought to them, as evidenced by progressively 
declining distances required for travel to work by authorities issuing 
unemployment benefit payments. 
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As we have observed in an earlier chapter, these difficulties are 
compounded by the tendency for national and sub-national units of 
government to promote their sovereignty to an increasing extent. They 
are also affected by the observable phenomenon, also mentioned earlier, 
that spatial loyalties are stronger than ideological loyalties, which goes 
part of the way towards explaining why a national government would desire, 
or be forced into, formal intergovernmental agreements with sub-national 
units, even when those sub-national units are governed by the same 
political party. 
For whatever reasons, intergovernmental agreements now symbolize the 
symbiotic relationship which exists between the component parts of the 
two federations and it is this symbolism which is, politically, as 
important as their substance. They have, in popular and academic 
writings, now come to be seen as (a) A method of altering the balance of 
power in the federations without resorting to any formal constitutional 
amendment; (b) Part of the expression "cooperative federalism" which 
apparently is regarded as applying whenever elected or appointed 
officials from the various governments put their heads, (or their swords), 
together. In other words, even if they are fighting they are still in 
some strange way co-operating; (c) Responsibility sharing - a newer term 
which implies more than mere power balancing or cooperation. It should 
be noted that a pure form of responsibility sharing would mean that all 
levels of government would jointly take responsibility for government 
action or inaction; (d) Part of the federal culture. If there is such a 
thing, then administrative or executive federalism is certainly a real 
part of it, and the intergovernmental agreements form a tangible part of 
that federal culture; (e) More evidence of the props and supports 
necessary to preserve a tottering structure. Those who take this view 
regard federalism as the worst of all worlds and they consider each 
agreement to be another piece of sticking plaster to cover over a crack 
in the facade and patch up yet another deficiency in the creaking 
federal system; Each agreement is thus a piece in the jigsaw puzzle of 
intergovernmental relations. 
192, 
The Nature and Purpose of Agreements 
The Canadian Federal Provincial Relations Office lists over 300 
agreements in its descriptive inventory of "Federal-Provincial Programs 
and Activities", and acknowledges that the list is not exhaustive. 
Most of them have some fiscal implication and as the publication states -
"Most of the programs and activities entail a 
transfer of funds between the federal government 
and another government: some involve other kinds 
of financial compensation such as loan guarantees, 
preferential prices, transfers of property, etc; 
under others, each government pays its share 
direct to contractors".1 
The report then proceeds to give a ninefold classification typology 
related mainly to the method of funding involved in the agreement. For 
each agreement details are given of the body/bodies administering the 
agreement, its purpose, the legal authority under which it is conducted, 
2 
the time frame involved, and the financing and operative details. 
In Australia there is no equivalent of the Canadian Federal 
Provincial Relations office and hence no official inventory of inter-
3 
governmental agreements. Neither has any Australian state attempted 
to make an inventory of all of the agreements in which it is involved as 
has been attempted for example by Alberta, Quebec and Ontario. My 
own research reveals over 325 intergovernmental "arrangements" in 
Australia and it is estimated that this would involve at least as many 
agreements, however formal and informal, although only two-thirds of 
1. Federal-Provincial Relations Office, Federal-Provincial Programs and 
Activities: A Descriptive Inventory (Ottawa: 1977), i. 
2. ibid. 
3. The only official attempt ever made was in May 1975 when the 
Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet published 
a document entitled "Australian-State Government Cooperative 
Arrangements, Joint Consultative and Planning Arrangements". The 
publication was, however, far from comprehensive, and quite inaccurate 
in many details. In itself it demonstrates the difficulty of coming 
to grips with the whole area of intergovernment agreements. 
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them would involve financing. Perhaps the very fact that there is no 
complete inventory of all intergovernmental agreements in either country 
is one of the most telling factors. 
Richard Simeon suggests that patterns of decision making in 
federations result from the interaction or interplay of three levels of 
factors viz. the social and cultural setting, the institutional and 
constitutional framework, and the particular goals, attitudes and 
behaviour of incumbent leaders and the demands and problems facing the 
5 
system. These factors influence the frequency of the interaction, he 
asserts, but they also affect the specific form of intergovernmental 
relations,although in this case the institutional variables are the 
most important -
"Thus in Canadian and Australia parliamentary 
government with strict party discipline, together 
with centralization within both levels of government, 
appears to have been a sufficient condition to 
inhibit the effectiveness of national legislative 
bodies as arenas for adjustment and so to facilitate 
the development of a new set of institutional 
arrangements, the federal provincial conferences. 
This contrasts with the United States, where lack 
of party discipline and decentralization within 
governments has meant that the Congress has served 
as an important arena for adjustments. Moreover 
the larger number of units and the fact that senior 
executives cannot easily authoritatively commit each 
other in the United States would make federal-state 
Conferences on the Canadian model difficult if not 
impossible".6 
These points are extremely significant in understanding the nature and 
forms of the agreements which exist in both Canada and Australia because, 
in both countries, an understanding of the nature of the conferences which 
spawned them is a useful guide to the agreements themselves. In fact one 
could go so far as to say that the agreements, and the associated 
conferences,are often inseparable as objects for analysis of political 
See Kenneth Wiltshire, "Australian State Participation in Federal 
Decisions" in Federalism in Australia and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, ed. R.L. Mathews, (Canberra: ANU Press, 1979). 
Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy. The Making of Recent 
Policy in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 302-304. 
•^bid., p. 304. 
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and administrative behaviour. In describing the growth of intergovernmental 
conferences and agreements in Canada in the period post World War II, 
Smiley makes the interesting observation that the more limited the scope 
of the interaction the more likely there is to be agreement, usually 
agreement based on the professional norms of engineers, foresters, social 
workers, public health specialists. He adds -
"In the past decade there has been a generalized 
trend toward subsuming federal-provincial 
relations at the middle and lower levels of 
the public services where under most circumstances 
professional and technical considerations are 
important to machinery where ministers and their 
deputies are participants. The concerns of these 
latter officials are of course more directly 
related to broader policies and to partisan 
politics".8 
Smiley adds that sophistication in staff work is a significant element 
in the influence of particular governments in federal-provincial relations. 
The Australian experience has been similar although intergovernmental 
agreements in Australia have come into existence in a more ad hoc fashion. 
An Australian inouiry into care of the aged and the infirm concluded that 
the consequences of programmes having been launched in an ad hoc fashion 
over the years included the absence of any satisfactory machinery for 
determining priorities between programmes, especially when they are 
administered by different levels of government, a lack of coordination 
between services supplied by different levels of government, and incentives 
9 
towards the misallocation of resources. They are formulated in a less 
formal manner and are perceived to be less binding than those in Canada. 
They also tend to apply for shorter periods which is only partly 
explained by the shorter statutory life of Australian parliaments. (See 
figures on length of agreements later in this chapter.) 
Thus it is extremely difficult to generalize about intergovernmental 
aoreements and the forms they take. In Canada, the Federal Provincial 
Relations Office each year publishes an inventory of intergcvernment?! 
?*. D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies (Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill, 1976), p. 59. 
8. ibid. 
f« Report of the Committee on Care of the Aged and the Infirm 
(Canberra: 1977), p. 23. 
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agreements from which the following figures have been derived. (The list 
is meant to be purely illustrative of the different forms of agreement and 
too much should not be read into the actual figures themselves. Obviously 
the Federal Provincial Relations Office itself is dependent on departments 
and agencies to supply the requisite data, and it can be assumed that there 
must be a lack of uniformity in the formats supplied if only because of 
the very real differences in the agreements themselves.) 
C A N A D A 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS 1978 
AUTHORITY FOR AGREEMENTS 
Federal Act 51 
Agreement 11 
Federal Act and Agreement 20 
Federal Act and Regulations or Order-in-
Council i 
Federal Act and Complementary Provincial 
Legislation 1 
Federal Act and Departmental Mandate 1 
Federal Act and Regulations and Agreement 2 
Federal Act and Treasury Board Approval I 
Federal Cabinet Decision I 
Federal Cabinet Decision and Agreement % 
Federal Cabinet Decision and Treasury 
Board Approval 1 
Departmental Mandate and Agreement 1 
Order-in-Council and Agreement 1 
Order-in-Council Alone II 
Departmental Mandate Alone 4 
Federal/Provincial Departmental Agreement 2 
Accord 1 
Interministerial Conference 3 
Arrangements approved by Governor-General 
in Council 3 
Exchange of Letters I 
International Agreements % 
Treasury Board Minute Alone i 
Nothing I 
Source: Derived from Federal-Provincial Relations Office, 
Federal-Provincial Programs and Activities 1978, 
Ottawa, 1979. 
N.B.: D.R.E.E. (Department of Regional Economic Expansion) 
agreements taken to be one agreement with each 
province. 
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The data published by the Canadian Federal-Provincial Relations Off ice also 
reveal ind i rec t ly that there is qui te a d i f f e ren t mixture of par t i c ipa t ing 
provinces involved in the various intergovernmental agreements. The 
following table indicates th is -
C A N A D A 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
NUMBER OF PROVINCES 
INVOLVED 
NUMBER OF 
AGREEMENTS 
10 
? 
S 
n.a. 
76 
15 
3 
2 
9 
10 
10 
6 
48 
4 
n.a. = not available 
An Australian analysis, (which took seven years),of about two 
hundred and fifty intergovernmental agreements,conducted with the 
cooperation of state governments,revealed that the basis for such 
agreements ranged from formal contracts between governments through 
to the most informal mechanisms viz. 
(a) Contracts signed by legal entities such as 
statutory corporations, including commercial 
contracts. 
10. Administrative Federalism, Selected Documents in Australian 
Intergovernmental Relations, ed. Kenneth Wiltshire, (University of 
Queensland Press, 1977). 
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(b) Formal written agreements for joint action 
signed by either 
(i) the Governor-General and/or Governor; 
(ii) the Prime Minister and/or Premier; 
(iii) the relevant national and/or State Minister; or 
(iv) permanent heads of relevant national and/or State 
administrative organizations. 
(There seems to be no consistent rationale to determine at 
which level signatories are involved.) 
(c) Memoranda of understanding signed by any of the above 
combinations of signatories. 
(d) Constitutionsof joint ministerial of administrative 
bodies, which clearly specify the composition of the 
body, its terms of reference, etc. (However there 
appear to be more of these bodies that do not possess 
a constitution than there are that do.) 
(e) Charters for joint bodies that have their origin in 
other intergovernmental arrangements. For example, 
many bodies have been established on the basis of 
formal minutes and proceedings of Premiers' Conferences 
or similar institutions, such as the Australian 
Agricultural Council or the Australian Transport 
Advisory Committee. 
(f) The wording and occasionally the accompanying schedules 
of national or State Bills, and the expansion of aims 
contained in second reading speeches in one or more 
parliaments. 
(g) Simple exchanges of correspondence (this is a frequently 
used device). 
(h) Informal discussions with no documented evidence of 
arrangements, occasionally no more than a telephone call. 
(i) Official manuals and other reports of joint action taken 
at the discretion of the administrators involved. 
It can be seen that in both countries there is no semblance of any 
uniform pattern, nor are there clearly defined models which are followed 
in identical situations. Indeed, the actual origins of many of the 
agreements have been lost in antiquity. Moreover, it is difficult 
to speculate on which areas have witnessed most intergovernmental 
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cooperation at the administrative level. Although in some cases the 
existence of a formal agreement can be construed as evidence of a desire 
to cooperate, in other instances real cooperation takes place more 
smoothly because of the absence of any written agreement. 
However, the key question to ask in order to understand the nature 
of intergovernmental agreements is - what is the purpose of them? ^ery 
little has been written in either Canada or Australia in this respect. 
Most studies have been confined to a few of the better known and more 
controversial agreements and to that extent there is a public impression 
that agreements symbolize conflict, whereas the majority of agreements 
reflect basic desires for cooperation and ease of administration. In the 
Australian research mentioned above it was discovered that Australian 
agreements tend to have been brought into being for one or more of the 
following purposes 
(a) to achieve uniformity in the administration of a 
common functional area; 
(b) to avoid overlapping in the provision of administrative 
services; 
(c) to respond to vertical imbalance; i.e., to distribute 
surplus commonwealth funds to needy areas of state 
government activity; 
(d) to disseminate information nationally; 
(e) to pool resources of governments for more effective 
administration; 
(f) to apply laws to mobile resources (i.e. ones which 
transgress state boundaries); 
(g) to achieve national solidarity; 
(h) to promote research; 
(i) to exhort the community on a vital issue; 
(j) to achieve complementary action between governments; 
(k) to review national priorities; 
(1) to provide a solution to an otherwise insoluble or 
unconstitutional problem; 
(m) to spy on other governments or to avoid being left out. 
11. ibid. , pp. 5-8. 
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It is instructive also to look at the meetings or conferences which 
occur to discuss these agreements. An official study in the mid-1970's 
12 by the Australian Prime Minister's Department found that -
* just over half of all meetings had been established 
jointly; 
* The big increases in officer level contact had been 
in the areas of education, health, housing, labor, 
social security, transport and urban and regional 
development; 
* Approximately two-thirds of the formally constituted 
ministerial meetings included representation from all 
states; 
* Quite often officials concerned with areas of 
formalized consultation met as a servicing group for 
the various ministers' conferences and were responsible 
for the initiation of follow-up action from these 
meetings; 
* Whilst the frequency of meetings varied considerably 
most ministerial meetings were held annually but 
officials' meetings were either biannual or quarterly; 
* More than one-third of all meetings held involved on-
going action in the form of sub-committees and/or 
working parties. Approximately 70 per cent of all 
formal ministerial meetings were serviced by officials' 
committees, sub-committees and working parties involving, 
often, a wide range of both governmental and non-
governmental members; 
* The extent of the distribution of material arising out of 
these meetings either in the form of minutes, papers or 
press statements presented a varied picture. Most 
Ministers' meetings issued press statements, and, 
increasingly, tabled proceedings of the meetings in 
the Australian Parliament. 
* Ministers and officials, in general, did not attend 
meetings with State officials outside their own 
portfolio areas. The major exceptions were the 
Ministers for Northern Australia and Science and 
Consumer Affairs who attended a number of formal 
council meetings. 
12. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian-State 
Cooperative Arrangements, Joint Consultative and Planning 
Arrangements (Canberra: July 1975), Foreword. 
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Problems with Agreements 
Many of the problems which arise when working with agreements are the 
same as those produced by conditional grants. This is not surprising as 
the vast majority of intergovernmental agreements are centred on 
conditional funding from national to sub-national government. Thus the 
Canadian provinces and Australian states complain about actions by the 
federal government to seduce the provinces or states into an agreement, 
and then,after a short while, terminate the agreement and force (in a 
political sense) the province/state to continue the agreements from its 
own funding. Or the widely made assertion that the existence of inter-
governmental agreements interferes with the priorities of the province 
or state by forcing it to devote a proportion of its own resources to 
programmes which it may well have assigned to lower degree of priority, 
or none at all. However this is not the place to begin an analysis of 
the merits of conditional and unconditional funding. (That is attempted 
in the next chapter,) 
Other broader difficulties experienced in both Canada and Australia 
include ambiguity about the legal powers of each level of government, 
because of the wording and the constitutions, with the consequence of 
uncertainty about High Court interpretation. Legal interpretations 
have made significant differences in both federations to the powers of 
the various levels of government to collect revenue and carry out functions, 
and there is a small number of examples of intergovernmental agreements 
being rendered void by the High Courts on this basis. 
Then there is the difficulty of coping with the ideologies of 
changing governments, \lery often an agreement will be framed in a broad 
way allowing for choice of delivery mechanisms. A change of government 
may well produce a desire for a different mix of those delivery 
procedures and this has happened in both federations, for example, in 
the housing area where conservative governments stress sale of public 
housing to tenants, whereas socialist or Liberal governments stress 
public ownership; or the problem encountered with roads agreements where 
national determination of the allocation of resources to each type of 
road might place limits on the pork-barrelling which can be done by a 
201. 
13 
sub-national government. This leads also to the more fundamental 
difficulty of coping with different degrees of commitment by different 
14 governments to intergovernmental agreements, affecting the time span 
of the agreement and the certainty with which public servants can implement 
it. It is a slightly more prevalent problem in Australia where all 
governments are elected for a maximum three year term of office, and hence 
there are more frequently changing political outlooks and thus shorter 
intergovernmental agreements than is typical in Canada. In both 
federations, however, this also raises the difficulty of coping with the 
recalcitrant state or province, i.e., the one/s which will either not 
join in an agreement, or having signed the agreement, refuse to implement it, 
The abovementioned problems seem to be common in both federations, 
and they pose great difficulties for the public servant intimately 
involved with agreements at the working level, mainly because of the 
uncertainty they create. In the Canadian interviews, in summary, these were 
respondents' views about intergovernmental agreements -
(a) Too many agreements stress uniformity in delivery across 
the nation and do not take account of the particular 
circumstances of each province. This was especially true, 
it was claimed, of social programmes where the provinces 
could not devise their own schemes to suit the local 
13. Consider the spectacle of the federal government in Australia 
which is committed ideologically to a new federalism policy (dispersal 
of power from Canberra), which has abrogated the results of a 1967 
referendum giving the national government power over aboriginal 
affairs by allowing state control to continue, or the 
events of June 1979 when almost at the same moment the federal 
government established joint control with one state over the Great 
Barrier Reef (clearly a national resource), and in the next breath 
initiated discussions for the states to hand over all their industrial 
powers to the federal government to prevent national strikes. The 
same government maintained control over legal aid in all but one 
state where it bowed to political pressure and allowed all national 
legal aid offices to be transferred to that state. 
14. In the same week two Australian states had opted 
for stricter environmental controls over motor 
vehicle emission thereby forcing the other four states to follow 
suit and one of those two states refused to sign an agreement for 
companies legislation thereby inhibiting national regulation of 
company law. 
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environment and often had to invent artificial 
administrative devices, like means tests, to 
qualify. It was also demonstrated by federal 
government devised eligibility requirements, 
residential requirements, national standards, 
universality and portability which locked the 
province into a quality of service that might 
not be appropriate to that province and might 
need to be varied from period to period. 
(b) The fear of the federal government pulling out of 
an agreement, which in the latter part of the 
1970's tended to induce the provinces not to 
enter some agreements at all. 
(c) The main area of freedom which agreements left to 
the provinces was in relation to wage and salary 
levels (and professional fees) because of provincial 
power to enter collective bargaining for public 
sector wage rates. The provinces seemed to relish 
this freedom. 
(d) Provinces preferred an agreement to be negotiated 
around lump sum or block funding whereas the federal 
government favoured earmarking of all components of 
the amounts flowing to the provinces. The provinces 
preferred to have the power under an agreement to 
reallocate the funding between sectors and programnes, 
and there was a distinct impression that provinces 
would prefer that the federal government not publish 
too widely the breakdown of its grants to the provinces, 
so the local pressure groups would not come a-lobbying 
for what they would then regard as "their" share of 
federal money. 
(e) The timing of an agreement is all important in that it 
must be common for all provinces or it may tend to 
favour one province rather than other. This could also 
encourage provinces to become late participants,especially 
as the terms of federal finance assistance have often 
become more generous in the twilight of the agreement's 
lifetime. However, provincial public servants seem 
unanimous in desiring long term fixed agreements, compared 
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with provincial ministers, who welcome shorter agreements 
to allow for greater bargaining and less fixed commitments. 
(f) Welfare agreements can be turned off easily technically but 
not politically. 
(g) The disproportionately severe consequences of termination 
or alteration of an agreement on small provinces, compared with that 
for larger ones, because of the greater impact on smaller budgets. 
(h) Agreements which are labour-intensive are much more 
severely affected by alteration or termination. 
(i) The amount of information required by the federal 
government under various agreements produces much too 
heavy a burden on provincial and local bureaucracies and 
the provinces doubt whether all the required information 
is really necessary. In the words of one provincial 
Deputy-Minister "The federal government keeps wanting 
crazy statistical data on a national accounts basis and 
jazzy presentations". 
(j) Some provinces argue that the "region", or some other sub-
provincial level, is the appropriate spatial area for the 
conferring of benefits arising out of intergovernmental 
agreements. This is especially so with welfare and 
infrastructure agreements. The irony is,of course,that 
the provinces still claim it should be they, and not local 
or regional government, to negotiate such agreements. 
Indeed in those agreements, (especially DREE*ones),where the 
federal government looks directly at regions,the provinces 
often claim that their sovereignty is being maligned. 
(k) Agreements can unduly interfere with the administrative 
structure of a province. This often depends on how 
programmes are classified and defined but there seemed, for 
example, to be a lot of consternation about mental health 
and whether it is a health or a welfare function. If it 
is defined in a certain way under an intergovernmental 
agreement,the province may well have to rearrange the 
whole of its administrative machinery to suit,although it 
disagrees with the way the function has been defined in 
the agreement. (There has been a similar problem in 
Australia in relation to pre-schools,which some governments 
see as a welfare or health function, and some as an education 
function. ) 
*Department of Regional Economic Expansion. 
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(1) Insufficient attention has been paid to the basic differences 
between agreements involving capital costs and those involving 
current or ongoing costs. There arises a serious problem if 
the federal government negotiates only a capital agreement 
and doesn't provide ongoing funds as well, or terminates the 
agreement in a way that the province or local government is 
left with the ongoing costs to bear. 
(m) Canada has cities which are heterogeneousand yet so many 
intergovernmental agreements for urban programmes are drawn 
up on the fundamental assumption of homogeneity. Thus it 
has been claimed,for example,that there might be more poor 
people in Toronto than in the whole of the Atlantic provinces. 
(n) The tardiness of updating agreements to modern social needs, 
including demographic changes,which leads to the claim that 
because of the rigidity of past agreements there are too many 
bassinets in Canadian hospitals and not enough beds for geriatrics, 
(o) The practice of negotiating individual agreements for particular 
functions and segregating them in relation to the powers of 
levels of government can make for problems where they meet 
at the margin. Who, for example, should install and pay for 
railway level crossings? 
(p) There was a strong suspicion amongst most provinces that 
funding for a particular function in a province could be 
sabotaged by a federal department also responsible for 
that function. This concern was exposed most strongly in 
relation to DREE agreements where,it was assumed by the 
provinces, that a province's claims were submitted by DREE 
to the particular federal department for comment. That 
federal department would be reluctant to recommend that 
too much federal money go to the province for that function, 
because it might mean a commensurate decline in that federal 
15 department's own budgetary allocations. 
15. Fisheries was an area which figured prominently in this respect. 
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Now the arguments listed above are not exhaustive and they do not 
canvass opposing viewpoints. For example, do the provinces really have 
priorities of their own to be distorted; isn't there some need for 
national supervision; does the federal government abruptly terminate an 
agreement or is it that the agreement simply ran its full course and 
the provinces wrongly assumed it would be continued; doesn't the federal 
government enter a lot of agreements precisely because the provinces 
accuse it of being too remote from the people; couldn't many of the above 
difficulties be overcome if the provinces got together for preliminary 
discussions before entering into dialogue with the federal government? 
These questions remain unanswered here but they are also part of the 
framework which leads to the practical difficulties of working with 
agreements. 
Problems of Accountability 
Some years ago Donald Smiley asked these questions about federal-
provincial conferences. They are, nowadays, equally pertinent questions 
to ask in relation to intergovernmental agreements -
"Who has the authority to cause a conference to 
be called? How is the agenda determined? Are 
Conferences to be open or closed? Should final 
communiques contain references to disagreements 
among the participating governments? Is it 
reasonable to expect that First Ministers commit 
their administrations at conferences or are there 
circumstances where such commitment can be withheld? 
Is it appropriate for governments to introduce new 
proposals into conferences without prior consultation 
with other governments? To what extent, if at all, 
is an incoming government bound by its predecessor? 
What are reasonable conditions of secrecy in 
federal-provincial relations?"16 
When analysing the matter of accountability for intergovernmental 
agreements it is natural that we should turn first to the control 
devices prevalent at each level of government purporting to control 
administrative discretion. Consider first the question of the 
legality of intergovernmental agreements. A senior official of the 
Canadian Federal Provincial Relations Office expressed the opinion 
16. op.cit. , pp. 61-62, 
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in interview that most of the so-called agreements are not agreements 
at all; they are federal legislation mostly not signed by the provinces. 
If this is the case then they are binding only on the federal government 
and, even then, only as long as the Act is not changed. The Medicare 
"agreement" was not a signed agreement but rather a basis of principles 
and no fixed time was stipulated. There were signed agreements under 
the Canada Assistance Plan. Under the Hospital Insurance Plan there were 
signed agreements and a mandatory notice to quit of five years. In post-
secondary education there was no agreement, just an audited statement 
from the province. The Established Programmes Financing arrangements 
do require formal notice from governments before changes are made. It 
also seems that there is a real possibility that agreements could be 
taken to the national arbitration authorities, but this too is unclear. 
The legal standing of intergovernment agreements is just as uncertain 
in Australia. There have certainly been challenges mounted in the High 
Court to determine the validity of the federal government entering into 
a particular agreement in the first place. The Court has rarely 
proscribed,such action because of the far reaching powers it assumes 
attributed under Section 96 of the Australian Constitution which allows 
the national parliament to "make grants to the states on such terms and 
conditions as it sees fit". But there has been little litigation which 
has sought to determine whether the national government is either escaping 
its responsibility or exceeding it under any particular agreement. There 
have been cases, as with the establishment of growth centres and the 
operation of national instrumentalities to operate in the spatial area 
of a state government, where complementary legislation had to pass the 
national parliament and the parliament of one or more states. 
17. Thus for Albury/Wodonga growth centre at the border of New South 
Wales and Victoria, requisite complementary legislation had to 
pass the national parliament and that of those two states. The 
Snowy Mountains Authority, a national statutory corporation 
which engages in engineering consultancy to government requires 
legislation to be passed in a state before it can serve as a 
consultant to that government. 
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The situation is made even cloudier, as in Canada, because of the 
uncertain constitutional status of local government in relation to 
18 
agreements. A well known High Court decision in Australia established 
that the national government could not enter into agreements directly 
with local government per se, but if a local government cared to register 
as a charitable organisation or under some other "hat" and "handle" 
provided for in the requisite national legislation, such agreements could 
be made and money could flow direct,thus bypassing the states. It would 
seem that the same is true for Canada and that effectively circumvents 
the legislation which a few Canadian provinces have passed forbidding 
any direct dialogue or funding between national and local government. 
Suffice to say that it is not possible to look to the Courts for the 
means of enforcing complete accountability and the usual processes of 
administrative law would not be suitable for this purpose either. 
The other immediate line of accountability in a Westminster system 
is to parliament. However very few intergovernmental agreements are 
debated in either federal or state/provincial parliaments before or 
after they are negotiated. On the few occasions on which they are 
debated,the appropriate minister issues a plea that there be no changes 
to the arrangements contained therein because of the daunting logistics 
involved in getting eleven, (Canada),or seven, (Austral ia), governments 
to agree. The situation is worse when it is a province or state which 
is refusing to join in some intergovernmental agreement. Then the 
Opposition in that parliament would be reliant on its colleagues in 
another parliament to furnish details of the agreement in question. 
As regards continuing debate on any agreement, in Australia,a backbencher 
would spend most of his or her time (a) ascertaining that there was an 
agreement, (b) obtaining a copy of it, and (c) trying to determine 
which minister was responsible for it. Having followed this tortuous 
process, he or she,would ask a question only to find that the minister 
could shift blame to the other level of government,or even refuse 
18. The case arose out of a state challenge to the Australian 
Assistance Plan, a welfare programme where money trickled from 
the national government directly to regional welfare bodies 
elected/established for the purpose. Some of those bodies 
were local governments. 
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to answer the question without falling at all foul of the Speaker. 
It must be admitted that there is an extremely poor degree and level 
of debate about intergovernmental matters in both Australian and Canadian 
pari laments,largely because there are few votes to be won or lost in it; 
but then there is a poor standard of debate on all broad policy matters 
anyway. Research has revealed that there is no formal requirement in 
either country that all intergovernmental agreements must be tabled in 
any parliament within that country. To compound the issue, the executive 
of the national and provincial/state or local government have a vested 
interest in blurring the degree of responsibility they have under any 
agreement,and in this they are aided and abetted by an electorate which 
is largely unaware of even the broad allocation of government functions 
in the constitution, although Australians are worse in this respect than 
Canadians. Apart from sporadic forays into particular policy areas,there 
are no standing committees in national, provincial/state, or local 
assemblies,which constantly scrutinize intergovernmental agreements. 
What of some of the other external checks on the accountability of 
public servants? The Auditor-Generals are effective in this area only 
to a limited extent because they are precluded from investigating affairs 
of another level of government. Unlike the situation in the U.S.A., in 
both Australia and Canada,the national Auditor-General cannot monitor the 
final destination of funds given to states/provinces under inter-
governmental agreements and must accept a certificate from the state/ 
provincial auditor certifying that the funds were spent in the manner 
designated in the agreement. Since few state/provincial auditors are 
conducting efficiency audits as yet, the most scrutiny that state and 
provincial public servants operating the agreements receive is the 
traditional compliance audit whose inadequacies are well known and 
needn't be canvassed here. Similarly the powers of national and state/ 
provincial ombudsmen are hamstrung in relation to intergovernmental 
agreements. Whilst they may ensure there is no maladministration in 
the delivery of the government programmes contained in the agreement, 
they cannot judge the arrangements provided for in the agreement as a 
whole,or the wisdom of the legislation itself. It would be extremely 
interesting to know where an ombudsman would apportion the blame if the 
tests,of say eligibility or portability,contained in an agreement were 
found to be defective, especially if those tests had been drawn up and 
"ratified at a federal-state or federal-provincial conference. 
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The media is not a very effective watchdog over public servants at 
19 
the best of times for a variety of reasons, and, in the area of 
intergovernmental agreements, newspapers, radio and television seem too 
busy at their wits end,endeavouring to understand the process and report 
the political wrangling, to question the role of public servants in the 
process. Moreover, the federalization of the media, mentioned earlier, 
usually results in all matters of intergovernmental negotiation being 
repeated and criticized from a spatial perspective,which only tends to 
reinforce the parochialism of the politicians and public servants involved, 
There are also, of course, internal controls on the accountability 
of public servants and that includes Departments of Finance, Treasury 
Boards, Public Service Commissions, Premier's Offices and the like, not 
to mention the hierarchical control patterns within particular departments. 
Until the early 1970's there was very little involvement by this sort of 
central coordinating agency,and intergovernmental agreements,both in 
Australia and Canada,were negotiated between functional departments at 
the state/provincial level and their counterparts at the national level. 
The arrangement was usually that the state/province had the constitutional 
power and the federal government had the finance, but the central fiscal 
institutions were not much involved because the funding often came from 
within a national department's own budget allocation and involved quite 
a deal of technical expertise,(hospitals, schools, roads, etc.),which 
central agencies didn't possess. The situation changed in both 
countries in the early 1970's,and in both countries it was partly 
because the national governments became more centralist,(more 
noticeable in Australia with the advent of the socialist party in 1972), 
which forced the sub-national governments to obtain a better view across 
the whole of their own public sectors to defend them more adequately. 
The appearance of the cry about interference in state/provincial 
priorities can be linked to the beginning of some oversight by central 
institutions of those governments in intergovernmental affairs in the 
states of Australia and the provinces of Canada. In Canada those 
offices flexed their muscles quite strongly so that, for example. 
19. For an interesting insight into the relations between the mass 
media and public servants, see Mass Media in the Seventies: Their 
Irnpact on Public Administration, R.I.P.A. Monograph (Brisbane: 1974) 
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Alberta quickly grasped the total dimension of its dealings with Ottawa, 
and in Quebec all intergovernmental agreements had to be vetted by the 
Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs and also signed by that minister. 
In Australia the counterpart state bodies were usually set up as small 
branches of the premier's own department and played a much more low key 
role,often confined solely to briefing the premier and cabinet with a 
second opinion on some,but not all, intergovernmental agreements. (The 
role of those central agencies is examined later.) From the mid-1970's 
to the present, national governments in both countries have fought 
stagflation largely by way of public expenditure cutbacks forcing 
provinces and states to curtail spending under intergovernmental 
agreements. So this central scrutiny has continued and in some cases 
has been strengthened, although it is more the treasuries who now have 
the upper hand. 
One should not overlook the informal behaviour of public servants in 
this environment. The Westminster model tells us that public servants 
are to be silent, permanent, anonymous and neutral. It implies a code 
of ethics which would have a public servant loyal to the government of 
the day on the assumption that the government is acting in the public 
interest. But when it is intergovernmental agreements we are 
considering the dilemma confronting the public servant at the drafting 
table,or the one negotiating with his counterpart from the other level 
of government, or the one implementing or overseeing the agreement, is -
which is the government of the day, and whose is the correct public 
interest? If he or she is a provincial public servant,should his or 
her behaviour be conditioned by an endeavour to draft or negotiate or 
implement an agreement in the interests solely of the government and 
people of that province, (bearing in mind the difficulty we met before 
of defining who the people of a province are), or is there a loyalty on 
the part of all public servants to the citizens of the nation? Consider 
the extreme case of a provincial public servant whose salary under the 
agreement being negotiated will be paid out of national funds. 
Part of the problem is that the nature of public services in both 
countries has changed. Up until the 1970's both federal and state/ 
provincial senior public servants were postwar products, with an 
altruistic outlook of endeavouring to speed economic recovery and 
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growth,and generally discover pragmatic solutions which were in the best 
interests of the nation as a whole. In Australia, and to a lesser extent 
in Canada, most of the thinking function fell to the national bureaucracy 
and the sub-national levels supplied the action. In the 1970's however, 
public servants themselves have become caught in the politicking and 
assertion of tub-thumping sovereignty. Astute young provincial/state 
public servants,(and municipal employees),these days are as concerned, 
if not more concerned, with the interests of their government alone 
partly because it is forced on them and, one suspects, partly with an 
eye to their own career prospects. The situation is more accentuated 
in Australia where there is not the equality of bargaining ability and 
intellect between federal and state public servants as exists between 
federal and provincial public servants in Canada, mainly because there 
is very little movement of federal public servants to the state public 
services, and even less movement from state to federal public service, 
or indeed between the states themselves. An extremely perceptive 
analysis in Australia by a recent task force on coordination in welfare 
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and health pointed out that,for public servants engaging in consultative 
arrangements,the three major pitfalls to be avoided were the generation 
of unrealistic expectations at the inception of discussions, using 
tokenism in claiming that others who were consulted have agreed with 
whatever line was now being taken, and politicking by means of excessive 
"barrow pushing" by participants. 
This leads us, of course, back to where we started, viz. the 
difficulty of public servants defining their own role and, particularly 
nowadays,that of their level of government in the agreement business. 
The problem of accountability can be seen in its truest perspective 
if one assumes for a moment the place of an aggrieved citizen or a 
pressure group. Assuming such a person, or group, were dissatisfied with 
the education system, or the hospital services, where would the lobbying 
20 • Task Force on Coordination in Welfare and Health, Second Report 
Consultative Arrangements and the Coordination of Social Policy 
Development (Canberra: 1978), pp. 25-27 (Chairman P. Bailey). 
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be directed? Who is responsible? Each level of government would be able 
effectively to pass the buck to another level quite legitimately. Because 
all are responsible none is responsible. In that sense,Reid's 
generalisation is correct that all of the institutions of "cooperative 
federalism" are undemocratic because they diminish ministerial 
responsibility to the electorate and parliament, in direct relationship 
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to the binding power of their decisions. This is true of inter-
governmental agreements and we might conclude that the answer to the 
question - "to whom is the public servant accountable" is that such 
public servants are accountable to their own minister in theory,and to 
nothing but their own consciences in practice. 
The Planning Potential of Intergovernmental Agreements 
At first glance,across the vista of executive federalism manifested 
by intergovernmental agreements,in both Australia and Canada,the prospect 
of introduction of public sector planning might well seem to be slight 
indeed. As we have already noticed these agreements contain a varied 
mixture of terms and a plethora of authority devices. Some of them are 
concerned with functional areas in which both the levels of government 
are interested, whilst others are purely spatial and involve the federal 
government dealing with a geographic entity or area. There is also a 
vast array of review processes built into the various agreements and, in 
some cases, no review process at all. The duration of agreements varies 
considerably, and it can confidently be stated that not every state or 
province is involved in every agreement,(indeed the Canadian statistics 
show that one quarter of the intergovernmental agreements involve only 
one province). Most importantly there is quite a variegated pattern 
of the type of funding, some agreements involving only capital 
expenditure or revenue, some current expenditure and revenue, and a few 
containing a mixture. Indeed a great many agreements in both countries 
are for a particular project,and the duration of the agreement is the 
construction time for that public project,or an agreed estimate of its 
natural life. The involvement of ministers in each agreement is 
usually different,which also emphasizes that the agreements differ in 
21. G,S, Reid, "Political Decentralization, Cooperative Federalism 
and Responsible Government" in Intergovernmental Relations in 
Australia, ed, R,L. Mathews (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1974), p. 28. 
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the nature and degree of their public accountability, although, as we 
have seen all are low on accountability. At least in Canada the very 
publication of an inventory of agreements on a reasonably uniform basis 
by the Federal Provincial Relations Office, and similar attempts by some 
of the provinces, provides a guide for interest groups to gain access 
into these systems of executive or administrative federalism. It is 
also important to note, in this respect, that both levels of government 
are generally able to reopen negotiations on each agreement, although 
this is more true in Canada than Australia. 
However, taking a broad picture of intergovernmental agreements as 
an entity in themselves, it is an inescapable conclusion that they 
represent a major and important link between national and sub-national 
components of both the Australian and Canadian federations. More 
particularly, most of the individual agreements show very promising 
potential for the application of a complete planning system such as 
the one we are endeavouring to apply. Already the bulk of these 
intergovernmental agreements are negotiated for a fixed term longer than 
one year; there are objectives spelt out within the arrangement,and 
the mechanisms which are devised to implement each agreement provide 
for allocation of responsibility between levels or units, the sharing 
or transfer of resources; and often a provision for review of the 
agreement close to its termination. Each of them is thus already close 
to the ideal type of planning system envisaged. This point applies with 
greatest force to the fact that experience with terms of longer than one 
year is fairly common in respect of intergovernmental agreements, even 
in Australia, which is notreknown for forward commitments beyond one 
year in the public sector. 
Data are not available to illustrate the extent of forward thinking 
in Australian intergovernmental agreements, but for Canada it is possible 
to construct a rough guide from the inventory of the Federal Provincial 
Relations Office -
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C A N A D A 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT 1979 
Time Frame No. of Agreements 
1 year 2 
2 years 6 
3 years 9 
4 years 4 
5 years 23 
6 years 2 
8 years 1 
9 years 2 
10 years 11 
>10 years 2 
Indefinite or Continuous 116 
To a particular year 4 
Ad hoc or no time frame S 
Length of life of the project 16 
Source: Derived from Federal-Provincial Relations Office, 
Federal-Provincial Programs and Activities 2978, 
Ottawa, 1979. 
Notes: 
(a) Some agreements specify a maximum duration and where this 
is so the maximum term has been used here. 
(b) For the umbrella agreement over a long time frame and 
individual agreement within the overall time frame has 
been used. 
(c) There is a whole range of conditions attached to longer 
time frame agreements,including a specified period for 
either level giving notice to quit, the necessity of a 
review of an agreement after a fixed period, the necessity 
for provincial legislation to remain in force etc. etc. 
(d) Where the length of life of the project is specified there 
are often other accompanying conditions as well. 
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(e) Where an agreement is classified as "indefinite or 
continuous" there is nearly always an assumed review 
process carried out by an annual or biennial meeting of 
appropriate ministers or public servants. There is also, 
in such instances, the provision for consultations to 
occur between levels of government at any time, such 
consultation can be requested by any of the parties. 
Using the above figures as even a rough guide it becomes apparent 
that a longer term perspective has now become commonplace in this field 
of intergovernmental agreements. However, it is just as apparent that 
there is no common time frame for them, nor is there a common 
originating or terminating year. This means, in effect, that the 
forecasting, implementation and review processes are conducted 
individually for each agreement and not across all agreements, or 
even across groups of them in the same field. (Something of exceptions 
are presented by the Established Programme Financing, and Regional 
Economic Expansion arrangements, but these could be regarded as clusters 
of agreements and represent only a portion of the public sector.) In 
other words,whilst these factors and processes are characteristic of 
single agreements,they do not occur across all the agreements. That 
being the case our attention is shifted to the process for, and 
machinery of, coordination of intergovernmental relations between and 
within each level of government, in the two federations. 
Coordinating Intergovernmental Agreements 
In both Australia and Canada serious concern over the coordination 
of intergovernmental relations has arisen only in the past 10 to 15 years. 
Prior to this time intergovernmental agreements, like most other aspects 
of intergovernmental relations, took place directly between counterpart 
ministers and for their public servants at the different levels in the 
federation. In the 1960's and 1970's such "executive federalism", to 
borrow Smiley's term, became an "industry" in itself, to borrow 
Stevenson's term, and led to the so-called machinery of intergovernmental 
I'elations. Smiley's observations about Canada in the decade following 
World War II are equally applicable to Australia -
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" Ins t i t u t i ona l i zed federa l -prov inc ia l in te rac t ion 
was for the most part l im i ted to two kinds of 
matters - the periodic renegot iat ion of the tax 
arrangements and cooperation in respect to 
specif ic services and f a c i l i t i e s , the l a t t e r 
often wi th in the framework of shared cost 
programs. There was r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e in tegra t ion 
of these two kinds of matters and the sharing 
of taxes and revenues was determined by finance 
and treasury departments in r e l a t i v e i so la t i on 
from col laborat ion between o f f i c i a l s and agencies 
of the two levels wi th concerns l im i ted to 
specif ic programs. Ne i the r . . . was there 
ins t i tu t iona l i zed co l laborat ion in f i s ca l po l icy 
as an instrument of economic s t ab i l i za t i on " . 22 
In Canada the 1955 Continuing Committee of Fiscal and Economic Matters 
is seen as the turning point in the formal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of 
federal-provincial re la t ions, in the sense that i t provided fo r the 
continuation of par t icu lar overview machinery. However, the s i t ua t i on 
in Canada has not d i f fe red great ly from that in A u s t r a l i a , i n that the 
intergovernmental conferences which meet to consider revenue sharing 
matters are quite d i s t i n c t from those that are concerned wi th 
responsibility sharing and, in the case of the l a t t e r , there tends 
to be a multitude of conferences each dealing wi th a pa r t i cu la r sector. 
In other words there is rea l l y no s ingle intergovernmental conference 
which considers the whole sweep of intergovernmental revenue and 
expenditure or programme matters. The cynic would say that nowadays 
such a conference would be a technical imposs ib i l i t y ,and could never 
consider the whole gambit of intergovernmental i n te rac t ion because of 
the sheer scope, complexity, and scale of such re la t ionsh ips . Others 
might say that the Austral ian Premiers Conference,or the Canadian 
Conference of F i rs t Ministers,would be the appropriate vehicle fo r such 
an exchange,but the sheer l o g i s t i c s of conducting conferences wi th 
seven participants (Austra l ia) or eleven par t i c ipants (Canada) has 
precluded discussion on a l l but the most pressing intergovernmental 
issues. The only occasion on which these Conferences take on something 
of the posture being suggested is in r e l a t i on to per iodic renegot iat ions 
of the broad intergovernmental revenue sharing agreements and associated 
formulae,but even here revenue tends to be discussed qu i te apart from 
expenditure and there is no considerat ion of p r i o r i t i e s across a l l 
expenditure programmes, merely an analysis of sub-national expenditure 
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23 in total . (A more deta i led analysis of intergovernmental f i s ca l 
negotiations is given in the next chapter.) 
Apart from the Premiers or F i r s t Ministers Conferences there i s , 
of course, a plethora of intergovernmental conferences held in both 
countries in par t icu lar f i e l d s . These are well documented and reasonably 
24 
well understood in Canada, and in a r e l a t i v e l y recent paper, Vei l leux 
produced the fol lowing table from the calendars of meetings prepared 
by the Federal-Provincial Relations Off ice -
23. For an analysis of Australian Premiers Conferences see C. Sharman, 
The Premiers Conference: An Essay in Federal State Interaction 
(Canberra: A.N.U., R.S.S.S. , 1977) and D.A. Dixon, "The Premiers' 
Conference, February 1970, A View of Federal-State Financial 
Relations in Austral ia" , Australian Quarterly, June 1970, and 
Kenneth Wiltshire, "Australian State Par t ic ipa t ion in Federal 
Decisions", op.cit. Financial aspects of pa r t i cu la r Premiers' 
Conferences can be found in R.L. Mathews and W.R.C. Jay, Federal 
Finance: Intergovernmental Relations in Australia Since Federation 
(Melbourne: Nelson, 1972). The Canadian Conference of F i r s t 
Ministers is analyzed in D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question, op.cit.; 
Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, op.cit.; Edgar 
Gallant and R.M. Burns, a r t i c l e s on "The Machinery of Federal-
Provincial Ke}at\ox\s", Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 8, 1965, 
and Donald V. Smiley, "Public Administration and Canadian Federalism", 
Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 7, 1964. 
24. See the Canadian references in note 23 plus G. Veil leux, Les 
Relations Intergovemmentales au Canada 186701967, : les mecanismes 
da cooperation (Montreal: Quebec U.P., 1971); R. Dyck, "Canada 
Assistance Plan: The Ultimate in Cooperative Federation", 
Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 19, 1976; R. Lindenfield, 
"Hospital Insurance in Canada: An Example in Federal Provincial 
Relations", Social Science Review, Vol. 33, June 1959; R. Schurtze, 
"Intergovernmental Cooperation, regulatory agencies and 
transportation regulation in Canada: The Case of Part I I I of the 
National Transportation Act", Canadian Public Administration, 
Vol. 19, 1976. 
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NUMBER OF 
C A N A 
FEDERAL-
FREQUENCY OF 
Ministerial 
Administration 
TOTAL 
1957 
5/-
m/-
64/-
D A 
PROVINCIAL BODIES AND 
THEIR MEETINGS 
1967 
14/17 
105/142 
119/159 
1973 
20/30 
62/121 
82/151 
1977 
31/39 
127/296 
158/335 
number/frequency 
Source: Gerard Veilleux, "1'evolution des mecanismes de 
liaison intergovernmentale", in Confrontation and 
Collaboration - Intergovernmental Relations in Canada 
Today, ed. Richard Simeon, (Toronto: I.P.A.C, 1979), 
The growth in the number and frequency of such meetings is obvious from 
the table, and Veilleux notes that his figures are incomplete, and in a 
footnote he acknowledges some data supplied by the Department of Inter-
governmental Affairs in Alberta which show that there had been 782 
federal-provincial meetings in 1975. (We should not lose sight of the 
significance of the fact that the Alberta government kept such detailed 
statistics.) 
It is not possible to reproduce similar data for Australia. I have 
presented such details as are available, elsewhere.* It is a safe 
generalization to say that the number and frequency of such Australian 
conferences would not be much fewer than is the case in Canada. 
Some data of particular interest, supplied once again by Veilleux, 
relate to interprovincial bodies and the frequency of their meetings -
*See Appendix in R.L. Mathews (ed.). Federalism in Australia and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Canberra, A.N.U. Press, 1980. 
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C A N A D A 
NUMBER OF INTER-PROVINCIAL BODIES AND FREQUENCY 
OF THEIR MEETINGS 
1975 1977 
Ministerial 16/19 17/22 
Administrative 19/23 13/15 
TOTAL 35/42 30/37 
number/frequency 
Source: Gerard Veilleux, "revolution des mechanismes de 
liaison intergovernmentale" in Confrontation and 
Collaboration - Intergovernmental Relations in 
Canada Today, ed. Richard Simeon, (Toronto: I.P.A.C. 
1979). 
The number of bodies is considerably smaller than that for federal-
provincial bodies, and the bulk of them were created in the 1970's. 
Comparable data are not available for Australia and, indeed, from the 
time of Richard Leach's analysis in 1965, the comment has frequently 
been made that formal interstate collaboration in Australia is a rarity. 
On this subject Veilleux makes an observation with particular 
significance for the coordination potential on intergovernmental 
matters in both countries -
"Their importance in purely quantitative terms seems 
to confirm the hypothesis often expressed during the 
sixties that the provinces might find it to their 
advantage to reach a consensus among themselves before 
negotiating certain agreements with the federal 
government".27 
". R.H. Leach, Interstate Relations in Australia (Lexington: Kentucky 
U.P., 1965). 
26 See for example G. S ta r r , "America's federal ism without Washington, 
Australia's missing l i n k " , Australian Quarterly, September 1976. 
• Gerard Veil leux, " r e v o l u t i o n des mechanismes de l i a i son 
intergovernmentale", p. 39. 
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There is now a reasonably large body of Canadian l i te ra ture , and a much 
smaller collection of Australian l i t e ra tu re , which has analyzed the 
reasons for the evolution of this intergovernmental machinery, i ts 
nature and i ts role, and we could spend a good deal of time in this 
field. However, our prime concern in this chapter is to assess the 
potential of such machinery for the coordination of intergovernmental 
agreements. 
The research associated with this study has revealed that the 
associated intergovernmental machinery in both countries now comprises 
the following catalogue -
(i 
(ii 
(iii 
(iv 
(v 
(vi 
(vii 
(viii 
(ix 
(x 
Conferences of ministers from the national 
and sub-national levels; 
Conferences of administrators associated with 
(i) or meeting quite independently of their 
ministerial counterparts; 
A National Cabinet minister appointed as minister 
for federal-state/federal-provincial relations; 
A national department or division charged with 
responsibility for intergovernmental liaison; 
A consultative or advisory body comprising 
representation from the different levels of 
government; 
Particular national cabinet ministers nominated 
as a liaison point for a particular state/province; 
National ministers and their ministries responsible 
for regional activity, i.e., in sub-state/sub-
provincial regions; 
State/Provincial ministers appointed as ministers 
for intergovernmental affairs in each state/province; 
State/Provincial departments or divisions responsible 
for intergovernmental liaison; 
Conferences of ministers and officials solely from 
the states/provinces. 
Let us exami ne each of these br ie f l y in turn 
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(i) Conferences of ministers from the national and sub-national levels 
of government 
It is these meetings at which intergovernmental agreements are 
usually formulated,although there is something of a pattern in both 
Australia and Canada whereby the need for an agreement is originated 
at the Premiers Conference/Conference of First Ministers, and then 
referred to a subsequent interministerial conference in that particular 
government function. As we have noted earlier, there has been 
considerably more research on ministerial conferences in Canada than 
28 is the case in Australia. Taylor documented them in 1957, but only 
briefly analysed them. Gallant, in 1965,made an astute observation 
about this machinery by comparing it with the pattern of international 
relations. He expressed the comparison this way -
"In our federal-provincial relations our machinery 
has evolved in a reverse order. We have first 
developed numerous committees and conferences at 
a specialist level. We have not had a comparable 
network of intelligence concerned with the total 
picture of intergovernmental relations".29 
Gallant remarked of the Conference of Premiers and Prime Ministers 
that it was concerned more with specific policy issues than with the 
continuous overview of federal-provincial matters, and the same was 
true of the other ministerial conferences. The basic thrust of his 
remarks at that time was that,although such consultation in individual 
programme areas had proved to be very effective, there was inadequate 
provision for coordination of the whole process, thereby running the 
risk of the left hand not knowing what the right hand was doing. He 
concluded -
"The various federal, provincial, and joint 
programs may be proceeding satisfactorily, 
taken individually, but how do we assess their 
combined effect on the economy, or determine 
which area should receive emphasis relative 
to another at a particular time".^^ 
28. K,W. Taylor, "Coordination in Administration", Proceedings of the 
Ninth Annual Conference of the Institute of Public Administration 
of Canada, 1957. 
29. Edgar Gallant, "The Machinery of Federal-Provincial Relations: I", 
Canadian Puhlia Administration, (8) 1965, p. 518. 
30. ibid., p. 526. 
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Coimienting in the same symposium,Burns observed that a broad pol icy 
coordination role might be d i f f i c u l t to expect of such conferences, 
given that one was t r y ing to "br ing in to regular consul tat ion a group 
of ministers of divergent p o l i t i c a l views, a l l wi th t he i r own 
responsibilities in an area where pol icy determinations are most 
31 di f f icu l t to reconci le" . Burns suggested a fou r - t i e red approach 
to such minister ial conferences wi th the apex consist ing of a regular 
conference of Prime Minister-Premier Conferences wi th a l im i ted agenda 
dealing with broad matters of pol icy which would overlap what he 
called " jur isd ic t iona l bounds". Below that would be the Federal-
Provincial Plenary Conference to consider what he cal led "the larger 
problems of pol icy" and,where necessary,matters could be hived o f f to 
sub-conferences of ministers concerned wi th the pa r t i cu la r a f f a i r . 
Under this structure would be the conference of ministers in the 
same programme area and, in t u r n , below that would be the meeting of 
32 
supporting o f f i c i a l s . 
Writing in 1978 Gordon Robertson, Secretary to the Federal Cabinet 
for Federal-Provincial Relat ions, indicated that the decade from 1968-78 
had seen twenty meetings at the level of F i r s t Ministers,whereas federal 
and provincial ministers and senior o f f i c i a l s had come together at 
formal meetings an average of 500 times a year. He acknowledged that 
interministerial conferences were an adjunct of execut ive, not 
parliamentary power, and hence were the "centrepiece" of executive 
federalism. The subjects for discussion at such conferences were 
usually the operation of the federal government, not of the provinc ia l 
governments. He also made the in te res t ing observation that "the e f fec t 
on the federal government of i n i t i a t i v e s of ind iv idua l provinces tends 
33 to be dealt with in b i l a te ra l exchanges". Wr i t ing in the same forum, 
Stevenson outlined what he saw as three roles for intergovernmental 
Conferences - Information exchange, programme and pol icy harmonization, 
and policy determination. However, in r e l a t i on to the second and t h i r d 
category, he was re fer r ing to po l icy between leve ls ,bu t in ind iv idua l 
31. R.M. Burns, "The Machinery of Federal-Provincial Relat ions: I I " , 
Canadian Public Administration, (8) 1965, p. 530. 
32. ibid., pp. 532-533. 
33. Gordon Robertson, "The Role of I n t e r m i n i s t e r i a l Conferences in the 
Decision-Making Process" in Confrontation and Collaboration -
Intergovernmental Relations in Canada Today, ed. Richard Simeon. 
sectors rather than across sectors 
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( i i ) Intergovernmental Conferences of Administrators 
There has been r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e w r i t t en about th i s aspect of the 
intergovernmental machinery of both Aust ra l ia and Canada,largely because 
i t is regarded as an in tegra l part of the i n te rm in i s te r i a l conferences. 
As such i t forms part of the overal l connotation about the ro le of publ ic 
servants so prevalent in Westminster systems, which seeks to portray them 
as passive and subservient actors act ing merely as advisers to t he i r 
political masters. However, longstanding observers of Premiers' 
Conferences and min is te r ia l conferences are well aware of the process 
which occurs,whereby meetings of the equivalent public servants occur 
before the po l i t i ca l conferences, to i d e n t i f y areas where there are 
differences of opinion and invar iab ly to devise a so lu t i on , formula, or 
trade-off which can serve as a basic discussion point for the ministers 
concerned. This role is p a r t i c u l a r l y pronounced for intergovernmental 
agreements,and i t is the publ ic servants from the d i f f e ren t levels of 
government who engage in the d ra f t i ng of the argument. This ro le is 
conducted predominantly by the publ ic servants from the relevant 
programme area, or in the case of tax measures, by the f i sca l central 
departments, and there is l i t t l e of an overview of a l l the agreements 
from the centre except fo r some involvement by the central agencies, old 
and new,which are examined below. 
( i i i ) A national cabinet min is ter appointed as min is ter for 
intergovernment re la t ions 
This experiment has been t r i e d in both Aust ra l ia and Canada,and in 
both countries experience has shown that such a min is ter looms as l i t t l e 
more than a figurehead and, when the crunch comes, completely subservient 
to the Prime Minister. There has ce r t a i n l y been no substantive ro le for 
such a person in re la t ion to the oversight of intergovernmental agreements, 
although he tends to be a focal point fo r lobbying by the s ta te /p rov inc ia l 
and local governments. His ro le may be circumscribed even fu r ther i f 
nere is a national Cabinet Committee spec ia l i z ing in intergovernmental 
"delations as has been the case in Canada in recent years. 
34. Don Stevenson, "The Role of Intergovernmental Conferences in the 
Decision-Making Process", ibid. 
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(iy) A national department or division charged with responsibility 
for intergovernment liaison 
This pattern is considerably more entrenched in Canada per medium of 
the Federal Provincial Relations Office which has no true Australian 
equivalent,although the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has a 
section which handles intergovernmental liaison and some briefing of 
both the Prime Minister,and the Minister mentioned in (iii), for the 
major interministerial conferences. In the mid-1970's there were some 
signs that the Australian Prime Minister's Department was attempting to 
follow the example of the Canadian Federal Provincial Relations Office 
and the most tangible evidence of this was their first and only attempt 
35 to produce an inventory of intergovernmental agreements. The foreword 
to that publication had this to say, inter alia -
"At the Premiers' Conference in Canberra on 
19 June 1975, the Prime Minister initiated 
discussion on aspects of Australian-State 
Government co-operative planning. In his 
address to the Premiers he said: 'The 
Australian government will be seeking in 
the longer term a more rational and co-
ordinated system of assessing needs, setting 
priorities and allocating resources in the 
public sector - one based on cooperation 
between governments. It may take years to 
develop a new approach of the kind we have 
in mind, of the kind discussed among our 
officials. But we believe a start should be 
made, now. Joint-planning and consultative 
arrangements are necessarily an integral 
part of this approach". 
Virtually no progress was made towards this aim mostly because of the 
change of government in 1975. Today the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet does provide significant professional briefings to the 
Prime Minister and the Minister for Federal-State relations on 
individual items as they arise, together with briefings from the Treasury, 
but there has been no impetus towards a coordinating role across all 
the intergovernmental machinery. Relations between the Australian 
national government and local government have also been handled partly 
by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet,but predominantly by 
separate departments such as the Department of Urban and Regional 
Development, and at present the Department of National Development 
through its small office of local government. 
35. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian-State 
Government Cooperative Arrangements (Canberra: May 1975). 
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Consequently our attention must shift to the Canadian Federal 
Provincial Relations office which, strange to say, has rarely been the 
subject of detailed academic investigation. The fact that the F.P.R.O. 
publishes a comprehensive list of intergovernmental agreements each year 
might lead one to assume a heavy coordinating role for the office in the 
substance of such agreements,but this is not really so. However, the 
office has many programme experts and professional staff with a broad 
knowledge and expertise, and they provide substantial briefings on 
individual intergovernmental fires as they ignite from time to time. 
They are involved heavily in the renegotiation of particular major 
intergovernmental agreements as they fall due for renewal or reform. 
The office also acts as the central point for the sifting of federal 
bureaucratic advice on intergovernmental agreements which transgress 
the boundaries of public sector agencies. Veilleux argues that the 
F.P.R.O. provides for an effective consideration of provincial view-
points by the federal government. He describes its operations thus -
"The Federal-Provincial Relations Office is structured along both 
regional and operational lines; there is a desk for each province 
and for each sector of government activity. Any document submitted 
to cabinet is examined or analyzed by the person responsible for 
3fi 
the relevant desk". Clearly this process of operation represents 
a micro, rather than a macro approach. However, Kernaghan presents 
quite a different view of the operations of the F.P.R.O. - "The office 
is structured so that its senior officials can take a comprehensive 
view of federal-provincial interaction. Officials of this Office 
assess the implications for federal-provincial relations of documents 
requiring Cabinet consideration. Operating departments have the 
primary responsibility for answering such questions as what consultations 
have been held with the provinces, what is the likely degree of support 
or opposition among the provinces, what are the implications for 
provincial-municipal relations in financial, administrative and 
jurisdictional terms, and what tactics should be adopted if it is 
necessary to take up the matter with the provinces". Kernaghan then 
quotes from an official Cabinet directive on the handling of Cabinet 
information to say that "the Federal-Provincial Relations Office is 
36. Gerard Veilleux, op.cit., p. 44. 
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usually able to contribute to these answers based on its overview of 
37 
the interaction between federal and provincial activity". Despite the 
fact that Kernaghan claims a "comprehensive view" for the F.P.R.O. he 
provides no evidence that it applies such a view to the whole range of 
intergovernmental relations at the one time. Rather it is a 
"comprehensive view" on particular issues or negotiations which arise. 
The latest and perhaps most interesting study of the F.P.R.O., by 
Campbell and Szablowski,as part of their review of federal central 
agencies, paints a picture of the F.P.R.O. as just another central 
agency vying with other central agencies to dominate advice to Cabinet 
on federal-provincial relations. They do, however, acknowledge it to be 
the "primary authority" in the field (i.e., compared with Finance, 
Treasury Board, Prime Minister's office and the Privy Council Office). 
My own interviews with senior officials of the F.P.R.O. confirm all the 
above views about the organization and - specifically in relation to 
intergovernmental agreements - it is clear that, whilst the F.P.R.O. 
does review each agreement in the light of the prevailing mcod and 
prospect of federal-provincial relations in general in that period, 
it nonetheless reviews each agreement seriatim. Apart from occasional 
attempts at the consolidation of a number of agreements, as occurred 
with the Established Programmes Financing arrangements, there is no 
attempt to engage in a regular or periodic review of all the major 
intergovernmental agreements and their attendant resource allocation. 
(v) A Consultative Advisory body comprising representation from the 
different levels of government 
Australia has such a body though Canada does not. The Australian 
Advisory Council for Inter-government Relations (A.C.I.R.) was 
established, (partly on the American model), after 1975 as part of the 
Eraser government's new federalism policy. It is comprised of five 
representatives from the national government, six from the states. 
37. Kenneth Kernaghan, The Power and Responsibility of Intergovernmental 
Officials in Canada, Paper delivered to the Annual Conference of 
the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (Winnipeg: 1979), 
pp. 22-23. 
38. Colin Campbell and George J . Szablowski, The Superbureaucrat 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 49-51. 
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six from local government, and five citizens. Its terms of reference 
confine it to operating on the basis of references from the Premiers' 
Conference. Although it has before it very broad references on the 
relationships which should exist between the three levels of government, 
it has as yet made no attempt to gain an overview of intergovernmental 
agreements. 
(vi) Particular national cabinet ministers nominated as a liaison 
point for particular state or province 
Both Australia and Canada have experimented with this technique 
although it is made more difficult in Canada when the party governing 
at the national level has no elected representatives, let alone ministers, 
in a particular province. In both countries the national governments 
have used this device mainly as part of an intelligence network to feed 
reaction from the states and provinces back to the national capital, and 
also to keep national officials in that state or province aware of 
national government policy decisions affecting that state or province; 
something akin to a low key ambassadorial cum espionage function. To 
this extent such ministers become slightly involved in intergovernmental 
agreements by conveying viewpoints to Canberra or Ottawa and displaying 
a symbolic presence in the state or province when the agreement is 
announced or ratified. 
(vii) National ministers and their ministries responsible for regional 
activity, i.e., in sub-state or sub-provincial regions 
This has been a development of the 1970's in both countries. In 
Australia the impetus came from the election of the Labor government in 
1972 committed to public spending on the cities and with a disrespect for 
the states as social or economic entities. A minister and department of 
urban and regional development quickly began formulation of policies with 
accompanying specific purpose grants for existing cities, particularly 
capital cities, as well as growth centres, and particular regions. In 
conjunction the Commonwealth Grants Commission was given a brief to 
introduce horizontal equalization for local governments. The bulk of 
such contact had to be through the states because of their constitutional 
responsibility for local government but there was also some direct dealing. 
These actions did involve intergovernmental agreements including the 
negotiation of previous agreements e.g., housing, roads, education etc. 
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as well as some particularly interesting new ones, e.g., the growth 
centre concept, which on one occasion required legislation to be 
nassed in the Commonwealth and two state parliaments because the centre 
39 
concerned straddled an interstate border. These developments came to 
an abrupt end in 1975 with the dismissal of the Whitlam government. In 
Canada this process is more firmly established and certainly more 
sophisticated. The Regional Economic Expansion programmes administered 
by the national Department of Regional and Economic Expansion (D.R.E.E.) 
are now well known. Their significance in the total scenario of inter-
governmental arrangements has now diminished and their basic orientation 
has also changed but they do represent, as did the brief Australian 
experiments, the only real attempt to consolidate a number of inter-
governmental agreements at once,and look at resource allocation in a 
wider perspective than one programme or one project or one sector. 
The very manner of the negotiation of the D.R.E.E. agreements, with a 
master framework agreement between the federal and provincial 
governments,and various subsidiary agreements for particular projects 
within that master agreement, represents a small step towards the type 
of coordination which we are seeking as does the manner in which the 
D.R.E.E. agreements managed to merge capital and recurrent funding 
although, admittedly, they often had a heavy capital emphasis. 
(viii) State/Provincial ministers appointed as ministers for inter-
governmental relations in each state/province 
This phenomenon exists in both Canada and Australia having begun 
earlier in the former than the latter. In some provinces/states a 
separate minister has been designated as responsible for inter-
governmental affairs but in the majority of cases the role has fallen 
to the premier. The more interesting fact of this development is the 
bureaucratic structure which supports these ministers and we shall 
examine that shortly. The role of the ministers has been an ambivalent 
one and has tended to fluctuate in importance according to the condition 
of intergovernmental relations. However, such ministers have become 
39. Albury-Wodonga. 
40. In fact the process was begun by Quebec in the early 1960's and 
followed by Ontario and Alberta and then other provinces. In 
Australia the move was unquestionably prompted by the election of 
the Whitlam Labor government in 1972. 
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powerful at certain times and in certain cases. For example, the 
Quebec Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs has been required to 
approve of intergovernmental agreements,as well as the sectoral minister, 
before cabinet will consider the agreement in question. Alberta and 
Ontario have followed this model, but it should be emphasized that the 
coordination which is being spoken of here is simply the centralised 
scrutiny of intergovernmental agreements seriatim in a manner not too 
different from that performed by a Minister of Finance or Treasury Board 
or Attorney-General. Admittedly the newly fledged Ministers of Inter-
governmental Relations and their supporting ministries are fully aware 
of, and completely sensitive to, their state/province's overall 
attitude to intergovernmental relations, and they bring that perspective 
to bear on the intergovernmental agreements which they scrutinize, and 
that is a fresh perspective. But they rarely review all of the inter-
governmental agreements as a total package. 
(ix) State/provincial departments or divisions responsible for inter-
governmental affairs 
Until very recently there has been little research conducted into 
this aspect of intergovernmental machinery in both Australia and Canada. 
Quebec introduced the concept with its Department of Federal-Provincial 
Relations in 1961 and it has been reorganized since into a stronger 
position. Ontario originally established a composite department of 
Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs obviously by means 
oftackingon intergovernmental affairs to the fiscal function, but late 
in the 1970's a separate Department for Intergovernmental affairs was 
formed which also oversees provincial-municipal liaison. Alberta's 
Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs was founded early 
in the 1970's and it has also assumed responsibility for the inter-
national relations of the province. Newfoundland also set up a separate 
department devoted entirely to intergovernmental affairs, as has 
Saskatchewan,but the other provinces generally established an inter-
governmental branch within an existing department. It has also been 
noticeable in Canada that several functional departments in provincial 
governments have added small sections to their structure to examine 
the intergovernmental aspects of their activity. 
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The comparable s i t ua t i on in Aust ra l ia has not been pub l ic ly 
documented or analyzed. Largely in response to the e lect ion and 
subsequent i n i t i a t i v e s of the Whitlam Labor government 1972-75, a l l 
state governments created central bureaucratic structures to cope 
with intergovernmental a f f a i r s . There was no common pract ice followed 
and at the time of w r i t i ng the s i t ua t i on is thus: Western Austra l ia 
has a Minister for Federal A f f a i r s who is also the Attorney-General, and 
a federal a f fa i rs o f f i ce comprising only a couple of o f f i c i a l s operates 
in the Crown Law Of f i ce ; in South Aust ra l ia there is no Minister for 
Federal Affairs as these matters are handled d i r e c t l y by the Premier, 
and a small s ta f f t o t a l l i n g four people operates out of the Premier's 
Department and must report through the permanent head of that department; 
the Premier of Tasmania handles federal a f f a i r s and he is advised 
directly by the Director of the Cabinet O f f i ce ; V ic to r ia has a Federal 
Affairs Division in the Premier's Department numbering seven people but 
that Division reports through the permanent head of the Premier's 
Department; whi lst New South Wales had a large federal a f f a i r s contingent 
in the Whitlam era. Premier Wran disbanded most of i t and the remnants 
now form part of the normal s t a f f of the Premier's Department on a much 
smaller scale; in Queensland there is a Federal A f fa i r s Div is ion of 
four people in the Premier's Department which reports through the 
permanent head of that department to the Premier on most intergovernmental 
matters,although i t does also service the Attorney-General on a few 
aspects,such as his involvement as the s ta te 's representat ive on the 
Australian Advisory Council fo r Intergovernment Relat ions. 
Some aspects of the growth of t h i s admin is t ra t ive machinery are 
worth noting. Vei l leux, in analyzing the growth of a l l intergovernmental 
machinery in Canada puts forward some causal factors under what he ca l l s 
two theses; the " p o l i t i c a l thes is" and the "adminis t rat ive thes is " . The 
former is v i r tua l l y the interdependence of the levels of government which 
has accelerated in the postwar per iod. The second is more in teres t ing 
for our present purposes, and i t has to do wi th the pract ica l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
raised by the management of intergovernmental r e la t i ons . The f i r s t 
impinges upon the second and "the increase in the intervent ions of 
governments, as well as t he i r e f f o r t s to ra t i ona l i ze these i n te r -
ventions, have produced a network of intergovernmental t i es which 
have become so numerous and so complex that governments have been 
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forced to set up internal administrative structures and bodies whose 
function it is to coordinate those ties". This, according to Veilleux, 
accounts for the existence of both federal and provincial departments 
or divisions devoted exclusively to intergovernmental relations. Of 
the officials in these bodies he is critical for not always taking the 
interests of the whole nation into consideration but rather viewing 
intergovernmental relations as a game and trying to maximize advantages 
or concessions from the other level. He continues -
"In my view, as a result of this attitude, more 
importance is often attached to the process of 
intergovernmental relations than to their 
substance, that is the manner rather than the 
matter that counts".^2 
Simeon argues that provincial governments have sought to achieve 
greater control over their spending priorities and so have increased 
central coordination of their activities - "Governments have sought to 
ensure that official relationships will be subordinate to overall 
political strategy". He adds that -
"The development of new techniques for policy 
analysis and political control within 
government has, perhaps ironically, had the 
effect of sharpening intergovernmental conflict .^ 
and rendering policy coordination more difficult". 
Simeon agrees with Veilleux on the aspect of substance becoming subservient 
to process,because of the rise of the central agencies, and uses the 
Pension plan to demonstrate that, because of the dominance of the 
central bodies, it came to be viewed as a fiscal problem rather than a 
welfare problem. It was a similar sentiment that caused Stevenson, 
himself the head of the Ontario Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, 
to argue that central bureaucracies such as his own should be kept 
small in size.^^ 
41. Gerard Veilleux, op.cit., p. 42. 
42. ibid., p. 45. 
43. Richard Simeon, "The Federal-Provincial Decision-Making Process" in 
Intergovernmental Relations, Issues and Alternatives, 1977, Ontario 
Economic Council (Toronto: 1977), pp. 31-32. 
44. ihid., p. 32. 
45. Don Stevenson, op.cit., p. 93. 
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The most recent and perhaps comprehensive analysis of the in te r -
governmental o f f i c i a l s of whom we are speaking has come from Kernaghan 
who begins by stressing the d i f f i c u l t y of i den t i f y i ng a l l public 
servants who are involved in intergovernmental re la t i ons . They 
certainly do not a l l reside in the central agencies but are also 
scattered throughout programme departments. He observes that the 
normal indicators of bureaucratic power ( f i nanc ia l and human resources, 
discretionary au thor i t y , inf luence wi th p o l i t i c a l ac tors , knowledge and 
experience), are not as important to intergovernmental o f f i c i a l s who 
rely more on diplomatic and bargaining s k i l l s , as well as the i r posi t ion 
in the hierarchy and the scope of t h e i r perspective on intergovernmental 
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relations. He puts forward three models of the ro le and power of 
intergovernmental o f f i c i a l s ; (a) the cooperation model t y p i f i e d by 
programme special ists wi th a great deal of autonomy and concerned with 
technical rather than p o l i t i c a l matters (we have already encountered 
this earl ier with Smiley's descr ipt ions of intergovernmental re la t ions 
in the postwar per iod) ; (b) the bargaining model involv ing ministers 
and senior administrators from each order of government and focussing 
on specific policy matters ( t y p i f i e d by Simeon's analysis of a number 
of specific intergovernmental po l icy negot ia t ions) ; (c) the 
bureaucratic politics model which refers to "bargaining over i n te r -
governmental matters among ministers and o f f i c i a l s in departments 
and agencies within each order of government". In other words i t 
involves intragovernmental bargaining which, i t is argued, impacts 
upon intergovernmental bargaining. 
Now this th i rd model i s a qu i te neglected aspect in both Austral ian 
and Canadian l i t e r a t u r e . Those who have dabbled in i t tend to suggest 
that past studies have been wrong in regarding "governments" as a single 
unit in the intergovernmental re la t ions process, because of the contact 
between o f f i c ia ls of the d i f f e r e n t levels of government,and because of 
the conflicts between the prov inc ia l departments and t he i r central 
46. Kenneth Kernaghan, op.cit., pp. 4-5. 
47. Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy (Toronto: Universi ty 
of Toronto Press, 1977). 
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agencies. Kernaghan concludes -
"Thus, on the basis of studies of Canadian federalism 
conducted to this date, it is risky to correlate too 
closely the power of officials in intergovernmental 
relations with their level, position and departmental 
or agency affiliation in government. Available case 
studies suggest that the exercise of power in the 
intergovernmental policy process, both by officials 
and other political actors, depends very much on 
the issue under consideration".^^ 
Kernaghan adds that,despite all the sophistication of the machinery 
of intergovernmental relations including the central agencies, a great 
deal of informal contact between officials still underpins the whole 
process including in particular telephone contact. This is certainly 
also true in Australia. 
In the light of the above discussion it has become reasonably clear 
that it is difficult to pronounce what role the new central agencies 
have in relation to intergovernmental agreements. No analyst in Canada 
or Australia has yet suggested a complete coordinating role of the kind 
that our planning system would envisage. My own interviews show that 
the situations which come closest to this model in either country are 
in the provinces of Quebec, to a slightly lesser extent Alberta, and to 
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a slight extent Ontario, where there is a formal requirement for inter-
governmental agreements to pass the sanction of the ministry responsible 
for intergovernmental affairs, but the sanction is applied basically 
within the perspective of the agreement under consideration rather than 
48. See for example Kernaghan's references to two unpublished Ph.D. 
Theses viz. Richard John Schultz, Federalism, Bureaucracy and Public 
Policy: A Case Study of the making of Transportation Policy, Toronto 
York University, April 1976, and Simon Mclnnes, Federal-Provincial 
Negotiation: Family Allowances 1970-76, Ottawa, Carleton University, 
April 1978. 
49. 
50. 
Kenneth Kernaghan, op.cit., p. 10. 
My interviews reveal that in Quebec there is a r i g i d adherence to 
the rule that the Department of Federal-Provincial Relations should 
monitor and even veto pa r t i cu la r intergovernmental agreements and 
this requirement is applied less severely in Alberta and Ontario. 
As no interviews were conducted in Saskatchewan or Newfoundland, I 
am unable to comment on the extent to which th i s aspect prevai ls 
in those provinces. 
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any attempt at macro resource allocation. Nonetheless such central 
agencies in these and other Canadian provinces, and even in the much 
more weakly coordinated Australian states, do attempt to place the 
deliberation over an intergovernmental agreement in the perspective 
of a perceived attitude to intergovernmental relations in general. 
(x) Conferences of ministers and officials solely from the states/ 
provinces 
As mentioned earlier,it has been rare in Australian experience for 
the states to manage liaison between themselves let alone the capacity 
to enter into binding relationships. This is, of course, related to the 
fact that at any one time there will usually be at least two of the six 
states governed by parties different from the other four states, and 
that situation is further complicated by the fact that some of the 
states will be governed by the same party as is governing at the national 
level and those states will be less willing to be seen to be conniving 
with the other states against their "friends" in Canberra. There have 
been some singular and notable attempts by the states to form a more 
permanent front,such as their compilation of a proposal for new federal 
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arrangements submitted at a Premier's Conference in 1970. This is 
analyzed in the next chapter but it only took a firm stand by the Prime 
Minister,and a weak stand by the Premier of New South Wales, to see the 
states divided again. In the mid-1970's it looked as if there was a 
distinct possibility of the establishment of a Council of States in 
Canberra as a lobby group and information and liaison secretariat. 
However the Labor states baulked at the proposal and even the major 
advocates in the non-Labor states lost enthusiasm. In the late 1970's 
the state Premiers in Australia met without the presence of the 
Commonwealth to review the tax sharing arrangements of "New Federalism", 
which were due for renegotiation, but the outcome was a relatively soft 
approach to be put to the Commonwealth Government which would not 
disadvantage any particular state. It has been known for state ministers 
and officials to gather together immediately prior to an intergovernmental 
51. New South Wales Premiers Department, The Financial Relationships of 
the Cormonwealth and the States: A Statement by the Premiers of 
all the States (Sydney: 1970). 
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conference, to seek some common ground before confront ing the national 
government, but such actions are loosely structured and are usually well 
overridden by the happenings of the actual intergovernmental conference 
itself. Unlike the s i tua t ion in Canada i t has been unusual for 
particular states, even contiguous ones, to form so l id a l l iances. Even 
the recent attempts of Western Aus t ra l i a , Northern Te r r i t o r y , and 
Queensland to form a so l id bloc for lobbying fo r northern development 
has been riven by jealousies between these e n t i t i e s . 
In Canada in terprov inc ia l l i a i son is more common and in the 1970's there 
have been a number of such conferences. However, Canadian experience has not 
demonstrated last ing s o l i d a r i t y in those circumstances where a l l 
provinces have been involved due, no doubt, to the d i f f e r i n g needs and 
53 perspectives of various provinces. What has proved to be more durable 
in Canada is l ia ison and commitment between contiguous provinces with 
common regional interests, s p e c i f i c a l l y the Council of Western Premiers 
and the Council of Maritime Premiers. ( I t should also be noted that 
these bodies have formed a loose a l l i ance wi th counterpart state 
groupings from American states j u s t across the border.) Research 
indicates that th is development has led to a "regional perspective" on 
some matters the subject of intergovernmental agreements, such as post-
secondary education, but there i s , as y e t , no common in te r -p rov inc ia l 
coordination or even viewpoint across a l l intergovernmental agreements 
and i t i s , natural ly, doubtful that w i l l occur. The h i s to r i c Western 
Economic Opportunities conference in the ear ly 1970's did demonstrate, 
however, the ab i l i t y of provinces to get together and analyze a l l the 
areas of intergovernmental arrangements which had a bearing on the i r 
common grievances against the federal government,viz. spat ia l 
discrimination against the West. This has something of a counterpart 
in Australia when the resource r i c h , export or iented lesser populated 
53 
52. For example the chief min is ter of the Northern Ter r i to ry f e l l out 
with the Queensland Premier over the remote area allowance that 
should apply for concessions on nat ional income tax. 
For an attempt to explain the lack of emphasis on f u l l i n te r -
provincial l ia ison in Canada, see Richard H. Leach, " I n te r -
provincial Cooperation: Neglected Aspect of Canadian Federalism , 
Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 2, 1959, and D.V. Smiley, 
Canada in Question, pp. 64-67. 
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states link up, ( in rhetor ic at l e a s t ) , against the national pol ic ies 
on ta r i f f s , t ransport , monetary pol icy etc . which, they c la im, are 
framed to suit the denser populated importing states located in the 
south-east of the cont inent. 
Clearly then th is regionalism suggests some capacity for a super-
state, or super-provincial , level of resource a l loca t ion in re la t ion to 
one or several public funct ions. However the scope for such a rea l locat ion 
across the whole public sector of a l l pa r t i c ipa t ing regional units of 
government seems very l i m i t e d , i f only because i t s occurrence would 
ultimately lead to a questioning of the v i a b i l i t y of the par t i c ipa t ing 
individual p o l i t i c s , and the p o s s i b i l i t y of the i r merging more formally 
and more permanently. At any event i t is bound to be more of a phenomenon 
in an east-west federation rather than a north-south one, and pa r t i cu la r l y 
where the former abuts the uni ts of yet another p o l i t i c a l federat ion, 
(the U.S.A.). 
Accountability 
So we have now examined the bulk of the intergovernmental coordination 
machinery in these two federat ions, and must conclude that there is no 
comprehensive coordination of intergovernmental agreements which would 
comply with the prerequisites of our planning model, although several 
elements offer some potent ia l in th i s d i r e c t i o n . Within each level of 
government, in both federat ions, the coordinat ion process is weak and each 
level of government is not yet in a pos i t ion to achieve coordinated planning 
across the whole f i e l d of i t s intergovernmental r e l a t i ons , although the 
Canadians are a l i t t l e closer to th i s s i t ua t i on than are the Austral ians. 
To put i t another way, the planning which does take place is sectoral 
and vertical planning w i th in pa r t i cu la r agreements, and not horizontal 
planning across a l l agreements and then between leve ls . 
Another severe problem, as we have noted, is that the planning 
which is achieved per medium of intergovernmental agreements is largely 
in secret. The central problem re la tes to the question of who is to be 
held accountable for the creat ion and implementation of these agreements, 
to whom, and in what manner. They are la rge ly drawn up by the i r 
architects away from public scrut iny w i th in the confines of executive 
policy, and when completed, they are implemented fo r f ixed period of time 
through methods which escape any searching analysis or debate in c i v i c . 
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state or national parl iaments. Public servants are in t imate ly involved 
in this whole process from b i r t h to de l ivery to maturation (and 
occasionally abor t ion) . This has to be so, not only because of the i r 
expertise, but also because in the d i v i s i ve p o l i t i c s of intergovernmental 
relations in Canada and Aus t ra l i a , i t is often the public servants who 
have to keep the federation hanging together. A key method they have 
to achieve this is the in t roduct ion and maintenance of intergovernmental 
agreements of one kind or other. In the performance of these ro les , 
however, two fundamental questions a r i s e , (a) To whom are such public 
servants responsible and (b) To whom do publ ic servants perceive 
themselves to be responsible? Accountab i l i ty to each level of 
government and to the public is qu i te b lu r red . Most of the wr i ters 
we have already considered are per fec t l y w i l l i n g to concede that in te r -
governmental agreements are part of Smiley's "executive federal ism", 
and in some ways the most in t rac tab le part of i t . There is the question 
of the lack of accountabi l i ty to nat ional and sub-national parliaments, 
already touched upon ea r l i e r . There is the very d i f f i c u l t problem for 
pressure groups and c i t izens who cannot pinpoint respons ib i l i t y wi th in 
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agreements. There are many other problems of accountabi l i ty already 
touched upon. The d i f f i c u l t y is especia l ly pronounced in re la t ion to 
the role of public servants. As Kernaghan says, " I t is clear that the 
participation of o f f i c i a l s in formal intergovernmental meetings is only 
the top of a sizeable iceberg. Below the water l i ne is a complex network 
of formal and informal in teract ions which a f fec t s i g n i f i c a n t l y the 
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outcome of intergovernmental negot ia t ions" . 
Gordon Robertson has made a s p i r i t e d defence of the closed nature 
of interministerial conferences, and since i t is those conferences which 
spawn most of the interdepartmental agreements of which we have been 
54 One of Austral ia 's largest pressure groups, the Austral ian Medical 
Association has come to gr ips w i th th i s problem recently by 
recommending that f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for hospitals be transferred 
to the national government so that pressure groups and the conmunity 
in general could pinpoint accoun tab i l i t y . See submission by the 
A.M.A. into the National Inqui ry in to Hospitals 1979. 
55. Kenneth Kernaghan, op.cit., p. 11. 
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speaking,his points are worth noting. He argues quite forcefully that 
"the foremost purpose of federal-provincial ministerial conferences 
remains to secure agreements, understandings and sometimes binding, 
precisely-defined decisions, affecting intergovernmental business, to 
arrive cooperatively at solutions to practical problems posed by the 
acknowledged interdependency of governmental activities".^^ Robertson 
believes that for the achievement of these objectives conferences 
cannot be entirely open, and gives reasons -
* "Open conferences hamper the process of reaching 
decisions, because of reluctance on the part of 
the participants to make concessions that might 
cause problems with the audience back home. If 
this forces the necessary bargaining 'underground', 
the role of officials may be magnified. 
* For bargaining to begin, political and partisan 
rhetoric must give way to straight talk. This 
usually requires closed doors, since the public 
stance of contests between leaders of opposing 
parties is essential to the political process. 
* Openness can be a divisive influence in that the 
debate, under the compulsion of the confrontational 
quality of the bargaining process, can highlight 
differences of opinion and viewpoint rather than 
the common ground. 
* Individual, practical problems can become hostages 
to a public relations exercise that may be necessary 
for broader political or other purposes".^^ 
If one accepts the above arguments it becomes clear that secrecy is 
likely to remain a feature of intergovernmental conferences as long 
as they remain so political. After all,the sheer existence of inter-
governmental conferences is a monument to the domination by the 
executive over the legislature which has been a feature cormion to 
the national and sub-national governments of both Australia and 
Canada,all of which profess to operate Westminster systems. One wonders 
whether the level of secrecy in intergovernmental relations is any 
higher than it is in relation to the executive activities in the affairs 
within either of the national governments,or those of the states/ 
provinces. This,however, does not overcome the objections raised 
56. Gordon Robertson, op.cit., p. 85, 
57. ihid. 
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ironically by Stevenson when he describes agreements hammered out at 
federal-provincial conferences as " v i r t u a l f a i t s accomplis which 
tend to erode the legit imacy of both Parliament and the provincial 
" 5 8 legislatures . 
Thus, although there are some strong elements of planning already 
apparent in the funct ioning of intergovernmental agreements in Austra l ia 
and Canada,it is not the t o t a l l y comprehensive or democratic planning 
we are seeking, nor is i t in any way f u l l y accountable. 
These are the two fundamental d i f f i c u l t i e s we have encountered 
in this examination of intergovernmental agreements; others which have 
arisen are more of a technical nature and should be able to be overcome 
much more easily. Of course the two basic aspects can be overcome too, 
the f i r s t by means of a d i f f e ren t kind of coordinat ion from the centre 
of each level,and the second by opening up the processes,although 
this wi l l automatically make the very processes of the operation of 
intergovernmental agreements more p o l i t i c a l and more tardy. Specif ic 
suggestions for resolut ion of these d i f f i c u l t i e s w i l l be proposed and 
discussed in our concluding chapter. 
58. Don Stevenson, op.cit. , p. 93. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FEDERAL FINANCE 
There is no more obvious element of the consequences of a federal 
division of power than the f i s ca l arrangements, and none more p o l i t i c a l 
either. All federations are characterized by revenue sharing,and/or 
responsibility sharing,between levels,and the dimension and nature of that 
sharing is made manifest in f i sca l terms. Moreover the con f l i c t s which 
occur across the l ine of the d i v i s ion of powers because of divided 
sovereignty are usually about the ownership of resources, or access to 
and use of them. Any compromise which is derived is expressed, in most 
cases, in financial terms. 
Consequently we might well expect to f i nd that the area of federal 
financial relationships w i l l be the most f r u i t f u l f i e l d fo r an assessment 
of the potential for public sector planning. This is so fo r a number of 
reasons: (a) Fiscal transfers of a l l kinds are r e l a t i v e l y easy to iden t i f y 
and isolate, (b) Financial re la t ions are so often symbolic of p o l i t i c a l 
relationships, (c) More has been wr i t t en about the f i s ca l side of 
federalism than any other aspect, so that we have more l i t e r a t u r e to guide 
us, (d) In the interviews conducted fo r th is project , respondents were more 
than will ing to speak of f i sca l matters, and were often able to conceptualize 
the problems of federalism most eas i ly by resor t ing to f i sca l example, 
analogy,or metaphor. In other words f inanc ia l aspects have so pervaded the 
literature and discussion of federal ism that a great deal of the debate 
about broad issues and viewpoints takes place w i th in the confines of 
fiscal terminology. 
We are going to explore that terminology and i t s supporting concepts 
in our endeavour to iden t i f y the hindrances posed by federalism to planning, 
and once again our at tent ion w i l l be focussed not so much on the internal 
aspects of the f iscal administrat ion of each level of government, but rather 
^P^''^ the intergovernmental f i s ca l re la t ionsh ips i . e . the processes which 
take place across the d iv is ion of powers by the players in th is game -
the sovereign government e n t i t i e s . 
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As we observed in earlier chapters,it is impossible to create a 
division of powers which will perennially secure the levels of government 
into watertight compartments, with a fixed list of functions,and a 
commensurate array of revenue sources to finance them. This is particularly 
true of Australia and Canada which, like all federations, experience what 
has been termed "vertical" imbalance. Vertical imbalance refers to the 
fact that there is not a neat or complete matching of expenditure 
responsibilities and revenue potential for each level, so that one level 
inevitably has more expenditure responsibilities than it can finance 
adequately from its own sources,and the other level is in the obverse 
situation with more revenue potential available to it than it needs to 
discharge its constitutional obligations effectively. In both Australia 
and Canada the situation since the second world war has been that the 
national governments have found that the arsenal of taxing powers which 
accrue to them under the division of powers is more than adequate to 
finance the functions of government they have been allocated. On the other 
hand,the states and provinces are in a situation where their expenditure 
responsibility,as allocated under the constitution require more finance 
than can effectively be raised using the taxing powers they have been 
allocated. This results in the overt manifestation of vertical imbalance 
being sizeable fiscal transfers of one kind or another from the national 
government to the states or provinces. We needn't go into the cause of 
this dilemma here - it has to do with the inability of the founding fathers 
of both countries to foresee the growth of the public sector,as well as 
the strange way in which the supreme courts in both countries have 
interpreted spending and taxing powers under the constitution,and certainly 
in ways that the founding fathers never intended. It should also be 
emphasized that the magnitude of vertical imbalance increased significantly 
during the second world war in both countries,so that its impact has been 
felt most heavily since that time. As will be demonstrated,both the 
Australian and Canadian national governments took over the main state/ 
provincial revenue sources as a war-time expediency,and never really handed 
them back after hostilities had ended,preferring instead to engage in a 
process of huge transfers of "national" funds to the lower levels in return 
for continuing to occupy the taxation fields. Now there are some important 
divergences in practice between the two countries in the period since the 
second world war, and they are differences which are quite instructive for 
our purposes here. We shall be analyzing these different approaches. 
Suffice to note,at this point,that in both Australia and Canada,the second 
242. 
world war marks the beginning of a period of profound vertical fiscal 
imbalance between the levels of government. 
There are really only a limited number of ways to rectify vertical 
imbalance. Firstly, functions could be transferred between the levels of 
government. Secondly, taxation powers could be so transferred. Thirdly 
there could be sharing of functions, (responsibility sharing) and fourthly 
there could be revenue sharing. All of these methods have been tried in 
both countries as we shall see. Looking at the four basic options it 
becomes readily apparent that vertical fiscal imbalance can generate a 
number of difficulties for the introduction of a planning system such as 
the one we are envisaging, particularly if its solution involves sharing of 
revenues or responsibilities rather than discrete shifts of taxing or 
spending powers between levels. Since it is the "sharing" concept which 
has pervaded Australian and Canadian experience, (because attempts to move 
taxing and spending powers between levels have been fairly unsuccessful),^ 
we can be forewarned. 
Another form of fiscal imbalance in federations is termed "horizontal" 
imbalance,and refers to the fact that each of the units of a federation 
at the same level of government, will not be equally endowed in terms of 
resources and the potential to exploit them. Thus,in both Australia and 
Canada,the states/provinces display marked variations in numerous 
characteristics of their terrain and their populations,which means 
differences in the capacity of those state/provincial governments to raise 
revenue,and different pressures upon them to spend that revenue. It can 
most forcefully be expressed by saying that some states/provinces are 
richer and some poorer, but that conveys only a picture of absolutes 
rather than emphasizing the different potential which also exists. In 
both countries there is a popular feeling that such horizontal imbalances 
should be eliminated,or at least minimized,and to the extent that a rigid 
conviction is held on this point it does not, superficially at least. 
1. The only significant shift of a taxing power to occur in Australia in 
the postwar period has been the transfer of payroll tax from the 
Commonwealth Government to the State Governments in 1971 but this was 
in response to the loss by the states of receipts duties following a 
constitutional challenge. For a history and analysis of those events 
see R.L. Mathews, ed.. State and Local Taxation (Canberra: A.N.U. 
Press, 1977), pp. 259-279. 
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seem to pose d i f f i cu l t i es for the superimposition of planning across the 
intergovernmental interface. However there are questions of the 
methodology to be employed to restore horizontal balance, as well as the 
fact that horizontal imbalance is intimately related to vert ical imbalance, 
in that each of the sub-national units of the federation w i l l , in t ru th , 
have a different degree of vert ical imbalance with the national level . 
Thus,attempts to rect i fy vert ical imbalance w i l l affect horizontal 
imbalance,and vice versa. We shall explore this aspect also in terms of 
the experience of the two countries. 
So, to recapitulate, we shall examine federal f iscal relations 
mainly from the aspect of the intergovernmental transfer of funds,and 
attempts at revenue sharing,in an endeavour to understand how such 
relationships operate and whether, within those relationships, there is 
potential for the injection of a planning system. The very conceptual 
basis of federal financial relat ionships, especially the notions of 
vertical and horizontal imbalance,warn us that there are a number of 
fundamental d i f f icu l t ies to be overcome. This analysis w i l l for the most 
part involve assessment of the copious polemic which already exists in 
this subject matter area both in the l i te ra ture and arising out of the 
interviews. But beforehand i t is imperative to give at least a brief 
description of federal finance in the two countries,to provide a frame of 
reference for the many points of dispute which w i l l follow. 
FEDERAL FINANCE IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 
(1) AUSTRALIA 
For the national government in Austral ia,taxes, fees, and fines 
comprise the bulk of funds available and at the latest count represented 
over 85 per cent of a l l funds available to that level of government. The 
nature of these taxes etc. can be seen from the table below -
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TABLE 5.A.1 
AUSTRALIA 
COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
Taxes, Fees, Fines Etc. by the type of Tax^^' 
Income taxes on indiv iduals 
Income taxes on companies 
Other income taxes 
Excise duties 
Sales tax 
Customs duties on imports 
Primary production taxes 
Other 
% of Total 
1970-71 
^^^ 44.2 
19.2 
0.7 
14.7 
f ,8 
6,5 
0.4 
5.5 
1974-75 
54.2 
16.5 
0.6 
12.2 
8.1 
5.9 
1.0 
1.5 
1978-79^P^ 
54.4 
12.8 
0.5 
16.3 
7.5 
5.8 
1.2 
1.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
(a) Excludes taxes col lected by Northern Te r r i t o ry Government au thor i t i es . 
(b) Includes Medibank levy payable from October 1 1976 to October 31 1978. 
(p) Preliminary f igures 
(Source: Commonwealth Goverrment Finance Australia) 
The above table demonstrates some features of great importance for 
federal financial re la t ions . In summary, the observation can be made that 
income tax on individuals and companies, excise du t ies , sales tax and 
import duties are the l i feb lood of the national government, r e f l ec t i ng the 
Australian si tuat ion whereby each of those taxes is now the sole preserve 
of that level government,whereas most other federat ions are characterized 
by a sharing of one or more of these s i g n i f i c a n t tax sources. 
In relation to income tax, the s i t ua t i on arises from the fac t that 
the national government, during the second world war occupied the income 
tax field exclusively, thereby taking from the states t h e i r most luc ra t i ve 
revenue source, and reimbursing them at f i r s t according to the revenue 
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each of them would have col lected had they retained th is taxing power. 
Those arrangements, the uniform tax scheme, have persisted since that time 
despite two High Court challenges by the states in which the Court upheld 
the Commonwealth's power under Section 96 of the Austral ian Const i tut ion 
to make grants to the states on such terms and condit ions as i t sees f i t , 
although legal opinion is that the states could re-enter the f i e l d of 
income tax at any moment,if they were united in th i s desi re. 
The main transformation which has occurred in these arrangements 
relates to the manner in which a share of the resul tant funds from income 
taxes have been transferred back to the states. As was explained above, 
during war time and immediately a f te r they were cal led " taxat ion 
reimbursement grants", but l a te r became " f inanc ia l assistance grants", being 
calculated on a formula which took account of population d i s t r i bu t i on among 
the states, age d i s t r i bu t i on of that populat ion, and a betterment factor to 
make some recognition of each s ta te ' s po ten t i a l . The change of name and 
method of d is t r ibut ion was of considerable p o l i t i c a l significance,because 
i t symbolized a s i tuat ion where the states were no longer automatically 
entitled to any predetermined share of income tax , as had been the case 
when the resulting grants from the Commonwealth to the states had carr ied 
the nomenclature and substance of being fo r taxat ion reimbursement."^ The 
new financial assistance grant 's formulae were renegotiated each f i ve 
years,until the advent of the Eraser government in 1975 and i t s "new 
federalism" policy which, as phase one,provided for the f inanc ia l assistance 
grants to be replaced by a f ixed percentage share of personal income tax to be 
returned to the states, d i s t r i bu ted amongst them according to pre-exist ing 
relativities, in a f i ve year agreement,and wi th a f l oo r guarantee that no 
state should receive less than i t would have under the old arrangements. 
The legislation provided for a complete review of the re l a t i ve d i s t r i bu t i on 
1942 and 1957. For a h is tory of uniform income taxat ion and state 
reaction to i t see R.L. Mathews and W.R.C. Jay, Federal Finance 
(Melbourne: Nelson, 1972); and J.E. Richardson, Patterns of 
Australian Federalism, Monograph No. 1 , Canberra, Centre for Research 
on Federal Financial Relat ions, 1973. 
For a history of the changes to name and content of the taxat ion 
reimbursement grants see L.A. Hie lscher , The Financial Assistance 
Grant, Appendix A, Occasional Paper No. 1 , Canberra, Centre for Research 
on Federal Financial Relat ions, 1976. 
The guarantee applied only for the f i r s t four years of the new 
arrangements. 
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of the grants among the states to be undertaken by 1981 in time for the i r 
renegotiation. Other elements of the Eraser government's new federalism 
will be analyzed la te r and the f u l l tex t of the new federalism pol icy is 
reproduced as an appendix, but i t has to be pointed out at th i s stage 
that i t also provided for a second phase whereby any state would be able 
to authorize a national government surcharge or grant a personal income tax rebate 
to resident taxpayers of that s ta te . To date no state has even passed the 
requisite leg is la t ion for the implementation of t h i s second phase, although 
i t should also be noted that the nat ional government has not contemplated 
moving out of the income tax f i e l d to al low the states room for the 
imposition of such an income tax surcharge. Consequently i t can be seen 
that the sole occupation of income tax powers by the national government 
produces two major ef fects in the Austra l ian federa t ion ; (a) i t ensures 
that al l income taxes, both ind iv idual and corporate are levied at a 
uniform rate across the nation unl ike the s i tua t ion pre-World War I I , when state 
income taxes varied s i g n i f i c a n t l y in t he i r incidence and s e v e r i t y , ( a l l 
Commonwealth taxes and levies must always be uniform as between states accord-
ing to the Australian Cons t i tu t ion) ; and (b) i t resul ts in the necessity for a 
massive transfer of revenue gained from income taxes by the national 
government to the states. There have been a few occasions in post war 
history in Australia when the states have had e x p l i c i t opportuni t ies to 
regain their income taxing powers, bu t , i n the f i n a l analysis, they have 
preferred a si tuat ion where the Commonwealth government incurs the 
political odium of levying a l l the income taxes. This does, of course, 
produce a situation of constant p o l i t i c a l argument between the levels of 
government,with the states forever claiming a larger grant than is being 
offered by the Commonwealth, despite the existence of a quinquennial 
formula for these f i sca l t rans fers . 
In relation to the ind i rec t taxes v i z . excise du t ies , sales tax , 
and import duties,a d i f fe ren t s i t ua t i on p reva i l s . The Austral ian cons t i tu t ion 
does specify customs and excise dut ies as a power of the national government 
but offers no def in i t ion of what const i tu tes such a tax. Thus i t has fa l l en 
to the High Court to make judgement on t h i s matter and, despite substantial 
prevarication from time to t ime, the view has emerged from the Court that 
4. A proposal reached the not ice paper stage in Western Aust ra l ia but was 
subsequently withdrawn. 
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all taxes levied at the point of wholesale are the preserve of the national
government. This is not the place to enter into an argument about the
merits of such a judgement, but we can note that its practical effect is
to give the Commonwealth Government a monopoly over excise duties, import
duties, and sales tax, despite some recent successful attempts by various
Australian states to impose similar sorts of taxes at the point of retail. 5
So it is that the national government in Australia dominates taxation
collection. This in turn creates a situation of considerable vertical
fiscal imbalance in the federation,with a consequent necessity for the
transfer of funds from the national government to the sub-national levels.
It is that transfer which will occupy most of our subsequent attention,
and we can begin by examining its significance for the outlays of the
national government, as in Table 5.A.2.
TABLE 5.A.2
AUSTRALIA
COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT FINANCE
Outlays
%of total outlay
1970-71
Grants to the States
1974-75 1978-79(P)
- for current purposes
- for capital purposes
Grants to Northern Territory(a)
Net Advances to the State~b~nd
local government authorities*
- for loan works
- Other
21.5
7.1
4.7
2.0
21.5
8.1
3.4
3.6
27.1
5.1
1.0
2.7
1.2
(a) The Northern Territory became self governing on 1.7.78.
(b) In this and subsequent Tables this terminology is used because
it appears thus in official publications. However it is of course
misleading to treat Loan Council allocations to the States as
Commonwealth loans or advances. They are, strictly speaking, a
State entitlement.
(p) Preliminary figures
(Source: Commonwealth Government Finance Australia)
*Se arate local overnment data not available.
or examp e, state taxes on petro an to acco pro
248. 
From Table 5.A.2 it can be seen that something over a third of the 
Commonwealth Government's outlay goes on the transfer of funds, in one 
form or another, to the states, and the latest figures are indicative of 
the trend under the Eraser government towards a mixture of funding with 
more emphasis on funding for recurrent rather than capital purposes. 
Table 5.A.3 presents a somewhat similar analysis in more detail, and it 
is significant that, in the past decade, the percentage growth rate of 
Commonwealth grants to the states and local authorities is nearly twice that 
of total Commonwealth outlays, the major boostshaving come in 1970/71and 1974/75. 
What is of more significance from the point of view of this study is 
the proportion of state revenue which is comprised of transfers from the 
Commonwealth government. It is not possible to obtain a measurement of 
this using state government budgetary data, because there is a distinct lack 
of uniformity in the presentation of state budgets in Australia. Instead 
we have to look to other sources which can provide a consistent, uniform, 
presentation of state public finance and there are only two such sources -
the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Commonwealth Grants Commission. 
Table 5.A.4 presents data from the Bureau of Statistics public finance 
series on state authorities. It can be seen immediately that, taking all 
of the Australian states together, grants from the Commonwealth government 
currently (1978-79) comprise 62.0% of total state receipts and 51.6% of 
total funds available to the states from all sources. Net advances from 
the Commonwealth provide a further 6.0% of the funds available to the states, 
and so in all, 57.6% of all the funds available to the states comes from 
Commonwealth funding. 
Table 5.A.4 also highlights a number of significant trends. Most 
significantly, there has been an unmistakable tendency for the states, 
taken as a whole, to become more dependent on Commonwealth grants.* In 
1964-65 grants from the Commonwealth government represented 50.9% of 
* Later analysis (see Table 5.A.11 and page 259) suggests that these 
generalizations do not necessarily apply to each State, nor is there 
always a continuous trend of Commonwealth dependence for those states 
which have become more dependent. It is not possible to be definitive 
on this matter because of the totally different basis on which the 
figures are compiled by the Bureau of Statistics, on the one hand, 
and the Commonwealth Grants Commission on the other. 
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TABLE 5.A.4 
AUSTRALIA 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS IN RELATION TO STATE REVENUE 
STATE AUTHORITIES RECEIPTS AND FINANCING ITEMS 
Grants from Com. Govt Net Advances from Com. Govt Total Com. Funds 
Year 
1964-5 
1965-6 
1966-7 
1967-8 
1968-9 
1969-70 
1970-1 
1971-2 
1972-3 
1973-4 
1974-5 
1975-6 
1976-7 
1977-8 
1978-9 
% Total 
Receipts 
50.9 
52.5 
52.0 
51.9 
51.1 
51.5 
58.1 
53.8 
53.7 
54.9 
60.1 
62.3 
61.0 
61.7 
62.0 
% Total 
Funds 
Avail-
able 
35.0 
35.8 
37.0 
37.4 
37.0 
37.9 
45.4 
42.4 
44.1 
45.5 
48.1 
53.5 
51.0 
51.0 
51.6 
% Inc. 
6.9 
12.5 
9.7 
10.8 
8.2 
14.0 
36.1 
7.6 
16.2 
23.4 
49.9 
35.8 
9.5 
27.2 
10.3 
% Total 
Funds 
Avail-
able 
18.9 
18.3 
18.0 
18.0 
16.5 
15.7 
10.7 
10.4 
10.6 
9.9 
11.4 
10.5 
8.5 
7.4 
6.0 
% Inc. 
7.2 
6.3 
5.0 
9.1 
0.2 
6.3 
-23.1 
12.9 
13.1 
12.1 
63.7 
12.0 
-6.9 
-1 .3 
-10.6 
% Total 
Funds 
Avail-
able 
53.9 
54.1 
54.7 
55.4 
53.5 
53.6 
56.1 
52.7 
54.7 
55.4 
59.5 
64.0 
59.5 
58.4 
57.6 
% Inc. 
7.0 
10.3 
8.1 
10.2 
5.6 
11.7 
18.7 
tJ 
15.6 
21.2 
52.4 
31.2 
31.2 
11.9 
7.6 
Source: Derived ^rox^ Public Authority Finanoe. 
State and Local Authorities, 
Australian Bureau of S ta t i s t i c s . 
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total state receipts* but in 1978-79 they represented 62.0%. By 
comparison, net advances from the Commonwealth, although recording an 
absolute increase, have come to represent a declining proportion of the 
total funds available to the states (6.0% in 1978-79 compared with 18.9% 
in 1964-65). In terms of the funds available to states,** total Commonwealth 
government transfers (i.e. grants and net advances) have also increased 
slightly and in 1978-79 some 57.6% of all funds available to the states 
came from Commonwealth transfers of some kind or other compared with 53.9% 
in 1964/65. We can safely conclude that well over half of all the funds 
available to the Australian states have come from Commonwealth transfers, 
mainly in the form of grants, and the proportion is now approaching 60%. 
One other important feature revealed in this table should not be overlooked, 
and that is the marked annual fluctuations in Commonwealth funds for the 
states. In the table this is recorded as the percentage increase each year 
and, especially in relation to grants from the Commonwealth Government, it 
can be seen that a small increase one year can be followed by an extremely 
large one in the next year. Indeed the grants to the states from the 
Commonwealth government have shown annual increases ranging from 6.9% to 
49.9%. The pattern in respect of the net advances from the Commonwealth 
is slightly smoother overall, although annual movements here have still 
ranged from a decrease of 23.1% to an increase of 63.7%. Perhaps the most 
significant statistics in this respect are those for total Commonwealth 
funding and Table 5.A.4 shows once again the annual variability factor with 
annual increases ranging from 5.6% to 52.4% although the annual increases 
in total Commonwealth funding are more cyclical than for Commonwealth 
grants alone. Of course it has to be borne in mind that, in interpreting 
the fluctuations in the figures in Table 5.A.4, there were several changes 
during this period in the division of powers and functions as between the 
Commonwealth and the States. This forms part of the explanation for the 
wide fluctuations in some years and serves to reinforce the point regarding 
the unpredictability of dependence upon the Commonwealth. 
Of course the total picture for all states combined is of only limited 
significance for our exercise in this study. Our concern is more with the 
impact of Commonwealth funding on each state individually. Tables 5.A.5 
through to 5.A.10 cast some light on this for us, based once again on 
Bureau of Statistics comparative state public finance data. Some of the 
key comparative data for the latest year has been collapsed into the table 
below -
* The use of the term "receipts" is somewhat misleading. It is used here 
because that is the way the statistician employs the term. Strictly 
speaking, what is being referred to here is receipts on current account. 
"Total Funds Available" is another term used by the statistician which 
does not have a strict equivalent meaning in terminology used in pre-
sentation of Treasury data. Here it means recurrent plus loan funding 
i.e. funds from all sources. 
** 
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State 1978-79 
Total Commonwealth Grants Total Commonwealth Funding 
as % of Total State Receipts as % of Total Funds Available 
to State 
NSW 59.0 55.6 
VIC 56.2 50.1 
QLD 65.6 61.0 
SA 66.7 65.8 
WA 67.3 62.2 
TAS 68.6 66.9 
SIX STATES 62.0 57.6 
The above data demonstrate that each Australian State has a different 
level of dependence on Commonwealth funding and, generally speaking, the 
level of dependence increases as the size of the State (by population) 
decreases. (This generalization does not hold for the relative positions 
of New South Wales and Victoria but it is widely acknowledged that the 
latter has a greater tax base than the former even though its population 
is smaller). Tables 5.A.5 to 5.A.10 confirm that this pattern has always 
been evident with Tasmania being the state always most heavily dependent 
on Commonwealth funding. This is not the place for an examination of the 
reasons for the disparate levels of state dependence on Commonwealth 
funding, but it would seem to be due to a combination of the fact that most 
Commonwealth funding is distributed to the states on the basis of formulae 
whose components produce an increased weighting the smaller the state, 
together with the existence of some level of correlation between the size 
of a state and its tax base for the sorts of taxes the states themselves 
levy. 
Analysis of Tables 5.A.5 through 5.A.10 also reveals a number of other 
pertinent factors: (a) All states have experienced a steady overall trend 
towards greater fiscal dependence on Commonwealth funding, (b) There have 
been pronounced annual fluctuations in all elements of Commonwealth funding 
in every state i.e., grants for current purposes, grants for capital 
purposes, and advances, but grants for current purposes have exhibited a 
somewhat smoother pattern than either grants for capital purposes or 
advances both of which have been quite erratic. 
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259. 
As was indicated earlier, we are restricted in attempting to compare 
Australian states because of the lack of uniformity in the format of state 
budgets, but the Commonwealth Grants Commission each year attempts to resolve 
this problem and publishes, in its annual report on special assistance, 
tables on state budgets. This is the source for the figures which appear 
in Table 5.A.11. These figures cannot be compared directly with those in 
Tables 5.A.4 through 5.A.10 because of the different basis of compilation 
and particularly because the item "Commonwealth Payments" in Table 5.A.11 
does not include all transfers from the national government to the states.* 
It must also be realized that the caption "state taxation" in Table 5.A.11 
includes large items of gross revenue for State public enterprises. The 
data are also of limited use for comparison between states because the 
scope of the budget varies from state to state, mainly because of the 
disparate existence of statutory bodies in each state, which have been given 
varying degrees of independence from the central fiscal and personnel 
oversights of state treasuries and public service boards. However, Table 
5.A. 11 is useful from year to year, bearing in mind always that it does 
not show the actual fluctuation in the other major element of Commonwealth 
funding - specific purpose payments. 
The real importance of Table 5.A.11 lies in the fact that, when it 
comes to state priority determination in Australia, publi-c finance practice 
means that it is budget financing which is the key vehicle. In other words, 
state governments regard their budget sector as reflecting their options, 
constraints and preferences, because that is the only segment of each 
state's public finance which comes into view regularly and coherently. 
The statistics show that, in terms of such budget revenue. New South 
Wales and Victoria are usually well below the other states in terms of their 
dependence on Commonwealth payments, generally below 40% and averaging 34% 
over the past 15 years in New South Wales and 39% in Victoria. Queensland, 
South Australia and Western Australia now have reasonably similar levels of 
dependence on Commonwealth funding at around 45% and the average level 
of dependence over the past 15 years has been 43% for Queensland, 41% for 
South Australia, and 46% for Western Australia. Tasmania has long been 
more highly dependent on this Commonwealth funding than any other state, which 
has comprised on average 55% of that state's budget revenue. 
In fact it excludes all specific purpose payments except the interest 
payments under the Financial Agreement. The specific purpose payments are 
included, in tables prepared by the Grants Commission by presenting state 
expenditure as net of the Commonwealth contribution. Since there is no 
segregation of specific purpose payments it is not possible for us to 
tahf^ ^^ i^""."impact on each state's budgetary position. Note also that 
aoies in this format were no longer published by the Commonwealth 
grants Commission after 1979. 
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All states' budgets are now considerably more dependent on state 
taxation than they were fifteen years ago, the general pattern being for 
state taxes nowadays to comprise double the share of budget revenue that 
they represented in the mid 1960's. The difference between the states in 
the contribution of state taxes to budget revenue is quite marked, with New 
South Wales, and particularly Victoria, recording a much higher level than 
other states, due mainly to their commensurately lower level of dependence on 
Commonwealth funding and the different machinery of government arrangements, 
referred to earlier, which create a different budget make-up. It should be 
noted that apart from these two items viz. "Commonwealth Payments" and 
"State Taxation" the other main components of this State budget revenue 
picture, derived from Grants Commission sources, are railways, debt charges 
recoveries, social service recoveries, mining royalties, harbour and transport 
charges, and interest received. We have concentrated our analysis on "State 
Taxation", (as defined by the Grants Commission), because that appears to be 
much more flexible than any of the above components all of which are linked to 
fixed variables such as demographic characteristics or levels of economic 
activity. 
The other relevant factor revealed by Table 5.A.11 is that, with the 
exception of two or three particular years common to all states, the level 
of dependence on both Commonwealth payments and state taxation has not 
fluctuated widely from one year to another. The exceptions to this 
generalization are 1965-66, 1970-71 and 1977-78, years in which all states 
received a boost in Commonwealth funding. To say this is to reveal the 
basic pattern of state budget formulation on the revenue side where 
Australian state governments tend to see what sort of funding they are 
going to receive from the Commonwealth government before determining levels 
of state taxation. In effect, our analysis has shown us that, there is a 
relatively smooth pattern of state budget revenue dependence on Commonwealth 
payments for general purposes and the relationship of such Commonwealth 
payments to State taxation. We cannot make any observations about such a 
pattern with respect to Commonwealth payments for specific purposes because 
we don't have the data available on a segregated basis. 
We have examined the impact of Australian intergovernment transfers on 
the outlays of the Commonwealth government and the revenue of the state 
governments. The next logical step is to analyze the nature of the funds being 
transferred between levels. Table 5.A.12 provides a broad functional breakdown 
ol'all the Commonwealth payments to state and local authorities. Inconsistencies 
in tabulation prevent the extrapolation of this data back beyond 1973-74. 
The table is of limited usefulness because of the large proportion of inter-
governmental funding which has not been allocated to any function (we examine 
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the split between general and specific purpose funding later in this 
chapter). But this merely serves to illustrate the fact that the bulk of 
intergovernmental transfers in Australia are general purpose, i.e., 
unconditional. The largest single functional category has always been 
"general revenue funds" which is, in reality, the income tax sharing 
(formerly financial assistance grants), which have come to represent an 
increasing proportion of intergovernmental transfers during the past decade. 
However it is clear from Table 5.A.12 that the largest functional areas 
of Commonwealth payments to other levels of government have long been 
education, health, transport and housing. Education has become progressively 
more important, health has fluctuated but now represents a similar proportion 
of intergovernmental funding to what it represented six years ago, transport 
(mainly road funding), has gradually lessened in importance, as has housing. 
The only other significant single element of intergovernmental payments has 
been the capital funding component represented by Loan Council borrowing, 
and capital grants from the Commonwealth, but this sector has become 
noticeably less of a feature in the picture of the intergovernmental flow 
of funds in recent years. 
Table 5.A.13 presents the basic split between funds for recurrent 
purposes and funds for capital purposes. Here the trend is unmistakable. 
Since 1972-73 there has been a marked increase in Commonwealth payments to 
the states for recurrent purposes and a commensurate decrease in capital 
purpose funding. Whereas in 1972-73 funds for capital purposes represented 
42.2% of all Commonwealth funds transferred to the states, in 1980-81 they 
represented only 21.8% of the total. The hospital cost sharing arrangements 
have played a significant role, but this switch in funding has come 
predominantly in the period of the Fraser government, i.e., since 1975-76, 
and partly represents definite elimination of various Whitlam government 
programmes which were capital intensive (growth centres, land acquisition, 
sewerage, area improvement etc.). It is also partly due to the general Liberal 
philosophy of public sector cutbacks as part of economic management, which 
have fallen most heavily on capital forms of expenditure. As can be noted 
from the table, both forms of funding have been the subject of marked 
f^luctuations from year to year. The pattern of annual fluctuations is 
only partially due to changes in the inflation rate. 
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1972-3 
1973-4 
1974-5 
1975-6 
1976-7 
1977-8 
1978-9 
1979-80 
1980-lE 
Total Funds 
Recurrent Pu 
% Tota l 
57.8 
58.1 
56.9 
63.4 
66.8 
70.6 
73.2 
77.2 
78.2 
TABLE 5.A.13 
AUSTRALIA 
PAYMENTS 
. fo r 
rposes 
% Inc. 
21.2 
47.4 
45.3 
12.6 
18.1 
8.8 
12.0 
11.8 
TO STATES 
Total F 
Capital 
42.2 
41.9 
43.1 
36.6 
33.2 
29.4 
26.8 
22.8 
21.8 
E = Estimated 
unds fo r 
Purposes 
% Inc. 
19.9 
55.3 
10.4 
-2.9 
-0.9 
-4.6 
-9.8 
5.6 
Total 
Funds 
% Inc. 
20.6 
50.6 
30.3 
6.9 
11.8 
4.8 
6.6 
10.4 
Source: Derived from Payments to or for the States, 
Budget Paper No. 7. 
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Table 5.A.14 is a useful p ic ture of a longer per iod, the past 15 
years, which reveals the mixture of recurrent and capi ta l funds going 
to each state. Clearly the overal l trend in every state has been towards 
recurrent funds rather than capi ta l funds. But the mixture does vary 
between states. New South Wales has received more from the 
Cofinonwealth for recurrent purposes than for cap i ta l purposes, and that 
trend has become pronounced in a f a i r l y smooth and gradual manner, except 
for the common f la t ten ing o f f in the period 1971-72 to 1974-75. V ic tor ia 
has had pretty well the same mixture of funding as has New South 
Wales and the same comments apply. Queensland has varied marginally from 
the two larger states, occasional ly having a s l i g h t l y higher component of 
one form of funding, and at other times a lower component. In recent years 
there has been a s l i g h t l y heavier emphasis on recurrent funding for 
Queensland than has been true of New South Wales and V i c t o r i a . The South 
Australian pattern is much more at variance, and th i s state has consistent ly 
received a s ign i f i can t l y lower proport ion of recurrent funds than has been 
true of most of the other s ta tes. Indeed, during the 1960's South Austra l ia 
received more Commonwealth funds fo r recurrent purposes than for capi ta l 
purposes. There is a clear demarcation point in Western Aus t ra l ia ' s h is tory 
in these matters because,until 1972-73,Western Aust ra l ia was propor t ional ly 
lower on recurrent funding than most other s tates,but since that time the 
situation has been reversed and since then Western Aust ra l ia has consistent ly 
recorded a higher component of recurrent funding than any other s ta te . Four-
fifths of the Commonwealth payments to Western Aust ra l ia are now for 
recurrent purposes and only o n e - f i f t h fo r cap i ta l purposes, whereas in the 
mid to late 1960's Western Aust ra l ia received more in capi ta l than recurrent 
payments. By contrast, during the whole of the 1970's,Tasmania has had a 
heavier emphasis on Commonwealth funding fo r cap i ta l purposes than any 
other state,and the di f ference in the mixture for Tasmania has 
varied s igni f icant ly from that of other s ta tes. Tasmania now receives a 
noticeably higher percentage of i t s Commonwealth payments for capi ta l 
purposes than does any other s ta te . 
Table 5.A. 15 casts fu r the r l i g h t on Aust ra l ian intergovernmental fund 
transfers f i r s t l y by reveal ing the overa l l s p l i t between general and 
specific purpose funding (which we shal l examine in depth l a t e r ) . I t also 
shows that funding to the states fo r recurrent purposes has always been 
predominantly in the form of general purpose funds,whereas funds for 
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capital purposes have usually contained a much more even mixture of general 
purpose and specific purpose funding especially in recent years. The only 
type of funding which has experienced reasonably smooth increases year to 
year has been recurrent funding for general purposes, whereas recurrent 
funding for specific purposes has been quite erratic, as has been all forms 
of capital funding. Of course it must be remembered that the unconditional 
recurrent funding represents nearly half of all Australian intergovernmental 
transfers, the bulk of it comprising the income tax sharing arrangements 
which are determined by a stable formula. It is worth re-emphasizing that 
the intergovernmental transfer of funds is made up of 48.0% recurrent 
funding for general purposes, 30.2% recurrent funding for specific purposes, 
10.4% capital funding for general purposes, and 11.4% capital funding for 
specific purposes. In the years of large increases in overall funding for 
the states, it has been specific purpose payments of both recurrent and 
capital funds which have been boosted (more so for recurrent purposes), and 
in years when the states have been squeezed for federal funds it has been 
capital funds which have been pruned the most, particularly specific 
purpose capital funds. 
Tables 5.A.16 through 5.A.21 give a functional breakdown of grants and 
advances from the Commonwealth to the states. The grants for current 
purposes (Table 5.A.16) are mostly taken up with tax sharing and education 
was the only other dominant area of current purpose grant funding until 
1975-76 when changes to Medibank funding methods made health the only other 
significant area. All components of grants for current purposes have 
fluctuated markedly from year to year. Table 5.A.17*reveals the spread 
of these current purpose grants among the states and distinct variations 
do occur. Care should be taken in utilizing this table because the dominant 
category "Other" comprises mainly the tax sharing/financial assistance grants 
which, it has already been noted, are distributed by formula amongst the 
states. Apart from this category, we have seen that education and health 
are the dominant areas in this form of funding. In education, it is 
Victoria which has by far the highest component in its mix, and Tasmania 
well and truly the lowest, although Queensland and South Australia are 
quite low too. In such health funds. New South Wales is dominant but 
Western Australia prominent too, with Queensland and Tasmania quite low. 
The table also reveals that the proportion of current purpose grants to 
the states which goes to particular functions has varied significantly 
over the past decade. The mixture of funding is different for each state, 
but, when that mixture tends to change its composition, it does so in the 
* Page 438. 
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same direction for every state. 
In respect of Commonwealth grants to the states for capital purposes, 
(Tables 5.A.18 and 5.A.19j,the only dominant functions are roads and 
education,with a much smaller emphasis on health and welfare, urban public 
transport, and agricultural activities. Such grant funding has also shown 
severe annual fluctuations within the overall framework of a reduction of 
all capital funding over the past few years which we have already observed. 
In terms of interstate distribution,the road function has a high emphasis 
in the mixture of funding for Queensland and Western Australia and - for a 
while - Tasmania, and a low profile in Victoria and South Australia. In 
education it is once again Victoria which is dominant and Tasmania which is 
very low in emphasis,with Western Australia and South Australia also a 
little lighter in emphasis. Again we can observe that the mixture of 
funding here is different for each state and that shifts in the mixture 
usually occur in similar directions in all States. 
The Commonwealth Advances (loans) to the states, (Tables 5.A.20 and 
5.A.21**)^ re mostly for the states' works programmes under the Loan Council 
arrangements described elsewhere, and, apart from this,housing stands out 
as the only other noticeable single functional area to be a recipient of 
such advances with a small emphasis on the support of agricultural and 
pastoral industries. Once again there have been most marked fluctuations 
in this form of intergovernmental funding. 
We are now in a position to summarize the main features of Australian 
intergovernmental transfers. Taken together they represent a very large 
component of national government outlays, currently around 37%, and they 
are progressively increasing in importance. The state governments,(and 
local governments too for that matter), are heavily dependent on inter-
governmental transfers as sources of revenue and,on average,such transfers 
provide 62% of state receipts and 58% of the total funds available to the 
states; the degree of vertical imbalance being higher the smaller the 
state. Moreover the states are gradually becoming more dependent on 
intergovernmental funding,although this dependence is now more upon grants 
than upon advances. The intergovernmental funding in Australia varies 
markedly from year to year in its magnitude, and annual increases have 
i^ anged from 6% to 52%. Commonwealth payments to the states for current 
* Page 439. 
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purposes tend to change more smoothly than those for capital purposes, and 
the trend is rapidly towards recurrent rather than capital funding. Indeed, 
only about one-fifth of intergovernmental transfers in Australia are now 
for capital purposes. Different states vary in the mixture of recurrent 
to capital funding but the overall trends are the same in all states. The 
degree of dependence of state budget revenue varies from state to state but 
there have been no pronounced fluctuations in this factor for all states 
from year to year. Any changes in Commonwealth funding are, of course, 
accompanied by a commensurate rise and fall in the degree of each state's 
dependence on its own taxation. The majority (58%) of intergovernmental 
transfers in Australia are unconditional (i.e. general purpose), and income 
tax sharing dominates the inventory of intergovernmental payments. The 
other dominant sectors for intergovernmental funding in Australia are 
education, health, transport (especially roads), and housing. Although 
the absolute amounts devoted to particular functions have varied widely 
year to year, the proportion going to each function has remained fairly 
constant. In years when there have been substantial boosts in overall 
intergovernmental funding it has been mainly specific purpose payments 
which have expanded, predominantly in the form of recurrent payments, 
and when overall contractions have occurred it has been capital funds 
which have been squeezed especially those for specific purposes, 
(2) CANADA 
No attempt w i l l be made to elaborate upon the h is tory of federal 
fiscal relations in Canada because that has been handled competently 
elsewhere. Our concern is p r imar i l y to analyze the contemporary features 
of fiscal federalism in Canada especia l ly to the extent that they provide 
useful comparisons with Austral ian experience. 
6. For differing perspectives on the evolut ion of federal f i sca l re lat ions 
in Canada see J.R. Mal lory, The Structure of Canadian Government 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1971); D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question: 
federalism in the Seventies ^ 2nd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 
1976); G. Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979). 
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It must be said immediately that there is a considerably lesser degree 
of vertical fiscal imbalance in Canada than obtains in the Australian 
federation. This is not because of any influences in the division of 
public functions between the levels of government; indeed we have already 
seen the similarity of the division of powers. Rather it is because of a 
higher degree of revenue sharing in the Canadian situation, in particular 
the capacity for the provinces to levy personal and corporate income 
taxes with the national government, income tax being (as in Australia) 
the largest single source of government revenue. Since 1977 when arrangements 
were modified for financing established shared-cost programmes (Established 
Programme Financing - examined in more detail below and reproduced in full 
as an appendix), an enlarged personal income tax field has been available 
to the provinces equivalent to about 44% of basic federal tax. However, 
provincial governments are free to specify rates above or below that level 
and in 1978 the rates were - Newfoundland 58% (i.e., 58% of the basic 
national tax which is the national government's income tax after a 
dividend tax credit but before any foreign tax credit or special national 
tax reduction). Prince Edward Island 50%, Nova Scotia 52.5%, New Brunswick 
55.5%, Ontario 44%, Manitoba 56%, Saskatchewan 58.5%, Alberta 38.5%, and 
British Columbia 46%. In Quebec provincial income tax is not related to 
basic federal tax,but is levied at graduated rates which accommodate a 
national government tax abatement,granted to that province after it 
"contracted out" its shared-cost programmes in 1964. The national tax 
abatement now granted to Quebec taxpayers is now 16.5%. 
In respect of company tax,in provinces other than Ontario and Quebec 
the provincial corporation income tax is imposed on the same bases as 
that of the national government's corporation income tax. Corporate 
taxable income earned in a province is eligible for the 10% national 
abatement to compensate corporations for provincial taxes payable. In 
Ontario and Quebec the determination of corporation taxable income follows 
closely, but not exactly, the national scheme but these provinces collect 
their own levy. The rates that applied in 1978 were - Newfoundland 14% 
(i.e. 14% of the company's income), Nova Scotia 12%, Prince Edward Island 
10%, Quebec 12%, and Alberta 11%. Five provinces introduced a preferential 
low tax rate for small business income. The dual corporate rates for 
these provinces were - New Brunswick 12%/9%, Ontario 12%/9%, Manitoba 
15V13%, Saskatchewan 14%/12%, and British Columbia 15%/12%. 
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In 1978/79,the latest years for which figures are avail able,the 
gross revenue of the Canadian national government came from these sources 
Personal income tax 33.3% 
Corporation income tax 14.7% 
General sales tax 11.1% 
Unemployment insurance contributions 6.6% 
Customs duties 6.5% 
Universal pension plan levies 4.8% 
Tobacco and alcoholic beverages tax 3.0% 
Oil export charge 0.8% 
Other taxes 3.5% 
TOTAL Taxes 84.4% 
Return on investments 8.0% 
Sales of goods and services 3.1% 
Other revenue 4.5% 
Gross general revenue 100.0% 
In relation to expenditure of the Canadian national government, transfers 
to provincial, territory, and local governments have comprised between 
a fifth and a quarter of the national government's gross general 
expenditure in the 1970's, as shown in the figures below -
CANADA 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
GENERAL PURPOSE TRANSFERS 
TO OTHER LEVELS 
TOTAL TRANSFERS TO 
OTHER LEVELS 
1971-72 
1974-75 
1977-78 
1978-79 
% GROSS FEDERAL 
8.5 
8.7 
7,6 
6.6 
EXPENDITURE % GROSS FEDERAL EXPENDITURE 
24.1 
21.7 
21.6 
22.1 
Source: Federal Government Finance,Ottawa, Statistics Canada, 
As the above figures indicate,the bulk of the intergovernmental transfers 
in Canada,(unlike Australia),are for specific purposes rather than for 
general purposes,and this has been the case for all of the past decade 
35.2 
64.8 
40.2 
59.8 
35.1 
64.9 
30.1 
69.9 
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as the following figures demonstrate -
CANADA 
TRANSFERS TO PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, TERRITORIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
1971-72 1974-75 1977-78 1978-79 
General Purpose % 
Specific Purpose % 
Source: Federal Government Finance, Ottawa, Statistics Canada. 
However, this data conceals the extremely important fact that the 
mixture of general purpose and specific purpose transfers varies 
considerably from province to province. Consider Table 5.C.1 and it is 
readily apparent that there is an enormous variation, with Newfoundland, 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick receiving a slight majority of transfers in 
the general purpose form. Prince Edward Island and to a lesser extent 
Quebec having a slight majority in the specific purpose form, and the other 
provinces receiving the vast majority of their transfers in the specific 
purpose form. The reasons for this will be examined later but one of 
the key factors is the equalization payment,which is a general purpose 
payment of considerable magnitude and which, naturally,varies between 
provinces and can vary significantly for the same province from one year 
to the next. 
7. The equalization formulae which have been used in Canada are usually 
referred to as a "representative tax system", which consists of a broad 
range of the various taxes and revenues that the ten provinces actually 
levy, classified in such a way as to give separate recognition to those 
taxes or revenues in respect of which relative provincial capacities to 
derive funds are distributed in a unique or distinctive way. In 
calculating equalization, the yield of the representative tax system 
viz. 29 individual provincial tax sources, is estimated for each 
province. This is done by calculating what each tax in the system 
would yield in each province if applied on the basis of uniform rates 
and structures to the province's tax bases. The resulting yields of 
all the taxes in each province are then compared. Since some provinces 
have richer tax bases than others, the yields vary. Those provinces 
for which the total yield of the representative tax system is below 
some prescribed standard are entitled to equalization to bring them up 
to that standard. For a further description including specific details 
of taxes, ceilings, limitations and methods of measurement, see Federal-
Provincial Relations Office, Federal-Provincial Programs and Activities 
(Ottawa: 1979). 
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Table 5.C.2 throws more light on the nature of Canadian inter-
governmental transfers. We have already examined the extent to which total 
transfers absorb national government expenditure. This table reveals that 
apart from general purpose transfers, the main functional areas in which 
large intergovernmental transfers take place are health, social welfare and 
education (again very similar to the Australian situation). Another area 
becoming slightly more prominent is "agriculture, trade and industry and 
tourism", but most of this funding is taken up in the encouragement of 
industry. Development of regions, once a fairly significant recipient of 
intergovernmental funding,has diminished in importance. An Australian 
observer would be surprised at the low proportion of such funding to be 
directed to roads,but the road construction and maintenance function is 
more evenly spread in Canada with the provinces having most of the direct 
responsibility. It should also be noted from this table,and from all 
other data which follows,that Canadians do not distinguish between funding 
for capital and recurrent purposes, at least in the tabulation of statistics 
and these figures include both types of spending. 
Having gained some idea of the dimensions and the nature of Canadian 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers,the question arises as to what impact 
they have upon the provinces. To begin with,the figures below give some 
idea of the average sources of provincial revenue -
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CANADA 
PROVINCES 
REVENUE SOURCES AS PERCENTAGES OF ESTIMATED GROSS GENERAL REVENUE 
1977-78 1978-79 
Provincial Taxes 
National Resource Revenue 
Privileges Licences and Permits 
Sales of Goods and Services 
Return on Investments 
Other Revenue From Own Sources 
Total Gross General Revenue From Own Sources 
General Purpose Transfers from Federal 
Government 
Specific Purpose Transfers From Other Levels 
TOTAL TRANSFERS 20,5 20,5 
Source: Provincial Government Finance, Ottawa, S t a t i s t i c s Canada. 
The key feature of these f igures is t h a t , as a whole, Canadian 
provinces raise nearly 80% of t he i r own revenue requirements o r , to put 
i t the other way, they receive only o n e - f i f t h of t he i r revenue from 
intergovernmental t rans fe rs , a s i t ua t i on of much less dependence, on 
average, than we noted for the Austral ian states. However i t is equally 
clear that within that o n e - f i f t h of revenue which comes from t rans fe rs , 
specific purpose transfers are double those for general purposes. Another 
especially interest ing facet of these f igures, for an Austral ian comparison 
at least, is the composition of the prov inc ia l tax l i s t . This is 
elaborated in the fo l lowing f igures -
56.8 
8.5 
2.7 
2.0 
8.5 
0.9 
79.5 
6.2 
14.3 
53.0 
10.3 
3.0 
2.0 
9.3 
1.0 
78.6 
5.8 
14.6 
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CANADA 
PROVINCIAL TAXES REVENUE 
% OF TOTAL 
1977-78 1978-79 
Personal Income Tax 40.8 43.0 
Corporation Income Taxes 9.5 9.8 
General Sales Taxes 21.8 17.4 
Motive Fuel Taxes 7.0 6.2 
Tobacco Taxes 2.1 2.5 
Taxes on Successions and Gifts 0.7 0.4 
Health Insurance Premiums 4.4 5.5 
Social Insurance Levies 4.8 5.8 
Universal Pension Plan Levies 2.8 2.6 
Other Taxes 6.0 6.6 
TOTAL TAXES 100.0 100.0 
It can be appreciated from the above that the provinces' own income taxes 
comprise about half their taxation revenue and when added to the various 
"sales" taxes the figure is swelled to over three-quarters of their tax 
revenue. The significance of this for Australian comparison is, of course, 
that none of these taxes is directly available to the Australian states 
under present arrangements. Overall then, the situation is that Canadian 
provinces are considerably more autonomous fiscally than are the 
Australian states in the sense of a lesser general revenue dependence. 
As we have already observed, about one-fifth of average provincial revenue 
comes by way of intergovernmental transfers. However, Table 5.C.3 
illustrates that the degree of vertical imbalance is far from symmetrical 
across the whole federation. The level of fiscal autonomy ranges from 
the highly autonomous provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, 
Saskatchewan and Quebec which receive only a relatively small share of 
their gross revenue from intergovernmental transfers (10.0%, 15.6%, 16.5%, 
18.3%, and 21.9% respectively), through to the highly dependent provinces 
of Prince Edward Island (55.1%), Newfoundland (49.2%), New Brunswick 
(48.7%) and Nova Scotia (48.2%). Manitoba is at the centre of the 
f'ange, (34.6%) and the fact that it is also geographically at the centre 
of Canada's east-west string of provinces, highlights the fact, revealed in 
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Table 5.C.3 that i t is the western and central provinces which are more 
independent of f i sca l t ransfers and the eastern provinces which are 
particularly dependent, largely though not completely a t t r i bu tab le to the 
foundations and appl icat ion of the hor izontal equal izat ion process. 
Table 5.C.3 also reveals that wh i l s t the provinces which have t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
been more f i sca l l y autonomous have become progressively more so during the 
past decade, those provinces which have been f i s c a l l y dependent have 
maintained the same degree of dependence on intergovernmental t ransfers 
Table 5.C.3,in add i t i on , reveals the mixture of general and speci f ic 
purpose funding which was analyzed through Table 5.C.1 above. However, 
this table gives a more graphic portrayal because i t reveals, for example, 
that some provinces v iz . Ontar io, B r i t i s h Columbia, A lber ta , Saskatchewan 
are not at a l l dependent on general purpose t rans fers . In 1978-79 general 
purpose transfers comprised only about 1% or 2% of the revenue of these 
provinces. Two other provinces, Quebec and Manitoba have only a minor 
degree of dependence on general purpose t ransfers (9.3% and 13.9% of gross 
revenue respectively). Clearly the Canadian s i t ua t i on is that those 
provinces which have a very low degree of dependence on intergovernmental 
transfers have the transfers they do receive in the spec i f i c purpose form. 
Those provinces which are highly dependent on intergovernmental t ransfers 
receive their transfers in a f a i r l y even mix but wi th a major i ty in the 
general purpose form.* In other words, the heavier the degree of dependence 
on intergovernmental t ransfers, the greater the general purpose component 
of the transfers, and,conversely, the lower the degree of dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers, the greater the spec i f i c purpose content. 
Nonetheless the most t e l l i n g general izat ion of th i s table is the simple 
fact that about hal f of the provinces in Canada raise f o u r - f i f t h s or more 
of their income and the other ha l f ra ise around one-half of t he i r own 
revenue. This can be compared wi th the Austra l ian s i t ua t i on where, as 
we have already noted, no state raises as much as ha l f of i t s own receipts 
and most raise only about one- th i rd of t h e i r own rece ip ts . In 1978-79 
he percentage of to ta l state receipts raised from own sources were 
Victoria 44%, New South Wales 41%, Queensland 34%, South Aust ra l ia and 
j^^^^ertKAustralia 33%, and Tasmania 31%.^ Quite evident ly there is a 
0 r 
^^^ State and Local Government Finance, Canberra, Australian Bureau of 
T^^ atistics. See table on page 252. 
J^ .""^  '^ c^ause equalization is by way of general purpose transfers 
n^o is only up to a national average standard. 
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lesser degree of vertical fiscal imbalance in the Canadian federation than 
in the Australian federation,although the incidence of vertical imbalance 
in Canada is much less symmetrical than it is in Australia. Maybe this is 
just another way of saying that Australia has a greater degree of vertical 
imbalance but a lesser degree of horizontal imbalance. 
Table 5.C.4*gives a further analysis of provincial government revenue, 
in this case the annual fluctuations in each of the major revenue sources. 
Overall there has been an absence of any marked fluctuations in gross 
general revenue and that has been true for all provinces. A couple of 
provinces have experienced wider fluctuations than others, viz. Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia with particularly large changes 
in certain years. Interestingly, different sources of revenue present a 
picture which differs by province. Provincial personal income tax has 
grown fairly smoothly in total and in most provinces. Corporation income 
tax revenue in the provinces has displayed substantial annual fluctuations 
and that pattern is characteristic of every province. Sales taxes have 
produced provincial revenue which has fluctuated substantially in all 
provinces,while annual changes in revenue from motive fuel taxes have been 
remarkedly smooth in all but two provinces (Alberta and Saskatchewan). 
The picture for revenue from all other forms of provincial taxation is one 
of considerable fluctuation year to year in all provinces, whilst non-
tax revenue from the provinces' own sources has displayed even growth in 
the vast majority of provinces. Our particular interest is in revenue 
coming to the provinces from intergovernmental transfers and here the 
overall provincial pattern has been one of annual variations, but not 
perhaps as marked as for other sources of provincial revenue,though 
significant nonetheless, (16.8% increase 1976-1977, decrease of 2.3% 
1977-78, 5.8% increase 1978 to 1979). In some provinces viz. Newfoundland, 
Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Quebec, and to a lesser extent New 
Brunswick there has been a smooth pattern of annual increases, but in all 
the other provinces there has been a pattern of pronounced annual 
variations (both increases and decreases) particularly in the case of 
Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan. Once again it is a 
geographical pattern with the eastern provinces recording the smooth flow 
of intergovernmental transfers,and the central and western provinces 
experiencing rises and falls in the revenue they gain from such transfers. 
This is, of course, as we have seen, another way of saying that the 
* Page 441. 
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provinces most dependent on fiscal transfers receive those transfers in 
a pattern of smooth annual growth, but those provinces which are less 
dependent on fiscal transfers receive their transfers more in fits and 
starts. We shall examine this phenomenon further when we consider 
Canadian conditional funding in more detail. 
THE HINDRANCES TO PLANNING 
What is it about federal financial relationships which could frustrate 
attempts at forecasting, priority determination, allocation of resources, 
implementation of that resource allocation, and a review of these processes? 
The literature has been scoured to cast light on each of these points and, 
in addition, every interviewee was asked at length to consider each element, 
and the system as a whole, in the light of his experience with federal 
financial dealings. What has resulted is a vast array of polemic, not always 
supported by tangible evidence, and often contradictory as between literature 
source and respondent. We shall now examine all of these arguments in turn 
seeking to determine their veracity, and significance. It is worth recalling 
that it is politics which lies behind most federal fiscal relationships, and 
thus it is natural that those authors or respondents associated with a 
particular level of government should stress the hindrances which they claim 
another level causes for them, but downplay the hindrances which their actions 
produce for others. We shall examine first the more general arguments 
relating to the federal fiscal process, and then move to a separate analysis 
of the debate surrounding conditional funding which lies at the hub of the 
controversy over fiscal transfers. 
GENERAL PERSPECTIVES 
We have seen that the Australian federal system, and to a lesser extent 
the Canadian, is typified by sizeable transfers of finance from the 
national to the sub-national level. Commensurately the level of tax 
sharing in Australia is much less than it is in Canada. In view of this 
situation, it is not surprising that national governments should 
argue that they are hindered in the determination of their own priorities 
because of the need to allocate a substantial share of the revenue they 
raise back to the states/provinces in the form of transfers, especially if 
it is difficult for the national government to control the size of those 
transfers. This is somewhat linked to the argument, also often advanced at 
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the national level, that if too large a proportion of national government 
expenditure is transferred away to other levels, or if too large a proportion 
of taxation space is shared with other levels, that will hinder the national 
government's attempts to regulate the economy using fiscal policy and 
thereby set overall goals for the whole economy. (It should be noted that 
no government and no other source has yet come up with a definitive 
statement on just how much national control is necessary for economic 
management purposes). 
Some other arguments which are advanced in favour of greater fiscal 
centralization have already been encountered when we were speaking of 
intergovernmental agreements. They include the need to cope with spill-
overs, mobility of resources, and horizontal equalization. There is also 
an argument advanced that greater fiscal centralization allows citizens to 
deal primarily with one level of government in relation to taxation and 
that makes administration simple, uniform, and, it is claimed, more 
efficient. It is often pointed out, as well, that by assuming responsibility 
for the bulk of taxation,the national government is insulating the sub-
national levels from the vagaries of fluctuations in economic activity 
reflected in jolts to public revenue collections, especially if firm long 
term agreements have been signed between the national and sub-national 
governments for a guaranteed transfer of funds. In view of all these 
arguments,and others,the national governments in both Australia and Canada 
see the processes of fiscal transfers as an extra burden for them to carry 
and an additional complicating factor in the determination of how funds in 
the central coffers are to be allocated. 
The states and provinces,on the other hand,see the large degree of 
vertical fiscal imbalance as a result of their legitimate revenue 
entitlements having been raided by the national government,so that the 
fiscal transfers which occur are nothing less than their just desserts. 
In other words, they tend to view the national government simply as their 
collection agency,and regard it as axiomatic that they should be entitled 
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to an automatic guaranteed share of national government spending. Of 
course they are dissatisfied about their level of dependence on the 
national government which,as we noted,is much higher for Australian states 
than for Canadian provinces and, of course, much higher for some states 
than others and much higher for some provinces than others. There has 
been an added concern, as the years have rolled by since the second 
world war, that the national government has come to regard payments to the 
states/provinces as just another national programme which should compete 
with other national programmes during budget deliberations. Thus, in 
times of public sector cutbacks the national government will apply the same 
outlook to the fiscal inter-level transfer payments that it does to other 
programmes in its budget,most of which are its own constitutional 
responsibility under the division of powers. It is also the claim of the 
sub-national units that this situation of vertical imbalance makes it 
quite difficult for them to predict the volume of funds they will receive 
each year both in total and by individual component. Because of their 
dependence on the transfers, and because of the intricacies of timing, this, 
they claim, makes it very difficult to forecast ahead on the revenue side 
and hence make long term commitments on their own expenditure side. 
Invariably these arguments quickly move to a debate over the manner 
in which the vertical imbalance should be rectified. It might be expected 
at first glance that sub-national units of government would prefer to be 
given increased forms of taxes, or a bigger share of joint taxation to serve 
this end. That has certainly been the case in Canada although even there 
the view has not been unanimous at that level,for the simple reason that 
some provinces have a worse tax base than others and they know that to 
accept greater tax room in return for reduced vertical transfers, is to 
penalize them in relation to richer provinces. Only the promise of 
9. For some expositions of this view in relation to the Australian states 
see L. Hielscher, op.cit., and The Financial Relationships of the 
Commonwealth and the States, a statement by the Premiers of all the 
states to the 1970 Premiers' Conference, January 19th 1970..; T.L. 
Lewis, "Making Federalism Work: Problems of the States" in Making 
Federalism Work, ed. R.L. Mathews, Canberra, Centre for Research on 
Federal Financial Relations, 1976. 
10. In Australia this is symbolized, in the view of the states, in the 
change of name of the tax sharing arrangements from "Taxation 
Reimbursement Grants" to "Financial Assistance Grants" in 1959-60. 
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horizontal equalization has al layed t he i r fears. In Austra l ia the reasons 
are more pragmatic. The states have long complained that they no longer 
levy their own income taxes (despite the fac t that they could reenter that 
field at any t ime). And yet on a couple of occasions when the national 
government has encouraged states to resume taxat ion of incomes they have 
politely declined the o f fer , rea l i z ing the odium which goes with taxat ion, 
and preferring instead to be able to blame Canberra for the i r economic i l l s . 
It is exemplified to some extent also in the refusal of the Austral ian 
states to adopt phase two of the Fraser government's new federalism 
arrangements and impose the i r own income tax surcharges or grant rebates, 
although i t must be emphasized that the national government has not w i th -
drawn from part of the tax f i e l d to l e t the states i n , in the way that the 
Canadian national government has always reduced i t s own tax burden by an 
amount equal to that which i t arranges fo r the provinces to occupy. 
Perhaps part of the explanation fo r the d i f f e ren t a t t i t ude in Canada l i es 
in the existence of Quebec which, more fo r phi losophical reasons, has 
always favoured transfer of taxes rather than funds, but i t also owes 
something to Ontario's a t t i t ude of wi l l ingness to share respons ib i l i t y 
with the national government for national f i s ca l pol icy across the whole 
nation. 
These arguments serve to h igh l igh t a point often made in the 
literature, that the separation of taxat ion from expenditure is inherently 
dangerous because i t promotes i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in publ ic expenditure to 
the extent that the spending government is not required to raise the 
necessary revenue, and by the same token the taxing government cannot be 
fully held to account for the f i n a l dest inat ion of those taxes. A somewhat 
related point is that to separate taxat ion from spending leads to less 
rational appraisal of expenditure p r i o r i t i e s fo r both levels of government, 
especially as the expenditure decision is thus made in i so la t ion from 
political demands. 
11, See for example R.L. Mathews and W.R.C. Jay, op.cit., passim; R.L. 
Mathews, ed.. Fiscal Federalism: Retrospect and Prospect, Monograph 
No. 7, Canberra, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, 
1974, Chapter X; Russell Mathews, Revenue Sharing in Federal Systems 
Monograph No. 31, Canberra, Centre for Research on Federal Financial 
Relations, 1980, passim; Russell Mathews, "The Future of Government 
Finance", Public Administration (Sydney), XXXII(2), June 1973, 
pp. 1-15, 
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It is those sorts of arguments which lie at the heart of the debate 
over the means to be used to rectify the inevitable fiscal imbalance in 
these federations. The attitude of the Australian states, and to a slightly 
lesser extent the Canadian provinces, is conditioned to a large extent by 
a number of what they claim to be basic factors relating to the nature of 
their fiscal activity -
(a) The sorts of taxes available to them in their own right, 
under the respective constitutions, are, they claim, 
mostly not growth* taxes and many of them are regressive. 
Therefore it is difficult for them to make a quick response, 
from their own resources to any changes in the level of 
federal funding, 
(b) it follows that it is unlikely that their own revenue 
sources will provide sufficient funds to keep pace with 
expenditure needs, if only because the division of functions 
under the constitution has left the states and provinces 
with the sorts of public functions increasingly in demand, 
especially those related to welfare and the provision of 
economic infrastructure, 
(c) A very large proportion of the expenditure of each Australian 
state and each Canadian province is already uncontrollable in 
the sense that it is devoted to wages and salaries and interest 
on debts. (The increasing level of indebtedness is itself a 
by-product of the vertical fiscal imbalance in the two 
federations). As these sub-national units are not completely 
autonomous in their own revenue raising they are left, they 
claim, with little room to shift priorities in their 
expenditure allocations. The addition of revenue dependence 
on another level of government simply complicates the whole 
matter and, so the states and provinces argue, adds yet 
another major constraint on their ability to be able to 
determine their own priorities. 
Against these factors must be weighed a number of counter-arguments -
(a) Fluctuations in economic activity, especially as they affect 
the sub-national leve\ are such that a state or province 
would find it much easier to forecast their revenue from 
formulae-determined grants from the national government 
*This use of the word "growth" is very misleading. When Australian states 
and Canadian provinces use the term they regard only personal income and 
company income tax as well as excise duties as being "growth" taxes, losing 
sight of the fact that their payroll tax, liquor, racing, tobacco and lottery 
taxes are also "growth" taxes not to mention some major stamp duties such 
as those on conveyances. 
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than it would be to forecast revenue from their own direct 
and indirect taxes. This is especially true in Australia 
and Canada because the major pattern of fiscal transfer 
has usually been by means of a formulae whose components, 
whilst not being stable, are less prone to fluctuation 
than the return from direct and indirect taxes, and 
especially as the national governments of both countries 
have inevitably inserted a guarantee into such formulae 
to provide a floor or minimum level of transfer to the 
sub-national units. 
(b) The states and provinces have often artifically constrained 
their own internal fiscal priority determination process by 
establishing ear-marking of certain taxes for trust funds, 
erecting artificial division of spending into capital and 
current accounts,and other accounting divisions such as 
17 
"economic" and "social". 
(c) They have also under-exploited modes of taxation legally 
1 o 
available to them under the constitution. 
(d) The above factors have been compounded by the attitude of 
state and provincial governments to local government, 
whereupon they have locked themselves in to various support 
schemes, and encouraged local government towards a degree 
of dependence on them which is reminiscent of their 
dependence on the national government. 
(e) With respect to the overriding problem of wage costs the 
states and provinces have not taken a tough enough stance 
on wage negotiations, especially where,(as in Canada), they 
have devolved or decentralized the power of wage negotiation 
in relation to wages which must ultimately be paid 
12. This division has applied for example in the province of New Brunswick 
where the government has seen fit to view government spending as being 
for "economic" or for "social" purposes, loosely translated as being 
for future or present purposes on the basis of the argument that 
welfare expenditure is a once only item but spending geared to the 
promotion of economic development provides a basis for the generation 
of future government revenue. 
13. For some comments on the potential for increased exploitation of the 
tax base of the Australian states see R.C. Gates, "The Search for a 
State Growth Tax" in R.L. Mathews, Intergovernmental Relations in 
Australia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1974); and R.L. Mathews, 
ed. , State and Local Taxation, Part Three. 
out of their coffers 
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(f) A similar argument applies to the general pattern of 
fragmentation of government activity at the state/provincial 
level whereupon their own funds, and particularly those 
which come from intergovernmental transfers, are dispersed 
through a multitude of departments, agencies, public 
enterprises, crown corporations, marketing boards, banks, 
utilities and other semi-government bodies and Qangos,an 
of which have varying degrees of autonomy and therefore 
preclude any sort of centralized rational priority 
determination within any individual state or province. 
In other words it is wrong to blame national government 
impingement on the sub-national level for distorting the 
latter's planning potential,when their own structure and 
processes are largely at fault,and would be,even without 
revenue or responsibility sharing with the national 
government. 
(g) It is also relevant that states and provinces have seen 
fit, for social and political reasons,to subsidize many of 
their own government activities,(especially public 
transportation and other utilities),usually by way of 
concessional charges, so that the full scale and extent 
of the subsidization is hidden and has been so for decades. 
That also means that it would be extremely difficult for 
such sub-national units to engage in any rational 
reallocation of resources irrespective of the source of 
the revenue. 
The above arguments do,of course,assume a relatively stable 
relationship between the levels of government in their fiscal dealings 
as the mention of formulae would imply. But of course that has not been 
true of either country,and the major elements of the transfer of funds 
have been subject to constant political negotiation even though the 
formula does provide a starting point. We can note here that, broadly 
speaking, intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Australia and Canada 
are constantly open to political manoeuvering,and to that extent an 
14. These arguments arise most often in relation to the salaries in the 
education and health system. 
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element of uncertainty is projected at all times across the fiscal
processes we are describing and debating.
So far we have been speaking in an extremely broad way about the
fiscal imbalance in these federations which stems from the division of
powers. However the real issues are to be found more in terms of the
nature of the means used to alleviate that imbalance, and in Australia and
Canada that means a discussion of the merits of general and specific
purpose funding or, in Canadian terms, unconditional or conditional funding.
GENERAL PURPOSE VERSUS SPECIFIC PURPOSE FUNDING
In Australia the preference of all the states is undoubtedly for
unconditional fiscal transfers from the national government and, it goes
without saying, that they prefer these transfers to be as large as possible.
Nonetheless they have usually been more concerned with the share of funding
each state would receive, and have rarely focussed their attention on the
size of the total national payout to the states. On a few occasions when
it seemed the states would press for a radical restructuring of the system
and a larger share for all, the national government was able effectively
to call their bluff~ The net result is that the size of the total fiscal
transfer from national to state level in Australia has remained relatively
stable being affected only on those very rare occasions when a shift in
taxation powers has taken place as with receipts duty and payroll tax,
or when a function has been transferred,as with the handover by some states
of their railway systems. However even on these isolated occasions, the
fiscal transfer from national to state level has been adjusted by an amount
equal tO,or close to, the amount of the tax being handed over or the cost
of the function being acquired. 15 Under what has been termed phase three
of the new federalism arrangements of the Fraser government, the national
government has even spoken of handing over a few national functions to
the states but without adjusting the fiscal transfer to accommodate the
accompanying expenditure. Also the Australian states all adhere rigidly
to the balanced budget doctrine believing that they have no role,or an
extremely limited role, in economic management. Consequently it is not
surprising that their attention is rivetted too intensely on the formula
15.
*
Adjustments for Tertiary Education have
provided equal reimbursement but in the cases of
railway takeover,and transfer of payroll tax, the states gained
some bonuses.
One notable exception occurred in 1970 when the national (Gorton)
government took over $1,000 million of state debts over
five years. This occurred in response to an approach by all states
for a radical restruc.turing of the system. Its effects can be seen
In Table 5.A~4 and assoclated comments.
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which governs the transfer of funds from the national government to the 
states and it must be pointed out that the components of past formulae 
e.g. population movements, wage rises, betterment factor, are such that 
forecasting revenue from the national government has not been particularly 
difficult. The situation under the new federalism arrangements was slightly 
different in that the states were guaranteed a fixed share of income tax,* 
as well as a guaranteed minimum, and for some reason the national treasury 
in Australia has found it difficult to forecast income tax receipts and 
indirect taxation receipts with much accuracy. The states have also not 
been impressed in recent years when the national government has unilaterally 
imposed taxation surcharges which it claims to be outside the tax sharing 
federal arrangements. Nor has it helped when the national government has 
vacillated on tax indexation, so that in one year the growth of income 
tax revenue has been capped, whereas in other years it has been left prone 
to the vagaries of inflation. This argument also applies when there is 
uncertainty about the national government's determination to proceed with 
taxation changes announced in its budget as with taxation on dependants' 
incomes, family trusts, and capital gains. It is again relevant when the 
national government has appeared to give serious consideration to a shift 
of emphasis from direct to indirect taxation or, in more recent times, 
for allocative as well as revenue reasons to impose an oil and natural 
gas levy and use burgeoning revenue from excise duty on energy sources to 
lower the severity of income taxation as well as refusing to allow the 
states a direct share of energy taxes. All of these aspects, claim the 
states, create considerable uncertainty as to the size of the revenue they 
can anticipate from the major fiscal transfers from the national government, 
and that, in turn, affects their ability to forecast and engage in priority 
determination. 
In Canada the preference of the provinces has been far from uniform. 
As indicated earlier, Quebec has always favoured the national government 
handing over taxation powers rather than fiscal transfers, and because the 
Canadian arrangements operate on the basis mainly of income tax sharing 
this has inevitably meant granting of tax points to the province. In 
recent years the larger more affluent provinces have favoured this method 
of rectifying imbalance also. The middle and smallest size provinces do 
not favour this method because of their more limited tax bases, and will 
only accept such a solution if it is accompanied by a strong equalization 
element. However all Canadian provinces, (including probably Quebec), would 
agree that there is some limit to the degree of tax sharing that can take 
*At the time of writing the tax sharing arrangements were under revision and 
it seemed likely that the states would, in future, receive a percentage share 
of a tax base wider than just personal income tax. 
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place and face the inevitable consequence of there having to be fiscal 
transfers from national to sub-national level. It is at this point that 
they adopt the same stance as their Australian counterparts and plead 
for those transfers to be unconditional, for basically the same reasons. 
It is most significant that the interviews found no serious complaints 
from the Canadian provinces about the revenue sharing arrangements. Whilst 
the timing of the receipt of the revenue had occasionally caused concern, 
the actual forecasting of such revenue occasioned no alarm,and the provinces 
seem to have a very harmonious relationship with the national ministry of 
finance which, in turn, seemed far more competent than its Australian 
counterpart at predicting income tax receipts and far more willing to share 
that intelligence with the provinces. There are also a number of other 
avenues of economic forecasting available to the Canadian provinces which 
would not be available to the Australian states. 
The arguments which were advanced about the attitude of the Australian 
states to the size of the fiscal transfers to them from the national 
government,apply with equal force to the Canadian provinces which have also 
usually had difficulty "getting their act together", although it is not as 
serious a matter in Canada since the degree of dependence on these transfers 
is not as great. There have been difficulties with elements of the transfer, 
as with the equalization programme where inordinate delays have occurred in 
receipt of funds by the "have not" provinces,and miscalculations have 
occasionally resulted in the national government having to ask a recipient 
government to return portion of the money it received in an earlier year. 
A politically pregnant action. Because of the construction and operation 
of the Canadian horizontal equalization formula there is always the distinct 
possibility,(and in recent years reality), that taxation decisions in the 
largest provinces will affect equalization receipts in the poorer provinces, 
as occurred with sales tax cuts in Ontario and Alberta. In other words 
the amount of revenue received out of equalization by a "have not" province 
can be significantly affected by a policy decision in another province. 
(It would appear that the same thing could occur in Australia if a standard 
state alters its taxation policy.) 
The discussion above has related to the total size of the fiscal 
transfer between the levels of government. It has been oriented towards 
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unconditional funding within that transfer which is especially appropriate 
to Australia because the bulk of the fiscal transfer in that federation is 
unconditional. Some of the aspects which were canvassed identified possible 
hindrances to the attainment of public sector planning at the sub-national 
level,although the Canadian experience would seem to demonstrate that these 
difficulties need not loom so large. These arguments, however, pale into 
insignificance when compared with the passions aroused over the other type 
of funding not yet discussed,viz. conditional or specific purpose funding. 
We shall examine these arguments at length for the very reason that national 
governments believe such funding to be necessary to achieve their priorities, 
whereas state/provincial governments claim such funding to be the single 
most significant aspect of interference with their own priority determination, 
Over the past decade there has been more written and spoken about conditional 
funding than any other single aspect of federal financial relationships, most 
of it misleading in the extreme. 
THE REASON FOR CONDITIONAL FUNDING^^ 
Conditional transfers are initiated by national governments because of 
what they perceive to be national needs for government action. Thus they 
16. The term "conditional funding" is being used here in an extremely 
broad sense to cover vertical transfers of funds with any form of 
condition attached to the manner in which they must be spent. This 
definition thus excludes the tax sharing (formerly Financial 
Assistance) grants in Australia even though they are given on 
condition that the states do not levy an income tax. For Canada 
this definition would exclude the equalization grants. For various 
definitions of conditional funding, most of them narrower than the 
definition employed here, see Russell Mathews, Revenue Sharing in 
Federal Systems, p. 25; James A. Maxwell, "Federal Grants in Canada 
Australia and the United States", Publius 4(2), Spring 1974; J.S.H. 
V^mter, Federalism and Fiscal Balance (Canberra: A.N.U. Press, 1977), 
p. 62; Garth Stevenson, op.cit., pp. 156-158; Robert Jay, "The 
Shift to Specific Purpose Grants: From Revenue Sharing to Cost 
Sharing" in Responsibility Shading in a Federal System, ed. R.L. 
Mathews, Monograph No. 8, Canberra, Centre for Research on Federal 
Financial Relations, 1975, p. 41; A.J. Robinson, Federalism and 
Efficiency, Occasional Paper 14, Canberra, Centre for Research on 
Federal Financial Relations, 1980, p. 16. 
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apply in situations that we have already encountered, such as when there is 
a need to ensure a minimum standard of government service or to capture 
spillovers, cope with resource mobility and to equalize. The national 
government may also wish to ensure that the money is spent in the 
designated way because it wishes to be seen to be responsible for the 
programme,especially if the particular programme formed a clear part of 
its election mandate. There is also the frequent political consideration 
that the national government wishes to receive the credit for the 
particular programme which is being funded,through the means of a 
conditional grant, implying that it will also accept the blame if things 
go wrong. 
It can also be the case that the national government wishes to see a 
greater accent given to government services already provided by states/ 
provinces, and in this case it is a deliberate superimposition of national 
emphasis on sub-national activity,very often accompanied by fiscal and 
administrative measures to make sure that the sub-national units do not 
withdraw their level of support to that activity by merely substituting 
national funds for their own. If the national government were to give 
money for a particular purpose but did not attach conditions of minimum 
accompanying expenditure, there would be little point in specifying the 
purpose in the first place,because the recipient governments would merely 
substitute those funds for others. This can lead additionally to the 
attachment of even further conditions to prevent national expenditure 
from going out of control at the behest of a state or province as, for 
example,when a conditional grant is negotiated solely on the basis of so 
much money from the national government for each dollar spent by a sub-
national government - the method used in this case would be to impose a 
ceiling on national expenditure. 
There are many other reasons advanced by national governments for the 
use of conditional funding. Once a decision has been made that a national 
need exists for a particular type of government service it may be desired 
to ensure that the programme is characterized by uniformity in provision, 
portability in entitlement, universality in coverage, and accessibility 
to all. The easiest way to achieve these aims is seen to be the attachment 
of conditions to the grants given to the sub-national governments for the 
purpose. Conditional grants can also be used to prod or stimulate sub-
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national governments into particular fields of activity perceived at the 
national level as having been neglected or requiring quick and vigorous 
action in the short term, as for example with unemployment relief. 
Conditional grants are often devised and offered by national 
governments who perceive that there are gaps in the programmes already 
being offered by states/provinces. This can occur for example in welfare 
programmes and was part of the reason for the Canadian Assistance Plan. 
This example also reminds us that it has not been uncommon for provincial 
governments themselves to request the national funding in the first place, 
and some conditional grants have begun this way. Whilst on the subject of 
welfare, the conditional grant programmes in the welfare area have often 
been designed in a way that ensures unification of administration of 
welfare measures, experimentation by the recipient governments including 
research and development, and the special consideration of certain groups 
such as Eskimos or Aborigines or groups for whom the national government 
feels particularly responsible. 
This is by no means an exhaustive inventory of the origins of 
conditional funding but it does point to the basic reason for their use 
viz. to identify, establish and monitor the priorities of the national 
government,and to overcome the major weakness of unconditional funding 
17. For a complete inventory of the perceived objectives of conditional 
funding see B.S. Grewal, "Specific Purpose Grants in a Federal System: 
Overseas Experience" in Responsibility Sharing in a Federal System, 
ed. R.L. Mathews, p. 122; Robert Jay, op.cit.; Garth Stevenson, 
op.cit., p. 158; Russell Mathews, Revenue Sharing in Federal Systems, 
p. 27; Russell Mathews, The Future of Government Finance, p. 12; 
J.S.H. Hunter, op.cit., pp. 58-60; R.L. Mathews and W.R.C. Jay, 
op.cit., p. 314; Russell Mathews, Regional Disparities and Fiscal 
Equalisation in Australia, Reprint No. 30, Canberra, Centre for 
Research on Federal Financial Relations, 1979, pp. 46-47; R. Else-
Mitchell, "The Australian Federal Grants System and its Impact on 
Fiscal Relations of the Federal Government with State and Local 
Governments", Australian Law Journal, 54, August 1980, pp. 486-487; 
Ontario Economic Council, Intergovernmental Relations (Toronto: 
1977), p. 40 et.fol.; Ross Cranston, "From Co-operative to 
Coercive Federalism and Back?", Federal Law Review, 10(2), June 1979, 
pp. 128-136; W.R. Lane, "Financial Relationships and Section 96", 
Public Administration (Sydney), XXXIV(l), March 1975, pp. 50-61. 
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which divorces taxation decisions from expenditure decisions and so breaks 
down political sensitivity and accountability. In both Australia and 
Canada the question of horizontal equalization always lurks behind the 
scene and exerts a strong influence on conditional funding,either by 
means of injecting some sort of equalization process into each conditional 
programme, or by means of the argument, often advanced at the national level 
in Canada, that any reduction in conditional funding would make provinces 
even more dependent on the formal equalization programme itself and so be 
more vulnerable to changes in it. Conditional grants, argues the national 
government, represent a fixed commitment from the national government,with 
the conditions inevitably determined only after detailed analysis of 
provincial conditions and consultations with provincial governments. It 
helps achieve the implementation of national priorities through the sub-
national governments as delivery mechanisms and spending agencies. The 
question of how these conditional grants affect priorities of the sub-
national governments will be examined below,but for the moment we can 
accept Lane's analysis that specific purpose grants in Australia are used 
for four basic purposes: (a) Correction for vertical imbalance, (b) 
Correction for horizontal imbalance, (c) Promotion and/or control of 
expenditure on specific functions or projects, and (d) Particular 
18 
pressing problems like unemployment relief or natural disaster relief. 
This analysis is also pertinent to Canada although the Canadian constitution, 
on the face of it, does not give anything like the carte blanche approach 
available to the Australian national government under the High Court's 
interpretation of the wording of Section 96, which in effect, allows the 
national government to attach whatever conditions it wishes to grants 
made to the states. In this respect Smiley makes the observation that in 
Canada there are four main limitations on the national government's 
spending power -
(a) Provinces and local governments have the right to 
participate or not; 
(b) The national government cannot oust a province from 
what is a provincial constitutional activity; it must 
use the province; 
(c) Conditional grants have little relevance to the sharing 
of power with respect to regulatory functions; and 
18. W.R. Lane, op.cit. 
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(d) Under the British North America Act the national parliament 
cannot contribute to a particular provincial activity from 
the proceeds of a national levy made for that purpose. 
The practice, if not the constitutional theory of these conditions 
would apply to the Australian situation as well. 
THE NATURE OF CONDITIONAL FUNDING 
Australia 
The following figures, in Table 5.A.22, show the break up of inter-
governmental fiscal transfers in Australia as between funds for general 
purposes and specific purposes. 
TABLE 5.A.22 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
(est) 
AUSTRALIA 
COMMONWEALTH PAYMENTS TO THE 
LOAN 
FOR 1 
Amount 
|M 
2682.9 
2790.5 
3600.9 
4402.6 
5078.6 
5775.2 
6234.2 
6673.3 
7334.2 
COUNCIL 
3ENERAL 
% o f 
Tota l 
74.2 
64.0 
54.8 
51.5 
55.5 
56.5 
58.2 
58.6 
58.4 
BORROWINGS 
PURPOSES 
% Increase 
4.0 
29.0 
22.3 
15.4 
13.7 
7.9 
7.0 
9.9 
STATES AND 
FOR SPECIFIC 
Amount 
$M 
931.5 
1570.1 
2967.0 
4152.3 
4068.5 
4449.1 
4485.6 
4706.0 
5226.9 
% of 
Total 
25.8 
36.0 
45.2 
48.5 
44.5 
43.5 
41.8 
41.4 
41.6 
PURPOSES 
% Increase 
68.6 
89.0 
39.9 
- 2.0 
9.4 
0.8 
4.9 
11.1 
TOTAL 
% Increase 
20.6 
50.6 
30.3 
6.9 
11.8 
4.8 
6.2 
10.8 
Source: Payments to or for the States, The Northern Territory and 
Local Government Authorities, Budget Paper No. 7, Canberra, 
A . G . P . S . 
19. D.V. Smiley, "The Rowel l-Sirois Report. Provincia l Autonomy and 
Post-War Canadian Federal ism", Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science, 28, 1962, pp. 61-62. 
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It is evident from the above table that the bulk of intergovernmental 
transfers in Austra l ia have, (since 1942), been in the form of general purpose 
payments, although i t is true that the proport ion of general to speci f ic 
purpose funding became almost equal in the mid-1970's as a resu l t of the 
Whitlam government's po l icy of using condit ional funding. The re la t ionsh ip 
now seems to have f la t tened out wi th around 58% of t ransfers being general 
purpose and 42% for spec i f i c purposes, as contrasted wi th the beginning of 
the 1970's when only one quarter of intergovernmental t ransfers were for 
specific purposes. (Unfortunately, inconsistency in the compilation of 
these s ta t is t ics prevents us from extending the table fu r ther backwards in 
time). In the years of very large increases in overal l intergovernmental 
funding, i t has been spec i f i c purpose payments which have expanded most 
significantly and s i m i l a r l y , when a sharp contract ion has occurred i t has 
been mostly in spec i f ic purpose funding, although f igures for the la tes t 
year avail able,would tend to suggest that the two forms of payments are 
now in something of a f ixed re la t i onsh ip . Nonetheless the important point 
remains that speci f ic purpose payments have changed in f i t s and s tar ts 
compared with a much smoother pattern of annual var ia t ion in general 
purpose funding. 
Table 5.A.23 gives a fu r ther breakdown of spec i f i c purpose i n te r -
governmental payments in Aust ra l ia between those fo r recurrent and those 
for capital purposes. 
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1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
(est) 
TABLE 5.A. 
AUSTRALIA 
COMMONWEALTH PAYMENTS TO THE : 
FOR 
Amount 
$M 
390.0 
609.9 
1211.5 
2315.9 
2387.6 
2873.9 
3047.8 
3360.3 
3799.1 
BORROWINGS 
SPECIFIC PURPOSE 
RECURRENT 
% o f 
Tota l 
41.9 
38.8 
40.8 
55.8 
58.7 
64.6 
67.9 
71.4 
72.7 
PURPOSES 
% Increase 
56.4 
98.6 
91.2 
3.1 
20.4 
6.1 
10.3 
13.1 
23 
STATES AND 
PAYMENTS 
LOAN COU NCIL 
FOR CAPITAL PURPOSES 
Amount 
$M 
541.5 
960.2 
1745.5 
1836.3 
1680.9 
1575.2 
1437.8 
1345.8 
1427.8 
% o f 
Tota l 
58.1 
61.2 
58.8 
44.2 
41.3 
35.4 
32.1 
28.6 
27.3 
% Increase 
77.3 
81.8 
5.2 
- 8.5 
- 6.3 
- 8.7 
- 6.4 
6.1 
TOTAL 
% Increase 
68.6 
89.0 
39.9 
- 2.0 
9.4 
0.8 
4.9 
11.1 
Source: Payments to or for the States, The Northern Territory and 
Local Government Authorities, Budget Paper No. 7, Canberra, 
A.G.P.S. 
This table reveals an unmistakable trend of the 1970's for a sh i f t in the 
mixture of specific purpose payments from capital to recurrent funding. 
Recurrent purposes now claim 73% of a l l specific purpose payments compared 
with 42% in 1972-73. In this respect the turning point, c lear ly, was 
1975-76 when there was a most s igni f icant decline in the growth of specific 
purpose payments for capital purposes. From that time, each year witnessed 
an actual reduction in specific purpose capital payments unt i l 1980-81, when 
a flattening out occurred. On the other hand specific purpose payments for 
recurrent purposes have seen a small amount of growth in real terms. The 
annual movements in both forms of specif ic purpose funding display quite 
an erratic pattern. 
Having identif ied the relevance of specif ic purpose payments in the 
total dimension of Australian intergovernmental transfers, we now turn to 
the pattern that applies for individual states, as revealed in Table 5.A.24, 
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As can be seen every state in Australia has, during this period, almost 
always received a higher proportion of Commonwealth government funding in 
the general purpose form, the only exceptions being New South Wales and 
Victoria in 1975-76, but the mixture varies significantly from state to state. 
The two largest states, New South Wales and Victoria, now receive a significantly 
lower proportion of their funding in the general purpose form than do the 
other four states but this has only been the case since 1974-75. 
Queensland now receives a slightly above average proportion of general 
purpose funding but once again this has only been since 1974-75, and before 
that year Queensland was slightly below the average for the general purpose 
component of the mixture, A similar situation exists for Western Australia. 
South Australia has, for most of the past 15 years, had a higher mixture of 
general purpose funding than the average and reached a record 81.2". of 
funding in this form in 1971-72. Tasmania is now substantially above the 
Australian average in relation to the mix of general purpose funding and 
has always been so throughout the period under review. 
But perhaps the most basic point to be made is that, since the mid-
1960's, specific purpose payments have never exceeded general purpose 
payments in the four smaller states, never exceeding 45", of the total 
intergovernmental transfers. In the two large states there has been only 
one (common) year when they have exceeded general purpose funding, and 
even then it was only by one or two per cent and in a year of large overall 
intergovernmental funding. Whilst it is year by year funding which is of 
greatest concern to us here, it is of interest that the average of the 
annual specific purpose mixtures for the various states since 1965-66 is 
35':. for New South Wales, 35". for Victoria, 34". for Queensland, 32". for South 
Australia, 35". for Western Australia, and 27", for Tasmania, compared with 
an average for the six states of 34^. In other words the average pattern 
in Australian states has been for around one-third of all intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers to be in the specific purpose form. There have been some 
individual years when the mixture of general to specific purpose funding 
has altered sharply, especially in 1973-4 to 1976-7, reflecting two changes 
of national government, but for the most part the change in the mixture 
has been fairly gradual in all states, and it appears to have settled down 
into a stable relationship in the past few years in all states, although 
the smaller states are now receiving a significantly smaller proportion 
of their funding in specific purpose payments than are New South Wales 
and Victoria. 
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We now turn to an examination of the functions of government to 
which intergovernmental conditional funding is directed in Australia. 
Table 5.A.25 presents the distribution of specific purpose grants for 
recurrent purposes during most of the 1970's.* Without question the 
dominant functional area is now the running costs of public hospitals, 
with tertiary education a close second, and schools also very prominent. 
Local government tax sharing is also significant, though this is a somewhat 
dubious category to list as a specific purpose grant, since the only real 
condition which attaches to it is that it must be forwarded on to local 
government. In terms of trends one can only really look to the period 
since 1975-76 because that was the introduction of the running costs of 
public hospitals as a specific purpose payment, and that category very 
much dominates the whole picture. Since then, hospital costs have 
retained a fairly constant share of the specific purpose payments for 
recurrent purposes. Indeed the distribution of these grants has remained 
quite constant. In recent years, there have been significant annual fluctuations 
in the largest functional areas, and the changes in amounts devoted annually 
to smaller functional areas like community health, school dental schemes, 
pre-schools, and assistance for deserted wives, have been quite marked. 
Table 5.A.26 gives a similar breakdown for the specific purpose payments 
which are made to the Australian states for capital purposes. The largest 
function here is unquestionably roads which now make up 43% of such payments. 
Roads have always been the major area of specific purpose capital funding 
for the states. Their share of all such funding has varied, and there have 
been significant annual variations in amounts of capital devoted to roads, 
despite the fact that road funding is allocated on a formula basis. Housing 
is the second largest function, although its prominence has been gradually 
declining and the amounts devoted to it annually have varied markedly. 
Capital funding for schools has always been a significant item and has 
maintained a constant share of the total despite quite remarkable 
fluctuations in the amount going to this function year to year. The 
proportion of specific purpose capital funding going to tertiary education 
has remained fairly constant but the mixture between the different forms 
of tertiary education has changed. Capital payments for Technical and 
Further Education are now more than twice those for either Universities 
or Colleges of Advanced Education. The annual shifts in capital grants 
for Universities, Colleges of Advanced Education, and Colleges of Technical 
* In Tables 5.A.25 to 5.A.38 only major items have been listed. The 
balance of the total is made up, in each case, of a plethora of small 
amounts for a wide range of disparate functions. 
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and Further Education have been quite marked even despite the existence 
of long term (3 year) agreements in these areas. Table 5.A.26 also 
demonstrates the susceptibility of this form of intergovernmental transfer 
to a change of government because functions such as growth centres, land 
acquisition, sewerage, pensioner housing,and aboriginal advancement,have 
been scaled down or eliminated since the fall of the Whitlam government 
in 1975. This table on specific purpose payments for capital purposes 
also reflects a phenomenon we observed with respect to specific purpose 
payments for recurrent purposes, though to a much lesser extent, viz. 
that although there are often extremely marked variations in the absolute 
amount of money allocated to a function from year to year, the change in 
the proportion of the total payments represented by that function is 
usually less severe. This again tends to suggest a pronounced annual pattern 
of incremental ism in the determination of the composition of these 
payments although, as mentioned, the clear elimination of some of the 
payments within only one or two years demonstrates that governments can 
break an incremental pattern if the will is strong enough. Of course 
capital payments are easier to terminate than recurrent payments because of 
the generally greater human dependence on the latter than the former. 
Some interesting features come to light if we compare Table 5.A.25 and 
5.A.26. Firstly, although the running costs of public hospitals is the 
dominant payment for recurrent purposes, there have been only relatively 
minor Commonwealth payments made for the capital component of hospitals. 
By contrast although roads are clearly the largest area for capital 
payments they do not figure as a recurrent payment. And there are other 
functions which have dominated capital payments but not recurrent payments 
and vice versa. We can quite simply conclude that there is no linkage 
or symmetry between the two forms of payment indicating, in the Australian 
federation, a different form of the division of powers where it is often 
the case that within a particular public function one level of government 
can be responsible for capital expenditure and another level responsible 
for recurrent expenditure and vice versa. This lack of symmetry is also 
borne out by the fact that in common functional areas the growth of 
payments for capital purposes, (i.e. both the annual and secular growth), 
in similar periods, can be quite different. This has been particularly 
true in the overall field of education. 
308. 
Tables 5.A.27 to 5.A.38 reveal the composition of specific purpose 
payments, as between those for capital and recurrent purposes, for each 
of the Australian states. Aspects of individual states will be considered 
later but for the moment we shall confine our analysis to interstate 
comparisons. 
In relation to specific purpose grants for recurrent purposes, there 
are differences in the profile of functions in the different states. In 
New South Wales the proportion of such funding going to universities has 
been higher than is the case in all the other states, much lower 
on colleges of advanced education, a little higher than most in technical 
and further education, higher than most for schools, and much higher than 
Victoria, Queensland and South Australia for hospital running costs. 
Victoria,by contrast,has been stronger than most states in its mixture, 
on colleges of advanced education and schools,but much lower than all 
states in respect of public hospitals. Queensland has been close to the 
interstate average in the distribution of these payments between functions. 
South Australia has been slightly lower than most states in the schools 
function. Western Australia has been below other states in the relative 
share of recurrent grants going to universities, and also schools, but 
quite higher than the others in relation to hospital running costs, and 
a little higher in respect of colleges of advanced education. Tasmania 
has been significantly lower than other states in the prominence received 
by colleges of advanced education, a little below in respect of schools, 
and a little above for hospital running costs. 
In all states there have been trends where certain functions have 
become more or less dominant in their share of specific purpose recurrent 
payments, but those changes in the profile of such payments have, at least 
since 1975-76 been quite gradual. Annual fluctuations in such payments 
have been much more pronounced though more so for the smaller functional 
areas than the large ones. 
With respect to specific purpose payments for capital purposes, there 
is again a different pattern of distribution for different states. New 
South Wales has been higher than the interstate average on universities, 
but about the average in most other functions. Victoria has been high on 
colleges of advanced education, a little higher in relation to technical 
and further education, a little higher for schools and housing, and quite 
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a deal lower in its emphasis on roads. In Queensland there has usually been a 
slightly lower emphasis on universities and colleges of advanced education, 
whereas in relation to technical and further education this state has been 
above the average in some years and below in others; similarly in relation 
to school funding. Queensland has had a significantly lower emphasis 
on housing in its receipt of these specific purpose capital payments, but 
has usually been well above all other states in the dominance of road 
funding. South Australia has recorded a slightly greater emphasis on 
technical and further education, has been generally lower on schools, but 
significantly higher in the emphasis on housing funds, whilst roads have 
been much less dominant than in other states. Western Australia has had 
a slightly lower emphasis on university capital funding in its mixture of 
specific purpose funds and that this is true also of colleges of advanced 
education, and has generally been lower than other states in relation to 
schools. It has been well below the average in housing, but higher than 
most states in the roads function, although lower for urban public 
transport. In Tasmania university funding has been much less 
dominant than in any other state, and the same has generally been true 
for colleges of advanced education. Until recently the same pattern was 
true for technical and further education. But Tasmania has most noticeably 
been behind the other states in relation to the prominence given to school 
funding in these specific purpose capital funds from the Conmonwealth. 
By contrast housing has had a much greater emphasis than in other states, 
and roads have been given an emphasis equal to the interstate average, 
although urban public transport is lower. 
In all states it has been the case that there have been most 
pronounced annual variations in specific purpose capital payments, considerably 
more pronounced than those in recurrent payments. This has resulted in 
changing profiles of the distribution of specific purpose capital payments 
as between public functions, in each state, which are not marked variations 
but do portray a shift much more noticeable than was the case for recurrent 
payments. As was the case with the total picture analyzed in Table 5.A.25 
and 5.A.26, there is little syrmetry between the specific purpose capital 
and recurrent payments functional distribution in any state. 
We will have recourse to Table 5.A.27 to 5.A.38 again later in 
looking at each state separately but there is one element of the transfer 
of conditional funding, which was implied by these tables, and which ought 
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to be made immediately more explicit. The variations in profiles of the
specific purpose payments which the national government passes to the
Australian states suggests that there are quite significant differences
in the relative distribution of various categories of payments as
between sta tes.
This factor is made quite apparent in Table 5.A.39 which reveals
the interstate distribution of the main basic forms of intergovernmental
transfer for each of the past five years to 1978-79 the latest year for
which such data is available. It becomes immediately apparent that there
is quite a significant difference in the way in which each category of
funding is distributed. New South Wales receives higher proportions of
the total for specific purpose recurrent purposes and less for general
revenue funds,but overall it does better*out of specific purpose payments
than general purpose payments. Victoria's position is similar to that
of New South Wales. Queensland does best out of general revenue funds and
specific purpose capital payments, the reverse position to that of the
two largest states. Overall Queensland does not differ markedly in the
share of general purpose funding compared with specific purpose funding.
South Australia clearly fares best in its share of general purpose
capital funds and worst in terms of its share of specific purpose funds
for recurrent purposes. Overall South Australia has a better share of
general purpose than specific purpose funding. Western Australia, like
Queensland, does best in its share of general revenue funds, and worst
out of general purpose capital funds,and overall is slightly better off
in the share gained of the general purpose intergovernmental funding
than that for specific purposes. Tasmania achieves a much higher
proportion of its funding in general purpose capital funds and a much
lower proportion in specific purpose funds for recurrent purposes, but
overall does better out of general purpose than specific purpose
funding. These figures seem to demonstrate convincingly the lack of
sYmmetry in the distribution of all forms of intergovernmental funding in
Australia. The fact that the patterns have been such for every year
indicates that the resultant horizontal balance
between states is different for each of the various major forms of
intergovernmental funding,viz. general purpose revenue funds, general
purpose capital funds, specific purpose funds for recurrent purposes,
and specific purpose funds for capital purposes. This, in turn,means
that the interstate relativities are different for the distribution of
*Although the words "better" and "worse" are used here these are used only
in a relative sense, and imply no absolute disadvantage for that State
overall.
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capital and recurrent funds in general, as well as those for general and 
specific purposes. 
We are now in a position to summarize the main characteristics of 
conditional funding in Australia, which has, since 1942, constituted less than 
the amount of unconditional funding. Even at the peak of the Whitlam 
government's centralism conditional funding was barely equal to unconditional 
funding. Specific purpose payments have been the flexible aspect of 
Australian intergovernmental transfers; in years of very large increases 
overall in intergovernmental funding it has been specific purpose 
payments which have expanded most significantly and similarly, when an 
overall sharp contraction has occurred,it has been specific purpose 
payments which have borne the brunt of that cutback. This and other 
factors have led to a trend in specific purpose payments with marked 
annual fluctuations. Trends also reveal an unmistakable shift in the 
mixture of specific purpose payments from capital to recurrent purposes, 
the latter now representing over 70 per cent of all conditional funding 
mainly as a result of the Fraser government's new federalism which 
concentrated, inter alia, on the elimination of certain capital intensive 
programmes funded by specific purpose payments to the states. However 
annual movements of specific purpose payments for both recurrent and 
capital purposes have been quite erratic. The two largest Australian 
states now receive a significantly higher proportion of their funding 
in the conditional form than do the other states but the mixture varies 
from state to state. Generally speaking it has been the pattern that 
the smaller states have received lower proportions of their federal 
funding in the conditional form. The main functional areas which receive 
specific purpose payments in Australia are running costs of public hospitals, 
and education in its various stages, in terms of recurrent spending; 
and roads, housing and education for capital purposes. Whilst there 
have been often pronounced annual variations in the amount of specific 
purpose funding going to a particular functional area, (especially in 
payments for capital purposes), the proportion of the total allocated to 
each function,(on average and in each state),has remained remarkably stable. 
There does, however, seem to be no linkage and a complete lack of symmetry 
between specific purpose capital payments for a functional area and specific 
purpose recurrent payments for the same function. It seems clear that the 
allocation of all forms of specific purpose funding proceeds on an 
3d hoc basis and it is also apparent that, sometimes, within the same 
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functional area,one level of government can be responsible for capital 
expenditure and the other for recurrent expenditure. The profile of 
distribution between functions of specific purpose payments of both a 
recurrent and capital nature is different for each of the states, in some 
cases significantly different. In all states this functional mixture has 
changed only gradually,although annual fluctuations in absolute amounts 
have often been quite pronounced,more so for capital payments than 
recurrent payments. Finally the evidence is clear that the relative 
distribution of intergovernmental transfers in Australia between states 
is different for each form of funding and within the conditional 
payments component it is different for recurrent funding as compared with 
capital funding. This means that each state has a different profile of 
intergovernmental transfers received from the national government. In 
other words the methods of distributing funds between 
states in Australia are different for each major form of funding,and 
also vary across functional areas which receive conditional funding. In 
conclusion,it probably should be emphasized that the conditional inter-
governmental funding in Australia consists almost entirely of national 
government payments to the states for activities which are clearly the 
constitutional responsibility of the states. That is to say, the 
conditional funding is not of the form of national payments to states for 
the implementation of national government powers,which is true of some 
federations. Indeed the fact that it is state functions being conditionally 
funded, and the largest state functions at that,(education, health, roads, 
etc.), points to the basic cause of the highly political nature of this 
element of the rectification of vertical imbalance in the Australian 
federal system. 
CANADA 
We have already observed a number of features about Canadian 
intergovernmental conditional funding which perhaps bear repeating in 
summary form. Specific purpose transfers represent, on average, only 
15% of provincial revenue, as much as 25% for one province and as low as 
9.3% at the other extreme. However they are, overall,a more prominent 
part of intergovernmental transfers than are general purpose funds, and on 
average are now more than double them. But again this varies between 
provinces,and specific purpose transfers comprise as much as 96% of one 
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province's total intergovernmental transfers yet as little as 41% of 
another's. The more fiscally autonomous the province the more likely 
that specific purpose transfers will be dominant in its receipt of funds 
from the national government. Finally, the major specific purpose 
transfers are directed to the functions of health, social welfare, and 
education; and to a much lesser extent, promotion of trade and industry 
and transport and communications. Table 5.C.5 demonstrates the functional 
breakdown of specific purpose transfers more graphically. 
The most interesting aspect of Table 5.C.5 is that the distribution 
pattern of specific purpose transfers, taking all provinces as a whole, 
has not changed markedly over the decade. Health, social welfare, and 
education,continue to be the dominant functional recipients and their 
shares of the total have remained little changed although health is 
slightly less dominant, social welfare is slightly more prominent, and 
agriculture trade and industry has become a noticeable element of these 
transfers* For each province the distribution pattern is different to 
some extent, as we shall see later, but the important point to note here 
is that there have been a number of instances of particular provinces 
defying the trend on particular functions. For example, transport and 
communications have become of lesser significance in Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick,but of increased importance in Saskatchewan and Alberta. 
Social vyelfare has become a conditionally funded area of slightly lesser 
significance in Manitoba and Saskatchewan when it has become of greater 
prominence in other provinces. Education has become much more dominant 
in British Columbia and in all provinces except Quebec, Prince Edward 
Island and Alberta. The increase in significance of specific purpose 
transfers for industry has been extremely pronounced in the Maritime 
provinces. 
Table 5.C.6 reveals the annual fluctuations in the various major 
transfer payments to the provinces. There is little need to elaborate on 
this table. Clearly there are severe changes year to year in a great many 
of the transfer payments going to each particular function in each 
particular province, there is little consistency in movements within a 
function as between provinces or within a province as between functions. 
Comparison of Table 5.C.6 with Table 5.C.5 reveals a phenomenon which we 
3lso noticed in relation to the Australian states,viz. that despite 
Agriculture, Trade and Industry, are included in the category "Other" 
in Table 5.C.5. 
**Page 442. 
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pronounced annual fluctuations in the amount of intergovernmental transfers 
going to a particular function, it is common for the proportion of all 
conditional funding devoted to that function to remain reasonably constant. 
Table 5.C.6 also reveals some other interesting factors. In some provinces, 
notably Newfoundland and to a lesser extent New Brunswick, Prince Edward 
Island and Manitoba and Alberta, the annual changes in specific purpose 
transfers match those in total transfers, but in the other provinces there 
is yery little correspondence and at times a complete divergence of 
movement. There also seems to be no connection between movements in general 
purpose transfers and specific purpose transfers in any province except 
Newfoundland. It is of course also true that all annual fluctuations in 
both conditional and unconditional funding transfers are a great deal 
more pronounced than the changes in gross revenue of the provinces. 
Table 5,C.7 takes up a theme which we referred to earlier, viz. the 
variation between provinces of the proportion of federal transfers which 
go to particular functions. Looking at transfers in total, in Newfoundland 
there is a higher than average emphasis on general purpose funding 
including equalization as well as a stronger emphasis on trade and 
industry but a much smaller emphasis on health, social welfare and 
education, whereas, by contrast, the profile of distribution of transfers 
in Ontario gives strong emphasis to health and education but very low 
emphasis to unconditional funding (with no equalization) and a lower than 
average emphasis on trade and industry, agriculture, and transport and 
communications. To put it simply, each province has a different profile 
of the functional distribution of total federal transfers of funds. Even 
provinces which have a basically similar mixture of unconditional and 
conditional funding, and a similar degree of overall fiscal dependence 
on transfers, find that the composition of the conditional element of 
their transfers does differ. 
Table 5.C.8 provides a different perspective to reveal an aspect 
we considered in relation to Australian conditional funding. This table 
shows the distribution between the provinces of conditional transfers 
in each of the main functional categories. It demonstrates quite 
effectively that the distribution pattern of conditional funding differs 
from that for unconditional funding. Consider, at the extreme. Nova Scotia 
with 11.8% of the unconditional transfers and 4.1% of the conditional 
transfers, or Ontario with only 1.7% of the unconditional funding but 
32.0% of the conditional funding, or Quebec with 42.3% of the unconditional 
329. 
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transfers but 27.3% of the conditional ones. Our main interest is in 
the particular categories of conditional funding, and the distribution 
pattern of various specific purpose transfers shows quite clearly 
pronounced variations. Consider for example. Prince Edward Island and 
Saskatchewan which both receive sizeable slabs of the money for 
agriculture (23.9% and 29.8% respectively), but hardly any of the funding 
for labour employment and immigration (3.2% and 0.7%), or environment 
(nil and 1.3%), or trade and industry (nil and 3.4%). Admittedly these 
are smaller conditional programmes and when one turns to consider the 
major areas of conditional funding (health, welfare, and education), the 
distribution pattern between provinces is quite consistent due, no doubt, 
to the heavy emphasis on population distribution in the formulae for those 
transfers. (It can be seen from the table that the distribution of those 
conditional transfers matches the population distribution fairly closely). 
We have one other set of data for Canada which is not available in 
the same format for Australia. This is contained in Tables 5.C.9 and 
5.CIO and it relates to the participation of provinces in conditional 
funding programmes.* Care has to be exercised with those figures because 
they reflect only the number of programmes and not their financial significance, 
Thus, for example, it could be possible for a province to be a strong 
participant in conditionally funded programmes, but those programmes might 
all be for small amounts of money. Or a province might choose to participate 
solely in those programmes that offered substantial funding. From Table 
5.C.9 we can deduce immediately that the bulk of conditional grants and 
shared cost programmes are concluded between the national government and 
just one or two provinces. Indeed, the frequency with which more than half 
the provinces participate in these pgorammes is confined to only 30% of 
them, and conditional programmes where every province participates 
represent only 16% of the total. It can also be observed from this table, 
although it is a generalization, that the tendency is for either all the 
provinces to be participating or just a few to be participating. From 
Table 5.CIO it is clear that there is some variation in degree of 
participation in conditional funding from province to province. The "lower" 
participators are Prince Edward Island (participation in 26% of the programmes) 
Newfoundland (30%), and Nova Scotia (32%). The "higher" participants are 
Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan (all 47%). But perhaps the most 
significant facet of this table is that no Canadian province participates 
*Data published as part of the Commonwealth budget presentation could be 
used as a rough basis for the compilation of similar Australian figures 
although the specific purpose programmes are not broken down to the extent 
that they are in Canadian data. 
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TABLE 5.C.9 
CANADA 
CONDITIONAL GRANTS AND SHARED-COST PROGRAMS 
Provinces 
Participating 
10 
1 
,8 
7 
1 
5 
4 
i 
1' 
1 
Total 
1974 
No. 
Programs 
12 
1 
1 
s3 
• ^ 
_ 
3 
14 
10 
34 
It 
1 
Total 
15.4 
1.3 
1.3 
3.8 
3.8 
17.9 
12.8 
43.6 
100.0 
1976 
Ni3. 
Programs 
13 
4 
« 
2 
« 
1 
4 
12 
10 
31 
78 
t 
Total 
16.7 
5.1 
2.6 
2.6 
5.1 
15.4 
12.8 
39.7 
100.0 
1977 
No. 
Programs 
13 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
7 
11 
34 
80 
% 
Total 
16.3 
5.0 
5.0 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
5.0 
8.8 
13.8 
42.5 
100.0 
Note: All grants and programs in Regional 
Economic Expansion regarded as one 
single program 
Source: Derived from Canada Year Book. 
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TABLE 5.CIO 
CANADA 
CONDITIONAL GRANTS AND SHARED-COST PROGRAMS 
Newfoundland 
Prince Edward Island 
Nova Scotia 
New Brunswick 
Quebec 
Ontario 
Manitoba 
Saskatchewan 
Alberta 
Bri t ish Columbia 
Average to Provinces 
Percentage 
1974 
28.2 
27.0 
28.2 
25.7 
34.6 
46.2 
41.1 
39.7 
33.3 
32.1 
33.6 
of Programs 
1976 
32.1 
24.4 
26.9 
30.8 
39.7 
51.3 
37.2 
44.9 
38.5 
32.1 
35.8 
Par t i c ipa t ing 
1977 
30.0 
26.3 
32.5 
38.8 
38.8 
47.5 
47.5 
47.5 
37.5 
36.3 
38.3 
Note: All grants and programs in Regional 
Economic Expansion regarded as one 
single program 
Source: Derived from Canada Year Book. 
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in more than half of the conditionally funded programmes, and most 
participate in only a little more than one-third of these programmes, 
This picture has not changed much in recent years. 
THE REACTION TO CONDITIONAL FUNDING 
To say that the introduction of conditional funding has produced a 
hostile reaction from the states of Australia and provinces of Canada would 
be an understatement. They have raised innumerable objections to the use 
of conditional funding by the respective national governments,and we shall 
attempt to do justice to all of those objections by means of the interview 
responses,supplemented by the voluminous amount available in the literature 
on this subject. If all the objections to conditional funding can be 
synthesized into one basic point it is that conditional funding, according 
to the states and provinces, distorts their own priorities and interferes 
in the very processes of their own priority determination. As can be 
readily appreciated, this argument, if valid, represents a very serious 
hindrance to the attainment of our planning system, requiring as it does 
harmonization of priorities and agreed allocation of resources despite 
the fact,which has already been observed, that where there are spillovers 
or externalities the logic of the situation identified under those headings 
requires some "overriding" of state or provincial priorities by a central 
government. We shall proceed eventually to this essential element of the 
debate about conditional funding, but it is also necessary to survey other 
objections raised by the Australian states and Canadian provinces to 
conditional funding. For the sake of convenience the various grievances 
have been grouped into broad categories and the interview responses have 
been supplemented by material from the literature. There is some degree of 
repetition of argument because the same point was often made by respondents 
n different contexts. 
i'^i Arguments related to efficiency and effectiveness of government 
Responses to the interviews produced a number of strong viewpoints 
including the following: 
• Conditional grants are often made for capital purposes without 
due consideration being given to consequent and associated 
current expenditure requirements, and vice versa. The same 
argument is used for conditional "grants" given as loans 
which do not take account of subsequent debt repayment,so that 
an additional capital grant gives rise to future indebtedness 
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whose realization diverts funds from other purposes. Depending 
on the level of funding it could follow that sub-national 
governments are forced to pay greater attention to debt 
repayment than current community needs. In these senses 
conditional payments increase a state or province's 
obligations rather than decrease them. 
The uncertainties of future national government policies 
affect the discretion of the sub-national governments mainly 
through the inability to predict commencement and/or 
termination of new programmes. 
. States and provinces are tempted to spend in high cost-
shareable functions or programmes when they often ought to be 
spending on lower cost but non shareable areas. This, it is 
argued, is compounded by the political risk which a state or province 
takes if it departs from a high cost-shareable area,and it 
could lead to a deterioration in standards in many areas not 
recognized by the national government for conditional funding* 
. States and provinces are induced by conditional funding to 
keep programmes going solely to get "national" money, even 
when they know that the programmes should be scrapped. In 
other words it discourages a true review of spending efficiency 
and efficacy. Also, in conducting any review of priorities there 
is a tendency to favour cost shared areas over areas which are 
funded solely from state or provincial revenue,simply because 
there is more to be saved in cutting back in the latter than in 
the former. In other words cost shared programmes tend to be 
given priority when they may not deserve it. (We examine 
this argument in more depth later). 
. Conditional funding, especially cost shared arrangements,can 
lead to an undue emphasis on certain types of projects,for 
example in social infrastructure which was claimed to be over-
abundant in Canada in the health and education areas, and which 
was inefficiently located and utilized in the health area in 
Australia. 
• Because of the kudos which can be associated with conditional 
Pi^ ogrammes, there is a tendency for national money to be offered 
^^__J^;oj;;e_for glamour areas, and the "bread and butter" activities are 
Drnv^°^-^^^^^ ""isk referred to relates to the likely criticism of a 
fiinH^ U'^ ^^ L^ '' ^ ^^te government which fails to avail itself of any substantial 
n^aing offered by the national government. 
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left to the states/provinces. 
Many conditional programmes result in duplication and overlapping 
between national and sub-national jurisdictions, brought about 
often by an excessive amount of detail laid down in the conditions 
of the funding. 
Most of the arguments have been raised, if not analyzed in the literature. 
Mathews identifies concerns which have been expressed about the allocative 
or distributional effects of specific purpose grants -
"These are related to such matters as the proliferation 
of overlapping programs; uncertainties about eligibility 
and the growth of grant lobbies and 'grantsmanship'; 
the duplication of bureaucracies at each level of 
government; the tendency to encourage unrestrained 
growth of the public sector; inadequate arrangements 
for consultation and policy coordination between units; 
unwarranted interference by granting governments in the 
detailed administration of grant programmes; failure to 
match grant programmes to policy objectives, inadequate 
accountability; lack of systematic analysis of expenditure 
needs; and failure to distribute grants on a basis which 
reflects relative needs and fiscal capacities".^0 
Elsewhere Mathews has made the observation that specific purpose grants, 
by their design, can distort the pattern of expenditure of recipient 
governments. In particular, matching requirements can make "recipient 
governments direct funds from one crisis area to another". Under these 
circumstances, says Mathews, general revenue grants without restrictions 
21 
are more likely to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. Gates 
also takes up this theme. He puts it this way -
"In fields in which both the Commonwealth and the State 
governments operate, it is often possible to document 
the contrast between relative lavishness on the one hand 
and relative parsimony on the other; and less precise 
observation suggests strongly that the duality extends 
to functions that are the exclusive province of one 
level or the other. An implication is that the transference 
of resources from the margin of expenditure at the 
Commonwealth level to the margin of expenditure at the 
State level would effect an increase in the real output 
of government services. This may well apply with equal 
force between State and local government administrations 22 
20- R. Mathews, Revenue Sharing in Federal Systems, p. 34. 
21- R.L. Mathews, ed . . Intergovernmental Relations in Australia, 
pp. 226-227. 
22- ihid., p. 171, 
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This raises the "duplication" argument which is also well entrenched in 
the literature, a favourite cry of state premiers in particular, who 
stress that the states generally have an expertise in the area in question 
built up over many years, and conditional funding brings an unnecessary 
duplication of such expertise at the national government level, all at the 
taxpayer's expense. Hunter states quite categorically,of Australian 
experience,that detailed conditions being attached to specific purpose 
grants involved a duplication of effort and cost associated with numerous 
conferences of federal and state ministers and officials. The 1970 
statement of the Australian premiers expressed concern about duplication 
of responsibility for pensioners with a resultant inconsistent cost 
23 impact on the states as between programmes. Trudeau in his 1969 
working paper on the Constitution referred to the welfare area as one 
where there could be overlapping and cautioned against the practice of 
24 having two levels of government transferring money to persons. Smiley 
has a theory on the reason for the gradually increasing resistance by 
Canadian provinces to conditional funding, which he attributes to 
increasing administrative sophistication -
"The earlier arrangements came into effect when the 
provinces were on the whole little disposed to 
budgetary or program planning. Thus '50 cent 
dollars' were attractive and the restrictions on 
provincial autonomy in the range and standards of 
services not very onerous. These circumstances 
have now changed. Just as administrative rationality 
has made federal officials anxious that the conditional 
grant device leads to heavy and unpredictable 
financial burdens without any guarantees that 
national purposes are effectively and efficiently 
pursued, so increasing administrative sophistication 
in the provinces results in reactions to the 
uncertainties and controls inherent in federal 
participation".2^ 
On this subject of uncertainty. Carter says of the Canadian E.P.F. 
arrangements (which as we have seen involve a sharp reduction in conditional 
23. Sir Henry Bolte, Ministerial Statement on Commonwealth and State 
Financial Relationships, Victorian Parliamentary Debates, March 10th 
1970, Melbourne, pp. 25-27. 
24. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federal-Provincial Grants and the Spending 
Power of Parliament (Ottawa: 1969), pp. 19-20. 
25. D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question, pp. 139-140. 
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funding) that they have increased predictability of funding for both 
national and provincial governments,and opened the possibility of more 
efficient provincial spending in the health field. And on the subject 
of administrative rationality Stevenson makes the interesting observation, 
in recalling Corry's work for the Rowell-Sirois Commission,that the 
"divided jurisdiction" inherent in shared cost programmes prevents 
bureaucracy from "operating in the rational and orderly manner prescribed 
by Max Weber since there is no single hierarchical chain of command when 
27 
more than one level of government is involved". 
Other authors have reinforced some of the arguments which emanated 
from the interviews. Thus Grewal says that aided programmes have often 
been selected hastily, and in many cases the objectives not spelled out 
clearly and precisely. He goes on -
"Ideally, specific purpose grants should be related to 
program output. But as measurement of output is not 
possible in many cases, actual grants are often related 
to input levels for example so many dollars per person. 
The result of this practice .... is that recipient 
governments are almost solely concerned with spending 
the grant moneys, without regard to efficiency. 
Frequently, the national governments also do not 
have any effective means of evaluating the efficiency 
of grant programs. This results in overall loss of 
efficiency in the use of fiscal resources".28 
Wade draws attention to the practice of attaching interest and repayment 
conditions to conditional grants,and warns against the concept of regarding 
conditional grants as some method of investing national government funds 
at interest. Rather, he says, the test should be related to whether the 
national government would or would not levy an interest charge if it were 
, 29 
able to finance the programme directly. Speaking of the Australian 
context,Hunter observes that about two-thirds of specific purpose payments 
are of a capital nature and in a sense therefore by-pass the evaluation of 
26. G. Carter, New Directions in Financing Canadian Federalism, 
Occasional Paper 13, Canberra, Centre for Research on Federal 
Financial Relations, 1980, pp. 16-17. 
27. G. Stevenson, op.cit., p. 158. 
28. B.S. Grewal, op.cit., p. 142. 
29. P.B. Wade, "Recent Developments in Fiscal Federalism in Australia, 
with Special Reference to Revenue Sharing and Fiscal Equalization" in 
Fiscal Federalism: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. R.L. Mathews, 
Monograph No. 7, Canberra, Centre for Research on Federal Financial 
Relations, 1974, p. 69. 
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30 the Loan Council. Speaking in relation to education funding Berkeley 
emphasizes that timing is an important component of efficiency,and states 
need to be given sufficient time to spend the funds allocated under 
conditional funding. This can also be dependent on whether the 
conditional funding is simply aiming at supplying new initiatives or 
just more of the same,and that,in turn,may be affected by how run down 
31 the system is when the federal grant begins. Auld supports this 
argument from Canadian experience and says that it may take tv/o or 
three years before a conditionally funded programme is operating in an 
efficient and desirable manner. He goes on to question the conventional 
wisdom that the national government is always the appropriate level to 
32 deal with the redistributive function. 
(B) Administrative and Technical Viewpoints 
It is not surprising that interviews with public servants on 
this subject evoked a strong response regarding the administration of 
conditional funding. This was certainly the case and the main points 
raised were as follows -
. The time span of different conditional grant programmes is 
different as are the conditions, methods, and mixtures of 
funding, making it difficult for any single state or province 
to obtain an overview of the conditional programmes as a whole, 
. Conditional grants weaken rather than strengthen the ability 
and desire of a state or province to innovate in both revenue 
raising and expenditure,because of the stringent conditions 
attached to federal transfers. 
. Frequent changes of government, or even changes of outlook, 
especially on the part of the national government,can cause 
technical problems with the delivery of a programme, 
especially where those changes are ideologically based. 
30. J.S.H. Hunter, op.cit., p. 60. 
31. G.F. Berkeley, Financing Education in Queensland: The State-
Commonwealth Mix, Occasional Paper No. 2, Canberra, Centre for Research on 
Federal Financial Relations, 1976, passim. 
>^2. D. Auld, Contemporary and Histor-loal Economic Dimensions of Canadian 
Confederation, Occasional Paper No. 12, Canberra, Centre for Research 
on Federal Financial Relations, 1979, pp. 30-31. 
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Because conditional programmes are formulated and negotiated 
outside the ambit of the state or provincial government 
budget process, they are bound to lead a life of their own 
and thereby preempt any review in budget formulation and 
appraisal. In other words it becomes an "uncontrollable" or 
"locked in" area. 
The amount of detail required for reporting on conditional 
programmes leads to duplication and overlap between levels. 
Also there is often insufficient time allowed to the sub-
national governments to design and introduce the programmes 
in view of the administrative difficulties involved. 
The criteria are often too rigid especially regarding 
eligibility including means tests etc. 
After the programmes are finally running there can be 
inordinate delays in payment to the recipient government 
caused, at times, by the foolishness of some national 
ministers who insist that they should approve every project 
in the programme. Further complications will arise if the 
national government is not prepared to accept the audit of 
the state or provincial governments on the programme in question. 
Occasionally too much of the conditional funding process is 
conducted by means of verbal dialogue between national and 
sub-national government officials,which poses various 
problems including subsequent disputes over what is acceptable 
if key personnel happen to shift. For this and other reasons 
there are also disagreements about exactly which items are 
cost-shareable, because even the wording of an agreement 
accompanying a conditional programme cannot possibly cover 
all eventualities. 
A quite serious administrative objection, raised particularly 
by the provinces in Canada,is the manner in which conditional 
programmes interfere in their administrative structure. This 
can occur when the national government specifies the delivery 
mechanism to be used for the programme, which can well alter 
the location of the funding between different provincial 
government agencies. Provinces claim they have been forced 
to relocate programmes in their machinery of government when 
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they believe that, on the basis of experience and local 
knowledge, the programme should be delivered through different 
administrative arrangements. 
These points have all recurred throughout the literature on both 
Australian and Canadian federalism, although they have tended to be 
downplayed because of the scant regard with which administrative 
arguments are usually viewed by politicians, journalists, and even 
academics. Holmes and Sharman, however, point to the seriousness of 
administrative factors when they state quite explicitly that under the 
Whitlam government's centralist policies vertical imbalance was shifted 
from the political arena of the Premiers' Conference to the administrative 
33 
arena. They go even further and assert that the states, especially 
Victoria and New South Wales, have progressively built up the expertise of 
their "advisory public services to counter central government 'know-how'". 
Holmes and Sharman strongly imply that in adopting this strategy the 
Australian states are following the pattern in Canada a decade earlier 
in the face of national government expansion. 
Many writers have been willing to ackowledge the administrative 
complexity in coordination of all the conditional programmes. Mathews 
expresses it this way -
"The (grants) machinery problem is partly one of 
fitting the grant program into the budget priorities 
and processes of each of the governments concerned 
and partly one of co-ordinating the policies of 
granting and recipient governments. In the absence 
of constitutional provisions for responsibility sharing 
of the kind which exist in West Germany, policy co-
ordination between governments involves legislatures 
as well as executive governments so that appropriate 
administrative machinery (such as ministerial councils) 
for purposes of consultation and policy formulation 
is not a sufficient condition for responsibility sharing 
through specific purpose programs".^^ 
Canadianwriters, with perhaps the benefit of greater hindsight, see other 
basic elements of the administrative coordination problem in relation to 
conditional funding. Both Burns and Stevenson, for example, are agreed 
33. J. Holmes and C. Sharman, The Australian Federal System (Sydney: 
George Allen and Unwin,1977 ) , p. 150. 
34. ihid. , p. 164. 
35. R. Mathews, Revenue Sharing in Federal Systems, p. 35, 
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that in the Canadian provinces conditional funding has resulted in tension 
between central agencies and programme departments. Burns expresses it 
this way -
"In recent years the thrust of (specific purpose) 
programme growth has been gradually eased, due in 
part to provincial opposition but more realistically 
to the fact that most of the expensive areas of co-
operation seem now to have been covered. No suitable 
alternative to this form of transfer is yet readily 
available, for as the business of supplying public 
services becomes more complex and all-embracing, the 
extent of overlapping interests and responsibilities 
becomes even more evident. Except for Quebec, even 
the provinces which express their concerns most 
strongly appear to appreciate the realities of the 
situation and in few cases has resistance been 
maintained in the face of attached financial advantages. 
As always, an important factor is still the division 
of interests within the provincial governments 
themselves. The programme departments which have 
benefitted from the availability of Federal funds 
continue to seek funds from their counterparts in 
Ottawa, while financial officers at both levels 
resist the weakening of their control".36 
Stevenson sees the medicare programme as the one which crystallized 
provincial opposition to conditional grants,and regards Ontario's 
Ministry of Treasury, Economics, and Intergovernmental Affairs as the 
leader in expressing such sentiments. According to Stevenson shared cost 
programmes lessened the ability of this Ministry to assert its authority 
over programme departments such as Health, Education, or Community and 
Social Services. Stevenson inclines to Corry's view that this tendency 
cannot go too far because of the "hierarchical and centralizing nature 
37 
of parliamentary Cabinet government". The increasing power of this 
ministry and other similar central agencies would reinforce this 
assertion as we saw in the chapter on intergovernmental agreements. The 
Ontario Ministry referred to by Stevenson published in 1972 a critique of 
federal-provincial shared cost programmes in Ontario. That report made the 
following pertinent observations -
36. R.M. Burns, Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Canadian and 
Australian Experiences, Monograph No. 22, Canberra, Centre for Research 
on Federal Financial Relations, 1977, p. 59. 
37. G. Stevenson, op.cit., p. 173. 
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"All provincial expenditures should properly be part 
of a central budgetary plan which reflects the policies 
and priorities of provincial Cabinets. Yet it has 
become evident that shared cost programs tend to take 
on an autonomous life of their own, largely outside 
the provincial budget planning process. Sustained 
largely by the program departments responsible for 
the original initiative and rigidly fixed by federal-
provincial agreement for an unstated duration, each 
program develops its own 'clientele' inside and outside 
government. This makes flexible and independent 
provincial programming difficult and, in essence, pre-
empts large portions of provincial budgetary funds from 
annual review and adjustment. In 1972, for example, 
$2.3 billion or 39 per cent of the Ontario budget was 
locked into shared-cost programs".38 
This document also listed other specific administrative problems of 
shared-cost programmes. That list included delayed federal payments, 
auditing difficulties, differences about programme aims and eligible 
costs, abrupt changes in programme definition, and unsatisfactory 
procedures for programme review or renewal. It was the delayed payments 
which were regarded as the most serious and the paper observed that, 
whereas the provinces were obliged to meet a range of deadlines in various 
programmes, similar time constraints did not apply to the national 
government in the release of funds. It was also the case that definitions 
of eligible costs were established by national auditors rather than through 
39 intergovernmental negotiation. Speaking of roughly the same period, a 
provincial minister of finance characterized shared-cost funding 
arrangements prior to E.P.F. in the following terms -
"Rapid cost escalation, particularly in the early years, 
which led to the introduction of ceilings on federal 
contributions. Major restrictions on hospital insurance 
cost-sharing, which encouraged expansion of the most 
expensive services and facilities, which were shareable, 
over less expensive alternatives which were not. A 
complicated set of shareability rules under the post-
secondary program, which took years to work out and 
which, even today - twelve and a half years after the 
program started - are still being debated".40 
38, Ministry of Treasury, Economics, and Intergovernmental Affairs , 
Federal-Provincial Shared-Cost Programs in Ontario, Ontario Tax 
Studies 8, Toronto, 1972, p. 10. 
39. ibid. , pp. 12-13. 
Hon. Dona 
Unconditi 
30.8.1979 
40. . nald W. Craik, Notes for a Statement on Shared Costs or 
itional Grants, I.P.A.C. National Conference, Winnipeg, 
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He also claimed that,during the negotiations for the E.P.F. arrangements, 
the national government argued that to ensure accountability it had to 
build in specific provisions requiring, on penalty of loss of payments, 
that provinces publicize federal payments in a specific way, for example 
by issuing regular nationally prepared news releases. The provinces 
resisted those restrictions but agreed to less formal modes of publicity 
for national contributions. 
There are, of course similar examples of cumbersome administrative 
arrangements applying to Australian conditional funding. Wade gives 
examples in the three functional areas of schools, urban and regional 
development, and pre-schools during the Whitlam government's term of office. 
In the case of schools there were seven categories of grants available 
under 25 heads, and in a number of cases the national minister was required 
to approve individual projects being financed in individual schools; and 
even in the area of government schools a special group of payments to 
"disadvantaged schools" was dependent upon a declaration by the national 
minister that particular schools nominated by the state minister were 
disadvantaged schools. For pre-schools only two months were allowed for 
completion of purchase. In the field of urban and regional development 
Wade comments that the complexities of the attaching conditions provided 
a continuous series of "field days" for government legal offices. "In 
addition it has brought to light an extraordinary number of eminent 'bush 
lawyers' from officers who were otherwise economists, engineers, 
accountants or administrators. And it has produced an amazing number of 
conferences and interstate journeys for both Federal and State officials. 
It is by no means an exaggeration to visualize Federal and State officials 
locked in earnest negotiations, sometimes for hours on end and sometimes 
well into the night, debating the merits of the inclusion of a particular 
phrase in a clause of a draft agreement or what a series of words written 
in English really are intended to mean". 
Speaking of the administrative detail required in education 
conditional funding in respect of accountability requirements Berkeley 
observes -
41. P.B. Wade, op.cit., pp. 58-60. 
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"The mass of detail sought under the accountability 
requirements is not normally a feature of State 
accounting and reporting systems. While in some 
instances it may be justifiably argued that it should 
be, in a great many others the detail is of no use 
other than for the purposes of accountability. The 
fact that the required detail is not readily available 
has meant that staff have had to be diverted from 
other tasks to extract it. This is usually a tedious, 
time-consuming process in which the efficient use of 
manpower is difficult. Further, the staff diverted to 
these tasks are usually drawn from planning, financial 
management or management support personnel. Their 
services could be utilized far more advantageously 
elsewhere "^ ^ 
The appointment by Australian Prime Minister Fraser of the Bland 
Administrative Review Committee provided an open opportunity for all 
the states to raise their objections to conditional funding especially 
as it had been manifest under the Whitlam labour government. As might 
be expected this process produced a catalogue of complaints, and the 
ones relating to administrative matters included a grievance that within 
each programme there was often a multitude of projects, but it was solely 
the national government which determined whether particular projects 
were compatible with the programme. The States also believed that they 
should retain tasks concerned with technical concepts and design, 
environmental impact, economic evaluation of alternative projects, 
financial management and the allocation of funds among all projects 
that met the broad requirements of the programme. The States believed 
that such a division of authority would allow them to select and 
develop projects for funding,which were compatible with their own 
"planning" objectives, with respect to such matters as the quantity 
and quality of physical and social infrastructure and interregional 
development. Inflexibility and delay was another charge levelled by 
the Australian states over conditional funding. Harris expresses their 
feelings in these words -
42. G.F. Berkeley, op.cit. , p. 15, 
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"... given the inexperience in many functional areas of 
the Commonwealth administration, there was a considerable 
lack of appreciation in that administration of the 
program lead times, of the time taken to conceive, 
generate, execute and review new programs. This led to 
serious problems for efficient planning and expenditure 
patterns by the States when funds were made available 
by the Federal Government on a fiscal year basis, but 
where delays in making approvals and notifying those 
approvals to the States meant that work could not 
actually begin until a significant part of the year had 
passed. The States claimed that they drew up proposals 
seeking an allocation of specific purpose funds to be 
expended over a full year, but that they sometimes 
received those funds as late as half-way through the 
year. As a result the States made hurried decisions, 
uneconomical design and excessive provisions on the 
project in an effort to secure commital of funds and 
to ensure expenditure. The States apparently accepted 
this inefficiency because not to have done so might have 
been to lose Commonwealth financial assistance, since 
there was no automatic approval by the Commonwealth to 
allow the States to transfer unexpended funds from one 
year to the next".43 
The States also complained that the audit requirements of specific 
purpose funding delayed cash flow and were often inconsistent between 
programmes and departments. 
However the administrative aspect of Australian conditional funding 
which has been the object of most attention in the literature relates 
to the role of advisory commissions, a phenomenon which is not unique 
to intergovernmental relations in Australia, but which became a key 
component of the Whitlam government's decision making process especially 
in regard to conditional funding. These bodies are statutory entities 
of the national government, set up in particular sectors e.g. schools, 
health, universities, welfare, etc. and required to advise on, and 
sometimes oversee, the distribution of conditional funding. Needless 
to say the states resented this para-bureaucratic intrusion in their 
line of communication with Canberra,especially as they were nearly 
always forced to appear before them as witnesses and protagonists 
rather than as equal partners. These coimiissions were an articulated 
component of Labor Party policy well before that party came to power 
nationally in 1972. Whitlam held hopes that they would become "planning' 
instrumentalities for each sector to overcome what he saw as 
43. C.P. Harris, op.cit., pp. 72-74. 
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44 fragmentation of decision making between the Commonwealth and the States. 
Said he - "Failing such commissions I see no way of determining the 
obiective priorities for those Commonwealth grants without which neither 
45 
schools nor hospitals can improve". 
Mathews believes that the conditions under which these Commissions 
operated tended to be destabilizing with respect to the economy and the 
Commonwealth budget. This, he says, was because the recommendations of 
the Commissions were largely formulated outside the normal budgeting 
processes of priority determination and financial appropriation. "Each 
Commission made its assessment of needs independently and without 
explicit regard to budget constraints". This meant that the assessment 
made by each Commission was virtually open-ended in its budgetary 
implications. Their recommendations cumulatively resulted inter alia 
in massive increases in specific purpose payments, and the failure to 
integrate their recommendations into the budget affected both vertical 
46 
and horizontal balance. Other problems with the use of advisory 
commissions identified by Mathews include duplication of the work of 
public service departments, the fact that the role of the Commissions 
and their relationship with the executive government and parliament 
were not clearly defined, and the fact that they did not act as inter-
governmental agencies despite the fact that they were recommending on 
47 functions which were state responsibilities. They were also 
supposedly concerned with achieving equalization in fiscal performance 
but because of the difficulty of comparing outputs, usually resorted to 
equalization of expenditure inputs. Mathews adds that the Commissions 
seldom took into account differences in the capacity of the states to 
provide services or their relative revenue-raising and expenditure 
efforts, but they "frequently recommended grants which had the effect 
of compensating particular states for deficiencies arising from their 
44. See E.G. Whitlam, "The Future of Australian Federalism - A Labor 
View" in Intergovernmental Relations in Australia, ed. R.L. 
Mathews, pp. 301-306. 
45. ibid. , p. 306. 
46. R. Mathews, "Federal Balance and Economic Stability", The Economic 
Record, 54(146), August 1978, Reprint No. 26, Canberra, Centre for 
Research on Federal Financial Relations, pp. 16-18. 
4'. R. Mathews, Philosophical, Political and Economic Conflicts in 
Australian Federalism, Reprint No. 23, Canberra, Centre for Research 
on Federal Financial Relations, 1977, pp. 16-17. 
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own past p r i o r i t i es or p o l i c i e s " . Else-Mitchel l too draws a t ten t ion 
49 to the effects of the advisory commissions on horizontal balance, and 
Lane sees these bodies as part of a piecemeal approach to hor izontal 
50 
equalization in the Austral ian federat ion. Weller and Smith believe 
that the state and local governments were simply incapable of providing 
the information required by the national government and i t s commissions, 
and because of var iat ions in local condit ions the commissions had 
51 diff iculty in understanding some of that in format ion. 
There have of course been kind words spoken about the advisory 
commissions. Even Mathews speaks well of the e f f o r t s of some of them 
to work towards rat ional and object ive c r i t e r i a , especia l ly re roads 
and universit ies, ( " ra t i ona l " meaning developing speci f ic purpose payments 
52 
appropriate to the i r purpose). Cranston is enthusiast ic about them 
53 for broadly simi lar reasons. 
On the subject of s ta tutory bodies Hayes raises a Canadian problem 
which exists in Austral ia but which has not surfaced there as an i n te r -
governmental issue. Hayes says that prov inc ia l governments in Canada 
are sometimes f rust rated by the fac t that cer ta in decisions which impact 
on them are in the hands of s ta tu tory bodies independent of national 
ministers, and he c i tes f r e i gh t rate regulat ion and energy transmission 
as examples.The problem is the old fam i l i a r one of the balance between 
control and autonomy for government s ta tu tory bodies but in th is case 
the grievance is that the provinces cannot inf luence those national 
48. R. Mathews, Regional Disparities and Fiscal Equalisation in 
Australia, pp. 48-49. 
49. See Hon. Mr. Jus t ice Else-Mitchell , The Australian Federal Grants 
System and its Impact on Fiscal Relations with the Federal 
Government with State and Local Governments, Law Council of 
Australia, Sydney, 13.8.1980. 
50. W.R. Lane, op.cit., pp. 64-65. 
51. P. Weller and R.F. I . Smith, "Set t ing National P r i o r i t i e s : The 
Role of the Austra l ian Government in Public Pol icy" in Making 
Federalism Work, ed. R.L. Mathews, pp. 88-89. 
52. R. Mathews, "The Future of Government Finance", Public Administration 
(Sydney), XXXII(2), June 1973, pp. 12-13. 
53. R. Cranston, op.cit., p. 130 e t . f o l . 
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entities in the same way as they might influence a national minister. 
No doubt the same argument could be made in both countries about 
statutory bodies responsible for monetary policy and tariffs. 
(C) The Standards of Government Services 
Respondents were concerned that -
. There can be a tendency for a duality of standards to 
arise where the national government chooses to fund 
only a certain narrow segment of a particular government 
sector e.g. a particular type of hospital or educational 
institution, or it can lead to marked differences of 
emphasis within bands of the one sector as, for example, 
if conditional funds are given for tertiary education 
but not primary or secondary education,or some classes 
of roads but not others, or for support of existing 
facilities rather than the encouragement of providing 
new facilities more urgently needed (or vice versa). 
. If states and provinces are tempted to spend in 
high cost shareable forms they will inevitably neglect 
lower cost but non shareable areas, leading to a 
deterioration of overall standards. 
. Because of the political nature of the funding, conditional 
programmes are often in glamour fields while "bread and 
better" issues are left to a state or province's own more 
meagre resources. Some would argue that the reverse 
should be true. 
Very little has been written on this aspect of conditional funding 
other than to list it in the catalogue of state/provincial grievances. 
Wade argues that there is a need to distinguish between existing 
programmes at a higher cost and standard, and new initiatives and new 
standards. The Australian states, he argues, should have an adequate 
tax base to cover the former situation with conditional grants restricted 
tothelatter use. The 1970 statement by the Australian premiers drew 
54. J.A. Hayes, "Federal-Provincial Coordination and Consultation in 
Canada" in Making Federalism Work, ed. R.L. Mathews, pp. 47-48. 
55. P.B. Wade, op.cit. , p. 69. 
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attention to the need for conditional funding to be escalated to take 
full account of inflation and particularly the associated labour costs 
of the programmes. They then made the following statement, the gist of 
which was encountered in the interviews -
"The trend to greater emphasis upon special purpose 
Commonwealth provisions rather than upon general purpose 
provisions has introduced a secondary disparity in 
standards of provisions within the States' own functioning, 
somewhatcomparable with the disparity between standards 
of provision for the constitutional fields of the States 
and those of the Commonwealth. There is, for instance, 
a disparity in standards between the provisions for 
university education, in which the Commonwealth 
participates, and primary education in which it does 
not; between provisions for roads in which the 
Commonwealth participates, and provisions for ordinary 
rail transportation in which it does not; between 
provisions for science laboratories and libraries, in 
which the Commonwealth participates, and provisions 
for class-rpom accommodation in which it does not; 
and so on''.^^ 
Berkeley makes the point, in relation to education, that conditional 
funding raises expectations on the part of recipients that associated 
standards will always be maintained, whereas this may not be a realistic 
aspiration and may indeed be subject to the whims of the national 
57 government. In the Canadian situation there have been fears 
expressed that, following the introduction of E.P.F, with its attendant 
backing-off from heavy conditional funding, national standards 
in various areas may fall. This is because there will be less 
opportunity for the national government to redistribute funding 
between provinces. However the fact that some of the payments are 
in the cash form does retain a potential for monitoring standards, but 
the variation in agreement conditions between sectors,(e.g. health is 
different from post-secondary education), affects the degree to 
which this can take place. A study published by the Ontario Economic 
Council agreed that the E.P.F, arrangements would take most of the heat 
out of the arguments about conditional funding. It was recognized that 
conditional grants to provinces had been justified on the ground that 
56. op.cit., p. 7. See also comments along similar lines in C.P. 
Harris, op.cit., p. 70 et.fol. 
57. G.F. Berkeley, op.cit. , p. 14. 
58. See G.E. Carter, op.cit., pp. 17-18. 
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the national government had a duty to ensure that all Canadians 
enjoyed common minimum standards of certain social services, health 
care,and education,even though these responsibilities fell within 
provincial jurisdiction. However the "common minimum services" 
argument, it was claimed, seemed to rest on at least one of several 
specific assumptions -
"(i) The decisions of provincial governments do 
not reflect the wishes of their constituents. 
(ii) The provincial governments are technically 
incompetent to take action in some fields 
constitutionally within their jurisdiction. 
(iii) Although the decisions of provincial governments 
may express the wishes of their own constituents, 
the residents of other parts of Canada, acting 
through the federal government, should be able 
to impose expenditure programs the latter feel 
to be desirable. 
When stated in this way, the proposition seems much 
less acceptable, provided one believes that the 
provincial governments are as legitimate an expression 
of the democratic process as the federal government".^^ 
Perhaps the difficulty with the arguments about standards is that, as 
Robinson points out,it is extremely difficult to determine whether 
past conditional funding has improved the level or quality of the 
services provided. He asks "at the operational level, do the amounts 
spent represent increased or improved output or are the increased 
expenditures merely shifted backwards to become higher wages and 
profits for workers and supplying firms? Even more difficult to 
measure is the effectiveness of the increased expenditures. For 
example capital grants to hospitals may result in increased purchases 
of X-ray equipment, but does the additional equipment significantly 
improve hospital services as indicated by measures such as reductions 
in work time lost in industry from illness and injury or more lives 
saved? Would a hospital have purchased the equipment if the grants 
fin 
had been unconditional?" 
Of course the real point of this debate is, as Else-Mitchell 
says, that, particularly in Australia with its high degree of vertical 
imbalance -
59. G. Young, "Federal-Provincial Grants and Equalisation" in 
Intergovernmental Relations, Ontario Economic Council, Toronto, 
1977, pp. 40-41. 
50. A.J. Robinson, op.cit. , p. 17. 
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' it must be conceded that there are 
considerable difficulties, political and otherwise, 
in terminating specific purpose grants programmes 
or reducing the amounts voted annually under those 
programmes. Quite apart from the prospect of 
electoral backlash, continued Commonwealth 
involvement is regarded as essential to ensure 
reasonable uniformity from State to State in 
the standards of services provided by the States 
with the assistance of Commonwealth grants. This 
is especially the case with education, health, and 
hospital services, which are the subject of the 
largest grants to the States. Moreover, if the 
major specific purpose payments were phased out 
and the amounts saved added to the general tax 
entitlements of the States, there would be no 
assurance that the policy objectives of the 
Commonwealth government would be respected by those 
States which have differing political objectives 
or philosophies".61 
(D) The Potential for Discrimination against particular States and 
Provinces 
The view of respondents on this matter related mainly to the 
unintended consequences of conditional funding resulting in regional 
discrimination -
. The fact that the time spansof different conditional grant 
programmes are different, as are the conditions, methods 
and mixtures of funding, gives rise to the possibility of 
discrimination against certain states or provinces. 
. The design of a programme may impinge upon the ideology of 
some state/provincial governments but not others. 
. The timing of the introduction of conditional programmes 
is held to be important because it may penalize states 
or provinces which have already spent a lot of money on 
the area in question, and benefit those who have lagged 
behind. This will be accentuated if the recipient 
governments are required to make matching contributions. 
61. Hon. Mr. Justice R. Else-Mitchell, "The Australian Federal 
Grants System and Its Impact on Fiscal Relations of the Federal 
Government with State and Local Governments", Australian Law 
Journal, p. 486. 
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. The more prosperous states and provinces, it is claimed, 
are induced by conditional grants to spend less from their 
non-grant sources, than they would otherwise do, and the 
poorer ones are induced to spend more. 
. Shared cost arrangements associated with conditional 
funding result in some states/provinces entering programmes 
they cannot really afford. This might also be true if the 
programme is designed to provide a public service which 
turns out to be in greater demand in a particular state/ 
province than in others e.g. historical sites, unemployment 
relief, or facilities for the aged. 
. Some conditional programmes are designed solely to benefit 
certain regions within states or provinces, which causes acute 
embarrassment for state or provincial governments because 
they believe other regions or their whole space should so 
benefit, or because it is political suicide for them to be 
seen putting any of their money into one region but not 
another. This does not rebound on the national government 
in the same way. 
From the literature on this subject there seems little doubt that 
the potential exists in conditional funding for the sort of discrimination 
in distribution to which respondents referred. As we have already 
observed the effects of conditional funding on horizontal imbalance 
fi? 
are already well known. In relation to Australia, Holmes and 
ShariTian say that the "developing imbalance in the rate of 
development between the various states in the 1950's resulted in the 
CO 
growth of Section 96 special purposes control grants". This 
problem has become particularly evident in Australia following the 
attempts under the Fraser government's new federalism to absorb 
specific purpose payments into general purpose payments to the states, 
62. See J.S.H. Hunter, op.cit. , p. 64; W.R. Lane, op.cit. and also in 
Intergovernmental Relations in Australia, ed. R.L. Mathews, 
pp. 141-143; W.R.C. Jay, "Implication of Specific Purpose Grants 
for Equalisation Policies" in Fiscal Equalisation in a Federal 
System, ed. R.L. Mathews, Monograph No. 4, Canberra, Centre for 
Research on Federal Financial Relations, 1974, pp. 85-112; B.S. 
Grewal, op.cit., p. 143; C.P. Harris, op.cit., p. 70 et.fol. 
53. J. Holmes and C. Sharman, op.cit., p, 136. 
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one of the major stumbling blocks being that the incidence of 
horizontal imbalance between the specific purpose payments differs 
markedly from the general purpose payments and, just as important, 
the degree of horizontal imbalance varies significantly from one 
64 
specific purpose programme to another. 
Canadians have been forced to come to grips with this aspect, 
perhaps in starker terms than Australians, because of the greater 
frequency of "opting out" of conditional programmes by particular 
provinces especially Quebec. When this occurs the problem is made 
very explicit. As Trudeau put it in his constitutional paper, if a 
province doesn't participate in a programme the citizens of that 
province are still paying their national taxes and so they are seen to 
65 be propping up programmes for other provinces. From another perspective 
Hayes points out that the complexities of various conditional programmes 
may disfavour small provinces who don't have the bureaucratic resources 
to cope with the details of the programme, and Stevenson cites the 
Canadian medicare insurance programme as one which was fundamentally 
at odds with those provinces ideologically opposed to regulating the 
CJ 
medical profession. Young,in the Ontario Tax Council study,admitted 
that national conditional programmes could be effective means of 
preventing provinces from erecting barriers to national mobility by 
ensuring universality accessibility,and hence mobility,in regard to 
government services, but he also argued that there should be a 
64. This problem was, of course, particularly in evidence with the 
introduction of the Canadian E.P.F. arrangements which produced 
protracted negotiations about the horizontal equalization 
arrangements which would have to accompany the national government's 
partial withdrawal from the associated massive conditionally funded 
programmes. The tensions were obviously mainly between the affluent 
and poorer provinces. For more detailed elaboration of this point 
see R. Mathews, Issues in Australian Federalism, Economic Papers No. 
58, March 1978, Reprint No. 24, Canberra, Centre for Research on 
Federal Financial Relations, 1978, p. 42 et.fol.; R. Else-Mitchell, 
"The Rise and Demise of Coercive Federalism", Australian Journal of 
Public Administration, XXXVI(2), June 1977, Reprint No. 20, Canberra, 
Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, 1977, p. 117 
et.fol.; 1975 Report of the Centre for Research on Federal Financial 
Relations, Canberra; C. Saunders and K. Wiltshire, "Fraser's New 
Federalism 1975-80 An Evaluation", Australian Journal of Politics 
and History , December 1980. 
55. P. Elliott Trudeau, op.cit., p. 16. 
66. J.A. Hayes, op.cit., p. 47. 
67. G. Stevenson, op.cit., p. 170 et.fol. 
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better option than the use of conditional programmes to achieve this 
CO 
objective. Finally, Donald Smiley, in work for the Canadian Tax 
Foundation, has asserted that because of conditional funding provinces 
that have already established a programme qualifying for grants are given 
an unfair advantage over other provinces; poorer provinces must often 
reduce their spending in other fields of activity so as to match the 
federal grants, and provincial programmes will gradually tend to become 
more uniform even without federal pressure. 
(E) The Legality of Conditional Funding 
It is not intended to enter into the many intricacies of the 
legality of federal financial relationships. However two points made 
by respondents will be mentioned because they have a profound influence 
on the whole attitude of sub-national units of government to conditional 
funding -
. Australian state governments and Canadian provincial 
governments argue that the use of conditional funding is 
a circumvention of the constitution when it involves national 
government intrusion,by means of funding,and especially 
administration, in functions clearly allocated to the sub-
national level under the constitutional division of powers. 
. Conditional funding, because of the nature of the activities 
for which it is given,restricts the ability of states and 
provinces to deal as they choose with the local authorities 
within their boundaries. 
The first of these arguments is a very old one and it is natural that it 
should recur because the largest conditional payments in both countries are 
for the largest functional areas of the state and provincial governments 
viz. education, health and welfare. The legality of the national government 
entering these functional areas has been upheld by the Courts in both 
countries, and the long and short of it is that the spending power of the 
national parliaments overrides the formal power division under the 
58. G. Young, "Federal-Provincial Grants and Equalisation" in Ontario 
Economic Council, op.cit., pp. 41-42. 
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constitution. In relation to the second point there are much tighter 
restrictions in both countries on the national government passing funds 
directly to local governments,although it does happen in various forms, 
more so in Canada than in Australia. 
Holmes and Sharman believe that there are occasions when the state 
governments in Australia are not necessarily opposed to national policy 
which lies behind a conditional programme, but they feel forced to oppose 
it because it transgresses the division of powers. The Administrative 
Review Committee found a unanimous reaction from the Australian states that 
the expansion of specific purpose programmes was an indirect way by which 
the national government was seeking to obtain control over functions within 
the area of state responsibility, control which it could not obtain through 
constitutional amendment. The counter argument has already been touched 
on, and it must be repeated that we have no intention of entering the 
legal aspects of the issue. Suffice to use Cranston's succinct summary of 
the opposing viewpoint -
"But how can it be said that the Australian government 
has no constitutional right whatever in areas like 
housing, education, water conservation, and roads when 
Section 96 undoubtedly gives it a right to provide 
specific purpose grants for such matters? The argument 
must mean that certain parts of the Constitution, 
principally the limitations on Australian Government 
power contained in Section 51, are to be given 
precedence over another part, namely 96, or that 
section 96 is to be limited to some notion of federal 
balance which is to be divided in the Constitution. 
Over the last fifty years the High Court has been 
unimpressed with such propositions and has consistently 
held that limitations cannot be placed on the plain 
wording of the section".72 
69. See for example Hon. Mr. Justice Rae Else-Mitchell, "The Australian 
Federal Grants System and its impact on Fiscal Relations of the 
Federal Government with State and Local Governments", op.cit.; 
also G. Sawer and C.A. Saunders, "The Development of the 
Commonwealth Spending Power", Melbourne University Law Review, 
1978, 11. 
70. J. Holmes and C. Sharman, op.cit., pp. 139-140. 
71. See C.P. Harris, op.cit., p. 70 et.fol, 
72. R. Cranston, op.cit., pp. 129-130. 
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Cranston is also of the opinion that it is doubtful whether the national 
government could obtain judicial remedies requiring the states to observe 
anv conditions anyway, although his opinion is not shared by all 
73 
constitutional lawyers. 
Trudeau advances a quite different justification for national 
intrusion of this kind. The justification was, he believed, to be found 
in the very nature of the modern federal system - "in its economic and 
technological interdependence, in the interdependence of the policies of 
its several governments, and in the sense of community which moves its 
residents to contribute to the well-being of residents in other parts of 
the federation. To understand these characteristics of an industrialized. 
Twentieth Century federal state is to understand the rationale for the 
74 
spending power of the Parliament of Canada". According to Burns, the 
provincial concern about jurisdictional independence was generally sub-
servient to the fiscal advantages of conditional funding,and it was only 
75 gradually that such resistance built up, outside Quebec at least. As 
Stevenson points out no provincial government has ever sought to challenge 
directly the legality of conditional programmes, and,in his view,any 
provincial government that objected to them on principle could protect its 
autonomy by refusing to accept them as Quebec did on more than one 
-JC 
occasion. (We examine th i s argument l a t e r ) . Nonetheless, in the round 
of constitutional discussions of 1979 between national and provinc ia l 
ministers, the stage was reached of considering a d ra f t cons t i tu t iona l 
amendment which would l i m i t the use of the national government's spending 
power, at least in areas of prov inc ia l j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
73. ihid., p. 134. 
74. Pierre E l l i o t t Trudeau, op.cit., pp. 20-22. 
75. R.M. Burns, op.cit. , p. 60. 
76. G. Stevenson, op.cit., p. 157. 
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/p) National Priorities Versus Sub-National Priorities 
Here is the hub of the argument about conditional funding which is 
most relevant to our interest in the potential for public sector planning. 
The views of the Australian states and Canadian provinces were quite plain 
The national government directs or seduces states/provinces 
into programmes which they do not want at all and would 
never have contemplated of their own accord. 
The national government enters programmes already operated 
by the states/provinces but by means of its funding mixture 
and other conditions induces or directs the recipient 
government to devote more of its own funds into that programme 
than it would have done. This is especially so, it is 
claimed, when matching conditions are used. 
. Action of either of the two kinds outlined above diverts 
funds which a state or province would have used for other 
purposes. 
, Having seduced states or provinces into particular programmes 
the national government pulls out after a time leaving the 
recipient government to finance that programme completely 
from its own resources. 
. The stringent conditions attached to some programmes weaken 
rather than strengthen the ability and desire of a state or 
province to innovate both in revenue raising and expenditure. 
, The mere existence of conditional funds acts to encourage sub-
national governments to pursue those funds rather than seriously 
contemplate increased taxation or aim at a greater share of 
unconditional funding. 
. It is argued that the national government makes decisions about 
the level of conditional funding against a completely different 
spectrum from that which the states/provinces use,and this can 
only result in differing priorities being given by each level 
to the same programme. There may be a further complication if 
the programme in question is part of a functional area which 
applies at the two (or even three) levels,(e.g. primary industries, 
or fisheries, or transport), so that the national government 
will be tempted to allocate resources for that purpose to its 
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own agency rather than pass them to the sub-national level. 
This may also result in distortions in the appraisal of the 
state/provincial programme if the national government uses 
its own functional agency to perform such an appraisal, because 
that agency will, at best, see the conditional programme as 
a threat to its own share of national expenditure and, at 
worst, will be tempted to inject unduly stringent conditions 
on performance of the sub-national unit. 
. Differences of opinion arise between levels of government 
about the duration of programmes and agreements. For example 
the Canadian national government favours long term agreements 
whereas some provinces, such as Quebec, have preferred them to 
be short for the sake of expediency. 
, States and provinces are induced, by conditional funding, to 
keep programmes going solely to get national money even if 
they believe the programmes have outlived their usefulness. 
Then, in conducting any review of state/provincial priorities, 
there is a tendency to favour cost shared areas over areas 
which are funded solely from state/provincial revenue, simply 
because there is more to be saved in cutting back in the 
latter than in the former. That is to say, cost shared 
programmes may be given priority by sub-national governments 
when they don't deserve it. 
These arguments and the general contention behind them are difficult to 
deal with. We have encountered some of them in earlier discussion. It 
has become commonplace assertion and entrenched mythology, in Australia 
at least, that conditional funding always distorts state priorities. 
The literature is full of statements to this effect particularly from 
state politicians. The arguments advanced to support this line are 
seldom given but when they are they tend to fall into a number of 
categories. 
Firstly there are those who equate a straightforward increase in 
conditional funding, in the absolute or more especially relative to 
unconditional funding, as an automatic reduction of state policy 
"laking autonomy. Naturally this argument reached its peak in Australia 
in the years of the Whitlam labour government when specific purpose 
payments increased to represent roughly half of all federal fiscal 
360, 
transfers. Indeed, in their 1970 statement, the Australian 
State premiers had clearly identified 
this trend and claimed even then "This has meant that more and more 
the Commonwealth has been able by indirect means to take out of the hands 
of the States the determination of priorities of expenditures over a 
widening area of functioning in which the States have clear constitutional 
responsibility". Also contained within this statement is an astute 
implication, that if conditional funding were adequately escalated to take 
account of inflation by means of formulae built into the programmes, but 
unconditional funding were not so escalated, this too would result in a 
gradual shift from general purpose to specific purpose funding. One 
state under treasurer expressed the fears of the states very vividly when 
he said that 
(a) The states saw the financial assistance grant as their 
entitlement for forgoing income taxing but the Commonwealth 
government regarded it as just another item of expenditure 
from its tax revenues. 
(b) The states were,generally speaking, starved for funds, but 
(c) the Commonwealth was pouring money into areas of state 
responsibility with conditional funding thereby proving 
that the funds were available and that the areas of 
state need did exist, 
(d) the financial assistance grant was not calculated on a true 
needs basis 
> (e) because the financial assistance grant was so insufficient 
and the states were so short of money they accepted more 
79 
readily the conditions attached to specific purpose payments. 
77. For a brief analysis of the impact of this trend on individual 
states see K. Wiltshire, "New Federal isms - The State Perspective", 
Politics, XII, 1971, pp. 76-86. 
78. 
79. 
op.cit., p. 7. 
L.A. Hielscher, op.cit., pp. 2-3, 
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Secondly, there are those who see this question of priority conflict in 
terms of national government activity competing with that of sub-national 
units. Prest, for example, berates the Australian national government for 
its actions in the postwar period in paying off the national debt when 
the states were in desperate need of additions to their schools, hospitals 
and sewerage systems. This is,to some extent,an admission that given 
the political nature of government spending, if the national government 
did not have the device of conditonal funding available to it (whereby it 
retains the kudos); there would be an even greater tendency for national 
government functions to grow at the expense of those of the states,even 
though it could be demonstrated that the states' needs were more basic 
and urgent. As Holmes and Sharman say of the 1960's, grants to the 
81 
states doubled but areas of direct responsibility quintupled. To 
the extent that this trend increased the indebtedness of state governments 
and created pending frustration at the standard of state government 
services, it acted as a constraint on state policy making. 
Thirdly, a number of writers have analyzed the aspect, evident in 
the responses to the interviews, that the different backgrounds to 
decision making by the different levels of government is significant. 
Mathews and Jay, writing in 1972 about the need to restore vertical 
balance in the Australian federation cormient forcefully that "although 
Commonwealth grants to the States have increased significantly, they have 
often been based on decisions which the Commonwealth has made arbitrarily 
or by reference to information that would be regarded as inadequate if 
the Commonwealth was directly responsible for the functionsin question 
Describing the Canadian tax abatement developments of the 1950's and 
1960's, Hayes has this to say -
82 
80. W. Prest, "Tax Sharing and Coordination" in Making Federalism Work, 
ed. R.L. Mathews, p. 141. On th i s general point see also data 
presented in R. Cotton, "The Future of Austra l ian Federalism -
A Liberal View" in Intergovernmental Relations in Australia, ed. 
R.L. Mathews. 
81. J. Holmes and C, Sharman, op.cit., pp. 153-154, 157-158. 
82. R.L. Mathews and W.R.C. Jay, Federal Finance, p. 293. See also 
W.R. Lane, "Direct Taxes in Relat ion to the Div is ion of Fiscal 
Powers" in intergovernmental Relations in Australia, ed, R.L. 
Mathews, p. 135, and W. Prest , ibid., pp. 193-198. 
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"There are major difficulties in the way of governments 
agreeing explicitly on overall national priorities. 
It is difficult enough for two levels of government 
to agree on their respective objectives and roles in 
one functional area ... the problem is compounded when 
all functional areas are considered together. In such 
a case, the federal government has to make an assessment 
of, among other things, the relative priority of 
exclusive provincial responsibilities such as primary 
and secondary education; and the provincial governments 
have to assess the relative priority of such federal 
responsibilities as defence expenditures. Ideally, 
too, individual legislators in the respective federal 
and provincial legislatures should be given the 
opportunity to make comparable assessments. It is 
small wonder that governments prefer to avoid such 
explicit assessments and to be guided instead by 
their own implicit judgements of the relative priority 
of the responsibilities of the two levels of government. 
The appropriateness of these implicit judgements are 
then - again implicitly - endorsed or rejected by the 
voters in federal and provincial elections".83 
And Trudeau spells it out especially in relation to capital expenditure 
".. the terms of reference by which a provincial 
government is guided differ necessarily from those 
which the Government of Canada must take into account. 
The criteria which are used by the provinces and 
their municipalities in determining the amount 
they will borrow each year, for example, are 
necessarily different than those employed by the 
Government of Canada. The provinces and municipalities 
are guided by their views as to the proportion of 
capital expenditures they think ought to be borne by 
present as opposed to future generations, their 
judgement as to the amount which can be borrowed in 
different capital markets, and the needs of their 
respective economies. The Government of Canada is 
guided, on the other hand, by its judgement as to the 
total demands which are likely to be placed upon the 
supply of resources and capital in the economy as a 
whole, including those by the provinces and 
municipalities, the desirable balance between fiscal 
and monetary policy, and other related considerations.. '84 
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, there is the actual 
practical effect of conditional funding on sub-national governments. 
Quite a number of authors have endeavoured to explain just how it is 
that the nature of conditional funding interferes with the priorities 
83. J.A. Hayes, op.cit., p. 41. 
84. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, op.cit., p. 24. 
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of sub-national governments. Each one approaches the question in a 
slightly different way so we are forced to canvass their opinions in 
some depth. Mathews portrays methods of vertical cooperation as a 
spectrum of possible decision-making combinations and financing 
arrangements for any two levels of government,from the extreme of 
complete independence between levels,to the extreme of total dominance 
by the national government. The use of conditional funding can be mid-
way along this spectrum or close to national dominance depending on the 
conditions imposed. In the block funding situation, he says, there can 
be a conflict between national and state priorities and a failure to 
achieve either. If the same information sources can be used for the 
decisions of both levels there can also be duplication. However,such a 
two-tier allocation process can result in more effective decisions, by 
devolving responsibility upon levels of government which have superior 
information sources or are more likely to seek improvements in the 
quality of services through innovation or experimentation. But a 
different kind of conflict occurs, he argues, if national priorities 
are "superimposed on state priorities by means of either (i) specific 
purpose grants with matching conditions, or (ii) specific purpose 
grants subject to revenue-raising as well as expenditure conditions. 
In both cases there is the possibility of inconsistency between federal 
and state priorities, but where matching conditions are imposed the 
problem is compounded by the probability that state priorities in other 
oc 
fields of expenditure will also be distorted". Unfortunately even this 
framework is too vague for our purposes because it doesn't explain the 
manner in which such priority distortion can occur. However Mathews 
elsewhere elaborates further -
"Because of the possibility that grants will not 
achieve their purposes if they simply result in 
recipient governments reducing their own tax 
efforts, governments making specific purpose 
grants frequently specify matching requirements 
or relate the grants to fiscal effort. But 
budget constraints often mean that matching 
requirements merely make the recipient governments 
divert funds from one crisis area to another, 
while other kinds of revenue constraints distort 
85. R.L. Mathews, ed.. Fiscal Federalism: Retrospect and Prospect, 
pp. 219-220, 
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"the pattern of choice available to the governments 
which are best placed to determine priorities".^6 
This is still quite a vague statement per se but a little later 
Mathews gives an example. The matching grants for universities 
and colleges of advanced education, he claims, distorted the pattern of 
State spending on education generally by forcing the States to divert funds 
from primary and secondary education to universities and colleges. In the 
case of roads the states had not been encouraged to construct interstate 
expressways,(as would be a proper objective of conditional funding),but 
they had been forced to spend money on country roads whether they wanted 
to or not. 
Wade gives some methods whereby conditional funding can cause priority 
distortion. One is where a state or local government may have given a high 
priority to a certain programme some time before a national decision is made 
to provide a specific purpose grant for that field. That state would then 
receive relatively less assistance from the conditional programme and no 
help whatever toward other areas of responsibility. He claims that this 
distortion is further accentuated if the state has to provide a matching 
grant or pay interest on the conditional transfer. Finally he asserts that 
continued emphasis on capital funding not only affects the capital 
expenditure state priorities,but also,unless appropriate adjustments are 
made in general revenue assistance, this can severely distort the current 
0-7 
account sector of a State budget. 
The only wr i ter who has confronted th is whole question in anything 
like a detailed way is Jay who has dist inguished four types of condit ional 
payments which do not a f fec t State p r i o r i t i e s and four other types which do. 
Those which do not a f fec t State p r i o r i t i e s are (a) grants which meet a 
proportion of the contractual ob l igat ions of the States for debt charges, 
(b) grants, mostly in the welfare f i e l d , which represent the expenditure 
of funds in areas which are the cons t i tu t iona l respons ib i l i t y of the 
national government. Here the States are merely the disbursing agents, 
(c) grants made under arrangements or agreements based on cooperation 
between equals rather than the imposit ion of p r i o r i t i e s by the national 
government, and (d) pure revenue-sharing grants fo r spec i f ic purposes 
86. R.L. Mathews, ed . . Intergovernmental Relations in Australia, 
pp. 226-227. Similar arguments are advanced by Gates, ibid., pp. 170-172, 
87. P.B. Wade, op.cit., pp. 68-69. 
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(e.g. pre 1959 road grants related to collections of customs and excise 
duties). The specific purpose grants which do affect state priorities are 
(a) grants necessary for a State to discharge its functions where the 
national government specifies how the grants are to be spent, (b) grants 
related to a national plan of expenditure on a State function, where the 
national government provides a substantial part of the funds but makes 
adherence to the national plan a condition of the grants, (c) grants 
provided in the form of specific purpose payments, where the States are 
required to make matching contributions as a conditon of the grants, and 
(d) arrangements whereby the national government takes out the entire 
responsibility for financing a State government function and reduces 
general purpose grants and State Loan Council programmes by amounts which 
oo 
the State Governments save. It can be readily appreciated that even 
this classification is quite vague in parts and rather simplistic e.g. to 
the extent that it assumes that all grants with any kind of matching 
condition will distort State priorities. Unfortunately Jay does not 
attempt to measure the magnitude of each category although he does say 
elsewhere that roads and education are the only fields where matching 
conditions apply, and he also makes the important statement that the 
89 
source of the state's own contribution to the funding is important. 
On the subject of matching grants,Prest offers the opinion that he 
doesn't think they are particularly appropriate to Australia except where 
a service could be partially financed by sources of income normally 
outside State budgets such as university or hospital fees and some forms 
of road taxation. Otherwise, he says, matching funds can only be obtained 
by reducing expenditure in some other field, often equally important, or 
pressing the national government into increasing its general purpose 
grants in which case it might as well have given the full grant in the 
90 91 
first place. We could go on citing authors reliant on Australian 
experience but would not obtain any more precision to the argument. To 
88. R. Jay, op.cit., p. 43 et.fol. 
89. See also W.R.C. Jay, "Implications of Specific Purpose Grants for 
Equalisation Policies" in Fiscal Equalisation in a Federal System, 
ed. R.L. Mathews, pp. 85-112. 
90. W. Prest, op.cit. , p. 194. 
91. See also J.S.H. Hunter, op.cit., p. 61 e t . f o l . ; C.P. Har r i s , 
op.cit. , p. 56 e t . f o l . 
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date nobody really knows the extent to which sub-national priorities have 
been distorted in Australia. Grewal probably sums it up best -
"The question that arises is whether the distortion of 
expenditure priorities is due to the instrument of 
specific purpose grants as such or the manner of their 
application? The answer to this depends partly on 
whether matching or other revenue conditions are 
attached to the grants and whether revenue and 
expenditure substitution takes place at the sub-
national level. If there are no revenue conditions, 
sub-national expenditure priorities are not distorted 
but the national government's priorities are 
superimposed to the extent that sub-national governments 
do not switch their expenditures. If expenditure 
substitution is prevented by the attachment of matching or 
other revenue conditions to the grants, the principal 
effect of specific purpose grants is to stimulate 
total expenditure on the selected functions. But this 
may occur at the expense of a distortion of the sub-
national governments' own priorities if the latter 
governments are required to spend more on those functions 
than they would do in the absence of the grants. If 
this is accepted, the responsibility for distortion of 
sub-national expenditure priorities must lie with the 
decision making processes which select the aided 
functions and the form of the grants. Selection of 
aided functions is the most crucial stage in the 
application of specific purpose grants. A ... 
weakness has been that the aided programs are chosen 
unilaterally and arbitrarily by the national government(s). 
Inadequate attention has been paid to the consideration 
of the opportunity costs of these programs, in terms of 
other competing national and sub-national programs".92 
This subject has also of course been raised in the Canadian context 
and views are basically similar to those voiced in the Australian 
literature. It is interesting to note that,prior to the introduction 
of the E.P.F. arrangements, conditional funding was tending to distort 
the priorities of the national government, to the extent that many 
programmes were open ended and the provinces were able to escalate the 
national payout on them by increasing their own spending under the 
no 
matching arrangements. It also happened in Australia in the mid 
1970's, rather more indirectly,that the continued payment by the national 
government of conditional and other funds to the states caused the 
national government to incur a higher level of indebtedness than had 
92. B.S. Grewal, op.cit., pp. 140-141. 
93. See G. Carter, op.cit., p. 12 and J.A. Hayes, op.cit., p. 46 e t . f o l . 
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been experienced for a long time. Thus conditional payments 
unwittingly interfered with the priorities of the Australian 
94 
national government. Robinson concludes on the basis of the available 
evidence that intergovernmental grants do increase the expenditures of 
recipient governments, but it is still not clear how this occurs. He 
poses a number of questions which have not yet been satisfactorily 
answered: "Do grants stimulate the activities they are intended to 
stimulate and to the extent intended? Are the expenditures new 
expenditures or substitutions?..." He then makes the pregnant statement 
that "The exigencies of intergovernmental politics are such that, if 
there is a possibility of an intergovernmental grant, the potential 
recipient is not likely to show his hand in the bargaining process by 
announcing the amount that will be spent if a grant is not forthcoming. 
Alternatively, instead of diverting expenditures to another item, a 
recipient government may reduce its own taxes, or, even more elusively, 
95 hold off a tax increase that will otherwise have been imposed". 
This leads us then to another point in the "priority debate"; the 
fact that sub-national governments can refuse to accept conditional 
funding if they find it is causing too much distortion of their own 
preferences. It is true that both the Australian states and Canadian 
provinces have refused some conditional funding especially where the 
programmewas at odds with the ideology of the recipient government, as 
with land purchasing or home rental versus sale. However, with the 
exception of the Quebec case, the incidences of such refusal have 
always been for relatively small amounts in minor programmes. We have 
already encountered one of the main reasons, viz. that the taxpayers 
of all states/provinces are funding the national government,and if a 
conditional programme is not accepted they are seen to be not reaping 
the benefits from their taxes. The sub-national position was put 
succinctly by a former premier of New South Wales -
" revenue has become regulation. The grant is 
offered to the State with strings attached. What 
else can a revenue-starved State do but accept 
the regulation that is imposed by the Commonwealth 
along with the grant? Assume the Commonwealth 
94. See R. Mathews, Revenue Sharing in Federal Systems, pp. 33-34. 
95. A.J. Robinson, op.cit., p. 17. 
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"puts forward the suggestion of a $ for $ contribution 
to some project. The project may seem worthwhile to 
the public at large, at least as long as one puts 
aside priorities. But that is just the point. The 
State's understanding of its priorities, of what is 
in the best interest of the State, can be thwarted 
by the Federal grant which the State is almost 
obliged to accept".96 
Mathews approaches the argument this way -
"The expansion of specific purpose programs was a 
direct consequence of the vertical financial imbalance 
which resulted from uniform income taxation and the 
other shifts in financial powers ...deprived of 
access to their own tax revenues and limited in the 
amounts they could borrow through the Loan Council, 
the States were forced to accept the specific purpose 
payments and with them the conditions which the 
Federal government attached to the payments. These 
were mainly spending conditions involving acceptance 
of the Federal government's priorities and policies, 
which were often formulated without adequate planning 
or consultation with the States. 
To the extent that revenue conditions were imposed, 
these generally took the form of a requirement that 
the States maintain their existing revenue effort and 
seldom involved burdensome matching requirements. Even 
the grants for up to 50 per cent of hospital operating 
costs did not impose onerous revenue conditions on the 
States, since they substantially relieved the States 
of existing expenditure responsibilities and enabled 
them to switch funds to other uses. Specific purpose 
payments for capital purposes usually took the form of 
advances rather than grants where the payments were 
to be used to acquire revenue-producing assets",^' 
This does of course lead us into the difficult question of inducement 
versus coercion. We have already canvassed the argument as to whether 
the actual conditions of conditional funding can be legally imposed, and 
there is a somewhat related point, though a moral rather than legal one, 
as to when the conditions (and amount) of a national programme are made 
so attractive that they cannot be refused by sub-national governments. 
This problem is a familiar one and is not confined in its application 
to intergovernmental relations. Even Cranston, who strongly decries the 
arguments about the extent of interference caused by conditional funding 
96. T.L. Lewis, op.cit., p. 206. 
='/• R. Mathews, Regional Disparities and Fiscal Equalisation in 
Australia, pp. 46-47. 
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and the claims that they place onerous burdens on the States,conced(  ine C ld imb un u u n c j i c u c i u o u i UCI13 u i i cu  o L  u c b , ur n,edeS 
that "in a political and economic sense the States have to accept specific 
purpose grants, (though he goes on immediately to list a number of examples 
where States refused them). 
(G) Political Considerations 
Our analysis has already revealed much of the politics which 
surrounds conditional funding. It is a fertile field. The responses 
from interviewees brought some more to light: 
. If the national government pulls out of a conditional 
programme this amounts to political blackmail because 
it is extremely difficult to terminate such programmes 
especially those which are welfare oriented. 
, The potential offered by conditional funding for the 
imposition of the ideology of the national government 
upon that of the sub-national government negates the 
democratic process, and undermines the legitimacy of 
governments at both levels. 
. It is political suicide for a state/provincial government 
to refuse a conditional grant because of the possibility 
that the Opposition will use that fact as a weapon to 
attempt to convey a picture of neglect by one state/ 
province as compared with another which has taken up 
the conditional funding. 
. The method whereby the national government encourages 
potential clientele support groups for each programme 
builds up expectations prior to intergovernmental 
negotiations and so circumscribes the present and 
later freedom of the state or province in relation to 
those programmes. 
. Differences in party political outlook between the national 
government and a sub-national government can result in 
conditional programmes being negotiated for very short 
periods of operation when the nature of the programme 
98. R. Cranston, op.cit., pp. 132-136. 
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demands a longer term commitment on both sides. 
, The political nature of conditional funding can lead to 
an overemphasis on glamour projects and a neglect of more 
urgent but basic government action. 
. The politics of conditional funding also leadsto attempts 
by national ministers to gain publicity from each phase 
of the project,leading to undue interference and an 
insistence that the national minister personally approve 
each phase. 
A number of writers have attempted to probe the basic reasons for 
political conflict over conditional funding. Weller and Smith have this 
to say about the ideological conflict -
"This kind of conflict is caused not by arguments 
about State independence, but by debate about 
whether a particular program is acceptable. The 
States would naturally prefer a system of fiscal 
federalism, with a guaranteed and sufficient 
income; but since they must accept money by way 
of Section 96 grants, they then argue about the 
acceptibility of the aims. Medibank and the 
provision, of leasehold (rather than freehold) land 
are two well known examples. The offer to take over 
state railways is another. It is in these matters 
that the comment that two premiers, one Liberal 
one Labor, have more in common than two Labor men, 
one a state premier the other prime minister, has 
the least truth. On grounds of status leading State 
Labor politicians may regret Federal incursions 
into state affairs, but on ideological grounds 
they accept the necessity for this action if a social 
policy considered important is to be implemented 
across the whole country. 
In ideological disputes, the parties are opposed 
to one another. But it is difficult to dismantle 
well-established schemes. Once a program has 
become institutionalised and once states, local 
governments or other bodies have come to depend on 
that program, the ideological contest of last year 
tends to become the political fact of life of next 
year. In the arena of Federal-State relations, 
status conflicts are eternal, inevitable and often 
rhetorical, ideological conflicts are prone to 
change their ground and their colour".99 
99. P. Weller and R.F.I. Smith, op.cit., p. 94. 
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Holmes and Sharman suggest that states are willing to criticize national 
governments of the same political persuasion over conditional funding, 
because the national government leaders lack direct political support 
in state-based party machines even though they share a nominal label. 
Mathews regards the disputes over conditional funding as being essentially 
about power, political and bureaucratic power, which diverts attention 
from policy goals and decision processes. He says "on the one hand, 
the States complained that programs and policies were formulated without 
adequate planning and consultation and without regard to legitimate 
State interests ... on the other hand, the States were often loath to 
accept the fact that national interests, more adequate information 
sources at the Commonwealth level and the effects on other States of 
decisions taken by individual States often made it necessary for programs 
and policies to be formulated by the Commonwealth government". Jay 
admits that specific purpose payments can be sheer political instruments 
to favour States of a like persuasion, and have been used in particular 
states in strategic areas at strategic times to win votes. He also 
sees some of the smaller programmes as having resulted from states 
demanding money for a project,however small, when there seems to be the 
chance of a handout. Jay argues that a very good reason should be given 
why such projects should not be financed by the State from its general 
purpose funds - "one of the criteria governing specific purpose grants, 
102 therefore, should be that if the amount is trivial it is suspect". 
As something of a counter argument,the 1970 statement of the state premiers 
said that the proliferation of conditional programmes tends to make the 
public think that the states are being well treated by the national 
103 government. In this respect Stevenson acknowledges of Canadian 
experience that provincial officials used to get largesse out of spending 
conditional health and welfare grants. Else-Mitchell offers the opinion 
100. J. Holmes and C. Sharman, o p . c i t . , p. 150. 
101. R. Mathews, Philosophical, Political and Economic Conflicts in 
Australian Federalism, p. 14. 
102. W.R.C Jay, op.cit. , p. 120. 
103. op.cit. , p. 8. 
104. G. Stevenson, o p . c i t . , p. 170. 
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that,because specific purpose payments have been made in many areas for 
so long,they are taken for granted and the source of power and method of 
verification of expenditure are not questioned. 
Both Hunter and Stevenson reveal another facet of the politics of 
conditional funding when they show that for both Australia and Canada 
there is a clear distinction between what Stevenson classifies as 
government functions of "accumulation" and "legitimization", which 
roughly corresponds with Hunter's categories of "development" and "welfare". 
Stevenson's contention is that conditional funding of the former type 
does not come in for criticism but that of the latter type does. This is 
because accumulation expenditures "directly benefitted the influential 
classes in the provinces - businessmen and in some cases farmers -
persuading them that they received good value in return for their taxes. 
.... another advantage ... was that accumulation expenditures (public 
works, resource development, subsidies to business, and so forth) largely 
remained within the province; in other words there were few spillovers. 
On the other hand, the provinces showed little disposition to spend 
heavily on legitimization, by which is meant such areas as health, welfare, 
social insurance pensions, protection of the environment, or support of 
the arts, letters and the sciences. These activities did not directly, 
and in the short run, benefit the dominant classes; taxes levied to support 
them would be viewed as a burden disproportionate to the benefits received. 
Those residents of the province who would benefit directly were politically 
weak and poorly organized, usually without even a political party that 
reliably represented their interests. Ideology and tradition provided no 
impetus towards such expenditure. In addition, the mobility of the 
population ensured that the direct benefits of expenditure on 
legitimization might be largely reaped outside the province". 
According to Stevenson's account,the provinces thus always had spent 
their own funds on accumulation rather than legitimization, always preferring 
a dam to a hospital, a railway to a university, and an industrial subsidy 
to a pension. So, Canadian conditional grants were formulated primarily 
a means of overcoming this situation. He goes so far as to say that as 
105. Hon. Mr. Justice Rae Else-Mitchell, "The Australian Federal Grants 
System and its Impact on Fiscal Relations of the Federal Government 
with State and Local Governments", p. 487. 
106. G. Stevenson, op.cit., pp. 161-162. 
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the provinces cannot be relied on to spend enough in this field of 
policy without substantial incentives and in some cases actual coercion. 
But the significant point is that conditional grants of the accumulation 
type do not come in for the criticism directed at conditional funding 
in general, and Stevenson thinks this fits neatly with North American 
rhetoric about the evils of government spending,which he sees as meaning 
really opposition to welfare spending, not spending to boost industry. 
The national government is slightly more attracted to the legitimization 
type of spending because it has more funds at its disposal, and spillovers 
don't worry it so much because welfare recipients rarely leave the 
country. But, according to Stevenson, the national government funds such 
programmes conditionally, rather than directly, because it too lacks full 
enthusiasm for them,and likes to be able to have the potential beneficiaries 
blame the provincial government if it refuses to accept the programme. 
There is also an age old feeling in Canada that welfare is a provincial 
function. Now the complete details of this Canadian scenario do not 
completely match Australian experience but the analogy does sit reasonably 
squarely. In the Australian context. Hunter expresses the opinion that one 
can only guess at the amount of spending which specific purpose grants 
promote which the States would have undertaken on their own initiative,but 
he believes it would be a large amount "especially since the initiatives 
for many grants, especially those in the developmental as opposed to the 
welfare category, come from the states. Moreover, these initiatives are 
almost certainly related to the relative paucity of the states' financial 
resources. If this is true the states have an incentive to press for 
specific purpose grants (assuming they cannot receive general purpose 
grants and wish to avoid higher state taxes or charges), whatever the 
merits of the programmes in question. Indeed, one criticism is that 
the approach tends to be a pragmatic response to political pressures. 
It has been claimed, for example,that these pressures emanate from the 
states who regard specific purpose grants as the reward for successful 
bargaining power'.' These factors, says Hunter are less evident in 
countries without such a high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance. This 
pragmatism in conditional funding in Australia is further reflected by 
the fact that very few of the Australian conditional programmes are 
conducted on a long term formula basis; they are mostly of an ad hoc 
107. J.S.H. Hunter, op.cit. , p. 60. 
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nature. 
There are innumerable other political aspects of conditional 
funding which could be analyzed, and associated political ploys which 
can at times make for humorous reading if the situation were not so 
109 
serious. But enough has been said to make the point. We can conclude 
with the perennial argument, so often appearing in the literature, that 
conditional payments distort accountability to the electorate. Stevenson 
has already shown us how a nationally devised programme like Medicare can 
interfere in the relationships a provincial government wants between the 
medical profession and its clients, or how an education programme can 
challenge a provincial government's view of the role of the church, or 
how a welfare grant can interfere in the provincial government's outlook 
on the family unit. He discounts the accountability distortion argument 
by simply saying that "since every Canadian citizen entitled to vote in a 
provincial election can also vote in a federal election, and vice versa, 
this argument does not seem exceptionally persuasive". Nonetheless in 
Australia, one of the largest and most influential pressure groups has 
recommended an end to cost sharing for hospitals and the placement of 
complete hospital funding with the states from boosted general purpose 
revenue funds from the Commonwealth. Their main reason was the difficulty 
of determining just which level of government was really responsible for 
the standard of hospital services; 50/50 cost sharing had, they believed, 
resulted in a situation such that "what is everybody's responsibility is 
nobody's responsibility". 
The overwhelming impression to be gained from the literature on this 
subject,coupled with the interview responses, is that there are clearly 
arguments for and against conditional funding. The extent to which it 
108. R. Mathews, Regional Disparities and Fiscal Equalisation in Australia, 
p. 47. 
109. Consider the Australian water programme which was terminated when only 
one half of the city of Adelaide had been covered and the state 
government was forced politically to meet the cost of completing the 
other half of the city. Or the Canadian practice by provincial 
governments to erect signs on conditionally funded projects with 
mention of the name of the national government at the bottom of the 
sign so that it is covered in winter by the snow line, 
no. G. Stevenson, op.cit., pp. 157-158. 
111. See Austra l ian Medical A s s o c i a t i o n , Submission to the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Efficiency and Administration of Hospitals, 
November 1979, pp. 11 -18 . 
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poses a hindrance to planning will be considered in our concluding 
chapter. Politically the line-up is obvious - the national governments 
favour the device and the sub-national governments oppose it. On this 
aspect we can leave the last word with Lane who says "State and local 
governments often complain that the conditions attaching to specific 
purpose payments distort their priorities and prevent them from making 
the best use of the money they receive. It is worth noting that, to the 
extent that they view the situation in terms of their own particular 
interests, they would inevitably see it this way. Whether the intervention 
by the high-level government is desirable has to be judged from a broader 
. .„ 112 
viewpoint . 
We shall reserve judgement on the arguments surrounding conditional 
funding for the next,concluding chapter. 
112. W.R. Lane, Financial Relationships and Section 96, p. 61, 
CHAPTER 6 
3/D, 
CONCLUSION 
I t is clear from the foregoing analysis that i t is d i f f i c u l t to 
attain public sector planning in a federal form of government. We 
have defined planning as a system,and our appl icat ion of that system 
to the theory and pract ice of federal ism, reveals a s i gn i f i can t degree 
of incompatibility between the two concepts. 
As observed ea r l i e r there are marked conceptual dif ferences between 
planning and federalism. Planning, at least as we have defined i t , is 
characterized by such notions as l og i c , r a t i o n a l i t y , symmetry, predic t -
ability, concentration of decision making, an unbroken pattern of con t ro l , 
and sequential l inkages, a l l geared to the resource a l loca t ion process. 
Federalism, by contrast , is t y p i f i e d by fragmentat ion, assymetry, 
bargaining and hence uncer ta in ty , and the sharing of power or control 
including control over resources. 
Our analysis of federalism as a concept,and also as a pract ice in 
the two countries of Aust ra l ia and Canada,has revealed that the aspect 
of federalism which poses the greatest hindrance to the in t roduct ion of 
the sort of planning we are envisaging, is the fac t that sovereignty is 
divided between a national government and sub national uni ts of government; 
power is thus fragmented. The most tangible expression of th i s divided 
sovereignty is the actual d iv i s ion of funct ional powers in the two 
federations. 
Split sovereignty and the d iv is ion of powers does not a f fec t a l l 
parts of our planning system wi th equal force. The planning system, i t 
will be recal led, comprises forecast ing, determination of p r i o r i t i e s , 
allocation of resources, implementation, and review. For example, fo re-
casting is a function which could adequately be handled by one level of 
government acting for i t s e l f and fo r the other levels as w e l l . S imi la r ly 
the review function could become the respons ib i l i t y of j u s t one of the 
levels of government* I t i s the determination of p r i o r i t i e s and the 
actual allocation of resources which are the most p o l i t i c a l elements of 
our planning system,and hence i t is in these functions that the involvement 
of different levels of government and a formal d i v i s ion of power between 
them causes most d i f f i c u l t y . To a lesser extent th i s i s also true of the 
implementation funct ion since i t is rare fo r one sovereign level of 
It is also possible, of course, that both functions could be performed 
by an agency separate from e i ther level of government. 
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qovernment to be willing to allow another unit of government complete 
autonomy in the implementation of policies in whose formulation it partici-
pated. We shall return to this aspect later. 
Our analysis of the division of powers in both Australia and Canada 
revealed a number of factors highly unconducive to smooth and efficient 
priority determination and resource allocation. By splitting sovereignty 
this also fragments legitimacy, leading to rival power-seeking by both poli-
ticians and administrators of the separate governments. Being rivals,their 
basic interest is often in conflict,rather than in cooperation or coordination 
since each has its own electorate to appease. Contrary to the expectations 
of the founding fathers of both federations, the division of power has become 
a line across which a bargaining process is constantly taking place,and that 
line is a dynamic one so that the relationships between the units of govern-
ment are constantly changing and are not the static, neat, dichotomy 
portrayed in the wording of the Australian or Canadian constitutions. 
The formal division of power in these federations has also become 
dated by the wording of the constitutions which tends to be in terms of 
subject matters whose meaning has changed over time. Moreover,in those few 
functions of government where power is deemed to be concurrent,the power 
relationship between the levels of government has become unsettled because of 
the absence of any mechanism, save the nominal supremacy of the national 
government, which is really politically unworkable. 
This leads to another difficulty,viz. that the formal division of 
powers tends to terminate the geographical jurisdiction of governments simply 
because the units of government in a federation are constructed with spatial 
boundaries. Thus a two dimensional political struggle takes place in these 
federations; over functions of government generally,and over the control of 
functions within particular geographical territory. The founding fathers 
of both federations compounded this problem by actually affixing a spatial 
dimension to some public functions. Thus the industrial relations power in 
Australia is divided by the Constitution in a manner which gives the national 
government jurisdiction only over industrial matters extending beyond the 
limits of one state, and the same effect is produced in Canada in regard to 
public works and company incorporations where it is the power of the 
provinces which is similarly circumscribed; or education where the power of 
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the Canadian national government is limited, or the law function which in 
Canada is divided between the levels according to the nature of the law. 
In Australia the control of shipping is fragmented between the two levels 
of government by constitutional provisions which seek, very falsely at times, 
to distinguish between interstate and intrastate shipping. Indeed, the 
division of powers has been responsible for the fact that jurisdiction over 
many simple and identifiable government functions has been split between 
the levels of government. Take transport,for example, and there is a mixture 
of responsibility over the various transport modes eg. roads, air, rail, sea, 
pipeline, cable etc., where different levels of government are responsible 
for different modes, and within a particular mode it can happen that one unit 
of government's jurisdiction is spatially limited. Thus, in Australia, the 
national government controls most air transport but shares power with the 
states over intrastate transport; similarly for sea transport; rail transport 
is divided with both levels of government actually conducting railway 
operations; road jurisdiction is split to the extent that the Commonwealth 
gives road funding and both state and local governments engage in road 
construction; bus and ferry transport are split between state and local 
governments etc. In the case of hospitals, in both Australia and Canada it 
is possible for national and sub national units (including local government 
in some circumstances), to construct hospitals. 
The point of these examples is simply to demonstrate that the formal 
division of power in a federation serves to fragment control over individual 
public functions. This can only be a hindrance to planning because public 
sector planning proceeds by way of expressing priorities in terms of one 
public function against another,which, in turn, requires that each public 
function must be capable of being perceived, and regulated as one discrete 
entity. How, for example, could an Australian or Canadian national public 
sector plan hope to cope with certainty, on a national basis,with the 
transport function or the hospital function? The spatial and functional 
breakages render the task particularly difficult. 
The sheer existence of a division of powers creates another hindrance 
for any planning attempt because it creates the necessity for an umpire to 
arbitrate between the levels of government and even between the units of 
government at the same level. This role is played in both the Australian 
and Canadian federations by the respective High (or Supreme) Courts. The decisions 
those Courts over the years have, as we have witnessed in the earlier dis-
cussion, changed the very division of powers itself by virtue of their inter-
pretations of the Constitution,and more particularly because of differing 
interpretations of the same matters from time to time. The presence of 
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an umpire itself presents an obstacle to planning because it provides yet 
another locus of decision making in a structure already complicated by the 
presence of more than one sovereign government. It also creates delays, 
and most importantly, it introduces an element of uncertainty into the 
various deliberations associated with the planning process. This would 
be true of any federation*and it is of course a necessary obstruction 
given the nature of federalism. But the court too, especially in Australia, 
proved to be an even greater hindrance because of the substance of some of 
its decisions which have tended to fragment power even further between the 
two main levels. Thus,for example, the liberal interpretation by the court 
of Section 92 relating to interstate trade has limited centripetal forces 
emanating from the national government, but has also placed limits on the 
extent of regulation of state governments over activities originating from 
within their boundaries but transgressing their borders. 
It might be imagined that a satisfactory division of powers in a 
federation would at least enable each unit of government to plan its own 
activities in a satisfactory manner,even if it could not do so for its 
intergovernmental relations. Indeed our extensive review of the history and 
literature of Australian and Canadian federalism has revealed that this was 
the basic intention of the founding fathers of both federations. But the 
division of powers which was created in each country was undertaken at a 
time when the role of government in the community was a limited one. It 
was also a time when the Westminster model of political accountability had 
reached its highest point of refinement in Britain and her colonies. There 
was also limited mobility of resources between colonies and limited 
communication between them. This meant that clear lines of accountability 
had been established from the executive to the people through a parliament 
which was not inhibited by party divisions. Hence the founding fathers 
had reason to believe that the division of powers which they desired could 
be a discrete division encapsulating each unit of the federation into a 
watertight compartment. 
Here then is the essence of the shortcomings of the division of powers 
in both federations. The role of government has been substantially extended 
and the nature of government activity has also changed. Resources are now 
highly mobile around the federation, and this,together with other factors. 
It is also true of a unitary system of government to the extent that the 
judiciary acts as a check on the executive and even, to a slight extent, 
on the legislature. However the role of the court being emphasized here 
is its function of determining legitimacy of levels of government. 
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has led to a complexity of soc ie ty , an interrelatedness which cannot be 
adequately regulated by a federal system which attempts to rest on a 
simplistic d iv is ion of powers. Society has evolved at a much fas ter rate 
than the ins t i tu t ions of i t s government. 
Our research has revealed a considerable number of linkages which 
exist within,and between, functions of government which have occurred in a 
natural manner as the economy and society in general have become more mobile, 
more communicative, more dependent, and so more sophist icated. These 
natural linkages stand in stark contrast wi th the a r t i f i c i a l d iv is ions of 
government power in the respective cons t i tu t ions , and i t i s th i s jux tapos i t ion 
of natural connections wi th a r t i f i c i a l breakages in government regulat ions 
which provide one of the most fundamental stumbling blocks to the i n t r o -
duction of a planning system such as the one envisaged. 
Earlier we l i s t e d and examined many of the linkages between ind iv idua l 
functions of government. I t w i l l be recal led that th is l i s t included, 
inter a l ia , the connection between post and telegraph and the conduct of 
lotteries; the impact of r a i l and road transport on land sett lement; the 
manner in which taxation laws can sp l i n t e r family estates; the obvious 
linkage between navigation and i r r i g a t i o n on r i v e r s ; the impact of i ndus t r i a l 
matters on trade and commerce; the connection of education to broadcasting, 
literature, research e tc ; the clear re la t ionsh ip of powers over marriage 
and divorce with family matters; the inf luence of radio and te lev is ion on 
cigarette smoking etc, etc . That i s one form of l inkage which is not 
adequately catered for by the formal d iv i s ion of powers. I f one were to take 
the trouble to construct a complete catalogue of such l inkages, one would 
find that a l l the chains in the l i n k w i l l be cont ro l led by d i f f e ren t levels 
of government, for example posts and telegraphs being a national funct ion and 
lotteries a sub national funct ion. These are reasonably spec i f i c l inkages 
and tangible ones, even though we tend not to view them as such because the 
institutions of government at each l e v e l , as well as between leve ls , fragment 
them for purposes of government con t ro l . Thus natural social and economic 
linkages are jus t as much a problem for the separation of powers as fo r the 
division of powers. 
As well as those more tangib le linkages between actual government 
functions, we have also i d e n t i f i e d a subtle form of l inkage between the 
levels of government in a federat ion which occurs where the un i la te ra l 
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actions of one uni t have consequences for other un i ts , even though the act ive 
unit is acting completely w i th in i t s formal power boundaries. As we have 
seen this occurs mainly as a resu l t of national actions which impact upon 
sub-national governments as with monetary po l i cy , t a r i f f protect ion po l i cy , 
broadcasting, etc. where national pol ic ies a f fec t sub national government 
activity. Immigration is another good example in the Austral ian context 
because the level of immigration has a real consequence for the provision of 
infrastructure by state and local governments. In a l i k e manner any f i d d l i n g 
by a national government wi th i t s c r i t e r i a for various pension enti t lements 
will create problems for s ta te /prov inc ia l or local governments who o f fe r 
various concessions on the i r normal charges for government services to 
pensioners. The reverse process can also occur, though less f requent ly , as 
when states tax resource u t i l i z a t i o n or change land u t i l i z a t i o n po l ic ies 
forcing reconsideration of national po l i c ies . In Aus t ra l ia , government control 
over aboriginal a f f a i r s provides an in teres t ing example because although a 
referendum in 1967 gave the national government unequivocal powers over 
aboriginal matters, the state governments re ta in a l l powers over land 
uti l ization. Since a great many aspects of l eg i s la t i on for aboriginal a f f a i r s 
relate to land tenure,the d iv i s ion of powers is a s i gn i f i can t hindrance to 
the implementation of national government po l ic ies for aboriginal people. 
Again there are the sp i l l ove r e f fects of the actions of a single government 
unit which have formed such a large part of our ea r l i e r analysis. The point 
about linkages of th is type is that,once again,the i n s t i t u t i o n s of 
federalism are not constructed to cope wi th them because the const i tu t iona l 
division of powers does not recognize them. More pa r t i cu la r l y , few provisions 
exist for one uni t of government to par t i c ipa te in a l l those decisions which 
affect i t . 
These then are some of the hindrances which arose when we engaged in 
a contemplation of the d iv i s ion of powers. Our technique, i t w i l l be 
recalled, was to examine the two most prominent manifestations of the power 
division to determine the i n t r a c t a b i l i t y or otherwise of those problems in 
a more practical context. Intergovernmental agreements and federal 
financial relat ionships were analyzed as the areas where intergovernmental 
I'elations take on the most tangible form. 
The examination of federal f i nanc ia l re lat ionships in Aust ra l ia 
•"evealed many problems facing the in t roduct ion of our planning system. 
The very existence of ve r t i ca l f i s ca l imbalance is a major obstacle 
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to the sub-national units of government because, especially in Australia, 
it leads to a very high level of dependence for them on transfers from 
the national government. (Of course it follows that this vertical imbalance 
automatically makes it easier for the national government to plan its 
activities in accordance with "national priorities".) Moreover the lack 
of uniformity between the states or provinces leads to an assymmetry in 
both federations whereupon each state or province has a different level and 
nature of dependence on intergovernmental transfers. In other words both 
federations also display a significant degree of horizontal imbalance made 
manifest in the overall incidence of dependence,together with differing 
mixtures of current and capital funding and differing mixtures of 
unconditional and conditional funding. Offsetting this factor, to some 
extent, is the very existence of a systematic policy of rectifying 
horizontal imbalance through equalization payments which, if nothing else, 
should remove some degree of the uncertainty for a sub-national unit in 
projecting its likely revenue. 
Of particular importance is the pronounced variability in inter-
governmental funding year to year and the necessity for the annual variations 
to be offset by quick shifts in revenue raising policies of the recipient 
governments. It must be recognized that this need not be an inherent 
problem of federalism per se, but could also at times reflect the way in 
which the national government uses its powers. All of this is compounded 
by the fact that,in both Australia and Canada,the largest blocks of 
conditional transfers from the national government are for functions which 
are constitutionally assigned to the state/provincial governments, thereby 
rendering the formal division of powers even more redundant. This situation 
is exacerbated by the processes of fiscal coordination within units of 
government which are not themselves conducive to priority determination 
because they are fragmented; for example, national as well as state or 
provincial budgets,are uncomprehensive owing to the existence of public or 
crown corporations, other statutory bodies, and the use of trust funds and 
other accounting devices which fragment fiscal policy within the sub-national 
level itself. This lack of coordination within units of government naturally 
bodes ill for any attempt at intergovernmental coordination which lies at 
the heart of our planning process. These,and other internal inadequacies of 
sub-national governments in particular, figured prominently in our earlier 
discussions. 
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What was not so explicitly recognized earlier was a number of other 
factors which lie at the heart of the difficulty of achieving the elements 
of our planning system in federal financial relationships. These are,in 
effect,linkages which would have to exist within the pattern of federal 
financial relationships for democratic priority determination and resource 
allocation to take place effectively. The first is some sort of connection 
between taxation and expenditure decisions. What is needed is a linkage 
at the marginal level of decision. Thus, it is not so much a matter of the 
degree of vertical imbalance but rather a question of whether the level of 
the vertical fiscal transfers is subject to negotiation or argument at the 
margin, so that for each government a change in expenditure has to be 
considered in relation to a change in its own revenue-raising. It is clear 
that in both federations this linkage is missing,especially in Australia 
with its high degree of vertical imbalance. The national government makes 
decisions about the level and nature of taxation to raise revenue which 
will be spent to a significant degree by the states/provinces. On the 
other hand the states/provinces make choices about expenditure allocations 
against a background where the national government will supply a large 
component of that spending. In such a situation the national government 
is responsible to its electorate for raising revenue whose disbursement 
it will only partially control, whereas the sub-national units are not 
responsible to their electorates for the raising of all the money that 
they spend. To oversimplify the problem we can say that with one 
sovereign government raising this money and a different sovereign government 
spending it, it is inevitable that they will find it difficult to coordinate 
their views, in order to agree on priorities, and the attendant allocation 
of money to achieve those priorities. Moreover the electorate of each of 
the two levels will find it singularly frustrating to place the credit or 
blame for government activity if it disagrees in any way with the priorities 
and allocations which emerge. In other words it is politically irresponsible 
that the government which spends funds has little say in the raising of 
them and vice versa. 
Secondly there is, within the financial relationships of both 
federations, a very tenuous relationship between decisions about capital 
expenditure,and decisions about recurrent expenditure. Indeed there are 
separate institutional frameworks for the intergovernmental allocation of 
the two types of funding in both federations. Yet for the introduction of 
our notion of public sector planning it is essential to recognize the link 
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between capital and recurrent spending. If this is not done it can result, 
in the extreme, in the provision of hospitals with no staff to run them, 
or a surplus of teachers with an inadequate number of schools and so on. 
Our analysis has shown no connection between the movements in the inter-
governmental transfers for capital purposes and recurrent purposes. The 
pattern in both Australia and Canada is for the two types of funding to 
be negotiated separately in different parts of the political and 
bureaucratic framework. Once again it needs to be stressed that this is 
not an inherent aspect of the federal form of government and could occur 
just as readily in a unitary system. However the problem is exacerbated in 
a federation where sovereign units have some further power to reallocate 
funds between capital and recurrent purposes. In terms of the actual flow 
of funds, the usual pattern is for a relatively smooth trend in recurrent 
payments,but an erratic trend in capital payments, because the former are 
more concerned with "uncontrollable" elements of public expenditure such as 
wages and salaries and interest on debt. From within recurrent and capital 
funding the intergovernmental allocation of expenditure and priority 
determination does not take place according to our concept of planning. 
Essentially this is because the spatial emphasis is stronger than the 
functional emphasis so that, for example, the Australian Loan Council 
which oversees public capital expenditure in the Australian federation, 
compiles a loan programme based on submissions from the states and then 
allocates loan funds by state rather than by project or by functional 
area. We shall return to this aspect later. 
The point has frequently been made throughout Chapter 5 that there 
is little in the way of a formal connection between the mechanisms 
affecting vertical fiscal imbalance and those which affect horizontal 
fiscal imbalance^ Indeed we have observed that, in both federations, 
there are in fact various formulae and processes which impact upon horizontal 
imbalance depending on the nature of the function. Each programme seems 
to have a different methodology for this purpose and they,in turn,differ 
from the basic equalization programmes achieved in Australia through the 
operations of the Commonwealth Grants Commission and in Canada through 
the formal Equalization formulae. There is no way horizontal equalization 
can be applied separately to individual components of a consolidated 
''udget: it has to be done for the budget as a whole, covering both 
revenue and expenditure. It can, of course, be done for separate sub-
I^j^ts with revenue earmarked for specified functions. 
It is, of course, true that the mechanisms for tax sharing take some account of 
both horizontal and vertical imbalance and they represent the major transfer 
Item. 
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Finally there is, of course, no consistent connection between inter-
governmental funding which is unconditional and that which is conditional. 
The former tends to change from year to year in a smoother pattern 
primarily because it is based on formulae negotiated to cover long term 
periods as with the new tax sharing agreements in Australia, By contrast 
the conditional funding is, as we have seen, prone to severe fluctuations 
year to year especially the capital element of it. It is quite apparent 
that the process for determining conditional funding is,generally speaking, 
more short term and more political. What is of particular importance is 
the fact that we have uncovered no evidence to suggest that,in determining 
the level and nature of conditional funding, there is automatic consideration 
of the level of unconditional funding. Trends display little correlation 
between the two types of funding. The states/provinces must seek the one 
type of funding through quite different channels from the ones through which 
they pursue the other type. The only time an automatic link is forged 
between unconditional and conditional funding is when an attempt is made to 
offset some movement in conditional funding by a commensurate change in 
unconditional funding, as for example, when a national government shifts its 
funding from single programmes into block grants or takes over some 
government function from the sub-national units, or for ideological or other 
political reasons simply decides to fund certain aspects of state/provincial 
activity in one way rather than the other as happened in Canada with the 
Established Programs Financing arrangements. This is another example of 
a problem not unique to federal forms of government but exacerbated by 
them. 
These then are some of the main factors which emerged out of our 
analysis of federal finance in Australia and Canada. They are evidence of 
a yery piecemeal and fragmented pattern of priority determination and 
resource allocation and so present severe obstacles to the implementation 
of the envisaged planning system. We did, of course, encounter some 
countervailing forces. A portion of the intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
is considered on a long term basis. In Australia the old Financial 
Assistance Grants,and the tax sharing arrangements which replaced them,have 
been negotiated for five year periods although it has not been uncommon 
for them to be supplemented in some years on an ad hoc basis reflecting 
political opportunism. Some Australian conditional funding,and a good deal 
of Canadian conditional funding,is negotiated on a formula basis applicable 
over three or five years with a lengthy period stipulated as being required 
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if one unit of government wishes to withdraw. This, of course,reflects 
the fact that conditional funding is often associated with intergovernmental 
agreements. The wery mechanisms of correcting horizontal imbalance through 
equalization programmes must create something of an air of certainty for a 
sub-national unit of government in the sense of a net or backstop should 
anything untoward occur in its revenue raising or expenditure capabilities. 
This leaves only the general debate about conditional funding to 
consider. This debate warrants separate attention because it loomed so 
large in responses from interviewees employed in sub-national governments 
who saw it as perhaps the prime obstacle to attainment of public sector 
planning,especially at their level of government. The arguments against 
conditional funding and the descriptive data about them in both federations 
werepresented comprehensively in Chapter 5. It must naturally be conceded 
that any type of conditional funding will make decision making by a sub-
national government more complicated. This is especially so for a central 
budget agency like a state treasury which will need to be able to compute, 
for government estimates,the amount of expenditure from the state's own 
revenue which will be required for every functional area. If some of 
those functional areas are to be the subject of intergovernmental funding 
as well as local funding, this will obviously change the level of local 
funding required. 
If it were a complete substitution of intergovernmental funding for 
local funding (that is with no matching or other requirements for a 
contribution by the recipient government), that need not be of concern to 
the recipient government,because if it is for the same amount which the 
recipient government would have spent anyway,the recipient government is 
able to free that amount of funds for spending elsewhere. If it is for 
an amount less than would have been spent by the recipient government on 
that function, the recipient government is always able to deploy some of 
its own revenue to top up the intergovernmental transfers being given for 
that function. If the intergovernmental funding is for an amount greater 
than would have been spent by the recipient government then that is 
obviously of no fiscal concern to the recipient government, although it 
"lay be of political concern in that it creates a higher expectation on the 
part of those benefitting from the expenditure,and an expectation that the 
higher level of funding will always continue even if the intergovernmental 
funding should cease or diminish. Such is the lack of sophistication and 
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natural human reaction of beneficiaries of public expenditure. However 
the point to be made is that in terms of our discussion of planning, 
involving priorities which we define to mean choices, none of the possible 
methods of conditional funding under this scenario really affect the 
priorities of sub-national governments. 
A somewhat different picture emerges if the government giving the 
conditional funding, which in Australia and Canada means the national 
government, attaches some kind of matching or other constraint to its 
funding. We have seen that the most common type of fiscal condition in 
these two countries is that which requires the recipient government to 
match the intergovernmental transfer to some degree. If those conditions 
only result in the recipient government devoting the same, or a lesser 
amount,of their own revenue to a particular function compared with what 
it would have spent on that function in the absence of the intergovernmental 
transfer, then there has surely been no effective interference with the 
priorities of the recipient government. This will depend on whether the 
sub-national government has any choice as to how much it will match. If 
it has a choice, then the marginal cost to the sub-national government of 
variations in the level of the service is reduced by the national 
government's contribution. However we can readily agree with the arguments 
advanced by interviewees and in the literature, in Chapter 5, that if the 
conditions of the intergovernmental transfer result in the recipient 
government devoting more of its own revenue to a function than it would 
have devoted in the absence of the intergovernmental transfer, a priority 
distortion has taken place for the recipient government. We can also 
readily agree that if, because of the nature of the matching or other 
conditions, the recipient (say sub-national) government is able to draw 
more intergovernmental funds for a particular function than the donor 
(say national) government had intended it would spend on that function, 
then a priority distortion has again taken place, this time for the donor 
government. The former situation is claimed to have occurred in both 
federations,especially in those situations where there were governments 
in power at the national level with a conflicting ideology with that of 
any incumbent sub-national government, especially in functions like public 
housing, land purchasing and some quasi-welfare payments. The latter 
situation has also occurred in both federations, though more so in Canada, 
where runaway provincial spending in conditional programme areas causing 
escalating national government spending through matching conditions,was 
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partly responsible for the new components of the Established Programs 
Financing package which now places a ceiling on national government 
contributions. In Australia, similar occurrences occurred, though to a 
lesser extent, with public hospital funding causing the national government 
to review its open ended commitment to meet 50 per cent of the costs 
involved in that function. There is a conflict, from the viewpoint of 
the economic theory of efficient resource allocation, between placing 
a ceiling on the national government's contributions, and offering a 
subsidy to the sub-national government in recognition of the spillover 
benefits of expenditure undertaken by the latter. However it is doubtful 
whether any attempt at measuring the spillovers has ever influenced the 
ratio of the matching requirement. 
Thus we can accept the argument that such priority distortion can and 
does occur. But what is unclear is the scale on which it occurs in both 
federations. 
There is no evidence to suggest that it is a problem of great 
magnitude. No respondent in the interviews associated with this study 
was prepared to place a figure on the proportion of intergovernmental 
transfers so affected and, as we saw in Chapter 5, the Australian author 
who has conducted the most research in this area, Robert Jay, was not 
able to provide such a figure either. The basic reason is that it is 
impossible to compute,because of the manner in which public finance data 
is presented, because of the poor oversight and research capacity of the 
central coordinating institutions at both national and sub-national levels 
in the two federations which have failed to tackle this question, as well 
as the real probability that the problem is a relatively insignificant one 
anyway. Indeed,all the evidence which is available suggests that the 
proportion of intergovernmental funding affected by the priority distortion 
phenomena is very low indeed. 
For a start, conditional funding has always represented less than half 
of all the intergovernmental transfers in Australia. In the case of Canada 
whilst conditional funding exceeds unconditional funding, it has generally 
"represented less than two-thirds of the total mixture. This allows latitude 
for the topping up process, referred to earlier, from unconditional funds 
into conditionally funded functions. This has been referred to elsewhere as 
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the "bottles analogy", whereby the various b o t t l e s , i . e . functions of 
sub national governments, are f i l l e d bythe donor government to the levels 
it desires through i t s condi t ional funding devices, and the sub-national 
governments then top up those bot t les which they think should be f i l l e d 
to a higher level with the use of t he i r considerable reservoir of unconditional 
intergovernmental t ransfers,as well as t he i r own revenue. Once again we can 
see that this analogy breaks down i f any bo t t l e is f i l l e d by the donor 
government to a higher level than the sub-national government would have 
wished in the f i r s t place. Or i f the donor government produces a bo t t l e 
which the recipient government would not have even placed in the l ine-up 
at all i f given the choice. I t must also be conceded that the evidence adduced 
from the tables in Chapter 5, for both Aust ra l ia and Canada, revealed a very 
erratic pattern of overal l condi t ional funding fo r many funct ional areas 
from year to year, and i t has to be conceded that th is would cause some 
uncertainty about whether the flow in to each bo t t l e would be a t r i c k l e or 
a flood each year. This , of course, is more of an administ rat ive problem 
revolving around communications between po l i t i c i ans and publ ic administrators 
at both levels of government. 
Secondly i t is obvious from the data in Chapter 5 that the 
level of dependence on intergovernmental t ransfers varies great ly from 
state to state in Aus t ra l i a , and from province to province in Canada. 
There is a def in i te pattern in both federations that the larger the state 
or province, the lower i t s dependence on intergovernmental t ransfers o r , 
to put i t the other way around, the more autonomous i t is in that i t provides 
a higher proportion of i t s expenditure needs from i t s own revenue sources. 
There is also something of a pattern in existence, especia l ly in Canada, 
whereby the larger sub-national uni ts received a greater share of t he i r 
intergovernmental funding in the condi t ional form mainly because the 
unconditional element of intergovernmental f i s ca l t ransfers in each country 
has a strong horizontal equal izat ion component. So those sub-national 
units with the greatest accent on condi t ional funding in t h e i r p r o f i l e of 
intergovernmental receipts are prec ise ly those uni ts which have more f i s ca l 
autonomy in general, and therefore l o g i c a l l y bet ter placed to o f f se t any 
priority d is tor t ion e f f ec t s . To take some extreme cases for the purposes 
1- R.L. Mathews, ed.. Making Federalism Work (Canberra, Centre fo r 
Research on Federal Financial Relat ions, 1976), p.124. 
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of i l lus t ra t ion , Ontario in Canada receives 96% of i t s intergovernmental 
funding in the condit ional form; the Alberta f igure is 88%; but those 
transfers represent only 17% of a l l the revenue coming to the province of 
Ontario and only 10% of a l l the revenue coming to Alberta (see table 5.C.3). 
Considering that the p r i o r i t y d i s to r t i on element would only be a f rac t ion 
of that 17% and 10%, i t s overal l impact i s most l i k e l y to be neg l i g ib le . 
In the Australian case, V ic to r ia receives 45% of i t s intergovernmental funding 
in the conditional form and New South Wales the same (see table 5.A.24), 
but i t can be estimated that those transfers represent only 16% of a l l 
Victoria's revenue and 17% of that of New South Wales (derived from table 
5.A.11). In view of these f igures i t is d i f f i c u l t to f i nd much sympathy 
for the p r io r i t y d i s to r t i on argument in the larger states and provinces. 
It seems therefore, on the surface at l eas t , to be more of a problem for the 
smaller states and provinces. However, in t he i r si tua t ion , the pattern of 
intergovernmental funding acts to r e c t i f y the s i t ua t i on . In both Austra l ia 
and Canada, especial ly Canada, the smaller states and provinces are 
definitely more dependent overal l on intergovernmental funding, but the 
profile of that funding has a much smaller proportion of condit ional 
funding in i t . So even in Prince Edward Is land, the most f i s c a l l y 
dependent Canadian province,(over 55% of i t s to ta l revenue comes from 
intergovernmental t ransfers) , the condit ional funding from the national 
government represents only 25% of the revenue coming to the province from 
all sources (see table 5.C.3) because that province receives only about ha l f 
of all i ts intergovernmental t ransfers inthe condit ional form,(see table 
5.C.1). In Aust ra l ia , Tasmania the smallest state receives only 33% of a l l 
its intergovernmental funding in the condit ional form,(see table 5.A.24), 
and that would represent only 18% of a l l the states revenue receipts from 
all sources, (derived from table 5.A.11). Consequently even in the most 
fiscally dependent sub-national un i t s , t he i r intergovernmental condit ional 
funding represents 25% (P .E . I . ) and 18% (Tas.) of t h e i r t o ta l revenue. 
Once again the p r i o r i t y d i s t o r t i on element of that condi t ional funding 
is l ikely to be only a f rac t ion of the t o t a l . I f i t amounted to even a 
fifth of a l l the condit ional funding that would s t i l l represent only 5% and 
3.5% respectively of the prov ince/s ta te 's to ta l revenue from a l l sources* 
Another way of attempting to come to gr ips with the extent to which 
the pr ior i ty of sub-national uni ts might have been d is to r ted is to examine 
those pr ior i t ies as re f lec ted in the proport ion of state or prov inc ia l 
j^^ Penditure devoted to each funct ional area over a period of t ime. 
The stat ist ics would be more meaningful i f we could segregate condi t ional 
grants with a matching requirement but no separate data of th is kind is 
Pi^ ovided for e i ther federat ion. 
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Any significant changes might, superficially at least, indicate the 
difficulty they have in maintaining such priorities, and the lack of 
any substantial variation could indicate a capacity on their part to 
weather all vagaries, including fluctuations in intergovernmental funding, 
particularly conditional funding. This is not an easy task to perform 
because of the lack of comparable data for each country between states 
or provinces, especially data on a functional basis. The state or 
provincial governments themselves do not provide such data and so we are 
forced to rely on derived data presented by the government statisticians 
in both countries, as well as the Commonwealth Grants Commission in Australia. 
It should be noted also that the presentation of this data differs from the 
presentation used for conditional funding so that it is not possible to 
compare directly fluctuations in conditional funding for a function with 
total state/local spending on that function. 
Table 6.1* gives the functional breakdown of fiscal consumption 
expenditure for Australian state and local authorities. (Local authorities 
have been lumped with state authorities for this purpose because of the 
fact that there is a difference between the Australian states in the 
distribution of government functions between state and local authorities). 
Considering that this table represents a ten year period, there is a 
reasonable consistency in the proportion of consumption spending allocated 
to each function, and this is true for ewery state, even though the 
proportion allocated to a particular function will vary from state to 
state. In other words, even though priorities differ from state to state, 
each state has maintained its priority pattern more consistently than might 
be expected given the pronounced fluctuations in intergovernmental 
transfers on which the states are so dependent. It can be noted that 
this has been the case through a period, 1972-75, when conditional 
funding to all states increased very rapidly. So there is obviously 
sufficient flexibility in the system of Australian public finance to 
allow priorities to differ from state to state, and also to allow each 
state to maintain its priorities. 
Some qualifications do need to be made to this broad conclusion. 
Firstly these figures for consumption expenditure are "net" amounts of 
spending after deducting the recoup of fees, charges, sales etc. in 
that public function. The definition of final consumption expenditure 
employed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics includes, inter alia, 
the following -
* Page 443. 
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"Fees and charges for services rendered and sales of 
goods and services by general government bodies have 
been offset against ... gross expenditure, together 
with recoveries from other governments, to give final 
consumption expenditure by general governments." 
Thus, in the allocation of consumption expenditure to various government 
functions, state and local authorities must take account of inter-
governmental transfers into that function as well as generated revenue. 
This may account for some of the difference between the expenditure 
profile from state to state because one state may make charges for a 
particular government service whilst another may not. For example, there 
has been no direct charge to patients at public hospitals in Queensland, 
whereas all other states have made such a charge, which will result in 
a "netting off" process in all states except Queensland. This factor 
also accounts for the major exception to our generalization about 
consistency of expenditure profile within each state viz. the item 
"hospital and clinic services" in Table 6.1. It will be observed that 
all states recorded an appreciable increase in the share of consumption 
expenditure on this function in the latter part of the period under review 
as a result of the new boosted hospital cost sharing arrangements 
introduced in the mid-1970's. Of course the very process of "netting" 
does not negate the general tenor of our conclusion. Indeed the 
possibility of using offsetting revenue adds another important element 
of flexibility for state/local governments. It is mentioned here 
because it explains to some extent the general conclusion we have drawn 
from Table 6.1 about lack of priority consistency between states but 
consistency within states. Yet another point to be made about Table 6.1 
is that the bulk of "final consumption expenditure" constitutes wages, 
salaries and supplements. Supplements include "contributions by general 
government bodies to superannuation funds and accruing superannuation 
liability of public enterprises", but "direct payment of pensions etc. 
to former employees by way of unfunded retirement benefits schemes are 
treated as transfer payments". Given the nature of such consumption 
expenditure it would be reasonable to expect a fair degree of consistency 
within any unit of government because items such as wages, salaries and 
supplements are generally determined by formulae or quasi-formulae, or 
at least some arbitral process, which produces escalation of a stable kind. 
This stability is further compounded by the comparative inflexibility of 
the government employment staffing establishment itself, at least in 
the short run. 
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Table 6.2*gives a similar breakdown but this time for expenditure 
on fixed assets. Once again there is a different pattern of priorities 
from state to state. The consistency of priorities within each state is 
reasonably high though not as constant as was the case for consumption 
expenditure. To some extent greater fluctuations might be expected in 
relation to capital expenditure than for recurrent expenditure because 
of the commencement and termination of major projects. Western Australia 
and Tasmania have the least consistent patterns of priority but even in 
those states the changes are confined to just a few functions. Thus in 
the field of capital expenditure, a vital aspect of public sector 
planning, the national system is also flexible enough to allow different 
state priorities, but a fair maintenance of priorities within states. 
Indeed the differences in priorities from state to state are less than 
they were in the case of consumption expenditure. 
A few aspects of the figures in Table 6.2 should be elaborated upon. 
The statistician's definition of expenditure on new fixed assets includes 
all spending whether for replacement or additions. He admits the impossibility 
of maintaining a satisfactory and consistent distinction between new 
construction and maintenance and, for example, expenditure on maintenance 
of roads is treated as capital. This does not affect our general conclusion 
as long as the statistician's figures are presented on a consistent basis, 
but in the case of roads and any other items involving maintenance, it 
means that we cannot be privy to the pattern of resource allocation by 
state/local governments as between new construction and maintenance. In 
other words a state government could, in any year, have spent a quite 
different mixture of funding between new construction and maintenance, 
but the figures available to us in Table 6.2 would not reveal that shift 
in priorities. Table 6.2 also contains something of the "netting" aspect 
because, for example, the statistician's definition of expenditure on 
construction of dwellings for rental purposes by state housing authorities 
makes provision for a deduction of the book value of previously rented 
dwellings sold to tenants; (expenditure on houses built for sale is 
excluded). Once again this disguises a little of the priority shift at the 
state level as between sale/rental of public housing, but it does give 
state governments an added degree of flexibility in their priority 
determination. It unquestionably accounts for a part of the priority 
difference between states. 
Page 444. 
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Table 6.3*is compiled from Commonwealth Grants Commission sources and 
relates only to social service expenditure. It gives a more detailed 
breakdown of functions than did the statisticians' data, and is thereby 
able to reveal quite significant priority differences between the Australian 
states. The amount of expenditure allocated to particular functions can 
vary substantially from state to state and there is hardly an individual 
function where variation of some kind does not occur between the states. 
Table 6,4*Vovides yet another perspective on this topic, this time 
distinguishing between current and capital outlays in each state. All 
states have experienced a progressive trend towards a greater emphasis on 
current outlays since 1964-65. The mixture of current and capital outlays 
is reasonably similar between states and has been in this period. Within each 
state there have been quite different rates of increase from year to year. 
The variation in those increases, though significant, has been nothing like 
the pronounced variations we observed in Chapter 5 in relation to inter-
governmental fiscal transfers. In other words the annual changes in state 
current and capital outlays in Australia are smoother than the changes in 
federal transfers. The year 1974-75 stands out as an aberration to all 
the abovementioned generalizations, but it proved to be a temporary phenomenon, 
and the trends which had been in existence soon were resumed. 
"kick 
Table 6.5 is the only similar data available for Canada and it is not 
as useful because it relates only to very broad functional areas, and only 
for a few recent years. It shows significant differences between provinces 
in the annual variations of expenditure in most functions. It also reveals, 
within all provinces, some sharp variations in the pattern of annual changes 
in expenditure on each function. This would, superficially at least, tend 
to indicate a different priority pattern from province to province and a 
less consistent priority pattern within provinces than was the case in 
the Australian states. 
However, taking Australian and Canadian figures together, these tables 
seem to indicate either (a) that the flow of intergovernmental funding in both 
countries does not significantly shift the priorities of the 
states or provinces, because the mere fact 
* Pi^i-445; 
** Page 446. 
*** Page 447. 
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that priorities do differ between sub-national units indicates flexibility 
to manoeuvre, whereas a fair degree of consistency of priorities within 
units indicates stability within that system, or (b) that states and provinces 
have a remarkable and resilient capacity to adapt to changing patterns of 
intergovernmental funding in order to maintain their priorities. Whichever 
explanation is closer to the truth, these factors tend to suggest a much 
lower priority distortion effect than was claimed by respondents in the 
interviews, or authors in the literature which we surveyed. How else can 
one explain a situation of marked fluctuations in intergovernmental funding 
to the states and provinces (as evident from many of the tables in Chapter 
5), and greater stability in priorities, (as evident from the foregoing tables)? 
A conment needs to be made on one other particular aspect of the 
conditional funding debate outlined in Chapter 5, viz. the argument that 
if a state or province does not wish to be influenced by conditional 
funding it can refuse to accept the relevant funds. We saw in Chapter 5 
that states and provinces have refused conditional funds from time to 
time. Indeed the Canadian statistics on participation by provinces in 
conditional grants and shared cost programmes reveal a pronounced 
assymmetry in the geographical impact of conditional funding; probably much 
greater than would apply in Australia. The overall situation in Canada 
is quite different, in that the possibility of "opting out" of federal 
programmes and receiving tax points in lieu, has been an alternative in 
theory and in practice. That alternative has not really existed in 
Australia since the introduction of uniform taxation, and it wasn't such 
a possibility before then, partly because of the constitutional requirement 
in Australia that all direct and indirect taxes levied by the Australian 
national government have to be uniform across the whole continent. As 
we observed in Chapter 5, refusal of conditional funding is always 
technically possible but it is not often politically possible.* It 
depends yery much on the scale of the programme involved. Clearly the 
potential for refusing conditional funding for the hospital or school 
system is vastly different from that for refusal of such funds for historic 
monuments. Where large amounts of potential funding are involved, refusal 
would be more obvious to the electorate, and would cause more havoc with a 
state or province's public finance, especially as the taxpayers from that 
state or province would be contributing to a programme from which their 
state or provincial government would be receiving no return. In the case 
of the smaller programmes, the situation would depend on how effective the 
state or provincial Opposition or pressure groups were in pointing out to 
the^  electorate that money was going begging. This, in turn, would be 
*There are many small conditional grants in Australia that the States could 
have refused. 
influenced by the extent to which a state or provincial government 
wanted to share the kudos for a programme with the national government, 
since it must be conceded that national governments frame many programmes 
with conditional rather than unconditional funding to gain votes, and 
especially to honour election pledges. That is only natural. Given the 
level of dependence of the Australian states on intergovernmental transfers 
it is unlikely that they could reject any substantial intergovernmental 
transfer for very long. Given the nature of both state and provincial 
functions in both countries, together with their relatively less 
lucrative taxation bases, there will always be substantial pressure to 
accept conditional funding. And given the political necessity for states 
or provinces to keep their own taxes and fees relatively close to those of 
their counterparts, the possibility of accepting or rejecting conditional 
funds by lowering or raising their own levels of taxation becomes more 
remote. 
This leads us presumably into the somewhat philosophical question 
of whether conditional funding is a control exerted by the national 
government over the sub national units, or merely an inducement. Suffice 
to say that if the division of powers including revenue raising capacities, 
and the overall constraints of taxation levels in the community, are 
sufficient to make it economically impossible for state or province to do 
without an intergovernmental transfer, an inducement becomes a control. If 
it is only political pressures which are at work, as for example when the 
amount of the funding is small but symbolic, inducements remain mere 
inducements. 
Obviously we have not confronted all of the points raised about 
conditional funding. Many of them should be regarded as technical or 
administrative matters related to the meddlesome nature of the strictures 
connected to them. These have been discounted here as artificial 
constraints rather than fundamental ones. That is not to say that they 
aren't important or a hindrance to planning attempts; but they are not 
in intrinsic part of the conceptual problem associated with conditional 
funding. We might reasonably conclude on this aspect by simply observing 
that (a) the fiscal powers under the constitutions of both countries do 
override the formal power division elsewhere in the constitution, (b) 
conditional funding is intended to be a means whereby national governments 
do impose their own priorities, (c) whether those priorities conflict with 
priorities of the sub national units will depend on the nature of the 
funding used, (d) some of that funding will interfere with sub-national 
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overnments' p r io r i t ies , (e) there is no evidence to suggest that the 
degree of such interference in either country is part icular ly s igni f icant, 
and indeed all the evidence points the other way, ( f ) some of the claims 
about priority distort ion stem from a poor coordinating capacity in 
the sub-national unit of government i tsel f , and part icular ly the absence 
of an overview of a l l intergovernmental f iscal transfers, (g) po l i t i ca l 
factors are key elements in conditional funding and i t is natural that 
donor and recipient should vie for any po l i t i ca l mileage to be gained 
in such spending, (h) this po l i t i ca l process is affected by the degree 
of understanding in the electorate, as to the division of powers and the 
exigencies of such funding, and the operation of federal finance in 
general, ( i ) given that the largest conditionally funded programmes in 
Australia and Canada are for the largest functions allocated to the 
states and provinces under the constitution, i t is inevitable that there 
will continue to be debate about conditional funding. 
There are some elements of federal finance which are related to the 
observations made about intergovernmental agreements in Chapter 4. Many 
of the hindrances presented by intergovernmental agreements were 
administrative and technical. Many reflected an intergovernmental 
communication and bargaining structure which posed obstacles to 
harmonization of national and provincial p r io r i t i es . We shall comment 
on this aspect soon. However many intergovernmental agreements in both 
countries, but especially Canada, reflected a feature common to some 
conditional funding programmes. That feature is the fact that many single 
agreements and programmes have been handled in a process that closely 
resembles our planning system. As we have already observed in Chapter 4, 
the bulk of intergovernmental agreements are negotiated for a fixed term 
longer than one year; there are objectives spelt out within the agreement; 
the mechanisms which are devised to implement each agreement provide 
for allocation of responsibi l i ty between levels or units and the sharing 
or transfer of resources; and often, (especially in Canada), there is a 
sunset clause providing for a review of the agreement close to i t s 
termination. Canadian data presented in Chapter 4 indicated that the vast 
"lajority of intergovernmental agreements in that federation are for very 
long time spans, greater than 10 years. We also noted, however, that 
there is no common time frame for a l l agreements and only rarely is there 
a common originating or terminating year. This means that the forecasting, 
implementation and review processes are conducted individual ly for each 
agreement,and not across a l l agreements, or even across groups of them, in 
the same f ield. 
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We seem to be faced therefore with a s i tua t ion where d e f i n i t e 
potential exists fo r the appl icat ion of our planning system to ind iv idual 
intergovernmental agreements and indiv idual federal f i s ca l programmes, 
but the potential appears to evaporate when more than one agreement or 
fiscal transfer is contemplated. When more than one such e n t i t y is 
contemplated matters begin to ar ise such as f i s ca l assymmetry between 
states or provinces, divergences between capi ta l and recurrent funding, 
differing locations in the administ rat ive s t ruc tu re , and so on. In 
other words the potential for planning in such intergovernmental 
relations appears to be inversely related to the range and scale of 
fiscal and administrative contact encountered. Scale is a serious 
inhibiting factor because the greater the amount of resources involved, 
the larger the impact on the in ternal a c t i v i t i e s of the pa r t i c i pa t i ng 
governments. Range is possibly even more s i gn i f i can t , because the 
greater the number of ind iv idual agreements or programmes considered, the 
more variegated the pattern of intergovernmental re la t ions becomes, 
predominantly because of the observable lack of uni formi ty between 
agreements and programmes in these two federat ions. 
These matters tend to suggest that public sector planning in a 
federation can therefore be bedevi l led by complexity,which, in t u r n , 
focuses our attent ion on the mechanisms fo r coordinat ion of i n te r -
governmental arrangements within and between the uni ts of government 
in these federations. From the evidence ava i lab le , canvassed in both 
Chapters 4 and 5,both kinds of coordinating capacity are very weak though 
becoming stronger. The r ise of the central coordinat ing agency fo r 
intergovernmental re la t ions has only been a recent phenomenon in both 
Canada and Austral ia though establ ished e a r l i e r in Canada. In pa r t i cu la r 
the coordinating machinery within each level of government does not at 
"present have the capacity to undertake the type of overview, and control, 
which would be required for the adoption of our planning system right 
across the plane of that government's intergovernmental relations. 
Given the present a v a i l a b i l i t y of data to such central agencies on a l l 
intergovernmental f i sca l t ransfers and agreements, together wi th the 
limited degree of the i r involvement in the actual negot iat ion of such 
intergovernmental matters, together wi th the tensions which ex is t between 
such central agencies and the operating or funct ional departments, 
exacerbated by the cabinet system in these Westminster model governments 
which generally dispenses power throughout a level of government, i t would 
simply be impossible for such central agencies in e i ther country at the 
Present time to engage in a system of fo recas t ing , determination of 
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riorit ies, a l locat ion of resources, implementation, and review, of the 
whole spectrum of intergovernmental f i s ca l t ransfers and agreements. The 
situation is not helped by the fac t that there i s , in most Austra l ian 
states and Canadian provinces, as well as in the Austra l ian and Canadian 
national governments,a fragmentation of coordinat ion between several 
central agencies for d i f f e ren t kinds of resources e.g. Treasuries or 
ministries of finance for government funding, publ ic service boards or 
commissions for manpower, attorney generals' o f f i ces fo r legal matters, 
and prime ministers' or premiers' departments for po l i cy . To add yet 
another complicating factor we can note t ha t ,w i t h i n each un i t of 
government in both federations, coordinat ion is s t i l l impeded by the 
presence of crown corporations and various s ta tu tory or semi-government 
organizations which tend to escape encapsulation in the budget or 
provisions of the public service acts. There is also often a fragmentation 
of government finance in to d i f f e ren t accounts including t r u s t funds 
and an a r t i f i c i a l separation of current from cap i ta l funding, a l l of which 
tend to make al locat ion of resources w i th in each un i t an exceedingly 
complex task. We might reasonably conclude that fo r the in t roduct ion of 
planning,the coordinating capacity required fo r intergovernmental 
relations is int imately re lated to the coordinat ing capacity within 
each of the units of government pa r t i c i pa t i ng in those re la t i ons . 
Weaknesses in such internal coordinat ing processes w i l l s ingu lar ly 
frustrate attempts to coordinate the re la t ions of the un i t of government 
with others in the federat ion. Such in terna l coordination has not been a 
prime focus of th is study but i t s inadequacies have surfaced often 
throughout our ear l ie r discussion. 
From the above remarks a suggestion immediately emerges that the 
perfect po l i t i ca l and adminis t rat ive pattern to underpin our proposed 
planning system would be one in which a s ingle and powerful coordinating 
agency existed in each un i t of government in the federat ion, to control 
all elements of that u n i t ' s intergovernmental re la t i ons . Then i n t e r -
governmental relat ions would become a matter of negotiat ions between the 
politicians and administrators of those seven (Aust ra l ia ) or eleven 
(Canada) super agencies. That would,indeed,provide a potent ia l fo r the 
introduction of planning in intergovernmental relations,because a l l the 
elements of our planning system could be handled in the one set of 
institutions,although a l l of the theore t ica l and pragmatic problems of 
federalism revealed in Chapters 2 and 3 would s t i l l have to be overcome. 
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Such a move would also encounter the problem of accountab i l i ty which was 
revealed so potently in our analysis of intergovernmental agreements in 
Chapter 4,viz. that the t i g h t e r the intergovernmental arrangements, the 
more binding and predictable they are, the less democratic they become 
because of the natural tendency of governments to attempt to place them 
outside the usual channels of publ ic scru t iny . I f that i s true of s ingle 
intergovernmental agreements we can imagine that i t would be i n tens i f i ed 
under any system which cont ro l led a wide range of such agreements, 
(We shall return to th is aspect). Perhaps the main lesson ar is ing from 
these points is simply a reinforcement of one of the key elements of the 
discussion in Chapter 1, v iz . the v i t a l importance of coordination in any 
planning system. 
In relat ion to coordination we have also considered at some length 
the processes of coordination of intergovernmental relations in the 
two federations. In re la t i on to intergovernmental agreements in Chapter 4 
we considered the lessons of the l i t e r a t u r e and interview responses 
concerning ten types of intergovernmental machinery. The resul ts of that 
analysis, simply stated, seemed to be that despite the growing frequency 
of intergovernmental contact by both po l i t i c i ans and admin is t ra tors , or 
perhaps because of i t , no port ion of such machinery possessed the potent ia l 
for handling the type of planning we have envisaged. Indeed most of the 
parts of this machinery seem to have come in to being on an ad hoc basis 
in response to periodic tensions in intergovernmental re la t i ons . One 
significant by-product of the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of such machinery seems to be 
a belated recognition of the prominent ro le of the administrator in 
intergovernmental re la t ions, and especia l ly the transformation of that 
role from that of f a c i l i t a t o r of such re la t ions to a more modern day ro le 
of frustrator of intergovernmental re la t ions , to the extent that the 
public servant involved in negot iat ing intergovernmental agreements or 
fiscal transfers has come to i den t i f y wi th the p o l i t i c a l views of the un i t 
of government he represents,rather than attempting to take a national 
perspective. 
Of part icular s igni f icance to th i s aspect is the f a c t , observed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, that the intergovernmental machinery which does ex i s t 
in the two federations s t i l l t reats each f i sca l t ransfer and each 
government in i so la t ion , ra the r than as a port ion of an overal l pat tern 
of intergovernmental re la t ionsh ips . Indeed,the Austra l ian experience 
11 particular,suggests that the only type of common approach occurs wi th 
he rise and f a l l of p o l i t i c a l tensions between a state government and the 
national government. Thus i f t\\e prevailing mod, between a government and 
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the national government i s hos t i l e , (whatever the cause), there w i l l be a 
tendency for a l l intergovernmental negotiat ions occurr ing at that time 
to become soured and for obstacles to a r i se . This preva i l ing mood need 
not necessarily involve complete governments; i t can be the resu l t 
of a straight clash of personal i t ies between say a state premier and the 
prime minister. I t can also ar ise out of tensions surrounding an e l ec t i on , 
or by-election,especially when there are d i f f e r e n t part ies in o f f i ce at 
the national and state l e v e l , and even when the same party rules at both 
levels,because the one government may expect even greater concessions to 
be made by the other at that t ime. Since both national and state 
governments in Austral ia are elected fo r only three year terms, the periods 
between an election of some kind are r e l a t i v e l y short . Thus i f the 
planning of intergovernmental re la t ions requires a cool period of p o l i t i c a l 
relationships to prevail th is w i l l not be easy to achieve. I t is d i f f i c u l t 
to conceive of the elements of our planning system being introduced or 
functioning smoothly across the whole gamut of intergovernmental re la t ions 
in periods of severe p o l i t i c a l storms between the uni ts of government in 
these federations, i f those storms are pers is tent . 
The lessons from the conclusions drawn thus fa r are that there are 
impediments to the reconc i l i a t ion of planning and federalism which are 
reflected in both the st ructure of intergovernmental re lat ions,and the 
political process which takes place w i th in and surrounding that s t ruc ture . 
Therefore the introduct ion of a planning system, such as the one envisaged, 
would require reforms to both the s t ructure and funct ioning of both 
federations. Our emphasis w i l l be on s t ruc tura l reform because i t i s an 
axiom of po l i t i cs that changes in process tend to require,to a large extent , 
changes in the i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework w i th in which the process takes place. 
To alter a po l i t i c i an or publ ic servant 's a t t i t ude , and method, one tends to 
have to change his actual behaviour through some ru le changes. Nonetheless 
we shall have some separate comments to make about process l a t e r . 
I f we consider the s t ruc tura l aspects of both federat ions f i r s t , 
there are a number of basic aspects that have emerged from our analysis 
of the division of powers and the two main elements which bridge that 
division - f inancial re lat ionships and intergovernmental r e l a t i ons . 
402. 
P|yjdnn_of Powers 
The introduction of publ ic sector planning in to intergovernmental 
relations would idea l ly require a number of changes in the way powers are 
currently formally divided in Aust ra l ia and Canada. I t would obviously 
help i f some new method of power d iv i s ion could be devised which f a c i l i t a t e d 
coordination between levels of government rather than c o n f l i c t . Some 
radical solutions present themselves as with the West German model of 
horizontal d is t r ibu t ion of powers which segregates the functions of levels 
of government according to which level has the po l icy funct ion and which 
has the implementation funct ion , or the Indian model which superimposes 
3 
a planning framework over the ex is t ing federal d i v i s ion of powers . 
But changes of th is kind would require radical reform and, unquestionably, 
constitutional amendments. They would also d r a s t i c a l l y a l t e r the whole 
shape and character of the Austra l ian and Canadian federations, whereas 
our task is to measure the potent ia l fo r planning w i th in the ex is t ing 
federal framework. 
The basic problem which we have i d e n t i f i e d wi th the present power 
division in these two federations is that i t is out of step wi th modern 
day linkages between government funct ions,and the scale and nature of 
government ac t i v i t y i t s e l f . I t does not recognize,or make allowance fo r , 
the interdependence of governments which arises out of the interdependence 
of the community i t s e l f . Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y i t refuses to acknowledge 
the impracticabil i ty of d iv id ing single publ ic functions d isc re te ly 
between self-contained uni ts of government. Clearly then the challenge 
is to devise a d iv is ion of powers which can take account of these fac to rs , 
and at the same time provide the potent ia l fo r s u f f i c i e n t coordination 
between the units of government to al low planning to proceed. The obvious 
method is , in the f i r s t instance, to produce criteria for the d iv i s ion of 
powers. 
2. See for example P. Bernd Spahn, ed . . Principles of Federal Policy 
Coordination in the Federal Republic of Germany, Monograph No. 25, 
Canberra, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relat ions, 1978 
and R.L. Mathews, ed. , Federalism in Australia and the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Canberra: A.N.U. press , 1980). 
3- See B.S. Grewal, Centre-State Financial Relations in India, Pa t i a l a , 
Punjabi University Press 1975, and B.S. Grewal, Fiscal Federalism in 
India, Monograph No. 3 , Canberra, Centre for Research on Federal 
Financial Relations, 1974. 
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However there are even hindrances to the process of c r i t e r i a 
development. They include recognit ion of the fo l lowing points at least . 
Even when c r i t e r i a are formulated there w i l l then be disagreement about 
the meaning of the c r i t e r i a themselves, such is the inadequacy of our 
language and the necessary vagueness of c r i t e r i a . Serious consideration 
will have to be given to a l loca t ing f i sca l powers p r io r t o , or at leas t 
in conjunction wi th ,publ ic expenditure or regulatory funct ions fo r a 
variety of reasons,not the least of which is the potent ia l fo r any 
severe degree of ver t i ca l f i s ca l imbalance to see f inanc ia l powers 
connected with transfers of funds overr ide const i tu t iona l power a l loca t ion , 
as we have seen current ly occurs in both Austra l ia and Canada. A decision 
needs to be made as to whether i t is actual functions which w i l l be 
allocated or also the objectives of those functions, and th i s means 
an attempt at broad rather than narrow de f i n i t i ons of government funct ions; 
where necessary a function may have to be broken in to i t s sub-elements. 
The matter of the asymmetry of the federat ion w i l l ar ise and there needs 
to be a resolution of whether a l l the sub national uni ts need to perform 
the same range of functions, or whether the national government or a 
neighbouring sub-national un i t , could provide any functions in the smaller 
units of the federat ion. In t h i s , and other respects, the question of the 
sovereignty of the federal uni ts has to be ser iously considered because 
i t may be that the governments and peoples of states or provinces may 
believe that sovereignty only ex is ts i f that government has the f u l l 
range of powers in i t s arsenal. F i na l l y , whatever c r i t e r i a emerge, i t must 
be realized that there w i l l probably have to be a trade o f f between 
the cr i ter ia themselves,because i t is inev i tab le that the appl icat ion of 
various c r i te r ia to the federal a l loca t ion of functions w i l l suggest placement 
of the same function at a d i f f e ren t l e v e l . This trade o f f is p o l i t i c a l in 
nature and should be made by the p o l i t i c a l process and not the legal or 
administrative process. 
In the pursuit of such c r i t e r i a there are, of course, lessons to 
be learnt from the l i t e r a t u r e and pract ice of federalism in Aust ra l ia 
and Canada,and our interviews also produced some valuable notions in th i s 
area, as canvassed in Chapter 3. The major shortcoming of these c r i t e r i a 
was that they tended to re la te d i r e c t l y to the layer cake model of 
federalism envisaged by the founding fathers of both federat ions. The 
criteria for a l locat ion which they adopted can s t i l l be expected to be of 
^t least some relevance today, though they must obviously be modified to 
ake account of factors mentioned previously. The old " layer cake" 
criteria included the fo l lowing aspects:-
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(a) Where a function is indivisible by nature and must spread 
across the whole geographical entity, that is a function 
for a national government. This is seen to apply to defence, 
diplomacy, immigration, international economic relations, 
dealings with the British Empire, and any area where the 
nation had to speak with one single voice. 
(b) Functions which should apply uniformily across the nation 
are generally regarded as being appropriate to a higher 
government. However it must be stated immediately that 
there has always been a debate about the merits of 
uniformity itself, many writers pointing out that one of 
the main virtues of federalism is meant to be the 
possibility of achieving a lack of uniformity. Then there 
are also many who claim that uniformity can just as readily 
be achieved by the sub-national units acting in concert. 
Suffice to point out here that the desire for uniformity 
in Australia in relation to weights and measures, currency, 
coinage, marriage laws, and other functions,resulted in 
those functions being given to the national government, 
and it might be inferred that failure to allocate other 
functions such as railways, education, law and order etc. 
meant that there was no overwhelming desire for uniformity 
in those matters. Of course, a distinction can be made between 
those functions where a case can be made for national responsibility 
mainly, or even wholly, on the cost or efficiency advantages 
of national provision, (e.g. in the fields of transport and 
communication), and those where the case for national responsibility 
rests mainly, even wholly, on the desirability of a uniform level 
of service or uniform regulation, (e.g. age pensions and company law) 
(c) Those matters on which units of government at the same level 
cannot agree should pass to a higher level of government. Since 
the national level is the only level at which there is but one 
government this inevitably means that it sweeps up all such 
functions in relation to the states in the same way that states 
have kept to themselves those functions which causes dissension 
between local governments. Whilst this principle is widely 
accepted in the 1iterature,there is still dispute as to whether 
it means that the higher level of government should actually assume 
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the function in question, or solely act as the arbiter of disputes
from lower levels which would retain the function. At any event
Australian functions like customs and excise were given to the
national government on this basis,as was provision for the
Interstate Commission to settle disputes about interstate transport
and trade. State governments have controlled prOV1Slon and
distribution of certain utilities on the same grounds.
(d) Where government regulation is required over resources or
entities that are mobile, it is generally believed that that
function should be given to the highest level of government that
can embrace such mobility. Thus for example, the functions of
trade, industrial disputes, and navigation regulation, and later
civil aviation, were split in the Australian Constitution into
their intrastate and interstate elements, and power over the
latter assigned to the national government. Clearly it is physically
impossible for a sub-national unit of government to control activity
the moment it has crossed a particular border. It is important to
emphasize this point because many writers argue that mobility can
be catered for most of the time by cooperation between sub-national
units, but the actual act of crossing a political boundary cannot
be controlled by any unit of government on either side of that boundary.
(e) In those functions where nationwide equality of opportunity and
equality of standards in public service is required, these functions
are generally regarded as being for the proper exercise of a national
government. And a similar argument is made for functions where it is
felt that statewide equality is necessary to be allotted to that level.
Obviously there is enormous scope for difference of viewpoint here
as equity is probably the most elusive political criteria ever
conceptualized. In Australia it would seem that citizens believe
opportunities and standards in a variety of welfare services should
be nationwide as they have been allocated to the national level,
whereas the allocation of education, law and order, and health,to
the states and not to local government can be partially explained
as a desire to see statewide equality of services in those functions.
This criterion has also been invoked to give higher levels power over
functions which lower levels might use to discriminate against
certain inhabitants of their units e.g. racial or religious minorities.
(f) Where there are "spillovers" the function should go to a higher level
of government. Many people assume that this is simply an economic
term dealing with external economies where the actions
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of one uni t de l ibera te ly or inadvertent ly 
affect a neighbouring un i t . However i t is j u s t as much a 
pol i t ical term because the unique p o l i t i c a l charac te r i s t i c 
of federalism is that a l l c i t izens e lect a l l three levels 
of government. Or, to put i t more e x p l i c i t l y , both state 
and national governments represent the in teres ts of the 
people of the state in the same way that both state and 
local governments represent the in terests of the c i t i zens of 
a local author i ty area. The aim here then, whenever a 
function arises which contains inherent ex te rna l i t i es or 
spi l lovers, is to t ransfer the funct ion to a level high 
enough to capture a l l the sp i l l ove r e f f e c t s , so that i t 
can remove or at least mi t igate them. The Austra l ian 
formal federal s t ructure does not contain many examples of 
this,although i t is par t l y exemplif ied by state government 
retention of ul t imate control over town planning and the 
provision of some basic resources the natural catchment 
area of which spans a number of local au tho r i t i es . I t i s 
also present again in the parts of the Const i tu t ion which 
allowed the Commonwealth government to regulate i n te rs ta te 
mobility of commodities, people, and ideas. 
(g) Where the resources of a un i t of government are not ample 
enough to allow i t to f u l f i l a funct ion adequately there is 
a case for a l locat ing that funct ion higher. This c r i t e r i o n 
is a very loaded one because the question immediately arises 
as to why the resources could not be made avai lab le from the 
higher to the lower level to carry out the funct ion, rather 
than take away the funct ion i t s e l f . 
However this l i ne of argument usually 
refers to those functions which have s i gn i f i can t economies 
of scale such as research a c t i v i t y , or construct ion of very 
large capital pro jects . Or i t may rea l l y be beyond i t s 
resources because of the size of the un i t of government, so 
that states could not sponsor in ternat iona l a i r l i n e s or 
shipping companies or armed forces. 
(h) Levels of government should be a l located those funct ions 
appropriate to the revenue sources at t h e i r d isposal . The 
assumption made here is that cer ta in taxes and levies are 
collected for pa r t i cu la r purposes,and the government which 
collects them should be charged wi th meeting those purposes. 
The best example of th i s i s the l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t i ng to 
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local government,which says quite forcibly that i f local 
government is to have property taxes as i t s main source 
of revenue, i t should be required to undertake a l l those 
public functions which are related to servicing property. 
It is an extremely relevant, though not very useful, 
criterion here because i t pre-empts once again the question 
of whether revenue sources or functions should be allocated 
f i rst . The danger in i t s pure application can be seen in 
the current Australian situation of a high level of vert ical 
fiscal imbalance,whereupon the logic of this argument would 
mean transferring a substantial array of functions to the 
Commonwealth government for the sole reason that i t controls 
most of the direct and the most important indirect taxes. 
It also overlooks the fact that i t is common for two, and even 
three,levels of government to tax the same person, company, 
or property. 
(i) I t was a maxim at Confederation in most federations that 
those levels of government which had bu i l t up expertise 
and administrative efficiency in a part icular function 
should retain that function. Thus this is largely an ex-post 
criterion,but i t could also presumably apply in any rational 
allocation of functions from f i r s t principles that the 
allocation would take strong account of the existing levels 
of expertise,(or lack of i t ) , i n a part icular level . The 
alternative of a reshuffle of the relevant public servants 
between levels has occurred in Australian history (census 
and stat ist ics, income tax co l lect ion) , but i t seems a 
remote possibi l i ty now,as does the prospect of a 
completely unified public service for two or even the 
three levels of Australian government. 
(j) There are a number of c r i te r ia which are brought into play 
to delineate functions which should not be given to a 
higher, i .e. national level of government,although, as w i l l 
be seen, each of them leaves open the question of whether 
i t should be the state or local government which should 
perform them. Thus in Austral ia, Canada and America i t 
was generally believed that functions should be reserved 
for sub-national units which involved -
408. 
* knowledge of "local" conditions 
* experimentation 
* variety 
* home or family 1 ife 
* private rights 
* everyday 1ife 
* close participation and constant accountability 
* affecting only that particular geographical area 
* scope for public spirit and "local" patriotism 
* close supervision 
* varying with different "localities" or "parallels 
of latitude" 
* internal affairs 
* "local" options and choice among the "local" options 
* access to "local" sources of information 
* speedy action 
responsiveness * 
These sorts of criteria are not defined at all well and tend to be 
expressed more in sentimental phrases such as "to the state everything 
that is local and relating to one state", "federal powers must be uniform 
and general, state powers local and particular", "the inner life of each 
community to the states" "a power that must be exercised differentially 
is not a federal power", and "to the less remote government the powers 
that are nearer their homes and closer their affections", (phrases extracted 
from the debates of the founding fathers). 
These are, for the most part, spatial notions and they often hinge 
on a definition of the word "local", the meaning of which may be often 
clear to the author, but is not conveyed to the reader. They are countered 
by many other authors who argue that any level of government can operate 
in a decentralized manner, so that even a national government which had a 
remote centre could still meet the above requirements by decentralizing 
its physical administration as well as its decision making processes. 
This is, of course, countered by the argument that what is envisaged is 
political decentralization, not administrative decentralization, on the 
principle that the politicians who are elected solely by a locality will 
be fully responsive to that locality alone as well as the more fundamental 
point thatunless "local" communities have to pay for their differential 
I'equirements there is no effective way of discerning their real preferences. 
1^ turn, this is accompanied by a warning from others, who point to the 
danger of allocating a function so low that it ends up in a unit 
of government unduly dominated by particular groups who can 
^^ en discriminate in the conduct of that function. 
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In other words, when does c lose, int imate, responsive, government become 
corrupt government? 
I t must be stressed that these c r i t e r i a are not necessari ly those 
which were used by the arch i tects of the const i tu t ions studied. 
As mentioned ear l ie r we don' t know what t he i r actual c r i t e r i a were 
because they never gave them e x p l i c i t l y . The c r i t e r i a above have come 
from commentators i n fe r r i ng the basis of a l loca t ion from the l i s t s 
contained in the Const i tu t ion,or simply engaging in polemic. That 
polemic, l ike the c r i t e r i a l i s t e d above themselves, ar ise out of a be l i e f 
in coordinate or layer cake federalism i r respect ive of which pa r t i cu la r 
level, i f any, an author favours. 
The basic fau l ts of the abovementioned c r i t e r i a have already been 
touched upon,including the i r i n a b i l i t y to recognize e x p l i c i t and i m p l i c i t 
linkages between various government functions,and the frequent emergence 
of "override" c r i t e r i a which can dominate any national debate about the 
division of powers. This is part of the move from coordinate federal ism 
to organic federalism. The modern l i t e r a t u r e of p o l i t i c a l science and 
public administration accepts for the most part that a return to 
coordinate federalism is not possible. I t is simply not pract icable to 
secure levels of government in to water t ight compartments together wi th 
their electors and c l i en t s . I t does not necessari ly mean that a l l 
functions of government w i l l be shared by two or three l eve ls , but i t i s 
likely that the most expensive ones, which touch the most people w i l l be, 
and many other related functions as w e l l . The question now becomes 
that of determining criteria to allocate the role that each level of 
government will perform in the shared responsibilities. There has, 
then, been a sh i f t in th inking on two grounds: 
(a) we are now speaking of the a l loca t ion of roles in a 
single funct ion, respons ib i l i t y fo r which w i l l be 
shared between two or three leve ls , rather than the 
al locat ion of d iscrete government funct ions between 
levels. Accepting th i s f a c t , the exercise becomes 
one of determining which level of government should 
have the primary ro le in that f unc t i on , which level 
should have the secondary r o l e , and maybe which 
should have the t e r t i a r y r o l e ; 
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(b) we are now speaking more in terms of the "roles" of 
levels of government rather than in terms of tasks 
or physical activities of levels of government. In 
other words, the emphasis is more on the objective 
of government functions rather than the functions 
themselves. The literature has very little to say 
about how to define roles of levels of government. 
For example, as noted earlier, the Bailey Task Force 
on Co-ordination in Welfare and Health,and to some 
extent the Holmes Committee on care of the aged and 
infirm, spoke in terms of the Commonwealth having 
a role of watching over the welfare/health field, 
eliminating overlapping, plugging gaps, initiating 
etc. - in other words, a policy and surveillance 
"role". The state and local governments would have 
mainly a delivery "role" including decisions and 
their implementation on the location, timing and 
manner of delivery. By contrast, Harris, in an 
assessment of the material pertaining to the Bland 
inquiry, formulates a schematic illustration of 
responsibility division where he ascribes to the 
Commonwealth a "role" incorporating goal formulation, 
identification of objectives, study of alternative 
courses of action and periodic review of the outcomes of 
a programme in terms of the objectives, whereas the 
state governments would be concerned with evaluation 
of alternative projects and developments by reference 
to costs and benefits and action through public 
4 
expenditure or aid to private expenditure. 
Most of the old criteria which applied to coordinate federalism, listed 
earlier, will still be applicable since the main distinguishing character-
istic between the three levels of government is still the spatial one. 
In other words, even where levels of government are sharing responsibility 
for a single government function, the role of each level will still be 
determined very much by geographical factors. In consideration of a 
C.P. Harris, Relationships between Federal and State Governments in 
Australia, Information Paper No. 6 (Canberra: Advisory Council for 
Intergovernment Relations, 1979), passim. 
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federalism that is both dynamic and organic, the fo l lowing appear to be 
criteria for a l locat ion of respons ib i l i t i es between leve ls . 
(a) I f uniformity across the nation in a par t i cu la r funct ion 
is regarded as essential there seems to be a weight of 
opinion in favour of g iv ing the national government a 
preponderant control of the func t ion ; i f not t o ta l con t ro l . 
This also applies to state governments being given a 
major say in functions that should be uniform state-wide. 
The question arises as to whether the same resu l t cannot 
be achieved by sub-units act ing together. The arrange-
ments for provinces in Canada to opt out of past national 
programmes which were meant to be uniform is held 
to demonstrate that a province,act ing alone,could keep i t s 
policies uniform wi th those of other provinces without 
having to hand over the primary respons ib i l i t y for the 
function i t s e l f . I t has to be said however, that in 
Australia i t has been immensely d i f f i c u l t to get s ix state 
governments of d i f f e ren t p o l i t i c a l persuasions to 
voluntari ly establ ish uniform l eg i s l a t i on and keep i t 
uniform. The delays in get t ing a uniform company law 
are a case in point . To adapt the words of John Adams, 
i t is extremely d i f f i c u l t to get s ix clocks to s t r i ke at the 
same moment. Also there are cer ta in funct ions, l i k e 
immigration, where a b i r d ' s eye view of the whole nation 
is required constant ly, and i t seems l i k e l y that a l l 
states could not plug a l l the gaps as fas t as they 
appeared. There is also the point made in re la t i on to 
local government,that i f un i formi ty i s desired in functions 
l ike education and pol ice they could not be given to local 
government i f they were to be financed sole ly from 
existing local government revenue because the services w i l l 
be unevenly provided - best in a f f l uen t areas and worst in 
poor areas. I t could be countered that the higher level 
of government could theo re t i ca l l y provide equalised grants to the lower 
levels to perform the funct ion*but then we might properly 
observe that the higher level would have the primary 
role in that funct ion anyway. We might as well at t h i s po in t , 
>"aise the obverse of a l l the above, which is that in those 
functions where var ie ty or lack of un i formi ty and indeed 
some experimentation i s desirable, the main respons ib i l i t y 
^Qi" the function should be a l located as low as prac t icab le . 
*But not pract ica l ly given the d i f f i c u l t y , mentioned e a r l i e r , of 
equalizing for pa r t i cu la r publ ic funct ions. 
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i^\ This leads to the question of portability,and virtually the same 
arguments apply as in (a) so that in those functions where 
portability is required between various geographical areas 
falling within different sub-national units, the primary role 
in that function is for the higher, national government. 
(c) It could be stated in a bland way that the role of horizontal 
equalization is one for the level of government higher than 
the level in which the units are to be equalized. It can be 
argued, of course, quite persuasively that a single level of 
government can quite ably equalize itself as occurs in some 
federations. However, it has to be admitted that there must 
be more trust between the units of the same level of government 
than exists in Australia, where units of government at one level 
look to a higher level to arbitrate their cases and equalize 
their standards. It may be a tautology,but it is worth saying, 
that horizontal equalization between units of government only 
becomes necessary because there is a division of powers between 
levels of government in the first place. If there were only 
one government in the nation all equalization would be inter-
personal equalization of some kind. Experience does point 
to one unintended consequence of handing over the role of 
equalization to a national government. This occurs where a 
national government is responsible for its own territories 
and implements its own standards and priorities in those territories 
e.g. A.C.T. or Northern Territory, and that choice produces 
consequent pressures on state governments to follow suit. 
(d) It is generally agreed in the modern literature that where 
national standards have to be set in a particular function 
the primary role for that function should go to the national 
government. However the degree of involvement of the 
national government is in dispute. It is not clear how much 
it should become involved in the fine detail of standard 
setting or of auditing and monitoring those standards. For 
example,the unanimous view of the state submissions to the 
Bland Committee was that the Commonwealth government should 
not become involved in the details,and should determine the 
composition of programmes but not projects. The means of 
achieving a standard in providing a function will vary 
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according to localities, they said, and so will the desirable 
mixture of projects to meet the standards, so the fine detail 
was better left to the states. There are two comments to be 
made about this and the first is that the states seem 
noticeably reluctant to adopt the same principle in their 
responsibility sharing with local governments. Secondly, it 
seems unavoidable, in most cases, that if a national standard 
is desired the national government will have to set that 
standard in reasonably fine detail or otherwise it ceases to be 
a truly national standard. 
(e) This leads to two further criteria, one of which is that the 
higher level of government should confine itself to policy 
making,and the actual administration of a function should be 
performed by the lowest level capable of performing it. Many 
will object that this begins to look like the famous old 
dichotomy between policy and administration which has been 
proved to be unworkable in practice, but nevertheless it seems 
to be the only practical method of responsibility sharing. A 
corollary is that the higher level should perform most if not 
all of the research which goes into determination of policy-
making. None of this means that the lower level, now mainly 
the administrative agent, should have no voice in policy. 
Indeed the reverse is likely to be true because the literature 
of public administration tells us that it is the official who 
has to implement the policy, and deal with those it affects, who 
will be the first to detect flaws and virtues in the policy 
itself. But it does mean that, in the crunch, the final power 
over policy determination must go to the higher level. Recent 
noise regulation procedures are of relevance here,whereby state 
governments have determined broad policies on noise levels and 
definitions of noise, but the regulation of noise and the 
determination of the hours in which it will be permitted,are 
left to local authorities to determine according to their 
local climate and social conditions. 
(f) The second criterion which is an outcome of (d), is that primary 
responsibility in functions should be allocated to the level 
of government which already possesses the expertise in that 
field. On the face of it this is bound, in Australia at 
least, to favour the state level since it is the oldest level 
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and possesses most of the public servants. But the argument 
would still hold good where a state wanted to enter a field 
like international relations or water supply, functions in 
which another level of government had the expertise. 
(g) The question of spillovers arises again and the same arguments 
seem to apply that the primary role must go to that level of 
government capable of catching and minimizing or eliminating 
all the spillovers. This argument is based on the assumption 
that a lower unit of government would either be unaware of 
the externalities involved,or if it were, because of political 
motivation would seek to "do in" its neighbours where the 
spillovers favoured it and appeal to a higher level anyway if 
the spillovers were against it. It ought to be said here 
that it is very easy to espouse this criterion or principle 
but difficult to implement it, if only because for example, in 
border areas, there are very few functions performed by a 
state or local government that do not affect other state or 
local governments respectively. An extension of the spillover 
criteria occursin cases where lower units are simply in dispute 
over a function and the higher level has to be the arbiter. 
Mathews and Jay go so far as to say that the fact that 
cooperation is needed between states on any function is,ipso 
facto,proof that it should be a commonwealth function, which 
may be so, but there would still need to be a secondary interest 
in the function for the states. Another, more interesting case 
occurs where, because of circumstances, one state is in a 
position to manipulate another. The latter was a fear expressed 
by Western Australia when it sought national government control 
of the transcontinental railway,fearing that otherwise South 
Australia could manipulate traffic between Western Australia 
and the eastern states. The same fear is expressed by the 
maritime provinces in Canada when Quebec starts talking about 
a corridor tax for goods passing from central Canada to the 
east,and the plea is for the higher. Dominion, level to be the 
regulator of interprovincial traffic. 
'^ See R.L. Mathews and W.R.C. Jay, Federal Finance: Intergovernmental 
Financial Relations in Australia Since Federation (Melbourne: Nelson, 
1972), Chapter 1, passim. 
(h) 
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It is widely held that the level of government which has the 
best information sources in relation to a function,and 
therefore is in the best position to make appropriate decisions, 
should have primary responsibility for that function. This is 
not a conclusive criterion however, as there is some dispute 
as to whether a higher level of government acting in an 
administratively decentralized manner is able to gain access 
to information equally as easily as the unit of government 
at that spatial level. This argument is often put up in 
relation to state versus Commonwealth powers in Australia, 
whereupon it is pointed out that the Commonwealth can, given 
the desire, decentralize its operations quite well, e.g. 
Australia Post, or Social Security offices. Therefore the 
assessment of which level has the best information network 
is best handled technically,realizing that all levels have 
politicians in the field as well as public servants, 
although the telling factor may be that in any given spatial 
area there will always be more local politicians than state 
than national, though this need not be true of the numbers of 
public servants. It is also slightly more imperative for the 
lower level of government to listen carefully to the information 
it receives within its area of government. A corollary of this 
"information" criterion is that of "promptness" or "responsive-
ness" in the sense that the primary role in a function should 
go to the level of government which will handle it most 
quickly, and then all the arguments raised above again come 
into play. 
(i) Once again the question of mobility of resources arises and the 
previous arguments apply. So many disparate entities are 
mobile including germs, criminals, professional people, school 
children, electricity etc. and they all have a habit of 
crossing political boundaries of sub national units. There can 
be no doubt that higher levels of government are best able to 
handle functions of government which attempt to regulate things 
which are mobile, but in this case the question of degree arises, 
and past Australian experience shows that it has only been in 
relation to things which are highly or frequentlymo\i^^e that a 
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complete transfer of function to the national government 
has been necessary,as for example with some diseases, pensioners, 
unemployed etc. Otherwise the slower and slightly more cumber-
some procedure of cooperation between the lower units at the 
same level is the manner of coping with mobility. This question 
has arisen in recent years in relation to the very serious 
problems of different standards applying to training for 
professional people, lawyers, doctors, nurses etc. who do move 
around the country. Consider for example the doctor who cannot 
sign a death certificate in the state of his practice because 
he didn't gain his qualification in that state. Again it could 
be stressed that it is impossible for any unit of government to 
regulate the mobility or movement across its own borders to 
another unit of the same level of government. 
(j) Those functions in which the nation, as a nation, needs to make 
an impression on the world, or speak with one voice, or appease 
national guilt are conceded by all writers to belong to the 
national government. Even the Australian states after the gloom 
of the last Olympics were prepared to recognize a primary 
responsibility for the commonwealth government in the encourage-
ment of sport. But all of this is really not much more than 
saying that where there are distinctively national aspirations 
and symbols to maintain, it is the national government which is 
responsible. That does not take us very far since not all 
citizens of any federation see their role as citizens of the 
nation taking precedence over their role as citizens of a state or 
province. 
(k) Now one of the most contentious criteria concerns the old 
question of matching allocation of the function to allocation 
of the finances in the federation. Thus Mr. Whitlam could 
say that the Commonwealth should have the main role in the 
provision of these functions where it provided the bulk of the 
finance. He also stated that if a function were desired to grow 
in importance it should be "hitched to the star" of the 
Commonwealth government. It would be easy to forget this 
criterion and say that the allocation of revenue ought not 
predetermine the allocation of functions, or even argue that 
• -^G. Whitlam, On Australia's Constitution (Melbourne: Widescope, 
1977), p. 270. 
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the reverse should be the case, were it not for the fact 
that state governments have resisted a number of offers 
to allow them back into the larger revenue fields. In a 
similar way local government in Australia is singularly 
unimaginative in the revenue sources it pursues and the 
argument for neglecting the revenue allocation becomes 
that much weaker. Nonetheless the argument must finally 
be rejected here mainly because it is not a consideration of 
allocation of functions from first principles, but also 
because, if taken to its extreme, it would be a cumulative 
or self-perpetuating process, so that the richer level of 
government would progressively gather up all the functions, 
the most expensive first, and then be in a position to 
manipulate spending on those functions in order to keep it 
growing richer still. Moreover, if the functions it took over 
in the early stages were the potentially more expensive ones 
it could plead a case to the people of the nation to allocate 
it an even larger share of the revenue. Even the theories 
of dynamic or organic federalism envisage a continuance of 
fairly evenly matched bargaining power between the levels of 
government,or what is left is not federalism at all. 
Naturally enough this problem is raised more acutely in the 
Australian federation than the Canadian with its lower 
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance. 
(1) Where equal ity of opportunity or access to a government service 
is especially important or where it is necessary to protect 
the interests of minorities, that function is best monitored 
and even controlled by the higher level of government. This 
arises too in respect of health and welfare services and both 
the recent Bailey and Holmes reports see a definite role for 
the commonwealth government in protecting the interests of the 
non-government recipients of national grants, despite the fact 
that both reports favour the Commonwealth handing over all 
programmes which can be effectively implemented at a lower 
level, and as low as possible. Another associated criterion 
is that if the government function involves the incorporation, 
or indeed sole use, of voluntary labour in its delivery, then 
it ought to be allocated to as low a level as possible. 
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u) Whilst dealing with the Bailey and Holmes report and similar 
Canadian literature in particular, it is now widely accepted 
that there is a proper role for a national government as an 
initiator or prodder, or stimulator. In other words, where 
there is a felt need within a government function for 
innovation, usually connected with research, that role belongs 
to the national level and presumably that reasoning can 
apply to any responsibilities shared between state and local 
governments which would see state governments in a similar 
posture. It is worth noting in this connection that it is 
stated, though not proven, in the literature, that openness 
to change increases the higher the level of government. The 
explanation offered is that it is easier for a pressure group 
desiring change to lobby one government than six although 
some case material available showed the dexterity of 
some industries in swaying smaller states with little 
vested interest in that industry to change their policies, 
thereby bringing moral pressure on other states.* 
(n) Simplicity and comprehensiveness combine as criteria to say 
that where one level of government is already heavily involved 
in functions of a kind similar to the one being considered, 
every effort should be made to allocate that function to the 
same level. However there is definitely considered to be a 
predominant role for the higher level of government in 
monitoring the comprehensiveness of the programme coverage 
in functional fields where it has some involvement. 
(o) Functions which cannot be fragmented to achieve their purpose 
have to be national functions. This would include control 
and regulation of the lower units of government, functions 
with pronounced economies of scale, and research and 
experimentation. 
(p) Although it is a conservative criterion in itself the 
disturbance to the status quo must figure in considering 
reallocation of a function. If it is going to cost a lot 
in dollars or anguish to transfer, say, the payment of pensions 
to another level, it is not worth the move even though other 
factors may suggest it. 
•"or example, successful attempts in the late 1970's by lobbyists for the 
•yargarine industry to change consumer legislation affecting margarine in 
lasmania (despite the fact that no margarine was manufactured in 
lasmama) thereby forcing other states to follow suit. 
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(q) There is a cr i ter ion which says that a level of government 
should be equipped with powers to handle any problem i t w i l l 
have to confront. Stated l ike that i t doesn't mean much 
but i t becomes clearer when an attempt is made to view the 
allocation of powers from the point of view of a business 
or individual trying to escape government regulation altogether. 
That business w i l l probably have a vested interest in pressing 
for all functions affecting i t to be allocated as low as 
possible or at least to argue for as much dispersal of power 
as possible. I f there is not adequate coordination between 
levels there w i l l develop what has been described in the 
literature of "zones of anarchy" where no necessary government 
regulation exists. The reverse case can also be cited where 
there could be too much regulation and even duplication of 
regulation in the one function. In both cases monitoring is 
required and i t has to be done by the level of government 
which can match the ent i ty being regulated. Since the ent i ty 
will undoubtedly have a bird 's eye view at any moment in time 
across the whole nation, i t can only be matched by the national 
level of government. 
(r) There remain a number of vague c r i te r ia which are important 
but d i f f i cu l t to encapsulate in a pragmatic way. These 
include an admonition that primary roles should be given over 
functions to levels which are 
* more democratic 
* more effective 
* least corrupt or least likely to be corrupt or 
dominated by vested interests 
* best able to give a lead or set an example 
* possessing the best career opportunities for 
public servants and so will be able to attract 
the best calibre officials to perform the 
function 
* best able to integrate the function with logical 
partner functions e.g. sea, land, air, rail transport. 
Finally it has to be said that those writers who either advocate 
organic federalism and/or believe it to be inevitable anyway, are all 
guick to point out that responsibility sharing i.e. the acknowledgement 
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of an interest fo r more than one level of government in a government 
function, must be accompanied by appropriate ongoing intergovernmental 
machinery for the a l loca t ion and constant review of roles of each l e v e l , 
jhe question only now being confronted especia l ly in the Canadian 
literature and const i tu t iona l review is how to make th i s machinery more 
accountable to each level and to the public in general, who must 
obviously f ind i t harder to read a recipe fo r a marble cake than one 
for a layer cake. 
Some Lateral Thinking 
We might question whether i t is necessary fo r the federal r e l a t i o n -
ship to be symmetrical throughout a l l i t s parts. In other words, is i t 
necessary for every state to have the same re la t ionsh ip wi th the national 
government or for every local au thor i ty to have the same re la t ionsh ip 
with a state government? I f not then i t is l i k e l y that there w i l l be 
different c r i t e r i a regarding the a l l oca t ion of functions fo r d i f f e ren t 
individual re lat ionships. This i s , of course, forbidden in re la t i on to 
federal/state revenue sharing because as we have seen the Austral ian 
Constitution st ipulates c lea r l y that the commonwealth government cannot 
discriminate between states or parts of s tates. However that need not 
necessarily apply to funct ions of government. Indeed i t does not apply 
already with respect to ra i lways; Tasmania having handed over i t s 
railways to the Commonwealth and South Aust ra l ia port ion of i t s r a i l 
system. There is also the point raised in the Canadian l i t e r a t u r e c i ted 
herein that large provinces may wish t o , and be able t o , carry on cer ta in 
functions, but smaller provinces might well prefer the dominion government 
to conduct the funct ion in the province. I t is l i k e l y that any asymmetry 
will be disturbed along th i s d is t ingu ish ing l i ne of large versus small 
units. From our ea r l i e r analysis i t is c lear that larger sub national 
units have an inherently d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l re la t ionsh ip wi th the nat ional 
government than do smaller ones because being a larger part of the whole 
federation thei r in terests are l i k e l y to be more s im i la r to those of the 
national government, they can exert more inf luence on the nat ional govern-
ment, and the national government in framing i t s p o l i c i e s , (espec ia l ly 
the uniform ones), is l i k e l y to base i t s policymaking more c losely on 
conditions in larger s ta tes . Of course t h i s p r i nc ip le is already much 
better known to local government where i t i s not uncommon to see 
some local governments in a d i f f e r e n t re la t ionsh ip to the state government 
fi'om that of others, the resu l t being tha t the funct ions being performed 
''y one local government w i l l d i f f e r from those being performed by another. 
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I t has been suggested, as an extreme measure, that i f federalism 
is dynamic, the best solut ion to the a l locat ion question is to give 
each level of government the power to amend i t s own powers; that is to 
discard or take on functions at w i l l . This would force po l i t i ca l 
compromises between levels of government over functions and parts of 
functions. 
A more urgent and more pract ical a l ternat ive is to regard the 
criteria for al locat ion of functions as having to be f lex ib le in them-
selves and al ter ing with changing circumstances. The solution then 
becomes one of establishing new and better intergovernmental machinery 
for reviewing and monitoring and adjusting the c r i t e r i a . I t is the 
Canadians who have addressed th is problem most d i rec t l y because 
"executive federalism" as Smiley termed i t , is more of an issue there. 
In fact proposed const i tut ional amendments in the late 1970's sought to 
enshrine the meetings of f i r s t ministers (the equivalent of the Australian 
Premiers' Conference) in the const i tu t ion i t s e l f so that i t would 
become a mandatory part of the machinery of government. Space does not 
permit here a f u l l discussion of the sort of formal machinery Austral ia 
could consider to perform th is task. We already have an elected Senate 
which is supposed to be a state 's house connected to a national house; 
we have the Premiers' Conference and various min is ter ia l and executive 
councils; we have a number of advisory statutory commissions which look 
after intergovernmental relat ions in a par t icu lar functional area; we 
have commonwealth and state grants commissions; we have arrangements for 
public servants of one level to also carry out functions for another 
level; we have state departments for local government; we have a host of 
non-government professional and social bodies whose membership includes 
people from a l l levels of government, and we have the Advisory Council 
for Intergovernment Relations. Surely out of a l l these bodies which 
span the levels of government some machinery could be moulded to perform 
3 task l ike that envisaged. The main problem, of course, is how to make 
it accountable to each level and to the public at large. As Reid has 
said of Austral ia, the i ns t i t u t i ons of cooperative federalism diminish 
ministerial responsib i l i ty in d i rect relat ionships to the binding power 
of their decisions.'^ 
'• R.L. Mathews, ed. . Intergovernmental Relations in Australia (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1974), p. 28. 
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Another la tera l approach is to consider the ef fect of the separation 
of powers on the d iv is ion of powers. Whether a certain function is to be 
given to a part icular government un i t may well be strongly influenced by 
the degree to which the executive or jud ic ia ry dominates the leg is la ture . 
Or i f a unit of government has decided to abdicate i t s policymaking role 
in a function and hand i t to a statutory body th is may be important. To 
illustrate this in the extreme, could a rat ional discussion of conventional 
criteria for al locat ion of functions take place between one level of 
government where the pol icy on that function was made in parliament and 
another level where i t was the prerogative of a public servant or j ud ic ia l 
commission. Probably not. 
Some would say that the ex is t ing at t i tudes of the public should be 
considered in al locat ion of funct ions. For example a s ign i f icant body 
of l iterature t e l l s us that the public do not care which level performs 
it as long as i t is e f f i c i e n t l y and e f fec t i ve ly handled. S t i l l other 
literature suggests that some people think a par t icu lar level of government 
performs a l l government functions anyway. S t i l l more people confuse the 
levels of government which perform par t icu lar services as witnessed in 
Australia by the number of federal M.P.s who receive complaints about 
property rates and the number of aldermen who handle grievances about 
pensions of various kinds. Now th is is quite a serious matter and i t is 
of profound importance in determining c r i t e r i a for the a l locat ion of 
functions. Two immediate solutions spring to mind, one being to educate 
the public as to which level of government provides which service and why, 
or to accept public ignorance and indif ference and attempt to unify or 
coordinate the del ivery of services by the three levels of government. 
The f i r s t has been very poorly handled in Austral ia especial ly regarding 
citizenship education in state government education cur r icu la . There have 
been some promising experiments in recent years regarding the second, 
including a one stop welfare shop for a l l three levels of government, 
current in i t ia t i ves by the Commonwealth Ombudsman to share of f ices and the 
same telephone number with the state ombudsman, and close l ia ison in 
regional centres between public servants of the three levels. However, the 
fundamental question here is whether governments should leg is la te or act 
to make people aware of r e a l i t y , or attempt to bring government action 
"lore in line with people's perceptions of r e a l i t y . 
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Another method of approaching the problem above is to consider 
some sort of un i f i ca t ion of the public services of the various leve ls , 
in the direction of the Indian model, or the West German. The 
Advisory Council for Inter-government Relations has already begun 
valuable exploratory work on the interchange of personnel but that 
does not overcome the basic d i f f i c u l t y that public servants are held 
accountable through only one of the three levels of government. A 
completely unif ied system would at least make public servants feel that 
they were equally responsible to three leve ls . This might overcome 
the problem, which we observed in the review of the Canadian l i t e r a t u r e , 
of public servants de l iberate ly aiding po l i t i c i ans in obscuring the i r 
accountability in order to bolster t he i r level of government and there-
fore their own career prospects. ( In the succinct words of one of the 
authors we encountered, some people would rather be on top of a two foot 
dung h i l l , than a th i rd of the way up a s ix foot dung h i l l ) . I t might 
also make for speedier government act ion i f publ ic servants from three 
levels of government did not have to take a symbolic amount of time 
scrutinizing proposals and information from other levels of government 
simply to accentuate the sovereignty of t he i r own l e v e l . I t would also 
make buck-passing that much more d i f f i c u l t . These arguments are connected 
in an obtuse way to the view, often expressed, that a basic consideration 
in parcelling out functions is that a level of government has to have 
enough total power and enough var ie ty of tasks to a t t r a c t o f f i c i a l s of 
a high calibre. We might also extend the discussion to consideration of 
whether the whole legal system could not be un i f ied in Aus t ra l i a . Simi lar 
and some additional aspects a r i se . 
Since po l i t i cs is conducted la rge ly in symbols, and some government 
functions are s i gn i f i can t l y more v i s i b l e than others, and some carry more 
prestige than others, i t seems i nev i t ab le , there fore , that when levels 
of government discuss the a l loca t ion of a funct ion they w i l l , at least 
psychologically, perceive the funct ion from a symbolic viewpoint and hence 
desire i t or shun i t as the case may be. 
There are a number of other considerations which spring to mind which 
are also not readi ly answered because of the way spat ia l considerations 
have dominated the approach to the d e f i n i t i o n of c r i t e r i a f o r a l l oca t ing 
functions. Perhaps they are best postulated as open-ended questions -
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Should the potential of a power or function be a 
determinant of where i t is placed? 
Should we give powers over new functions of 
government to one particular level consistently? 
Does al l the allocation have to be vert ical or could 
there be some specialization of tasks within the one level 
of government so that one unit of a level would provide a 
function for a l l the other units in that level? (This might 
be appropriate where one spatial unit possessed most of the 
national phenonmenon which had to be regulated). 
Could horizontal reallocation of functions include 
delegation of functions by one unit of government to another 
unit of the same level? 
Could functions be allocated but financial l imitat ions 
be placed on the expenditure of that function? 
Should functions be categorized according to the extent 
to which they invade the l iber ty of individuals and in particular 
their privacy as a basis for subsequent allocation? 
If one sub national unit of government has a l l the resources 
related to a particular function, is i t not a question of that unit 
versus the rest of the whole nation rather than a dispute between 
all of that units' level and other levels. 
In vast areas, sparsely populated, can there be such a thing 
as a "local interest" i f there is nobody there to foster i t , and which 
level should then be regarded as responsible for functions in that 
area? 
Will a government act as rat ional ly in relat ion to a function 
in which i t is only indi rect ly involved, say through funding, as i t 
would i f i t had the function i t se l f? And w i l l i t tend to make 
decisions on i ts part icipation on a better or worse pool of 
information? 
The criteria which have been outlined must be considered in any attempt 
to allocate functions between levels of government. The trade-off 
between them cannot however be prescribed. I t is a matter of individual 
political preferences which, with some good fortune, when accumulated 
"lay result in a majority of opinion in regard to shi f t ing functions 
towards particular levels. The trade-off w i l l be more l i ke ly and be 
achieved considerably faster, i f a l l parties agree to adopt the concept 
speaking in terms of primary and secondary interests in most 
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qovernment functions fo r the levels of government, rather than attempting 
to allot sole respons ib i l i t y to a par t i cu la r l eve l . A few points need 
to be added in re la t ion to the Austral ian s i t u a t i o n . The f i r s t is that 
it seems doubtful whether there could ever be a completely ra t iona l 
discussion between the three levels of government about the a l loca t ion 
of functions, wh i ls t the degree of ve r t i ca l f i s ca l imbalance remains so 
high. 
I t should ser iously be considered whether the size of the uni ts of 
government could not be reviewed before any f i n a l decision i s made to 
allocate a funct ion. I t would seem that most of the proposals on new 
states, or regionalism have come to g r i e f because i t was always thought 
that the new units would have exact ly the same functions as the uni ts 
from which they would be extracted. There is a l i n k between funct ion 
and size so fundamental that one j u s t cannot be considered without the 
other. . 
In view of c i t i zen perceptions and cu l tu ra l a t t i tudes towards 
governments in Aus t ra l ia , i t might not be so much a question of which 
level should perform which func t ion , but more a question of whether the 
citizen is prepared to t r u s t any government at a l l . This in i t s e l f 
might emphasize the f ac t , that in the short term at l eas t , i t may be 
better to aim at set t ing up a process fo r governments to s h i f t funct ions 
around within the ex is t ing cons t i tu t iona l framework. There are already 
clear procedures for a re fe r ra l of power or the a l te rna t i ve could be 
to declare more powers to be concurrent. 
I t seems highly l i k e l y , given our r e l a t i v e l y b r i e f experience 
with organic federalism that the c r i t e r i a fo r a l loca t ion of funct ions 
will change absolutely, and r e l a t i v e l y to one another, as Austra l ian 
federalism i t s e l f changes in i t s nature. In other words, the c r i t e r i a 
themselves may well be dynamic and a review of c r i t e r i a fo r the a l l oca t ion 
of roles should be updated and reviewed at frequent i n t e r va l s . 
Finally, the Austra l ian p o l i t i c a l system has, u n t i l the present 
time, completely abdicated i t s r espons ib i l i t y fo r determining the c r i t e r i a 
for allocating funct ions, and allowed the courts to conduct the exercise 
by default. That means that the legal system has performed a p o l i t i c a l 
task and hence has acted p o l i t i c a l l y . To a p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t that i s 
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intolerable. For the p o l i t i c a l system to address i t s e l f to th i s question 
the single most dominant theme is that the process should be conducted 
democratically. Since democracy means pa r t i c i pa t i on and openness that 
suggests that any review of the c r i t e r i a fo r the a l loca t ion of functions 
of government between the levels of government in the Austra l ian federal 
system should incorporate some form of publ ic p a r t i c i p a t i o n . That 
might best be achieved through the establishment of some kind of i n t e r -
governmental machinery fo r a constant review of government functions in 
the light of the c r i t e r i a developed. 
Steps such as those which have been out l ined should overcome many 
of the obstacles to planning presented by the d i v i s i on of powers to the 
extent that they would provide fo r a more ra t iona l a l loca t ion of roles 
rather than discrete funct ions. They would recognize the importance of 
responsibility sharing in a federat ion. They would reor ient the 
institutional channels of communication between levels of government 
giving a firmer basis for intergovernmental negotiat ions to determine 
priorities, al locate resources, and implement the attendant decisions -
the three core elements of our planning system. They would go some way 
towards recognizing the linkages through the interrelatedness of government 
activity and hence provide a c learer overview fo r coordinat ing bodies 
within and between governments in the two federat ions, and they would 
recognize the need to incorporate provisions to maintain p o l i t i c a l 
accountability. 
Intergovernmental Agreements 
I t has been our main contention throughout t h i s study that the 
mechanism of intergovernmental agreements o f fers the greatest potent ia l 
for the introduction of publ ic sector planning in to the federal systems 
under review. Primari ly th i s i s because i t is the most e x p l i c i t and 
tangible bridge across the d i v i s ion of powers. Intergovernmental 
agreements between the sovereign units of a federation are formal 
recognition of a fusing or sharing of some of that sovereignty. 
This is extremely important because, as we have observed, the s p l i t t i n g 
of sovereignty is the main p o l i t i c a l hallmark of federat ion and i t s most 
divisive factor. Hence i t lays the foundation for a var ie ty of p o l i t i c a l 
obstacles to coordination between the levels of government. 
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We have already noted ea r l i e r a number of aspects of intergovern-
mental agreements in Aust ra l ia and Canada which pose d i f f i c u l t i e s for 
the introduction of public sector planning but i t w i l l be recal led that 
these were related mainly to the problems inherent in coordinating a 
wide range of agreements of varying scales. Another fundamental problem 
which we noted in Chapter 4 was the d i f f i c u l t y of maintaining 
accountability of uni ts of government fo r t he i r pa r t i c ipa t ion in such 
agreements. Indeed i t must be recognized that the very nature of such 
agreements e.g. the i r long term framework, t he i r binding nature and 
the secrecy of the processes whereby they are negotiated, make them an 
inherently undemocratic instrument and so a challenge is immediately 
presented to devise ways of recognizing and countering t h i s chronic 
condition. 
In a po l i t i ca l system the basic prerequis i te for determining 
accountability is that the ro le of each actor in the process must be 
clear. To this extent any attempt to ensure c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the role 
of each unit of government in intergovernmental agreements would have to 
be preceded by the review of the d iv is ion of powers mentioned e a r l i e r . 
Given the binding nature of agreements in a constantly changing federal 
environment there is a need fo r a regular review of agreements even 
though they be long term agreements themselves. Perhaps a decennial 
review process inst igated by a neutral body independent of any one level 
of government as for example the Austra l ian Advisory Council on 
Inter-government Relations fo r which there is no s t r i c t Canadian equivalent. 
Ideally, a l l intergovernmental agreements should be tabled as a 
green paper in each p rov inc ia l / s ta te leg is la tu re and the national 
parliament for debate before f i n a l r a t i f i c a t i o n . However, i t would seem 
that the best forum for in-depth analysis of these agreements is the 
Australian and Canadian Senates which were, a f te r a l l , meant to be 
Houses of Parliament r e f l e c t i ng geographical i n te res ts . (This would 
require a new-look Canadian Senate, wi th bet ter representation of a l l 
provinces than in the past) . Such small houses could well establ ish 
a standing committee to examine a l l intergovernmental agreements and 
submit reports for f u l l debate in that chamber. I f scrut iny p r io r to 
•ratification of agreements proves d i f f i c u l t at times fo r reasons of 
confidentiality or secur i ty or the sheer mechanics of the s i t ua t i on 
and time constraints, such agreements should d e f i n i t e l y be invest igated 
and debated af ter r a t i f i c a t i o n and to t h i s end they might well contain 
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a standard 'sunset' clause and maybe an intergovernmental impact statement. 
The Senate should also be given the power to subpoena state/provincial 
public servants for examination on these aspects. 
In order to conduct the parliamentary scrutiny outlined above a more 
high powered advisory network is needed. The Canadian Federal-Provincial 
Relations Office is a model which could well be upgraded for the purpose 
and it would, of course, have to have its composition changed to include 
permanent representation of provincial and municipal public servants on 
its staff. Such a body would serve well as a research agency to back up 
Senate and provincial parliamentary inquiry into intergovernmental agree-
ments. 
The next logical step is a better codification of intergovernmental 
agreements and a consequent breaking down of the secrecy associated with 
them. Any attempt to define the status of federal-provincial conferences 
would assist in this process. The arguments for and against codification 
of intergovernmental agreements have been well canvassed elsewhere and it 
must be conceded that there is no guarantee that it would, of itself, 
ensure any less political posturing. The factor which appears to tip 
the balance is that if agreements are formalized, a formal situation 
requires some sort of trade-off. If the actors in the bargaining process, 
in this case public servants, know that there ultimately has to be a 
trade-off, it is easier to achieve one. At present in describing inter-
governmental agreements the Federal-Provincial Relations Office gives the 
following information:- name of the agreement, time frame, objectives, 
financing and operation, payments, and whom to contact for further 
information. The recent Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration, in an analysis of seven intergovernmental arrangements, 
provided a longer and complementary list.^ The sort of codification 
envisaged would be an amalgam of the two lists which would be constantly 
updated and sent to all federal and state members of Parliament and 
made readily available to local governments, and pressure groups and 
deposited in public libraries, etc. It is really reprehensible that no 
level of government in either federation has a central repository and index 
of all intergovernmental arrangements entered into by that government. 
8. Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, Appendixes to 
Report Volume Two (Canberra, 1976), pp.425-56. 
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In order to combine f l e x i b i l i t y wi th openness there may well be 
a case for moving toward broader agreements rather than a plethora 
of individual, de ta i led , highly technical documents. Current Austral ian 
moves for greater use of the interchange of powers under the cons t i t u t i on , 
including transfer of powersZ^oti^ ways, could also add a welcome note of 
f lexibi l i ty . But that serves to h igh l igh t again the need for the constant 
monitoring and debating devices that were out l ined e a r l i e r . 
I t must be stressed that the suggestions above are only incremental 
ones requiring no fundamental cons t i tu t iona l changes and are merely a 
simple refinement and rearrangement of ex is t ing administ rat ive machinery. 
The basic dilemma of how to make the area of intergovernmental agreements 
more open to democratic accountab i l i ty remains. That presupposes public 
participation, which, in i t s turn presupposes publ ic understanding o f , 
and interest i n , the role of governments. The reforms suggested would 
seek to enhance that understanding so that c i t i zens could hold each level 
of government correct ly to account for i t s part in the process. But 
institutional reforms alone w i l l not do t h i s . I t needs a massive onslaught 
through the education system to acquaint the pub l i c , and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the young people who w i l l be the e lectorate of the fu tu re , about how 
they are governed. Yet the cur r i cu la in both Canadian and Austra l ian 
primary and secondary schools are de f i c ien t in th i s area of c i t i z e n 
education. Of course, education is the c lear prerogative of s ta te / 
provincial governments so i n i t i a t i v e is t h e i r s . Natura l ly , i t w i l l take 
quite a while to educate c i t i zens about the ro le of each level of 
government le t alone what happens when they i n te rac t . In the meantime, 
it may be as well to accept public ignorance about intergovernmental 
agreements as given and compensate fo r i t . To th i s end, simple reforms 
as already mentioned l i k e j o i n t locat ion of government o f f i ces would be 
a welcome s tar t ; or one-stop welfare shops fo r the three levels of 
government are in te res t ing , or the moves by the federal ombudsman in 
Australia to share o f f i ce space and the same te lephonist and inqui ry desk 
with his state counterpart. I f people cannot i den t i f y the chef who 
baked the marble cake or the committee which concocted the rec ipe, they 
might at least know which shop se l l s i t so that they can go back to that 
shop i f the cake is too sour, too sweet, too r i c h or too o l d . 
A few more questions ar ise in r e l a t i on to these aspects. Should 
guidelines for intergovernmental agreement negot iat ions be l a i d down 
for the benefit of public servants? The recent Aust ra l ian Task Force 
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on Coordination in Welfare and Health^ suggested that a successful 
consultative process would include: defined scope of de l i be ra t i on , 
clear goal d e f i n i t i o n , t r u s t , con t inu i ty and f l e x i b i l i t y , openness 
of discussion, concentration on real issues, some inf luence on po l i cy , 
suitably representative membership, and a v a i l a b i l i t y of resources. 
Can there ever be a completely ra t iona l discussion between the 
three levels of government about intergovernmental agreements while 
there is such a large degree of ve r t i ca l f i s ca l imbalance? This is 
especially true in Aus t ra l ia . S im i l a r l y , should we not ser iously 
consider the size of the uni ts of government before any review of i n t e r -
governmental agreements is undertaken? Developments in Canada and 
Australia in recent years toward regionalism at the sub-national level 
(for example, the Council of Western Premiers and the Council of Maritime 
Premiers), and at the sub-provincial level (regions fo r various education, 
social and economic development purposes) might well be taken as super-
ficial evidence that the very s t ructure of the federal system is f a u l t y . 
This is not surprising when i t is real ized that the p o l i t i c a l boundaries 
often have only h is to r ica l s ign i f icance. Can there be meaningful 
discussion about intergovernmental agreements when some of the p a r t i -
cipating units of government are barely economically viable? 
The role of the public servant would be made so much easier i f 
the emphasis of each government on i t s sovereignty were downplayed. One 
cannot begin any process of agreement or negot iat ion i f each level of 
government regards i t s e l f as sacrosanct or untouchable. I f we cannot 
clarify the respons ib i l i t ies of each level of government under i n t e r -
governmental agreements then the only a l te rna t i ve is fo r a l l levels to be 
held equally responsible fo r every agreement they enter. 
federal Finance 
We have already examined many elements of the federal f inanc ia l 
relationships in Austral ia and Canada especia l ly the debate about 
unconditional and condit ional f i s ca l t rans fe rs . I t has become patent ly 
clear throughout th is discussion that the s t ructure of federal f inance 
in the two federations, especia l ly Aus t ra l i a , is not at a l l conducive to 
the adoption of public sector planning predominantly because of the degree 
and nature of the ex is t ing ve r t i ca l f i s c a l imbalance. This breaks a 
-^ Second Report, pp. 14-22. 
431. 
number of important linkages including the connection between taxation 
and expenditure decisions, between capital and current funding, between 
vertical and horizontal imbalance, between conditional and unconditional 
funding and between associated government functions. We might for 
purposes of illustration, focus on the Australian intergovernmental 
mechanisms for the allocation of funds for capital expenditure viz. 
the Australian Loan Council. In a nation like Australia which is still 
developing public capital expenditure assumes a particular importance 
for planning because it relates to the laying down of the infrastructure 
which will, in turn, determine the future fiscal and spatial direction 
of further public and private expenditure. The process of decision 
making in the Australian Loan Council if we can oversimplify it a little, 
is that each state government presents a proposed loan programme on 
behalf of its own instrumentalities, its semi-government authorities 
and its local governments. The Commonwealth may also submit a loan 
programme. The size of the total loan programme is negotiated between 
the states and the Commonwealth with the Commonwealth having the upper 
hand for a variety of reasons^, but the distribution of the final loan 
programme is a spatial one i.e. by states and to the Commonwealth 
government. That is to say no attempt is made to rank order the various 
projects or elements which make up the loan programme, irrespective of 
their location,which would have to occur under any rational system of 
intergovernmental public sector planning. This is because the matter 
of sovereignty again arises and the determination of priorities and 
allocation of resources in this instance is performed as an exercise 
between separate sovereign entities in a manner which allows each to 
retain its identity throughout. In fact it is stretching a point quite 
a long way to regard Loan Council deliberations as a "determination of 
priorities" - it is more of the nature of a spatial squabble in a fowl-
yard. The very existence of a backstop provision reinforces this 
tendency whereby if the participants cannot agree there has to be a 
reversion to a formula which is the average distribution which has 
occurred between the spatial units over the past five years. We might 
reasonably conclude that the Australian Loan Council is a totally 
inappropriate institution for the facilitation of public sector 
planning in intergovernmental relations in Australia and presents a major 
obstacle to the introduction of such planning. For it to become useful 
10. Mainly because of its financial domination and the fact that it underwrites 
State loan programmes. It controls the exchange rate, interest rates, the 
banking system and monetary policy in general. The actual voting mechanism 
on this aspect of Loan Council decisions also gives the Commonwealth 
two votes and a casting vote. 
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in this respect, the loan programme would have to be considered on a 
functional in addi t ion to a spat ia l basis, the capi ta l expenditure would 
need to be related to the federal d i s t r i b u t i o n of recurrent funding, and 
both would have to be considered on a forward pro ject ion basis possibly 
a five year ro l l i ng programme. 
This last mentioned point introduces the other major Austra l ian 
institution for handling federal f inanc ia l r e l a t i ons , the Premiers' 
Conference. (Canada has a close equivalent in i t s Conference of F i r s t 
Ministers.) However the Premiers' Conference suffers from exact ly the same 
impediments to planning which are present in the Loan Counci l , though in 
relation to the d i s t r i bu t i on of recurrent finance which is i t s main 
concern. Again the a l loca t ion process is a spat ia l one and in th i s case 
there is no attempt to re la te i t to the capi ta l expenditure d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
There has been a f i ve year formula fo r the tax sharing element, the major 
element, but that has been subject to many ad hoc addit ions in the nature 
of pork-barrel l ing from year to year. I t has become the subject of so 
much pol i t ic izat ion and accentuation of sovereignty of the uni ts of 
the federation as to make the achievement of the key elements of our 
planning system i .e . determination of p r i o r i t i e s , a l loca t ion of resources, 
and long term implementation well nigh impossible. So both the Loan 
Council and the Premiers' Conference are fundamental impediments to the 
attainment of public sector planning because of the nature of t he i r 
composition and decision making, as is the very fac t that they do not 
co-exist but rather a r t i f i c i a l l y d iv ide the federal d i s t r i b u t i o n of funds 
for capital purposes from the d i s t r i b u t i o n of funds fo r recurrent 
purposes. Moreover the actual decision making process of both bodies is 
secret, part icular ly that of the Loan Counci l , making the whole process 
unaccountable especial ly as the decisions of both bodies are not tabled 
or debated in ei ther national or s tate parl iaments. In add i t i on , in 
the case of the Loan Council the Austra l ian Const i tut ion (Section 105 
and 105A) tends to place the del iberat ions of the Loan Council 
permanently outside parliamentary sc ru t iny . These points about the Loan 
Council and Premiers' Conference apply wi th equal force to the vast array 
of interministerial conferences which take place in both Aust ra l ia and 
Canada the number and range of which we observed e a r l i e r . 
II- The recent changes to the operations of the Aust ra l ian Loan Council 
in relation to i n f ras t ruc tu re projects provides evidence of the 
capacity of that body to break away, at least to a small extent 
from i ts hidebound spat ia l o r i en ta t i on , even though the vot ing 
structure s t i l l gives the Commonwealth a veto s ince, in any major i ty 
decision, that major i ty must include the Commonwealth. 
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Consequently any move towards public sector planning of fiscal 
matters in the Australian and Canadian federations would require 
fundamental reform of the structure and process of federal financial 
relations, in particular the operations of the major political 
institutions responsible for vertical and horizontal fiscal balance. 
As already mentioned one of the major changes would have to be for a 
consideration of fiscal resource allocation on a sectoral rather than 
a spatial basis, but because of the intense contemporary political 
emphasis on the sovereignty of sub-national units in both the Australian 
and Canadian federations, such a shift of emphasis would not be easily 
achieved. It would have to be accompanied, or preceded by a number of 
other changes, and those changes would have to be akin to the kind of 
reforms suggested in relation to the division of powers and inter-
governmental agreements. 
Those changes would have to include, inter alia, a clearer 
presentation of the effects of federal financial resource allocation in 
relation to some objectives or criteria. This would at least involve the 
12 proposal of Lane's that the purposes of each intergovernmental transfer 
should be clearly identified and that the amount so transferred should be 
classified in relation to those purposes. For example, tax sharing grants 
and many specific purpose grants contain both horizontal and vertical 
adjustment objectives but the total amount of the grants does not 
differentiate between these two objectives. Clearly it should do so. 
The clarification process could be extended to encompass distinctions 
between capital and recurrent elements (especially in Canada where 
this distinction is rarely presented in official data); long term 
programmes and short term programmes (i.e. the extent to which the 
amount under consideration is part of any ongoing commitment); the 
proportion of total intergovernmental transfers being devoted to the 
item, or function in question;and the growth in the amount compared 
with that of the previous year and in relation to movements in total 
outlays and G.N.P. Any mandatory requirement that such information 
be tabled should assist in the delineation of objectives of inter-
governmental funding and ideally that information should be debated 
12. W.R. Lane, "Financial Relationships and Section 96", Pvblic 
Administration (Sydney), XXXIV(l), March 1975. 
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in both national and sub-national parliaments preferably annually or 
even longer provided such a review were a regular feature of the 
parliamentary cycle even if biennial or triennial. 
The political federal resource allocation process could also 
benefit in these respects from independent advice and analysis of such 
information. To that extent an "expert" body would seem most appropriate 
and the function of that body would be to assess the current and likely 
pattern of federal financial relations (revenue and responsibility sharing) 
in relation to the sorts of objectives mentioned above. This information 
would provide the basis for discussion at Premiers' Conferences, Loan 
Councils, and interministerial meetings in particular functional areas. 
It would tend to make discussion at those meetings more rational, more 
coordinated, more informed and probably more open, and thus be in the 
13 
spirit of our planning system. It could also serve as an advisory 
body to the national parliament, especially the Senate, and also state 
parliaments where required. Its membership would need to reflect a 
federal participation and so it could be composed of national and state 
and local officials, permanent or seconded, together with outsiders. 
here are models currently in existence in Australia or Canada but it 
could be a modified version of the Canadian Federal Provincial Relations 
Office with a stronger fiscal reference, or an expanded and modified 
version of the Australian Commonwealth Grants Commission such as occurred 
with the augmentation of that body to perform the analysis of fiscal 
relativities between the states. The Grants Commission's present 
expertise lies in horizontal equalization and it is conceded that this 
new role is one relating to vertical balance and particularly the process 
of determining priorities as between the expenditure and revenue 
components of the national and sub-national governments. 
13. This is not to deny the opposing argument, often advanced in 
Canadian and Australian literature, that premiers' conferences 
represent the extreme of the political bargaining process and 
should be used as an unfettered process of checks and balances. 
All that is being claimed here is that, if planning is desired, 
the processes of intergovernmental political meetings would have 
to change. 
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This whole process would also be aided by more inherent f l e x i b i l i t y 
in federal f iscal arrangements especia l ly in re la t i on to revenue sharing. 
jhis is par t icu lar ly relevant fo r the Austra l ian s i tua t ion so characterized 
by vertical f isca l imbalance wi th attendant dependence of a l l the states 
on federal funding of one kind or other. The ideal so lu t ion to th i s 
problem, (ideal in the sense of reconci l ing planning processes wi th 
federal power d i v i s i o n ) , would be to move towards the Canadian system of 
greater exp l ic i t taxat ion for the states to levy , coupled wi th clear 
and unambigous long term formulae for federal f i s ca l t rans fe rs . In 
other words a speci f ic port ion of taxat ion would be designated as state 
taxation and the states would have the power to raise or lower that 
portion at their own behest, but t he i r share of national government 
taxes would be f ixed by formulae although that pa r t i cu la r share would 
be flexible enough to be a l tered i f required by circumstances, on the 
advice of the i ns t i t u t i ona l framework already ou t l i ned . The actual 
mechanisms of the process would depend on the pa r t i cu la r taxes to be 
divided, and the taxes to be shared. 
In Conclusion 
The results of th is study have reinforced the view that planning 
is basically incompatible wi th federal ism. That has proved to be the 
case in both concept and pract ice and in p o l i t i c a l terms the main 
factor is the divided sovereignty which is the essential ingredient 
of federalism. However our research has demonstrated also that the 
hindrances or obstacles which ar ise in any prac t ica l attempt to marry 
the two concepts are not necessari ly insurmountable. The incompat ib i l i t y 
can be mitigated by reforms which are pract icable even w i th in the 
constraints of the ex is t ing federal system. 
The reforms which we have suggested for the federal system under 
review have been of three main kinds -
(i) Changes to the roles of the actors in the federal political process 
principal ly in re la t i on to the respons ib i l i t i e s of each level of 
government and the d i v i s i on of powers. This s h i f t of emphasis 
to roles rather than functions, and the very d i v i s ion of those 
roles has been aimed at achieving greater ce r ta in ty in federal 
relations as well as more r a t i o n a l i t y and accountab i l i ty -
three v i t a l ingredients of any planning system. 
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(ii) Changes to the structure of federal relations principally in 
relation to the major political institutions involved in the 
federal resource allocation process and its attendant coordination 
process. These changes have been aimed mainly at achieving 
smoother coordination and greater rationality in federal 
resource allocation; once again two vital ingredients for 
any planning system. 
(iii) Changes to the processes of federal relations especially the 
way in which resource allocation is viewed, presented, 
debated, and decided. These are reforms aimed at achieving 
rationality accompanied by accountability. 
Thus, in accordance with the stipulated aims of this study we have 
found that our planning system does not fit the federal systems particularly 
well. Hindrances have been identified and reforms suggested for the 
federal system to make it more amenable to the sort of planning we have 
envisaged. The other main underlying element in these suggested reforms 
has been an attempt to achieve the maximum degree of accountability in 
such planning and that has inevitably involved taking the federal 
resource allocation process back to the politicians for debate and 
decision, aided by more rational advice, in an open environment. This 
has not proved completely practicable either, for planning and democracy 
are basically incompatible. However, as Carl Friedrich observes -
"Planning is often involved in effective policy 
making as the very process of sorting out ... 
alternatives. And the opinion which sees an 
insoluble conflict between planning and 
democracy is untenable. Experience has 
shown further that the voters have a sense 
of appreciation for objective achievements. 
The electorate at the same time recognizes 
that there are other than technical problems 
and it reacts sharply when the values and 
beliefs of the community are at stake. If 
the often-heard claim that planning is 
incompatible with democracy or with a free 
society is therefore untenable, contemporary 
evidence suggests that they both presuppose 
planning under contemporary conditions. 
Hence planning and public policy are least 
likely to be defective under such conditions 
as only democracy and freedom can provide".!'^ 
14. Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Decision Making, Public Policy and 
Planning", Canadian Public Administration, 14(1), Spring 1971, p. 15. 
437, 
In the context of th is study planning and federal ism, l i k e 
planning and democracy are r e l a t i v e l y , not absolute ly , incompatible 
and thus the Austral ian federal system can be made more or less 
compatible with the planning system we have u t i l i z e d . The extent 
to which the sub-national uni ts of the Austral ian federa t ion , or 
any other federat ion, can plan the i r a c t i v i t i e s w i l l vary accordingly. 
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TABU 5.A.17 
AUSTRAIIA • 
COmONUEALTH SRANTS TO THE STATES - FOR CURREKT PURPOSES 
PERCEHTAGE OF TOTAL 
Firct ion 
( m n l Public S e r v i c e s 
UKltion 
Wlt« 
iKill Security 1 Welfare 
brtin^ 1 Comunity Ameni t ies 
loRoiic Services 
kJ<r< 
1972-3 
0.3 
6.1 
0.6 
6.0 
0.4 
0.5 
84.2 
N.S 
1974-5 
0.3 
26.9 
1.4 
1.6 
0.3 
0.6 
69.0 
V. 
1976-7 
0.2 
24.1 
13.6 
0.3 
0.1 
0.6 
61.0 
1978-9 
0.2 
21.6 
16.0 
0.5 
o.r 
0.7 
46.9 
1972-3 
0.3 
9.2 
0.7 
5.3 
0.3 
0.5 
83.6 
Vic 
1974-5 
0.2 
M.2 
1.0 
1.9 
0.2 
0.5 
65.9 
1976-7 
0.2 
28.8 
11.1 
0.3 
0.1 
0.7 
58.6 
1978-9 
0.2 
25.1 
13.9 
0.5 
0.1 
0.6 
59.7 
1972-3 
0.2 
6.0 
0.7 
5.4 
0.2 
0.7 
86.9 
Qld 
1974-5 
0.2 
19.1 
1.2 
1.6 
0.2 
0.7 
•72.0 
1976-7 
0.1 
18.8 
9.3 
0.4 
0.1 
0.8 
70.5 
1978-9 
0.1 
17.1 
11.6 
0.4 
* 
1.0 
69.7 
1972-3 
0.4 
5.6 
0.4 
4.2 
0.5 
0.4 
88.6 
S. 
1974-5 
0.4 
20.2 
1.2 
1.5 
0.3 
0.3 
76.2 
k. 
1976-7 
0.3 
20.4 
11.6 
0.5 
0.2 
0.5 
66.6 
1978-9 
0.2 
17.8 
13.1 
0.5 
0.1 
0.5 
67.7 
1972-3 
0.2 
5-6 
0.5 
4.3 
0.3 
0.5 
88.7 
k.A. 
1974-5 
0.2 
20.8 
1.6 
1.8 
0.3 
0.5 
74.7 
1976-7 
0.2 
19.5 
12.6 
0.3 
0.1 
0.5 
66.7 
1978-9 
0.1 
16.8 
J4.5 
0.5 
-0.1 
0.5 
67.5 
1972-3 
0.2 
4.4 
0.3 
6.8 
0.4 
0.5 
S8.5 
Tas 
1974-5 
0.2 
14.6 
1.3 
1.2 
0.2 
1.5 
81.0 
1976-7 
0.1 
15.1 
8.9 
0.4 
0.2 
1.1 
74.1 
1978-9j1972-3 
0.1 
13.3 
10.9 
0.4 
0.1 
0.4 
74.7 
0.3 
7.3 
0.6 
5.3 
0.3 
0.5 
85.7 
Six SUte ToUl 
1974-5 
0.2 
24.4 
1.3 
1.7 
0.3 
0.6 
71.6 
1976-7 
0.2 
23.1 
11.7 
0.4 
0.1 
0.7 
63.8 
1978-9 
0.2 
20.4 
14.1 
0.5 
0.1 
0.7 
64.) 
• - Corprised almost entirely of the Financial 
Assistance (New Tax Sharing) Grants 
Source: Derived from Catnonutalth Covmrrrrvnt Pxnanae, 
U-i'^  
TABLE 5 . A . 1 9 
AUSTRALIA 
COmOtiffALTH GRAffTS TO THE STATES - FOR CAPITAL PURPOSES 
PERCEKTAGE OF TOTAL 
Educltior 
Heilth 
Sociil Security i Welfare -
Housing i Ctpinunlty A m e n i t i e s 
Recreation i Culture 
Soli 1 Water Resources Mgt 
Assistance to A g r i c u l t u r e 
1 Pastoral i F i s h i n g 
Road Transport 
IWwn Public Transport 
Otfier 
1972-3 
16.5 
0.4 
1.3 
1.2 
- • 
3.2 
1.7 
39.3 
-
36.3 
N.S 
1974-5 
32.2 
3.8 
0.8 
5.2 
0.6 
1.0 
0.7 
25.5 
3.3 
26.5 
u. 
1976-7 
21.5 
8.6 
0.7 
2.8 
0.3 
0.5 
0.3 
28.4 
5.1 
31.7 
1978-9 
25.3 
0.7 
1.4 
0.7 
0.1 
0.8 
0.4 
34.9 
2.9 
32.7 
1972-3 
18.6 
1.1 
1.1 
0.2 
0.7 
2.2 
36.1 
-
40.0 
Vic 
1974-5 
34.0 
3.7 
0.4 
5.1 
0.7 
0.5 
0.8 
21.8 
5.4 
27.7 
1976-7 
24.7 
8.9 
1.4 
1.7 
0.6 
0.3 
0.8 
25.6 
4.4 
31.7 
1978-9 
29.0 
1.1 
1.1 
0.1 
, 0.2 
0.5 
0.5 
X.! 
3.4 
34.0 
1972-3 
11.3 
1.7 
1.2 
3.1 
-
0.6 
0.2 
47.8 
-
26.1 
Old 
1974-5 
24.5 
4.0 
0.6 
5.5 
0.6 
2.5 
0.6 
31.2 
0.9 
29.5 
1976-7 
20.4 
8.5 
1.1 
2.3 
0.4 
1.6 
0.6 
34.0 
4.2 
26.3 
1978-9 
23.5 
0.7 
•1.0 
1.2 
1.1 
0.8 
0.5 
41.3 
3.4 
26.4 
1972-3 
13.7 
1.5 
0.6 
0.9 
-
1.6 
2.5 
34.8 
-
40.9 
S. 
1974-5 
29.7 
4.9 
0.4 
5.7 
1.1 
0.9 
0.5 
21.1 
4.1 
31.2 
\. 
1976-7 
16.3 
9.5 
1.1 
2.1 
1.4 
0.8 
0.5 
25.3 
2.8 
37.8 
1978-9 
22.7 
0.8 
1.2 
1.3 
0.4 
0.6 
0.6 
28.4 
2.7 i 
40.5 1 
1972-3 
12.0 
1.0 
1.1 
4.6 
-
1.2 
2.4 
51.3 
-
26.0 
V. 
1974-5 
23.8 
8.1 
0.5 
4.2 
2.0 
1.2 
0.8 
35.1 
2.0 
22.4 
A. 
1976-7 
14.9 
10.5 
1.1 
4.7 
0.7 
1.3 
0.6 
37.0 
1.2 
27.8 
1978-9 
22.3 
1.3 
0.8 
2.6 
0.3 
Tas. 
1972-3 
12.0 
0.8 
0.5 
.0 .3 
. 
1.9 ! 0.5 
0.9 : 1.8 
40.4 : 33.5 
1.3 1 -
28.3 i 47.8 
1 
1974-5 
17.6 
3.0 
0.2 
1.6 
2.1 
0.2 
1.4 
35.2 
0.5 
37.9 
1976-7 
8.6 
4.6 
0.8 
0.8 
1.1 
0.2 
0.4 
43.5 
o;3 
39.5 
1978-9 
11.9 
7.3 
2.1 
0.2 
0.7 
0.6 
0.2 
30.7 
1.2 
45.3 
Six SUte Total 
1972-3 
14.9 
1.0 
1.1 
1.6 
_ 
2.5 
2.1 
40.7 
_ 
35.2 
1974-5 
29.5 
4.3 
0.6 
5.0 
0.9 
1.1 
0.7 
26.5 
3.2 
27.9 
1976-7 
20.2 
8.7 
1.0 
2.5 
0.6 
0.8 
0.6 
30.1 
3.9 
31.4 
1978-9 
24.6 
1.2 
1.2 
0.9 
0.4 
0.8 
0.5 
34.6 
2.8 
32.9 
Source: Derived from Camx'nuealth CaiMTrwnent Finance. 
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TABLE 5 .A .21 
AUSTRALIA 
(WMONWtALTW ADVANCES TO THE STATES 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
Fixictton 
 
1972-3 
1.5 
-1.1 
6.9 
86.8 
-1.0 
N.S.U. 
1974-5 1976-7 
4.2 3.7 
46.1 39.1 
3.6 2.0 
46.2 57.6 
-0.1 * 
1978-9 
1.4 
30.8 
2.3 
68.2 
* 
1972-3 
1.1 
-2.2 
7.9 
93.7 
-0.4 
Vic 
1974-5 
1.3 
49.9 
3.8 
48.4 
-0.1 
1976-7 
1.2 
37.6 
3.3 
57.8 
* 
1 
1978-9:1972-3 
0.2 ! 0.3 
29.4 ; -1.2 
2.0 19.5 
68.3 1 83.6 
• ) -2.2 
Old 
1974-5 1976-7 
2.8 6.8 
28.8 20.2 
19.7 17.8 
49.1 56.1 
-0.5 -0.9 
1978-9 
3.7 
21.5 
0.4 
74.8 
-0.4 
1972-3 
* 
-1.8 
4.1 
97-7 
* 
S.A. 
1974-5 1976-7 
0.1 1.2 
48.2 37.3 
4.0 4.8 
47.7 56.7 
« * 
1978-9 
• 
31.5 
2.9 
62.5 
3.0 
1972-3 
0.2 
-1.9 
9.0 
92.7 
-
U. 
1974-5 
0.7 
50.6 
2.3 
46.5 
-
A. 
1976-7 
1.0 
37.2 
1.3 
58.7 
1.7 
1978-9 
• 
•26.2 
5.5 
62.4 
5.9 
1972-3 
* 
-0.7 
6.6 
94.8 
-0.7 
Tas. 
1974-5 1976-7 
0.2 
35.9 38.5 
3.6 -1.7 
60.7 71.4 
-0.4 -0.2 
1978-9 
* 
26.1 
-3.1 
77.5 
-0.4 
> 
1972-3 
0.8 
-1.5 
8.7 
90.5 
-0.8 
Six-State Total 
1974-5 1976-7 1978-9 
2.1 2.7 1.0 
44.6 35.2 28.7 
5.9 4.6 2.0 
48.3 58.3 68.2 
-0.1 • 1.0 
* • Insignificant or irrelevant 
Source: Derived from Camonutalth Covmnxmt Finanoe. 
TABIC i . e . 4 
CANAIi* 
P[RCtNIAGt INCRrASt OR DtCREASE I » PROVlNCIAl 
RrvrNur BT KAIN SOURCLS 
W^\ 
Kit 
M.I. 
IS 
M 
lut! 
ilu 
i : 
'e'jl 
Personal 
1974-5 1976-7 
28.7 
• 24.2 
21.0 
13.7 
33.1 
23.5 
27.6 
47.3 
23.3 
23.2 
27,9 
18.9 
6.2 
12.5 
15.1 
24.8 
12.1 
13.3 
35.4 
24.8 
13.9 
19.1 
ncODe Tax 
1977-8 
19.8 
21.6 
21.0 
14.3 
27.3 
31.3 
15.7 
36.7 
19.0 
29.0 
27.5 
1978-9 
19.3 
21.0 
19.9 
23.1 
12.4 
22.2 
15.5 
14.0 
3.3 
26.6 
16.9 
Corpo 
1974-5 
32.) 
62.0 
49.9 
76.8 
42.5 
40.5 
60.6 
74.2 
140.1 
79.6 
56.9 
ration 
1976-7 
80.4 
52.2 
173.1 
33.9 
-0.8 
-19.1 
85.9 
49.0 
42.6 
14.6 
4.3 
Income 
1977-8 
-13.8 
-12.7 
-24.7 
2.2 
15.3 
18.7 
-26.7 
-35.9 
-39.3 
3.0 
-0.5 
Tax 
1978-9 
-0.8 
12.1 
0.3 
22.1 
14.4 
42.3 
6.9 
36.3 
8.6 
29.9 
25.6 
Ge 
1974-5 
34.3 
4.0 
10.6 
6.5 
22.0 
19.3 
21.0 
30.3 
-
17.4 
19.3 
neral Sales lax 
1976-7 
14.3 
8.2 
19.7 
4.9 
11.4 
34.0 
12.4 
14.7 
-
49.4 
24.6 
1977-8 
12.7 
10.0 
9.7 
15.0 
13.6 
13.0 
10.0 
10.5 
-
4.2 
11.5 
1978-9 
2.8 
-5.3 
-16.5 
3.B 
-11.7 
-10.0 
-24.9 
-15.7 
-
-13.5 
-11.3 
Motor Fue 
1974-5 
8.1 
5.0 
5.4 
7,4 
3.1 
4.5 
-2 .0 
-21.9 
-21.B 
11.8 
1.7 
1976-7 
9.9 
1.2 
2.8 
4.6 
1,6 
1.6 
14.0 
30.2 
9.5 
3.6 
3.9 
1 ^^%•^ 
1977-8 
4.7 
-
3.2 
8.4 
4,7 
5,5 
4.B 
37.3 
4.6 
-
5.6 
I Health 
197B-9!l974.5 
3,P 
4,5 
3,7 
5.4 
2,7 
3.6 
-
-
-
-
-
3,4 
-100,0 
5.1 -100,0 
-90 ,9! 6,2 
4 .2j 5.5 
- 3 . 8 ; 1.1 
Insurance Premiums 
1976-7 
-
-
-
-
-
39.5 
-
-
19.0 
39,2 
37.6 
1977-8 
-
-
-
-
-
3.2 
-
-
18.1 
10.7 
5.3 
1978-9 
-
-
-
-
-
35.3 
-
-
2.0 
24.2 
30,9 
1974-5 
22,4 
0,9 
-3.8 
20,3 
13,6 
18,8 
13,6 
50.3 
29.2 
31.5 
17.7 
Other 
1976-7 
12.6 
18.3 
13.1 
7.6 
30.9 
29.2 
31.6 
27.8 
22,1 
43.0 
30.0 
Taxes 
1977-8 
24.0 
10.9 
11.3 
32.6 
15.4 
23.5 
15.5 
0,6 
14.6 
3.7 
16.6 
1978-9^ 
lb.5; 
H.3i 
56.8 ! 
15.9; 
10.3; 
17.1 • 
.).l i 
12.9; 
14.6 t 
19,3 ; 
1:1,7! 
Hon-tax Revenue frwr, 
own Sources 
1974-5 1976-7 1977-8 
12.7 18.5 13.6 
8.3 -7.2 19.1 
12.2 9.6 12.6 
12.9 10.9 15.2 
15.6 13.0 14.0 
21.5 11.4 16.0 
16.0 16.) 19.2 
1)4.2 5.) 18.3 
86.6 25.0 16.9 
11.9 14.8 -0.2 
35.9 16.0 14.3 
1978-9 
4.3 
17.9 
6.8 
14,4 
34,1 
13.0 
16.9 
22.6 
10.8 
58.8 
19.9 
1974-5 
26.8 
20.6 
18.9 
19.5 
36.7 
25.2 
13.1 
4.4 
41.4 
44.7 
27.6 
Trtnxfers 
1976.7 
11,» 
12.3 
10". r 
7.7 
13.1 
24 .9 
10.4 
- 1 . ) 
22 ,9 
24 ,6 
16.B 
1977-6 
9.7 
0.7 
e.o 
2.6 
15 .6 
- 1 6 . 6 
- 2 . 5 
- 4 5 . 7 
- 7 . 4 
- 1 1 , 2 
- 2 . 3 
1978-9 
12.0 
6.1 
13.6 
16.6 
7.1 
2.7 
0.5 
3.0 
4.2 
7.7 
5.8 
Gros 
1974-5 
24.7 
15.2 
16.0 
16.8 
25.7 
20.7 
17.3 
41.5 
62.1 
24.5 
26.6 
s General Revenue 
1976-7 
15.2 
8.7 
14.0 
9.3 
17.3 
16.9 
16.9 
12.7 
25.6 
23.3 
18.1 
1977-8 
11.5 
10.6 
9.3 
9.8 
18.1 
10.8 
5.7 
2.1 
8.9 
4.7 
11.4 
197B-S 
9.E 
8.1 
10.) 
15,4 
10.5 
12.8 
3.3 
11.2 
6.7 
21.4 
11.6 
Source: Derived froni froinnrial Covtrnmen: 
Finance: /)«t>r>«<* and ^p^nditur*-
EttimtsB, O t tJMi , S U t l s t i c s Canada. 
h\\^ 
lAlllI i.e.6 
CANADA 
iMliiatio'^ 
In levmue Guarantef 
iMjl General PurpoSf 
Inatpart 1 CcMTTwnlcatloni 
m>» 
k i l l Velfirf 
Uullor, 
fc'-ril Resources 
I'Jl Special Purt)OSc 
ml Irinsfers 
1975-6 
2.5 
NA 
7.0 
-97 .2 
13.3 
19.1 
-56.4 
-94 .1 
5.5 
6.3 
Nfld 
)976-7 
)7 ,6 
63,6 
19.8 
a 
18.6 
2.0 
69.9 
10.8 
15.8 
1977-8 
19.7 
-66 .8 
]2 .3 
49.5 
-17 .7 
-2 .4 
193.) 
36.5 
12.2 
)2 .2 
INCREASC 
1978-9 |1975-6 
23.6 13.4 
-76 .2 1 N* 
23.5 13.2 
- ! -75 .8 
32.3 22.2 
19.8 i 31.8 
32.8 -70 .7 
22 . ) 46.0 
2 2 . 9 , 28.4 
OR DECRCASE I^ 
P.t 
1976-7 
12.4 
76.4 
14.1 
656.6 
19.8 
18.9 
246.7 
0.6 
7.0 
1, 
1977-8 
IB.3 
11.5 
HAJOR TRANSFER PATMrNTS TO 
1978-9 
1.8 
21.8 
12.0 
PROVINCES 1975-6 TO 
N.5. 
1975-6 
26.3 
15.1 
-11 .2 
91.0 
23.1 
25.0 
1976-7 
O.B 
6 ) . 8 
3.6 
a 
17.6 
1.4 
-17 .1 
794,4 
- i ; 3 
9,4 
1977-8 
22.6 
-65,5 
15.B 
-17 .6 
- 9 . 6 
104,7 
730.0 
- 1 . 7 
8 .1 
1978-9 
-1 .2 
-79 .6 
- 2 . 7 
108.7 
28.4 
5.6 
26,6 
-76 .6 
24.9 
7.9 
1975-6 
17.1 
-60 .1 
14.2 
53.3 
-17 .4 
20.6 
17.5 
N 
1976-7 
13.2 
-60 ,4 
13.2 
1978-9 
B. 
1977-8 
-62.5 
5.9 
2.5 
-26 .1 
-11.7 
ioe.6 
* 0.7 
3.3 
1978-9 
18.6 
-80 .8 
13.6 
a 
42.3 
19.9 
21.6 
b 
28.9 
20.5 
i 
1975-6 
9.2 
NA 
30.4 
-77 .3 
0.9 
- 2 7 . 0 
- 4 . 6 
NA 
-13 .4 
6.9 
Ouc 
1976-7 
14.6 
109.1 
12.2 
42.0 
- 5 . 2 
121.4 
49.5 
a 
42.4 
25.3 
1977-8 
16.8 
- 69 .3 
3.5 
170.3 
153.3 
- 2 . 5 
- 2 9 . 2 
185.3 
28.2 
15.7 
1978-9 
2 .0 
- 7 8 . ) 
- 1 . 9 
90.9 
12.5 
57.7 
0 .1 
-26 ,8 
18.7-
9.5 
Ont. 
1975-6 
-NA 
196.0 
a 
20.6 
60.0 
18.0 
107.8 
28.4 
36.1 
1976-7 
-188.0 
143.3 
- 63 .6 
22.4 
4 .0 
12.4 
-61 .5 
15.4 
28.3 
1977-8 
-
- 7 8 . 0 
-75.4 
-32 .7 
- 2 4 . 2 
-15 .3 
98.2 
11.1 
- 8 . 0 
-20 .9 
1978-9 
-
- 7 9 . 3 
- 7 8 . 2 
572.2 
26 .0 
7.9 
27.5 
- 36 .9 
, 21.9 
10.6 
Han. 
1975-6 
23.3 
NA 
15.7 
938.5 
19.3 
81.1 
-20 .8 
-93 .7 
31.7 
24.8 
1976-7 1977-8 
13.9 16.5 
55.4 -66 .5 
19.8 0.4 
35.1 -100 .0 
27.4 - 25 .8 
-19 .3 9.6 
53.7 124.8 
a 3.3 
16.0 - 7 : 1 
17.5 - 4 . 1 
1976-9 
6.4 
-82 .9 
-3 .4 
-22 .0 
33.6 
3.4 
29.7 
-79.5 
15.5 
7.2 
TABLE 5.C.6 
(Continued) 
Sask, 
1975-6 
-54.8 
Nt 
-59 .3 
102.0 
18.7 
40.5 
-14 .8 
a 
40.0 
-7 .4 
1976-7 1977rB 1978-9 
b 88.9 a 
113.2 -70 .3 -93.5 
-46.2 -248.8 200.2 
43.8 -39 .1 117.3 
27.2 -20 .7 34.3 
35.5 -45.3 0.2 
26.0 209.4 41.9 
-94.9 150.0 295.0 
17.1 -11 .6 25.6 
3.6 -41 .5 41.0 
A l u 
1975-6 
-K> 
-70 .3 
114.5 
25.5 
76.6 
-17.5 
-88 .9 
45.9 
- 7 .1 
1976-7 1977-8 
-74.2 -67.5 
66.3 -4S. I 
24.7 -34.5 
20.1 -15.5 
- 4 . 0 -2 .6 
- 6 . 0 137.7 
a -100.0 
13.4 -0 .1 
19.9 -8.6 
1976-9 
-
-77.6 
-27 .6 
22.1 
20.2 
10.6 
51.6 
- 7 . 6 
21.3 
I2.S 
B.C. 
1975-6 
-HA 
32.2 
9.5 
25.4 
33.2 
1.4 
-46.4 
21.0 
21.8 
1976-7 
-203.4 
172.0 
-47 .2 
16.7 
- 1 . 9 
32.6 
-71 .0 
11.9 
24.1 
1977-8 
-
-75.5 
-70 .8 
115.0 
-31 .8 
15.9 
846.2 
323.1 
2.5 
-9 .7 
1978-9 
-
-77.9 
-49.2 
171.6 
35.6 
2.3 
15.2 
52.1 
14.7 
9.0 
1975-6 
8.4 
KA 
-13.5 
-41.6 
18.4 
29.1 
- 2 . 8 
-26.3 
17.5 
16.2 
Total 
1976-7 
8.6 
127.3 
26.0 
63.0 
19.2 
19.6 
30.2 
80.4 
19.5 
21.7 
1977-8 
13.8 
-73 .7 
-15 .7 
20.6 
- 9 . 8 
- 6 . 6 
45.4 
31.3 
2.6 
-3 .7 
1978-9 
9.6 
-79.7 
- 4 . 1 
95.? 
24.4 
20.5 
18.3 
0.? 
20.4 
12.1 
NA - Not ava i lab le 
a • Profound Increase 
b • Profound decrease 
* • Ins ign i f icant or i r re levant 
Source: Derived frcm Fmd^rai Govgrnrrwnt Finanot, Ottawa, S t a t i s t i c s Canada. 
TABLE 6 . 1 
AUSTRALIA 
STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE BT PURPOSE 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
U , , Or^er and Public Safety 
GtMraT A* i ln ls t ra t1on N . E . I . 
PrliHry 4"^ Secondary Education 
University Education 
Other Education 
Hospital and Cl in ic Services 
Otter Heal tti 
Social Security and Welfare 
Housing 
Ccaaajnlty and Regional Development 
Sewerage and Drainage 
Sanitation and Protection of 
Environment N . E . I . 
Conunlty Amenities 
Recreation and Culture 
Sol) and Hater Resources 
Forest 
Other Agriculture 
Wfterals Management and Conservation 
Electricity and Gas 
Hater 
tall Transport 
Sea Transport 
•oad Transport 
•Ither Transport N .B . I . 
Other Econtnic Services including 
Seneral A* i in1stra t ton 
Other 
1968-9 
11.6 
12.7 
27 .0 
7 .0 
7 .0 
17.5 
2 .2 
1.6 
0 .1 
0.5 
-
0.8 
0.1 
3.3 
1.7 
0.7 
2.4 
0.6 
0 .1 
-
. 
0.3 
1.2 
0 .2 
1.2 
0.2 
N.S 
1971-2 
11.2 
12.7 
28.5 
6 .6 
7.7 
17.5 
2 .1 
- 1.6 
0.1 
0.4 
-
0.5 
0.1 
3 .0 
1.6 
1.0 
2.4 
0.6 
0.1 
-
-
0.2 
0.9 
0.1 
1.4 
0.1 
u. 
1974-5 
10.1 
9.5 
28 .0 
7.5 
9.5 
21 .1 
2.5, 
1.0 
0 .1 
0.6 
* 
0.8 
0.1 
2 .7 
1.3 
0.5 
1.9 
0.6 
0.1 
-
-
0.2 
0 .5 
0.1 
1.3 
• 
1977-8 
9.3 
9 .8 
27.2 
e.e 
9.7 
24.0 
2 .9 
0 .9 
0.1 
0 .6 
* 
0.7 
0 .1 
2 .9 
0.9 
0.4 
1.6 
0.5 
• 
-
-
0.2 
0.5 
0.1 
1.2 
• > 
Vic. 
1968-9 
9.9 
8.4 
32.3 
6.7 
e.i 
16.8 
2.6 
2 .0 
* 
0.2 
-
0.9 
-
3.9 
1.2 
0.6 
2.4 
0.5 
-
-0.2 
• 
0.2 
1.4 
-
1.9 
0.4 
1971-2 
9.0 
7.6 
33.1 
e.3 
9.9 
17.6 
2 .1 
2 .0 
• 
0.3 
-
0.7 
0 .1 
3.5 
0.7 
0 .5 
2.4 
0.5 
-
-0.2 
• 
• 
1.2 
-
Z.6 
• 
1974-5 
8 .2 
7.1 
32.2 
6.8 
12.3 
16.7 
2.3 
2 .1 
• 
0.5 
* 
1.1 
0 .1 
3.4 
0.7 
0.5 
2 .1 
0.5 
-
-0.1 
• 
-
1.0 
* 
2.3 
• 
1977-8 
7.6 
6.3 
31.9 
6 .0 
11.4 
21.4 
2 .1 
2.4 
0.1 
0.6 
* 
1.0 
0.1 
3.3 
0.5 
0.3 
1.8 
0.4 
-
-0.1 
• 
-
1.0 
0.1 
1.9 
• 
1 
Qld 
1968-9 
12.8 
12.4 
24.6 
5.2 
4.4 
16.8 
2.6 
2 .8 
-
-
1.3 
0.7 
-
1.8 
2 .1 
0.8 
6.7 
0.9 
0.2 
• -
-
-
1.2 
0.1 
3.7 
1971-2 
11.9 
12.2 
26.8 
5 .1 
6.9 
17.2 
3.4 
2.5 
-
0.1 
* 
0.7 
0.2 
2 .3 
2.3 
0.7 
5.3 
0.9 
0.2 
-
-
-0.1 
0.5 
• 
1.6 
-
1974-5 
11.0 
10.2 
26.4 
6.0 
8.2 
17.5 
3.5 
2.5 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.9 
0.2 
2.6 
2 .2 
0.6 
4.4 
0.7 
0.1 
• 
-
-0.1 
0.5 
• 
1.9 
* 
1977-8 
10.4 
11.0 
26.2 
5.3 
9.4 
19.0 
3.7 
2 .0 
0 .1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.3 
0.2 
3 .0 
1.8 
0 .6 
3.9 
0.5 
0.2 
• • 
-0.1 
0 .6 
« 
1.4 
-
1968-9 
10.2 
9.4 
34.6 
8.2 
5.0 
15.6 
3 .0 
2 .8 
0.1 
0.1 
-
0.8 
-
3.8 
1.6 
-
1.9 
1.1 
-
-
• 
. 
-0.2 
• 
2.0 
• 
S.A 
1971-2 
9.5 
7.9 
34.5 
7.1 
9 .6 
15.1 
3.4 
2.3 
0.2 
0.2 
* 
0.8 
0.2 
3.2 
1.1 
-
2 .1 
1.0 
-
-
• 
-
-0.2 
• 
2.1 
-
1974-5 
9.0 
7.5 
31.3 
7 .0 
11.0 
16.9 
4.4 
2 .0 
0.1 
0.6 
-0.1 
0.9 
0.1 
3.3 
0.8 
-
1.6 
1.0 
-
-
* 
0.1 
0.3 
0 .1 
z.o 
0.1 
1977-8 
8.5 
6.6 
28.8 
5.5 
11.8 
22.6 
3.6 
1.8 
0.1 
0 .6 
-0.1 
1.0 
0 .1 
3.4 
0.9 
« 
1.7 
0.9 
-
* 
-
0.1 
0.3 
0.1 
1.9 
1968-9 
10.2 
13.8 
23.0 
4 .6 
».6 
16.1 
4.7 
2.6 
-0.1 
0 .2 
0 .1 
0.5 
.-
4 .8 
0 .1 
0.5 
4 .2 
1.1 
-
-
0.3 
_ 
0.9 
0.1 
2.6 
W.A 
1971-2 
10.7 
9.6 
25.3 
4 . 1 
10.7 
18.1 
2.8 
2.5 
-0.1 
0.4 
0.2 
0.4 
-
4.7 
0 .2 
0.2 
3 .5 
2.6 
-
-
0.3 
-
0.9 
• 
2.5 
• 
1974-5 
10.2 
7.4 
23.1 
5.2 
13.2 
22.0 
3 .8 
2 .1 
0 .1 
0.3 
0 .1 
0.5 
0 .1 
3 .2 
-
0.2 
3.2 
1.8 
-
0.5 
0.1 
-
0.4 
0.1 
2 .7 
* 
1977-8 
9.7 
6.6 
22.8 
4.8 
12.5 
25.8 
4 .0 
1.7 
0.1 
0.3 
* 
0.5 
0.2 
3 .1 
0.1 
* 
2.9 
1.4 
• 
0.4 
• 
-
0.3 
* 
2.6 
0.1 
1968-9 
10.0 
14.2 
24.7 
4.7 
7.4 
16.S 
3 .8 
1.5 
0.2 
0.2 
0 .2 
0 .8 
0 .2 
3.5 
1.2 
1.5 
4 .7 
1.1 
-
0.3 
-
-
0.6 
-
2 .6 
0.5 
Tas. 
1971-2 1974-5 
10.2 
11.5 
26.1 
4.7 
7.7 
16.1 
3.4 
1.1 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2 
0.8 
-
3.7 
2.4 
2 .0 
4 .5 
1.0 
-
0.3 
0.1 
-
1.0 
0.1 
2.4 
0.3 
10.0 
9.7 
26.2 
5.4 
9 .8 
18.6 
3 .1 
1.0 
0.2 
0 .1 
0.1 
1.0 
-0.1 
4 .7 
2 .2 
1.8 
3.5 
0.8 
-
0 .2 
-
-
0.4 
* 
2.4 
0.1 
1 
1977-8 
9.6 
10.3 
24.6 
4.7 
9.9 
20.2 
3.5 
1.0 
0.2 
0.1 
-
0.9 
-0.1 
4.5 
2 .3 
1.3 
2.6 
0.9 
-
0.2 
-
• 
0.3 
* 
2.9 
0.1 
Six State Total 
1968-9 
11.1 
11.4 
28.3 
6.4 
7.0 
16.9 
2.7 
2 .1 
* 
0.3 
0.2 
0.8 
0.1 
3.4 
1.4 
0.6 
3 .1 
0.7 
* 
• 
• 
0.2 
1.1 
0.1 
2 .0 
0.2 
1971-2 
10.5 
10.5 
29.6 
6.0 
8.5 
17.3 
2.5 
2 .0 
0.1 
0.3 
* 
0.6 
0.1 
3.3 
1.3 
0.6 
3.0 
0.9 
• 
• 
• 
0.1 
0.9 
0.1 
2 .0 
* 
1974-5 
9.6 
8.6 
28.6 
6.7 
10.6 
19.0 
2.9 
1.7 
0.2 
0.5 
• 
0.9 
0.1 
3.1 
1.1 
0.5 
2.5 
0.8 
• 
* 
• 
0.1 
0.6 
0.1 
1.9 
* 
1977-8 
8.9 
8.4 
27.9 
5.9 
10.6 
22.5 
3.0 
1.7 
0.1 
0.5 
• 
0.7 
0.1 
3.2 
0.9 
0.3 
2.2 
0.6 
• 
• • 
• 
0.1 
0.6 
0.1 
1.7 
* 
• Insignificant or 1rr«levant 
Derived from Public Autkarity Finance: 
Stats (Bid Local Authorities. 
TABLE 6.2 
AUSTRALIA 
STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
EXPENDITURE ON NE¥ FIXED ASSETS CLASSIFIED BY PURPOSE 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
La», Order and Public Safety 
General Ackninlstration N . E . I . 
Prinary and Secondary Education 
University Education 
Other Education 
Hospital and C l i n i c Services 
Other Health 
Social Security and Welfare 
• 
Housing 
Coarunlty and Regional Development 
Sewerage and Drainage 
Sanitation and Protect ion of 
Envlromient N . E . I . 
Connunity Amenities 
Recreation and Culture 
Soil and Water Resources 
Forest 
Other Agriculture and Fisheries 
NInerals Management and Conservation 
Electr icity and Gas 
Water 
Rail Transport 
Sea Transport 
Road Transport 
Urtan Transport 
Pipelines 
Other Transport 
Other Economic Services Including 
General Administration 
Other 
1968-9 
0.9 
2.7 
6.6 
2 .1 
1.6 
3.5 
0.2 
0.2 
3.6 
• 
7.1 
0.8 
* 
1.9 
3.3 
1.0 
0.1 
1.1 
18.6 
6.5 
6.1 
2.9 
27.2 
0.3 
-
• 
2.6 
• 
N.S. 
1971-2 
1.0 
1.8 
6 .1 
2.2 
2.2 
3.2 
0.1 
0.3 
4 .1 
* 
11.1 
0.5 
• 
3.4 
2.7 
1.2 
0.1 
1.2 
15.0 
5.9 
5.4 
3 .0 
27.7 
0.3 
-
• 
1.2 
• 
w. 
1974-5 
0.9 
2 .9 
9 .2 
1.6 
3.3 
3.4 
0.8 
0.2 
8.2 
0.4 
10.2 
0.4 
• 
1.6 
2 .0 
1.0 
0.1 
1.1 
10.7 
6.1 
5.3 
1.6 
26.2 
0.3 
-
• 
2.4 
• 
1977-8 
1.1 
3.0 
7.5 
0.9 
1.7 
3.8 
0.6 
0.3 
5.4 
1.6 
9.6 
0.3 
• 
1.3 
1.8 
I .O 
0.2 
1.3 
13.5 
4.4 
9.1 
2.1 
27.9 
0.1 
-
• 
1.5 
• t 
* 
1968-9 
1.3 
2.4 
5.7 
2.5 
2 .0 
3.3 
0.1 
0.3 
3.2 
• 
6.4 
0.7 
-
1.7 
3.2 
1.0 
0.2 
l . I 
22.2 
4 .0 
3.4 
2.6 
29.2 
• 
1.6 
-
1.8 
-
Vic 
1971-2 
0.9 
2.6 
7.8 
2.3 
2.9 
3 .0 
0.1 
0.2 
2.7 
0.1 
10.8 
1.0 
-
1.5 
2.4 
1.1 
0.1 
0.8 
17.0 
6.8 
3.5 
2 .0 
29.4 
0.2 
-
-
0.7 
-
1974-6 
0.8 
4 .0 
10.1 
1.5 
4 .3 
4 . 1 
0.4 
0.1 
5.4 
0.2 
10.6 
i.o' 
-
1.5 
2 .3 
1.3 
0.1 
0.7 
12.2 
6.0 
5.3 
1.9 
24.7 
0 .6 . 
-
-
0.8 
-
1977-e 
1.8 
5.2 
7.4 
0.2 
2.2 
3.7 
0.8 
0 .1 
2.4 
0.1 
7.3 
0.9 
-
2.6 
2.2 
1.4 
0.1 
1.6 
19.5 
8 .0 
6.4 
1.3 
22.7 
0.9 
. 
-
1.3 
• 
1968-9 
1.3 
3.6 
4.9 
1.1 
2.4 
2.5 
-
0.4 
4 .0 
0.2 
5.8 
• 
-
« 
3.4 
2.1 
0.3 
l .D 
19.7 
6.0 
7.1 
2.8 
29.6 
0.6 
-
-
0.9 
-
Qld 
1971-2 
1.6 
4 .8 
5.3 
1.3 
2 .0 
3.4 
• 
0.5 
3.1 
-
6.4 
* 
-
• 
4.4 
1.8 
0.6 
0.7 
16.1 
5.5 
9.9 
3.5 
27.8 
0.5 
-
-
0.8 
-
1974-5 
1.2 
4 .9 
5.6 
1.4 
4 .5 
3 .0 
0 .1 
0.3 
6.3 
0.1 
6.4 
1.9 
0.1 
1.4 
2.4 
1.7 
0.3 
2.9 
16.6 
4.7 
6.8 
0.9 
25.8 
0.1 
-
• 
0.5 
-
1977-8 
1.4 
• 6 . 0 
6.4 
0.8 
3.2 
5.4 
0.3 
0.4 
4 .6 
0.1 
5.7 
0.5 
0.2 
2 .2 
2.4 
1.6 
0.5 
0.9 
16.8 
4 .6 
7.7 
2.7 
24.9 
0.5 
-
0.1 
0.3 
-
1968-9 
0.7 
1.9 
-
1.1 
8 .5 
4 .2 
0.7 
0.2 
3.2 
-
4.8 
-
-
0.5 
0.9 
0.6 
0 .2 
1.1 
11.2 
8 .6 
7.6 
1.4 
27.6 
• 
15.0 
-
• 
-
S.A 
1971-2 
1.5 
2 .2 
7.7 
1.7 
3.6 
8.3 
0.4 
0.2 
4 .5 
-
5:3 
0 .1 
-
1.6 
1.2 
0.7 
0.4 
3.0 
10.1 
9.5 
4 .6 
2 .1 
28.6 
1.5 
1.2 
-
0.4 
-
1974-6 
1.2 
3.4 
9.7 
1.9 
6.4 
7.3 
1.2 
0 .6 
7.9 
0 .8 
6.3 
0.4 
-
2.2 
2 .0 
0 .8 
0.3 
4 .9 
8 .5 
6 .8 
2.8 
1.7 
21.9 
0 .3 
0.5 
0 .1 
0.1 
-
1977-8 
2.3 
4 .0 
8.4 
1.3 
6.8 
6 .8 
1.0 
0.4 
5 .8 
1.4 
6.1 
0.5 
0.1 
3 .1 
2.6 
1.0 
0.7 
0 .8 
10.4 
7 .0 
0.8 
2 .0 
23.8 
1.8 
1.3 
O.I 
0 .1 
-
I 
1968-9 
1.5 
2 .9 
5.3 
0.9 
1.9 
5 .0 
• 
* 
4 . 1 
0 .1 
2 .3 
-
-
3.4 
3.4 
2 .1 
0.8 
0.8 
13.3 
7.5 
14.6 
2.4 
26.3 
0.6 
. 
-
0.8 
-
W.A. 
1971-2 1974-5 
0.7 
3.4 
5.3 
1.2 
2 .8 
3 .9 
0.3 
0.4 
1.5 
0 .5 
4 .8 
-
• -
3.0 
2.4 
2 .0 
0.8 
1.8 
15.4 
7.5 
6.4 
, 4.4 
30 .1 
0.7 
-
-
0.6 
-
1.5 
2 .2 
8 .3 
2 .0 
3.3 
6.9 
1.1 
0.7 
3.7 
0.7 
9 .1 
0.1 
• 
3.3 
0.4 
2 .1 
0 .6 
0.3 
13.0 
6.9 
4 . 1 
3.4 
24.8 
0 .8 
. 
-
0.9 
-
1977-8 
1.7 
2.3 
7.2 
1.3 
1.8 
7.3 
0.5 
0.4 
9 .2 
0.7 
B.3 
0.1 
0.4 
3.7 
0.2 
2.9 
0.4 
0.4 
14.5 
7.3 
1.7 
2.2 
22.7 
0.7 
-
-
0.5 
0.2 
Tas. 
1968-9 
1.4 
3.3 
3.3 
1.8 
2.7 
5.9 
0.2 
-
1.9 
-
3.4 
-
-
1.1 
-
2.4 
1.0 
0.1 
39.7 
2.3 
1.6 
6.7 
20.9 
0.3 
-
0.1 
-
1971-2 
2 .2 
1.1 
5.7 
1.1 
5.3 
4 .8 
0.2 
-
1.7 
-
2.8 
-
-
1.9 
0.4 
1.9 
0.5 
0.2 
31.4 
2.0 
7.0 
6.0 
23.1 
0.2 
-
0.2 
0.3 
-
1974-5 
3.3 
3 .1 
8.3 
1.1 
5.2 
3.2 
0 .1 
0.1 
9.8 
-
2.9 
-
-
2 .0 
O.I 
2.3 
0.3 
0.1 
21.9 
1.4 
2.6 
4 .2 
26.3 
0.6 
-
0.1 
1.3 
-
1977-8 
2.9 
3.4 
7.1 
0.4 
4.7 
B.O 
0.1 
• 
12.0 
0.1 
2.6 
-
-
1.9 
* 
4.1 
0.3 
0.6 
21.0 
, 1.6 
0.2 
2.1 
25.3 
0.5 
-
• 
0.9 
-
Six State T o U l 
1968-9 
1.1 
2.7 
5.2 
1.8 
2.6 
3.6 
0.2 
0.2 
3.5 
0.1 
5.9 
0.5 
• 
1.5 
2.9 
1.3 
0.3 
1.0 
19.5 
5.8 
5.9 
2.8 
27.T 
0.3 
1.9 
* 
1.6 
* 
1971-2 
1.1 
2.7 
6.4 
1.9 
2.6 
3.8 
0.2 
0.3 
3.3 
• 0.1 
8.7 
0.4 
• 
2.1 
2.6 
1.4 
0.3 
1.2 
16.0 
6.4 
5.8 
3.0 
28.2 
0.4 
0.1 
* 
0.9 
• 
1974-5 
1.1 
3.5 
8.7 
1.6 
4 .1 
4.2 
0.6 
0.3 
6.8 
0.3 
8.9 
0.7 
• 
1.7 
1.9 
1.3 
0.2 
1.5 
12.6 
5.8 
5.1 
1.8 
25.3 
0.4 
• 
• 
1.3 
* 
1977-8 
1.6 
4 . ) 
7.3 
0.7 
2.5 
4.E 
0.6 
0.3 
5.2 
0.7 
7.6 
0.5 
0.1 
2.2 
1.8 
1.6 
0.3 
1.1 
15.6 
5.8 
6.4 
2 .0 
25. ) 
0.6 
0.1 
• 
1.) 
• • Insignificant or irrelevant 
Source; Derived from Public Authorit}/ Finance: 
Stats and Local Authorities 
U-'qr 
STATE EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL SERVICES FROM 
COfWWWEALTH REVENUE AND CERTAIN SPECIAL FUNDS: 
EDUCATION 
Education Department and Schools 
A*n in is t ra t ion and General 
Transport of School .Children 
Training of Teachers 
Primary 
Seconda ry 
Non-Government 
Sub-total 
Adult Education N . E . I . 
Technical 
Agricultural 
L ibrar ies , Museums, e tc . 
Special Education 
TOTAL EDUCATION 
HEALTH. HOSPITALS AND WELFARE 
Public Health 
Hospitals, e tc . 
Mental Hospi ta ls , e t c . 
Health of Mothers and Children 
Sub-toUl 
Recreation 
Relief of Aged, Indigent and In f i rm 
Child Welfare 
TOTAL HEALTH, HOSPITALS AND WaFARE 
LAW, ORDER AND PUBLIC SAFHY 
A * i i n i s t r a t i o n of Just ice 
Police 
Gaols 
Public Safety 
TOTAL LAW, ORDER AND PUBLIC SAFETY 
GRAND TOTAL 
1968-9 
1.97 
2.91 
2.98 
19.92 
17.26 
KA 
<S.04 
• 
• 
0.38 
0.95 
-
55.98 
1.53 
18.49 
5.21 
0.28 
23.96 
0.43 
2.68 
1.22 
29.85 
1.67 
6.90 
2.06 
0.46 
11.06 
96.91 
N.S.W. j 
1971-2 1974-5 1977-8 
2.53 4.76 9.88 
4.13 8 .30 14.30 
6.24 6.37 7.02 
28.67 47.92 71.14 
26.16 46.58 70.25 
2.36 4.48 8.01 
70.06 118.41 180.59 
0.28 1.25 
10.73 19.23 
0.64 0.22 0.33 
1.59 3.44 5.86 
-
87.18 133.08 207.27 
2.51 6.51 11.17 
29.51 71.78 67.31 
7.15 13.06 17.05 
0.31 0.O4 1.00 
36.96 64.91 96.52 
1968-9 
0.92 
2 .39 
5.93 
20.24 
14.04 
NA 
43.51 
• 
• 
0.28 
• i . o e 
0.77 
61.31 
0.80 
14.40 
6.14 
0.45 
20.99 
0.69 1.39 3.241 0.12 
4 .30 8.47 18.34 
2.95 6.69 9.04 
47.43 106.98 127.15 
2.03 5.03 5 .71 
10.50 19.98 32.46 
2.47 4.44 8.20 
1.68 
2.17 
25.77 
1.09 
7.03 
1.00 
0.62 1.13 1.B8J 0.34 
15.62 30.59 48.25^ 9.45 
1 
60.22 270.64 382.67 1 96.53 
V,c. ] 
1971-2 1974-5 1977-8 
1.32 4.12 7.16 
3.42 5.14 7.82 
9.27 10.16 6.26 
29.60 49.33 82.97 
31.13 60.00 96.98 
2.77 5.73 12.04 
77.50 134.48 213.21 
• 0.24 0.45 
4.94 7.38 
0.32 0.44 0.92 
1.53 3.74 7.28 
1.13 2.14 6.00 
93.72 145.97 235.24 
1.14 3.49 9.71 
24.54 51.09 61.99 
8.64 15.01 24.59 
0.50 1.06 1.64 
33.57 67.15 97.83 
0.16 1.29 2.70 
2.92 5.89 16.58 
3.67 6.47 8.50 
41.48 84.22 125.66 
0.78 2.45 2.09 
9.94 18.62 30.79 
1.52 2.69 4.38 
0.57 2.20 3.20 
12.80 25.96 40.47 
48.00 256.15 401.38 
1968-9 
1.41 
2.14^ 
2.45 
18.70 
13.47 
NA 
38.16 
* 
• 
0.65 
0.69 
0.20 
46.32 
1.97 
17.17 
3.98 
0.73 
21.88 
0.11 
1.36 
2.13 
27.45 
1.52 
8.83 
1.29 
1.54 
13.19 
86.96 
HCT PER CAPITA EXPENDITUR 
4 
Qld 
1971-2 
2.53 
2.68 
4.38 
28.55 
18.60 
3.48 
60.22 
* 
• 
0.99 
1.14 
0.35 
73.57 
2.01 
28.41 
5.40 
i.oe 
34.89 
0.14 
3.61 
3.13 
43.78 
2.46 
12.67 
1.82 
0.83 
17.77 
35.13 
1974-5 
5.67 
4.37 
4.S5 
49.90 
36.96 
5.58 
107.42 
0.61 
6.69 
0.78 
2.33 
3.81 
121.64 
3.29 
63.27 
9.23 
2.10 
74.61 
1.18 
2.65 
4.80 
86.53 
5.24 
22.29 
4 .41 
1.79 
33.74 
?41.91 
1977-8:1968-9 
10.99 
6.35 
4.94 
82.51 
56.55 
10.07 
171.41 
0.29 
11.31 
1.57 
5.74 
6.44 
196.96 
5.19 
59.58 
13.62 
2.81 
81.19 
3.52 
5.98 
7.44 
98.12 
6.38 
34.23 
7.81 
3.08 
51.51 
346.59 
0.98 
1.57 
5.23 
20.76 
20.06 
NA 
48.60 
• 
* 
0.30 
1.22 
0.10 
57.48 
1.07 
15.77 
4.77 
0.28 
20.82 
0.58 
1.59 
1.51 
25.58 
0.19 
8 .16 
1.98 
0.40 
10.72 
93.78 
S.A. 
1971-2 1974-5 1977-8 
3.36 9 .31 20.33 
1.92 3.19 4 .71 
9.64 7.40 4 .60 
33.55 57.82 96.16 
31.02 59.96 93.74 
1.41 , 2.68 7.27 
80.90 140.36 226.82 
3.55 3.54 
* 7 .40 17.19 
0.26 0.19 0.12 
2.15 4.55 12.83 
0.13 0.35 0.42 
99.51 156.40 260.90 
1.66 2.35 14.34 
26.21 71.10 69.73 
7.51 15.19 25.31 
0.47 1.28 1.77 
34.19 87.57 111.16 
0.87 2.53 4 .06 
5.54 13.59 16.80 
2 .06 4 .68 11.13 
44.32 110.73 143.15 
0.80 3.18 4.54 
11.05 22.00 39.55 
2.21 4 .25 7 .40 
0.55 1.67 1.94 
14.61 31.11 53.42 
58.44 298.23 457.48 
\ 
1968-9 
1.21 
3.55 
3.75 
23.75 
15.19 
NA 
47.46 
• 
• 
0.35 
1.47 
0.05 
60.40 
2.17 
23.97 
5.21 
0.59 
29.77 
0.89 
1.72 
2.16 
36.78 
0.86 
7.73 
3.21 
0.63 
12.43 
109.6) 
W.A, 
1971-2 1974-5 
2.89 7.49 
3.92 5.91 
7.57 9.71 
36.19 52.74 
27.66 47.32 
1.76 4.25 
79.99 127.42 
• 0.14 
15.59 
0.11 0.15 
2.31 4.13 
0.O3 -
103.08 147.42 
3.71 7.63 
33.12 93.88 
8.73 17.92 
0.B8 1.78 
47.73 113.59 
0.99 2.48 
8.88 9.37 
3.29 9.99 
64.69 143.14 
1.84 4.02 
13.47 22.74 
4.87 8.36 
0.89 2.24 
21.07 37.36 
185.84 327.92 
1977-8 
13.84 
9 .00 
9.45 
80.25 
71.75 
8.48 
192.76 
1.80 
23.68 
0.62 
8.25 
0.71 
227.82 
15.29 
98.43 
28.54 
3.50 
145.76 
8.25 
12.22 
15.64 
181.86 
5.82 
31.12 
12.83 
3.02 
52.78 
462.47 
Tas, 
1968-9 
1.03 
4.59 
4.67 
20.38 
22.84 
NA 
53.50 
• 
• 
0.01 
2.22 
0.97 
G5.36 
3.18 
19.68 
6.11 
0.73 
26.52 
0.54 
4.02 
1.03 
35.28 
1.60 
7.89 
2.55 
1.24 
13.28 
113.93 
1071-2 1974-5 
3.11 9.24 
5.74 8.28 
6.82 8.12 
31.40 55.68 
36.45 69.77 
NA NA 
1977-8 
;E,75 
11,93 
15.19 
90.29 
100.57 
HA 
83.52 151.10 237.73 
7.28 1 . 2 1 . 
7.03 11.04 
0.02 0.01 
3.56 8.66 
1.13 4.18 
102.54 176.21 
5.08 7.38 
30.23 78.74 
8.62 17.86 
0.64 1.85 
39.49 98.44 
0.98 3.00 
5.77 12.56 
2.27 4.19 
53.58 125.57 
2.27 6.39 
13.05 29.79 
3.28 6.26 
1.62 3.69 
20.21 46.13 
176.33 347.90 
2.19 
21.35 
0.04 
14.61 
4.65 
280.58 
12.09 
79.66 
25.94 
1.67 
119.36 
6.80 
9.00 
15.98 
151.14 
6.90 
42.79 
9.44 
7.71 
66.84 
498.55 
SI 
1968-9 
1.41 
2.63 
4.05 
20.22 
16.09 
HA 
44.40 
5.11 
5.62 
0.37 
1.06 
0.29 
56.85 
1.45 
17.36 
5.28 
0.43 
23.07 
0.35 
2.07 
1.71 
28.67 
1.11 
7.43 
1.74 
0.62 
10.90 
96.42 
X State Total 
1971-2 
2.32 
3.55 
7.26 
30.07 
27.34 
2.42 
72.96 
7.23 
6.92 
0.50 
1.68 
0.42 
89.71 
2.15 
28.39 
7.49 
0.55 
36.42 
0.51 
4.35 
3.10 
46.56 
1.62 
11.03 
2.31 
0.68 
15.64 
151.92 
1974-5 
5.51 
6.15 
7.54 
50.18 
50.88 
4.67 
125.03 
0.64 
8.62 
0.35 
3.68 
1.33 
139.65 
4.92 
66.76 
13.79 
0.95 
1977-8 
10.91 
9.89 
6.72 
•'9.84 
78.67 
9.17 
195.20 
1.17 
15.01 
0.68 
7.35 
2.89 
222.30 
10.52 
67.96 
20.62 
1.74 
81.50 100.84 
1.58 
7.53 
6.00 
101.54 
4.13 
20.67 
4.32 
1.75 
30.87 
272.06 
3.76 
14.98 
9.62 
129.21 
4.76 
33.12 
7.46 
2.71 
48.05 
399.56 
NA - Not appl icable 
Source: Derived from Conitionwealth Grants 
Cofmission Annual Reports 
H-Hb 
TABLE 6,4 
AUSTRALIA 
STATE AUTHORITIES 
OUTLAY 
1964-5 
1965-6 
1966-7 
1967-8 
1968-9 
1969-70 
1970-) 
1971-2 
1972^3 
1973-4 
1974-5 
1975-6 
1976-7 
1977-8 
N.S 
Current 
Outlay 
Total 
57.8 
57.4 
58.3 
59.7 
61.2 
61.9 
62.4 
63.3 
65.1 
66.0 
64.6 
65.9 
70.6 
70.3 
I 
Inc. 
8.8 
9.6 
9.3 
10.9 
12.6 
17.7 
16.7 
13.1 
20.1 
39.4 
24.0 
18.7 
15.2 
w. 
Capital 
Outlay 
Total 
42.2 
42.6 
41.7 
40.3 
38.8 
38.1 
37.6 
36.7 
34.9 
34.0 
36,4 
34.1 
29.4 
29.7 
Inc. 
10.6 
3.5 
2.7 
4.9 
9.3 
15.0 
12.6 
4.4 
15.6 
48.1 
16.8 
-4.3 
16.8 
Vic. 
Current 
Outlay 
I 
Total 
56.2 
55.9 
55.7 
56.1 
57.3 
59.0 
61.5 
64.7 
65.6 
66.3 
62.8 
66.1 
67.5 
68.5 
I 
Inc. 
10.0 
8.6 
12.0 
12.4 
13.2 
16.2 
15.4 
18.5 
20.9 
34.4 
30.9 
18.9 
14.7 
Capital 
Outlay 
I 
Total 
43.8 
44.1 
44.3 
43.9 
42.7 
4 1 . 0 . 
38.5 
35.3 
34.4 
33.7 
37.2 
33.9 
32.5 
31.5 
I 
Inc. 
9.7 
8.9 
8.5 
7.8 
6.6 
10.3 
0.8 
13.5 
17.6 
56.5 
13.4 
11.7 
9.1 
Old 
Current 
Outlay 
I 
Total 
53.9 
55.9 
57.3 
55.7 
58.7 
60.3-
61.6 
60.4 
65.0 
64.5 
62.7 
66.5 
66.9 
67.4 
I 
Inc. 
12.2 
10.4 
11.5 
12.3 
15.4 
16.0 
15.0 
20.0 
22.0 
38.0 
27.6 
18.6 
13.9 
Capital 
Outlay 
Total 
46.1 
44.1 
42.7 
44.3 
41.3 
39.7 
38.4 
39.6 
35.0 
35.5 
37.3 
33.5 
33.1 
32.6 
Inc. 
3.5 
2.6 
16.8 
-0.3 
B.O 
9.7 
21.4 
-1.4 
24.4 
49.4 
8.1 
16.4 
11.4 
S.A. 
Current 
Outlay 
I 
Total 
52.0 
51.2 
53.6 
56.9 
54.5 
55.8 
59.3 
60.8 
62.5 
63.2 
61.6 
63.8 
67.6 
68.8 
I 
Inc. 
9.4 
10.6 
8.7 
9.8 
13.7 
18.2 
18.3 
17.4 
24.5 
36.5 
2}.5 
21.7 
16.1 
Capital 
Outlay 
I 
Total 
48.0 
48.8 
46.4 
43.1 
45.5 
44.2 
40.7 
39.2 
37.5 
36.8 
38.4 
36.2 
32.4 
31.2 
Inc. 
12.8 
-0.4 
-7.3 
24.3 
7.6 
2.4 
11.0 
9.6 
20.7 
46.0 
16.2 
2.9 
9.7 
W.A. 
Curri 
Outl 
1 
Total 
53.9 
51.6 
54.1 
54.1 
55.5 
54.4 
55.8 
54.4 
61.0 
64.3 
63.0 
67.6 
68.5 
69.8 
nt 
ay 
1 
Inc. 
11.1 
10.5 
10.1 
10.2 
15.6 
17.0 
23.4 
14.7 
22.2 
36.6 
27.9 
19.1 
16.8 
Capital 
Outlay 
s 
Total 
46.1 
48,4 
45.9 
45.9 
44.5 
45.6 
44.2 
45.6 
39.0 
35.7 
37.0 
32.4 
31.5 
30.2 
I 
Inc. 
20.5 
-0.7 
8.5 
5.7 
20.6 
10.6 
30.2 
-12.5 
6,4 
46,2 
4.8 
13.7 , 
9.3 
W 
Current 
Outlay 
S 
Total 
55.0 
55.3 
57.4 
52.8 
54.9 
56.5 
60.8 
61.6 
64.3 
65.3 
65.6 
64.9 
67.0 
67.5 
I 
Inc. 
11.2 
10.3 
16.2 
6.3 
11.7 
15.1 
14.9 
14.0 
16.3 
42.4 
17.4 
17.9 
IS.I 
A. 
Capiul 
Outlay 
I 
Total 
44.7 
42.6 
47.2 
45.1 
43.5 
39.2 
38,2 
36.7 
34.7 
34.4 
35.1 
33.0 
32.5 
I 
Inc. 
19.7 
10.2 
20.9 
-2.1 
4.8 
-3.9 
10.4 
2.4 
11.4 
40.0 
21.3 
7.6 
12.5 
Six State ToUl 
Current 
Outlay 
J 
Total 
55.7 
55.5 
56.5 
57.0 
58.2 
59.2 
61.0 
61.9 
64.6 
66.4 
63.4 
65.9 
68.5 
69.1 
Inc. 
10.0 
9.7 
10.7 
11.1 
13.5 
16.9 
16.6 
16.1 
21.1 
37.6 
26.6 
19.0 
15.0 
Capital 
Outlay 
Total 
44.3 
44.5 
43.5 
43.0 
41.6 
40.8 
39.0 
38.1 
35.5 
34.6 
36.6 
34.1 
31.6 
30.9 
Inc. 
11.0 
3.8 
6.5 
6.5 
B.B 
8.5 
12.5 
3.9 
16.7 
49:> 
13,6 
t.o 
12,1 
Derived from Public Auih^rii 
Finance: Stat-e and Lonu. 
Authorities 
TABLE 6 ^ 
CANADA 
INCREASE OR DECREASE IN PROVINCIAL EXPENDITURES BY KAIN FUNCTION 
Nfld 
P .E.I . 
N.S. 
N,b. 
Out. 
Dm. 
Man. 
SasL. 
AUt 
B.C. 
Total 
1974-5 
24.2 
13.8 
19.4 
20.7 
29.9 
9.4 
10.2 
21.5 
26.9 
27.2 
19.6 
Education 
1976-7 
9.B 
9.1 
16.? 
6.9 
26.8 
9.4 
1.4 
21.3 
6 .5 
3.3 
14.2 
1977-E 
21.f( 
12.9 
t.fe 
».fc 
9.4 
6.7 
14.1 
8 .6 
2!-. 4 
11.3 
10.fc 
197B-9 
5.4 
7.7 
B.9 
4 .9 
4.7 
5.7 
0.3 
10.3 
- 3 . 2 
12.0 
5.1 
• Health 
1974-5 
24.1 
20.5 
25.4 
9.9 
19.9 
21.9 
24.1 
11.1 
22.1 
30.B 
21.8 
1975-7 
3.9 
11.8 
9.3 
14.2 
14.0 
9.4 
17.8 
21.7 
28.8 
9.4 
13.1 
1977-8 
8.1 
10.6 
5.0 
9.8 
8.6 
9.2 
8 .2 
20.4 
16.9 
12.1 
10.2 
1978-9 
10.3 
10.6 
10.6 
6.8 
9.2 
4 .3 
3.6 
11.7 
19.5 
12.8 
8 .6 
1974-5 
19.5 
50.8 
26.0 
51.1 
23.3 
40 .2 
10.2 
38.8 
40.6 
49 .6 
33.3 
Social 
1976-7 
19.4 
- 0 . 5 
15.1 
7.3 
22.9 
18.3 
20.4 
33.9 
17.7 
3 .4 
18.1 
Welfare 
1977-8 
11.8 
10.6 
17.7 
13.2 
12.8 
8.6 
25.1 
11.6 
16.2 
5.5 
11.3 
1978-9 
7.1 
11.5 
7.8 
8 .4 
13.0 
5.5 
- 6 . 0 
5.2 
16.9 
7.9 
7.3 
Transport and 
Ccnmunlcations 
1974-5 
24.0 
- 5 . 1 
9 .0 
42 .3 
19.4 
15.6 
2.8 
34.1 
78.8 
45 .0 
25.1 
1976-7 1977-8 
- 4 . 3 4.4 
- 1 . 9 7 .2 
-3 .7 9 .8 
6 .6 14.0 
1.5 - 0 . 3 
15.7 10.0 
-10 .6 B.2 
8 .8 14.9 
- 1 0 . 0 . 6 . 0 
- 1 1 . 0 14.6 
l .B 7 .3 
1978-9 
7.0 
17.2 
22.1 
25.1 
3.7 
0 .8 
36.5 
7.4 
30.8 
31.6 
11.3 
1974-5 
22.8 
23.1 
5.2 
19.0 
9.4 
17.4 
44 .0 
8 .3 
17.0 
16.9 
15.9 
Debt 
1976-7 
15.8 
5.5 
5.8 
12.2 
24.0 
19.7 
37,9 
28.1 
19.5 
54.4 
21.7 
Charges 
1977-8 
16.2 
19.1 
19.0 
26.7 
19.6 
IB.2 
35.9 
30.1 
21.4 
-10 .5 
IH.fc 
197B-9 
15.0 
22.0 
19.3 
31.7 
11.6 
13.7 
28.8 
6.3 
15.9 
25.2 
15.1 
Other Expenditures 
1974-5 
46.2 
24.1 
7.4 
27.9 
37 .0 
52.6 
43 .3 
77.2 
49 .0 
44.6 
44.2 
1976-7 
11.1 
- 3 . 8 
12.9 
10.0 
10.9 
6.4 
19.4 
11.8 
49.9 
3 .2 
13.1 
1977-8 
17.4 
34.1 
21.5 
14.1 
9 .3 
5 .9 
0 .2 
- 0 . 2 
6.7 
- 1 . 3 
6.9 
1978-9 
- 1 4 . 2 
-12 .8 
9 .5 
16.6 
16.4 
5.9 
-
28.5 
17.5 
17.4 
13.6 
Gross General 
Expenditures 
1974-5 
28.2 
19.3 
16.1 
25.3 
25.6 
25.1 
21.8 
34.5 
35.6 
37.8 
27.2 
1976-7 
8 .9 
3 .3 
10.7 
9.4 
17.3 
11.2 
14.4 
19.1 
23.7 
4.1 
13.6 
1977-8 
11.1 
18.2 
12.1 
12.4 
9.5 
9.1 
11.9 
10.1 
14.5 
6.7 
10.0 
1978-9 
- 2 .2 
3.4 
11.8 
12.5 
10.0 
5.6 
4 .6 
14.4 
13.8 
15.0 
9.4 
Source: Derived from Itwinaial Oov0rTvntnl rtnanf>f: 
S la l i s t lc i Canailo 
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APPENDIX A 
IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS IN THE DIVISION 
OF POWERS: THE LITERATURE OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
AUSTRALIA 
There is a wealth of literature about Australian federalism and, 
whilst little of it is directly concerned with the aspects of the 
division of powers we are contemplating, most of it makes some reference 
to the conceptual and practical difficulties for governing this country 
which have arisen out of the allocation of functions between levels of 
government contained in the Australian Constitution. Restrictions of 
space mean that we shall have to consider most of that literature 
summarily but there have been a number of particularly relevant official, 
academic, and other inquiries and reviews which warrant special 
consideration. 
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The f i r s t of these is the 1929 Royal Commission on the Const i tu t ion , 
the f i r s t (and s t i l l the only) fundamental reappraisal of the whole 
operation of the federal system ins t igated by the government. I t was 
directed to inquire in to the powers of the Commonwealth under the Const i tut ion 
and the working of the Const i tut ion since Federation, and to recommend 
Constitutional changes considered to be des i rab le , and in par t i cu la r to 
examine and report on ten subjects from a const i tu t iona l point of view, 
viz. Aviation, Company Law, Health, Indust r ia l Powers, In ters ta te 
Commission, Judic ial Power, Navigation Law, New States, Taxation, and 
Trade and Commerce. 
The Royal Commission in terpreted i t s terms of reference widely going 
so far as to consider whether there shouldn' t be a uni tary system of 
government in Austral ia rather than a federal system. 
Directly addressing the d i s t r i b u t i o n of powers in the Const i tut ion 
the Commission f e l t that the method which had been adopted was convenient 
as well as simple. Section 51 had not been based on abstract pr inc ip les 
but was a practical so lut ion of compromise adopted by the founding 
fathers. They added -
"Some of them, e.g. the powers as to defence, 
external a f f a i r s , na tu ra l i za t ion of a l i ens , taxat ion 
(including control of customs), and the borrowing 
on the cred i t of the Commonwealth, are obviously 
appropriate to a central l e g i s l a t u r e . Some, e.g. 
the powers as to b i l l s of exchange and promissory 
notes, are designed to secure the advantages of 
uniform law. Some, e . g . , the powers as to pos ta l , 
telegraphic, te lephonic, and other l i k e serv ices, 
are modelled on the provisions of the American and 
Canadian Const i tu t ions, wi th such addit ions as 
appeared to be required in order to include modern 
developments. Some, e.g. the powers as to the 
marriage and d ivorce, fo l low the Canadian precedent 
in view of the experience of the United States 
through the omission to grant them to Congress. 
Some, e.g. the powers as to i n v a l i d and old-age 
pensions, and indus t r i a l a r b i t r a t i o n , are Austra l ian 
innovations. One, namely the power in paragraph 
(xxxvi) which re lates to matters in respect of which 
the Consti tut ion makes provis ion ' u n t i l the 
Parliament otherwise p rov ides ' , leaves to the 
Commonwealth Parliament numerous matters in regard 
to which i t was necessary or desirable to have some 
provision in the Const i tu t ion from the establishment 
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"of the Commonwealth, but it was not practicable, 
or not expedient, to stereotype either principles 
or details (cf. ss. 7, 10, 22, 24, 29, 30, 31, 
34, 39, 46, 47, 48, 49, 65, 66, 67, 73, 87)".1 
An analysis was provided by the Commission of the list of powers 
possessed by the Commonwealth as compared with the federal government 
in the United States and the Dominion Government of Canada. Substantial 
differences were uncovered but there was no delving into the basis of 
those distributions. 
Some of the general observations made by the Commission included 
the inability of the Commonwealth to pass a uniform Companies Act, 
the need for the uniformity of marriage and divorce laws throughout 
Australia, and the need for implementation of commonwealth power to 
maintain uniform weights and measures. Eight examples were given of 
fields where the Commonwealth had been able to enter although it had no 
power expressly assigned to it under the Constitution. These are worth 
reproducing because they show important "linkages" between public 
functions -
"Entry upon fields of legislation not expressly 
assigned to the Conmonwealth Parliament. 
In the exercise of its powers the Commonwealth 
Parliament has been able to enter upon fields of 
legislation which were not expressly assigned to 
it by the Constitution. 
(1) By virtue of its control of posts, telegraphs, 
and telephones the Commonwealth Parliament has 
legislated so as to prevent letters being delivered 
to the addresses of persons engaged in carrying on 
a lottery, although it has no specific power to 
legislate with respect to lotteries. 
(2) By virtue of its power to legislate with 
respect to taxation the Commonwealth Parliament 
has been able to pass an Act intended to bring about 
the subdivision of large estates. 
(3) By virtue of its control over elections the 
Commonwealth Parliament has enacted that while elections 
are pending for the Commonwealth Parliament, newspaper 
articles and other matters commenting on election 
issues shall be signed (See Smith V. Oldham, 15 C.L.R., 
355). This enactment has now been modified with 
regard to leading articles and reports of meetings. 
1. Coimionwealth of Australia, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution (Canberra: Government Printer, 1929), p.74. 
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'(4) The Commonwealth has no express power to 
control conditions of manufacture, but by virtue 
of its power to legislate with respect to trade 
and commerce with other countries it claims the 
right to prohibit the export of goods which are 
not manufactured under approved conditions. 
(5) The Commonwealth may admit goods on 
condition that they are to be used in a manner 
prescribed by the Comptroller-General of Customs, 
and this condition may be enforced by a bond. 
(6) The Commonwealth has no power to legislate 
with respect to industrial conditions, but by 
virtue of its power to legislate with respect 
to conciliation and arbitration it has set up a 
Court which may in part override state laws and 
fix standard wages and hours. 
(7) The Commonwealth may impose conditions on 
loans made to states and so influence state 
administration. Loans have been made to the 
state of South Australia, for forestry purposes, 
subject to conditions, and an officer of the 
Forestry School has been sent to Tasmania to 
inquire into proposals for a loan, also subject 
to conditions other than conditions for repayment. 
(8) The Commonwealth may influence the method of 
administration of the states by making grants, 
subject to conditions as to the manner in which 
the money granted shall be expended. The most 
conspicuous instance is the roads' grant, which 
is made subject to the condition that the money 
granted will be spent on a prescribed type of road, 
that the states will contribute a prescribed 
proportion of the total sum spent, and that p 
preference will be given to contract labour". 
The Commission found hindrances in operation in the Commonwealth 
on its trade and commerce powers. There were practical difficulties on 
the navigation and shipping powers because of the allocation of inter-
state shipping to the Commonwealth and intrastate shipping to the states 
"Different rules may prevail, therefore, and 
different conditions may apply to ships engaged 
in the interstate coastal trade and ships trading 
solely between the ports of one state. Different 
conditions may apply to the same ship, according 
to the voyage which it undertakes, or the waters 
which it traverses. Different standards may be 
applied in granting certificates, according as 
the certificates are to be used in interstate and 
intra-state trade. The same distinction does not 
2- ibid., pp. 86-87. 
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"apply to what has been cal led the ru le of the 
road at sea, and the master of a vessel , though 
on an i n t ra - s ta te voyage, may be punished by 
the Federal law fo r an offence committed in 
waters traversed by i n te r - s ta te vessels",3 
This had led to cost ly dup l ica t ion of o f f i c i a l time and resources, 
confusion for shippers, and uncertainty as to standards.^ They 
recommended the Commonwealth take over f u l l respons ib i l i t y for a l l 
navigation and shipping independent of the trade and commerce power. 
The same problem had arisen with l ighthouses beacons and buoys 
because the Commonwealth cont ro l led those "on the coast" but the 
states controlled those " i n the r i ve rs and channels" and th i s had 
led to similar confusion and overlapping. 
The industr ial re la t ions powers were discovered to be chaotic 
because of the d i f f i c u l t y of def in ing f i r s t l y when a dispute had 
occurred and secondly and more important ly when i t could be regarded 
as spreading beyond the confines of one state because only then did 
the Commonwealth power come wi th force. This led to confusion which 
industrial interests were quick to exp lo i t . I t demonstrated the real 
difficulty of applying a geographical dimension to the same government 
function in the a l locat ion between levels of government. 
In the area of heal th , a power la rge ly retained for the s tates. 
Commonwealth power had had to be involved in 1919 because of an 
influenza epidemic and "problems a r i s ing out of the return of large 
numbers of troops from the war". A Royal Commission on Health in 1925 
had recommended that cons t i tu t iona l power to l eg is la te fo r the control 
of foods and drugs should be t ransfer red by the states to the Commonwealth 
and the Commonwealth should also formulate the pr inc ip les of health 
administration. In reference to these matters witnesses had made the 
following points. From a Commonwealth o f f i c e r -
-^ ibid., p. 151. 
''• ibid., p. 153. 
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"there is hardly a single aspect of public health 
which does not for its proper consideration 
require to be studied in its national phases... 
hardly, a single aspect of public health 
administration could be considered as a matter 
which concerned one state only ... some form 
of central co-ordination was essential to 
success ..." 5 
From a state officer -
"... such matters as the control of water and 
sewerage would be in the hands of a local 
authority, while things which concerned the 
state as a whole would be dealt with by the 
state, and things of national importance would 
be dealt with by the Commonwealth, but chiefly 
through the states".5 
Other health officials felt no transfer of powers was necessary and 
better results could be obtained by cooperation, and by grants from the 
Commonwealth to the states subject to the minimum of conditions and that 
the control of health was bound up with local government. The question 
of Commonwealth power to register doctors, dentists, pharmacists and users 
had also arisen to cater for problems such as where a doctor registered in 
one state could not sign a death certificate in another, the lack of 
uniformity in training, and unacceptabil ity of qualifications in some 
states, etc. 
There followed a comprehensive list of areas where there had developed 
a large amount of cooperation between the Commonwealth and the states. The 
word "uniformity" looms large, as does the linkage between government 
functions such as the power of the Commonwealth to bring migrants to the 
country but the necessity of state powers to absorb them.^ 
In respect of the roads agreement the following observation was made -
"It was said of the roads agreement that it was an 
attempt to produce uniformity where uniformity was 
impossible, that one government should have the 
supervision and control of all roads within a state, 
and that that government should be the state 
government if only by reason of its control over 
local government bodies. Further it was said that 
the roads agreement forced an expenditure on the 
states which they could not afford. 
5. 
b. 
/. 
ibid., p. 173. 
ibid., p. 174. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
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"and which they would not have 
attempted if left to themselves. In explanation 
of this criticism and in defence of the states 
it was said that no state ministry, particularly 
in periods of unemployment, could resist the 
pressure of its political supporters to obtain 
money to be spent in the state when offered 
from a source other than the revenue or the loan 
moneys of the state itself, or the temptation 
presented by the opportunity of a new exercise 
of patronage".9 
And on aviation -
"The very nature of aircraft and their users, 
and the nature of the regulations required, 
make utterly impracticable, in my opinion, a 
control by the Commonwealth the effectiveness of 
which would only arise contingently on a particular 
class of journey being undertaken. Where could one 
draw the line and decide where Commonwealth regulations 
began to operate? Such an arrangement would, in my 
view, be hazardous in the extreme, and a menace to 
all classes of aerial navigation... 
There is absolutely no other industry, or means of 
locomotion in which control necessitates super-
vision of the product from the drawing board through 
all the processes of manufacture to the finished 
article, and then throughout the life of the machine. 
There is no means of travel which is so unrestricted 
by physical boundaries".10 
A balance of opinion on Company law -* 
"At the present time it seems probable that a uniform 
company law may be obtained through co-operation 
among the states, but divergences may subsequently 
arise through amending legislation in different 
states. 
... witnesses urged that it was a disadvantage to 
investors and those engaged in the management of 
companies that there should be different company laws 
in the different Australian states, and if it was 
urged that because of the absence of this power in 
the Commonwealth the laws at present in force in 
Australia do not sufficiently safeguard the interests 
of the public. These arguments are summarized in 
the evidence of Mr. W.T. Tidex: -
9- ibid., p. 204. 
10- ibid., pp.205-207. 
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"(a) Legislation differs in every State. 
(b) Companies carrying on business in more than 
one state suffer from confusion thereby. 
(c) Registration is necessary in each state in 
which trading is conducted, thus restricting 
freedom of trade throughout the Commonwealth, 
and involving unnecessary duplication. 
(d) Legal decisions in one state are not 
necessarily binding in another. 
(e) Reform of the New South Wales Act, which is 
long deferred owing to the probability of 
company legislation being made a federal 
matter. 
(f) There is a big disparity in the cost of 
registration of companies in the different 
states. 
(g) The anomaly frequently exists of a company being 
registered in one particular state on account 
of the low registration fees payable there, although 
the whole of its operations may be confined to a 
different state. Moreover this virtually creates 
competition between the state authorities for 
registration fees". 
... witnesses who opposed or questioned the proposed grant of power 
for the most part called attention to difficulties of definition 
or administration, and claimed that there are certain classes or 
corporate bodies which should not be subject to Commonwealth 
legislation. 
... In a statement presented on behalf of the Melbourne Chamber 
of Commerce the following reference was made to company law:-
"In principle the power of control over the 
incorporation, administrating and winding up 
of companies is in the general interests of 
the community. It is not a power which interferes 
with the exercise of individual rights, but is 
one which affords a common measure of protection 
to all parties. Exercise of such power should 
not interfere with the domestic fiscal legislation 
of any state, but should give the whole community 
adequate and common safeguard. A safeguard 
determinable on general lines, and administered 
from one source, can be more easily adjusted than 
where the control is divided. 
On the grounds of convenience, we submit not only 
as between state and state, but as between any 
state and the outside world, trade and commerce 
would be materially assisted were it unnecessary 
for possible creditors to reconcile varying laws 
before engaging on business with a company. On 
the same ground we consider that one registration 
should be sufficient to enable a duly incorporated 
company to commence business in any part of the 
Commonwealth". 
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The objections raised by witnesses against conferring this 
power on the Commonwealth Parliament were of two kinds: 
(1) that it would be difficult to define the subject-matter 
of the power; and (2) that there would be difficulties in 
administration. These difficulties are summarized in the 
evidence of Mr. Owen Dixon and of Mr. Layton. The following 
extract is from the evidence of Mr. Owen Dixon, on behalf 
of the Committee of Counsel of Victoria: -
"The advantages of a uniform company law are 
probably undeniable, but at the same time they 
are not very considerable. We think there is 
a great deal of difficulty in giving the 
Commonwealth power sufficient to enable it to 
make a uniform company law, unless it is 
expressed in terms which will enable the 
Parliament to control completely the internal 
management and operations of companies, the 
determination of what associations of persons 
and partnerships shall or shall not be incorporated, 
and indeed the whole subject of incorporation 
and the use of the idea of the juristic person. 
It may be doubted whether a power which would 
extend to regulating all activities and affecting 
all transactions so long as they were carried on, 
entered into or performed by companies, is a 
desirable one, and yet short of this it is 
difficult to confer power which will be sufficient 
for all purposes of company legislation. 
... We think so many difficulties would result 
from an attempt to confer power upon the Federal 
Parliament, which would be wide enough to enable 
it to exercise any real discretion in framing 
a uniform company law, that the very minor 
advantages derived from such a law would be far 
outweighed. 
The fact is that 'company law' is merely a 
convenient description of an existing head of law, 
and is an entirely artificial and unnatural 
division of subject-matter for a legislative power. 
In relation to many matters of the general law, 
of which this may be considered an example, it 
seems to us that the various parts of the Empire 
are in the same situation. There is no real 
reason why the law relating to the formation of 
companies, the mutual rights of members, and the 
general regulation inter se should not be uniform 
throughout the Empire, and this is true of the 
general law relating to civil rights. There has 
been an increasing tendency towards this uniformity. 
The codification of the law relating to bills 
of exchange, partnership, marine insurance, and 
sale of goods had been adopted by most of the 
legislatures, and in the case of copyright the 
Imperial Parliament as the result of an arrangement 
passed an Act for the express purpose of adoption 
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"by legislatures of the Dominions. This form 
of legislation might well be adopted in relation 
to many other matters, including the general 
rules of company law, and we suggest that the 
Commonwealth Parliament might be given power to adopt 
for the whole of Australia if it thinks fit any 
legislation upon any subject which the Imperial 
Parliament has passed pursuant to any similar 
arrangement for the purpose of adoption by the 
legislatures of the Dominions". 
The following extract is from the evidence of Mr. E.E.S. Layton, 
Registrar-General of New South Wales: -
"Now as to the advantages of administration of 
the company law by the states. Firstly there is -
(a) Prompt incorporation. 
(b) Convenience. 
(c) Efficiency in existing organisation, 
(d) Economy. 
(e) Continuity of prac t ice , etc. 
( f ) P rac t i cab i l i t y of special l e g i s l a t i o n 
desired by a s t a t e . " H 
The Royal Commission reproduced proposals from the Riverina New States 
movement including a l i s t of powers that a state should have, but no 
12 
rationale for that l i s t of powers. 
With respect to aborigines some favoured handing powers to the 
Commonwealth government because of the d i ve rs i t y that existed in the method 
fff their employment in d i f f e ren t s ta tes. "As an abor iginal knew 
nothing of po l i t i ca l boundaries, the laws by which he is governed 
should be uniform and imposed by one author i ty on ly" . Aust ra l ia would 
also, i t was claimed, have a bet te r regulat ion i f the Commonwealth had 
such a power and could better a t t r a c t and t r a i n s t a f f to work wi th 
aborigines. The counter claim was that to make proper provision fo r 
aborigines reserves were required and reserves meant land and the 
states controlled land. State pol ice were bet ter qua l i f i ed to "con t ro l " 
1 '^  
aborigines. 
States were hindered in t h e i r e f f o r t s to safeguard t h e i r fauna 
by Section 92 whence prosecutions might f a i l owing to the lack of 
similar controls in an adjacent s ta te . Some said the Commonwealth 
should be given the power but others urged closer i n te rs ta te co-
operation and most agreed that "close local knowledge was required to 
II- ibid., pp.208-212. 
^^' ibid., p.215. 
^^- ibid., pp.219-220. 
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fix the proper periods of p ro tec t ion , the condit ions vary great ly 
not only between states but also w i th in the states themselves, and 
that the state au thor i t ies have an advantage in securing information 
through thei r control of the po l i ce " . 
Economy and e f f i c iency in rai lway operation would occur i f the 
Commonwealth took control most said. I t would overcome problems 
re uniform rates, and fares , standard gauges, wartime needs, 
construction of new l ines etc. Those opposed said i t would j us t add 
another overhead to local organizat ion which would have to be 
retained. The interests of the states were diverse, and most 
importantly, control of railways could not be dissociated from the 
control and management of lands of the state and trade and commerce 
15 generally. 
Generally speaking the major i ty of the Commission came down 
in favour of the retent ion of a federal system of government. They 
felt that a central author i ty was necessary -
, For Australia to speak and act as a whole, e . g . , defence 
foreign a f fa i rs etc. 
Where uniformity was required, e . g . , weights, measures, 
carriage. 
But they f e l t that sel f -governing states were necessary where -
People were at long distances from the central au thor i t y . 
I Where populations were sparsely se t t l ed . 
Where there was scope fo r publ ic s p i r i t , local pa t r io t i sm, 
and local knowledge. 
As a means of supervising development and preventing 
a disastrous experiment. 
The inconviences which had come about because of the d iv i s ion of powers 
had become less important because of growing co-operation in 
administration. I t had led to a "sub-d iv is ion of p o l i t i c a l in te res t " 
but that was outweighed by the advantages of self-government which 
prevented a "paralysis at the centre and anaemia at the circumference". 
Moreover states could not a t t r a c t publ ic servants and po l i t i c i ans of 
high calibre i f t he i r powers were l i m i t e d . 
14. ibid., p.221. 
15. ibid., pp.223-227. 
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A minority report by three of the members of the Commission said 
they would rather have star ted from the premise of where a l l 
sovereignty should l i e rather than consider functions piecemeal. This 
affected for example, one's views on new states. They preferred to 
transfer to the Commonwealth matters requir ing uni formi ty of i n te res t , 
and matters indissolubly connected. A rb i t ra ry l ines of demarcation 
as with trade and commerce produced uncerta inty. "When a subject matter 
is divided in th is manner and produces uncertainty and d i f f i c u l t y of 
interpretation the only log ica l th ing to do is place the whole 
undivided power in the hands of one au thor i t y ; and since the control 
of interstate trade cannot be carr ied out by state or local au tho r i t i es , 
there is only one place where the power can be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y placed, 
1 C 
and that is in the hands of the central Parliament". 
The minority also expressed an opinion that not only were trade 
and commerce i nd i v i s i b l e but so were customs du t ies , t rading 
conditions, and conditions of employment, that they should be under 
the same government control and since the Commonwealth has to control 
customs i t ought also to control f u l l trade and commerce, company law, 
shipping, navigation and indus t r ia l powers. The problems of trade 
and commerce were national now because of technological and 
communications advances unl ike the time of federat ion; and the present 
division of powers had led to the undue l i t i g a t i o n to determine j us t 
what the Constitution rea l l y meant. Moreover the system of dual 
authority allowed p o l i t i c a l part ies to get o f f the hook regarding the i r 
election promises. The d iv i s ion of power had led to overgovernment 
and would continue to do so. 
The conclusion of the minor i ty was that the most su i table form of 
government for Austra l ia was a central Parliament handling a l l 
major national questions, leaving matters of minor importance as 
well as the administration of federal laws, to the states. Under th is 
arrangement the Commonwealth would have l i k e powers wi th the central 
government in a uni tary system such as Great B r i t a i n . The method 
of accomplishment of t h i s arrangement was to empower the federal 
parliament to amend the Austra l ian Const i tu t ion how and when i t found 
It necessary for the construct ion and a l t e ra t i on of i t s laws. This 
would make the federal system f l e x i b l e and dynamic. This system would 
1^ - ibid:, p.244. 
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be gradual and i t would ensure decentra l izat ion of admin is t rat ion. 
The states would become subdivided in to smaller uni ts but re ta in ing 
important functions such as i r r i g a t i o n , harbours, roads, hydro-
electricity, fo res t ry and land tenure. In add i t i on , hea l th , 
education, local cour ts , municipal government and pol ice would 
"almost certain ly be delegated by the central au tho r i t y " . "Whereas 
the existing states include widespread areas with c o n f l i c t i n g 
interests, those smaller uni ts could be based on community of 
interest. Consequently, there would be more scope than at present 
for local patr io t ism, local knowledge, and public s p i r i t " . 
Space prevents a f u l l analysis of the evidence tendered to 
this Royal Commission. A number of witnesses to the Commission did 
give expl ic i t c r i t e r i a by which they believed powers should be 
distributed in the Austral ian federa t ion , inc luding Owen Dixon, 
Edward McTiernan, K.H. Bai ley, and D.B. Copland. 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Const i tut ional Review 
The 1959 report of t h i s Committee afforded i t an opportunity 
to give some of the reasoning behind recommendations i t had put forward 
in a short report a year ea r l i e r . Basical ly the resu l t of the 
Committee's work was to produce a l i s t of subjects on which the 
Commonwealth ought to be able to make laws concurrently wi th the states. 
No general c r i t e r i a emerge from th i s report but in re la t ion to some 
specific topics there were some relevant arguments. 
On navigation and shipping the report found that the industry 
desired uniformity but there were discrepancies between commonwealth 
and state law. There was also a need to keep two laws in force 
because a question of whether a commonwealth or state law applied 
would depend on the nature of the voyage. This bad l i ne of demarcation 
also caused problems for handling casual t ies at sea. So there were, 
the committee believed, "unquestionable advantages fo r both the 
shipping industry and the general publ ic i f legal requirements were 
made uniform and administered under a s ingle system of con t ro l " . 
17. ibid., p.247. 
18. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Aus t ra l i a , Report of the 
Joint Committee on Constitutional Review (Canberra: Government 
Printer, 1959), pp.60-61. 
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The Committee wanted the Commonwealth to have express powers 
over scient i f ic and indus t r ia l research because i t was already 
financing most of i t but mainly because "research is incontestably 
a national matter and i t is important that Austra l ia should not 
constitute an exception to the emphasis which other major countries 
19 
now place on technological progress". One of the reasons fo r 
making i t clear that the Commonwealth had power over broadcasting 
was because frequency a l loca t ion had become an in ternat ional matter 
and the Commonwealth was a party to an in ternat iona l convention on 
broadcasting. The Commonwealth needed complete power over 
industrial relat ions because "employers and employees, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
in the more important industr ies carr ied on in more than one s ta te , 
have so organized as to make i t possible to have Federal determination 
of their industr ial re la t ions in preference to the separate 
20 determinations of the s ta tes " , and the ex is t ing arrangements were 
costly, unclear and subject to a l o t of l i t i g a t i o n . 
To enable a uniform companies law, the Commonwealth should be 
given power over corporat ions, the Committee said. But they did not 
intend that the Commonwealth need also have the power to regulate 
the business ac t i v i t i e s of corporat ions. A uniform company law 
would protect the publ ic , remove the necessity fo r companies to 
register in a l l states a l l of which d i f fe red in t he i r requirements and 
attract more foreign investment, be in accord wi th improved national 
communications and transport . I t was possible that the states 
acting in concert without the Commonwealth could develop a uniform 
21 
company law but the i r record on th i s had been unimpressive. Other 
interesting arguments were that un i formi ty would be los t as each state 
embarked on the task of making amendments at varying in te rva ls of 
time. Company law does not stand s t i l l and is in need of continual 
change. Company law was an a r i d subject , not very e x c i t i n g , and not 
exciting po l i t i ca l passions. A state act ing alone would have to consider 
the affect on incorporation of companies outside i t s borders and hence 
a state could delay necessary law reform to prevent a company seeking 
flight to an easier s ta te . One company law meant s imp l i f i ed income 
tax, and a faster wind-up of defunct companies. 
19. ibid., p.73. 
20. ibid., p.92. 
21. ibid., p. 112, 
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Because of the growing i ndus t r i a l i za t i on in Aust ra l ia and the 
emergence since federat ion of our national economy and not s ix 
separate economies as before federat ion, i t was now necessary fo r 
the Commonwealth government to have powers over r e s t r i c t i v e trade 
practices. State l i m i t s meant very l i t t l e in the conduct of the 
national economy and exports. The state governments already 
possessed the power but the " in tegrated nature of the Austral ian 
economy" prevented them from using i t . 
Since the power over marketing of primary products was divided 
between levels of government according to the i n t r a - s t a t e / i n t e r s t a t e 
rule, orderly marketing had only been possible to maintain i f the 
Commonwealth and producing states were able to agree. In the 
interests of producers and consumers the Committee proposed that the 
Commonwealth be given powers to make laws to a marketing plan free 
from the rest r ic t ions of Section 92, where t h r e e - f i f t h s of the 
votes cast by a pol l of primary producers were in favour. 
The Committee recommended a number of general economic powers fo r 
the Commonwealth mainly because -
"when the Const i tut ion was dra f ted , no government 
in Austral ia was responsible fo r the general 
state of the economy, including the level of 
employment, s t a b i l i t y of the value of the currency 
and the rate and balance of economic development. 
I t was not un t i l many years a f te r Federation that 
the achievement of economic understanding had made 
the factors determining these matters s u f f i c i e n t l y 
clear for governments to take ac t ion . I t was not 
surpr is ing, in these circumstances, that the 
Constitution was not conceived wi th the a l loca t ion 
between the commonwealth and the states of the 
powers needed to implement a general economic 
policy. The Committee considered that the 
Commonwealth now had to discharge a respons ib i l i t y 
of government which did not ex is t when the 
const i tut ion was o r i g i n a l l y framed, namely, to 
safeguard and promote the economic welfare of the 
community of Aust ra l ia" .22 
22. ibid., p. 133. 
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rnn<;titutional Conventions 
A Constitutional Convention was held in the 1940's to consider 
the specific question of the states handing over powers al legedly 
for purposes of the war e f f o r t . The case fo r a greater role fo r 
the Commonwealth in the federat ion has probably never been more 
forcibly put than by Dr. H.V. Evatt at that Convention in November 
1942. As Attorney-General, he prepared a book on the subject of 
discussion at the Convention and the theme of his whole work was 
that postwar reconstruction was such an important object ive that 
i t ought to override a l l other considerations and the d iv is ion of 
powers should be a l te red , temporari ly at l eas t , wi th the same 
aim of f a c i l i t a t i n g that ob jec t ive . Natural ly there was a plethora 
of other speakers who wished to refute th i s view and the debate 
became one which centred around the importance of postwar 
reconstruction, whether the Commonwealth rea l l y needed the 
additional powers i t sought to achieve, and how far the states could 
trust the Commonwealth to hand back the powers a f te r the war. 
The Convention was unsuccessful, as we noted in Chapter 1 , and so 
was the referendum which fo l lowed, and both demonstrate the d i f f i c u l t y 
in cooperation and coordination of resources caused by the d iv is ion 
of powers although there are those, no doubt, who would argue that 
since Australia did recover reasonably quick ly from the war, an 
alteration to the d iv is ion of power would not r ea l l y have been necessary. 
There have been four Const i tut ional Conventions in the 1970's in 
Australia. None produced any actual act ion which a l tered the balance 
of powers although, as we noted in Chapter 2 , the Perth Convention of 
1978 produced a dra f t interchange of powers b i l l which a sub-committee 
is considering. Nonetheless the convention did produce much debate 
which highlighted many prac t ica l problems caused by the d iv i s ion of 
powers. For example at the 1973 Convention Senator Murphy opened a 
debate asking for a reference of powers to the Commonwealth on many 
matters e.g. in family law to f i l l in gaps in the power of the 
Commonwealth such as the maintenance and custody of chi ldren whose 
parents have never married and the status of t he i r legit imacy and 
consequent legal disadvantages as wel l as adoption prov is ions, in 
defamation laws to establ ish un i formi ty across Aus t ra l i a , and in 
navigation and shipping fo r reasons we have seen e a r l i e r in t h i s 
chapter. Said Murphy "there are immeasurable pract ica l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
resulting from the i r r a t i o n a l d i v i s ion of l e g i s l a t i v e au thor i t y " . 
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Mr. Wi l l i s speaking general ly against these provisions argued 
firstly that in social matters i f a need fo r reform in the law 
exists i t does not necessari ly fo l low that change has to be nat ion-
wide because national a t t i tudes on things l i k e abort ion and homo-
sexuality are not necessari ly homogenous. Secondly, uni formity was 
a sacred cow and the basic element of a federat ion was a lack of 
uniformity, and t h i r d l y the states were more expert, competent and 
close to the problems and the people af fected than any federal department 
could ever be. On the defamation question he produced the rather novel 
argument that "Notwithstanding the degree of homogeneity in the 
Australian people, i t can be argued that the fac t that state l eg i s l a t i on 
varies in this f i e l d suggest that people in the s ix states have d i f f e r i n g 
views on what r ights and immunities are desirable or acceptable". 
Moreover there would be matters in a state province that would need 
to be preserved such as protect ion over the utterances in a state 
parliament. At any event the states were already busy through t he i r 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General discussing a uniform defamation 
23 law. Mr. Wi l l i s asked leave fo r some material to be incorporated on 
the shipping and navigation question which is pa r t i cu l a r l y i n te res t i ng . 
State marine author i t ies were convinced that they could derive and 
enforce uniform laws without commonwealth in ter ference. Also i t had 
to be recognized that fo r the "ordinary c i t i z e n " who owned or hired 
a motor boat, he wanted assurances about his fami ly 's safety , the 
recklessness of others, low br idges, overhead cables, moorings, 
obstruction in the r i ve r by vessels and hulks - these were matters on 
the exercise of a navigation and shipping power which were of a 
purely local concern. 
Mr. Wi l l is added -
"The Council of the Aust ra l ian Port and Marine 
Authorit ies Association has come to the con-
clusion that the only prac t ica l and e f fec t i ve 
division of marine admin is t rat ion is one which 
rests on the physical questions in which 
vessels are engaged, and that the determining 
consideration in the del ineat ion of 
Commonwealth and state respons ib i l i t y should 
23. Proceedings of the Australian Constitutional Convention (Sydney: 
Government Pr in ter , 1973), p.278. 
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"in general be the nature of the voyage undertaken 
by the vessel. The division favoured by the 
Council is that the Commonwealth should deal 
with all vessels making voyages overseas or 
interstate, except pleasure boats and fishing 
boats moving interstate, and that the states 
should deal with all vessels engaged in intra-
state voyages including, of course, inland 
navigation, together with interstate pleasure 
boats and fishing boats. This is a clear and 
workable division that would be readily under-
standable by the public and by administering 
authorities.. ."24 
The 1976 Convention in Hobart continued the debate on family law 
and other powers, and perhaps Walker summed it up best by saying -
"I think it is fairly obvious that family 
relationships and the legal issues to which 
they give rise can rarely be slotted into 
neat categories consonant with the distri-
bution of legislative power under the 
Constitution". 
Speaking of the results of the Constitutional Conventions of the 
1970's Finnimore observed "... all members of the Federal Parliament, 
whatever their political beliefs, are reluctant to give away any power, 
no matter how irrelevant it may appear to be to the essential 
responsibilities of a central government even in return for powers 
that would be of much greater value to a central government". He 
placed great faith in the propositions for an interchange of powers, 
arrangement between levels as a means of flexibility, experiment and 
goodwi11. 
Fundamental Problems of the Division of Powers 
Apart from the abovementioned material which might be considered 
as attempts at a broad review of the functioning of the Australian 
federal system as a whole, there has also been a voluminous amount 
written by individual authors about the problems of the division of 
powers. We shall now consider some aspects which have been raised. 
24. ibid., p. 280. 
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Different authors have at different times reviewed the division 
of powers in the Australian federation from quite different, though 
fundamental, perspectives, and have emphasized aspects of considerable 
relevance to our exercise. Consider for example the comments of 
K.H. Bailey in a volume of studies on the Australian Constitution 
published in 1933. 
"We have seen that the mere division of powers is 
not peculiar to federations alone. But the 
circumstances in which federations come into 
existence make it likely that the powers to be 
conferred on the new federal institutions will be 
scrutinized with both anxiety and jealousy, and 
that they will be set at the minimum rather than 
the maximum. This is of course why the normal 
method of performing the actual division is to 
enumerate one by one the powers (particularly 
the legislative powers) to be conferred on the 
federation, and leave the residuum in the hands 
of the states. It is a frame of mind indicative 
of a body of people not yet very positive in 
their desire to act as one". 25 
Bailey then examines in some depth the potential of cooperation 
between the states. "One cannot for that matter assume", he says, 
"that once a particular subject is left to the states, there is an 
end of all unified action as one federal community" ... "You can 
have common action by agreement as well as under authority". He 
points out however, that such common action involves a willingness 
on the part of all states at once which may not always be forthcoming 
as with civil aviation or government borrowing. Then he makes the 
most prophetic statement -
"The satisfactoriness (or otherwise) of the 
division of powers in any federal constitution 
will therefore probably depend a good deal on 
circumstances which may have been difficult, 
or even impossible to foresee when the 
Constitution was being framed. I mean the 
extent to which the needs of the community 
will demand common action (e.g., uniform 
regulation) in matters left to the states, and 
the degree of readiness for such common action 
which the states will exhibit at any given time. 
The same problem arises where powers with respect 
to a given subject matter are divided between 
25. G.V. Portus, ed.. Studies in the Australian Constitution (Sydney: 
Angus & Robertson, 1933), pp.31-32. 
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"Commonwealth and states - as for example in trade 
and commerce, including shipping and navigation, 
where the division takes place, as it were, at 
the state boundary, the Commonwealth having power 
with respect only to interstate operations. 
Opinions differ widely as to the success of the 
Australian division of powers, largely because 
opinions differ as to the extent to which unified 
action and direction are desirable in the matters 
concerned". 26 
There followed examples drawn from trade and commerce, immigration, 
industrial relations and finance. Then an extremely interesting 
observation on why the High Court had favoured the Commonwealth -
"The more energetically the organs of government, 
whether state or federal, exercise their powers, 
the more need and occasion there will be for the 
definition of boundaries. For the same reason -
the fact that the Commonwealth's powers are 
necessarily expressed in outline - one would 
naturally expect that the result of judicial 
interpretation would favour the extension of 
Commonwealth powers, as compared with the kind 
of limits that the draftsmen had actually in mind". 27 
Some eighteen years later Bailey, looking back over fifty years of 
the Australian Constitution, believed the federal powers were too vaguely 
worded and had certainly allowed great scope for legal interpretation. 
Section 96 was a fruitful section he believed because firstly it 
actually allowed the states to carry out functions within their 
constitutional field whereas otherwise they may not have been able; 
second, it allowed expression of the sentiment that citizens should 
participate equally in the federation; third, it allowed the Commonwealth 
to do indirectly what it couldn't do directly. Section 92 on the other 
hand, had simply made the division of powers too uncertain. Some years 
earlier Bailey had weighed up the centralist/federalist arguments and 
on balance concluded that Australia was homogenous, arguments based 
on the size of the country were obsolete because of improved communication, 
and Australian institutions needed mobility. Thus he favoured transferral 
of powers to the Commonwealth. Because of the way the powers were 
divided, he said, the Commonwealth could not even deal adequately with 
the matters entrusted to it. 
26. ibid., pp.34-35. 
27. ibid., pp.38-39. 
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In a symposium of the Austra l ian I n s t i t u t e of P o l i t i c a l Science to 
commemorate the j ub i l ee of federalism in Aust ra l ia H.P. Brown saw the 
functions of government in the federat ion as f a l l i n g in to the categories 
of international r e l a t i ons , social serv ices, development of resources, 
and business undertakings. He went on, " . . . the most s t r i k i n g features of 
this division of functions are the very l im i ted f i e l d of local government 
activity and the extent to which the states are responsible for those 
matters which most d i r e c t l y a f fec t everyday l i f e (education, l i quo r , 
roads.)" Speaking of local government he said i t s funct ions were narrower 
than in any other English speaking country and added "one gets, therefore, 
a general impression of pressure from above, wi th each higher government 
entering into the functions of the lower au tho r i t y " . The Commonwealth 
had done more to decentral ize i t s administ rat ion than had the s ta tes , he 
added, but the states were more "popular" because they were the main 
spending author i t ies. On possible change to the d i v i s i on of powers he 
developed a new c r i t e r i a by suggesting that " f l e x i b l e " expenditure should 
be transferred to the states. In th i s same symposium Copland looked at the 
impact of federalism on public administ rat ion and said that the factors 
influencing the founders in t h e i r decision to hand over powers to the 
Commonwealth were a mixture of admin is t ra t ive convenience, un i fo rmi ty , 
and the inevitable extensions of cer ta in a c t i v i t i e s beyond the boundaries 
of one state. 
The jubi lee of Austral ian federal ism had also inspired the volume 
Essays on the Australian Constitution edited by Else-Mitchel l and in the 
introduction to the second ed i t i on the ed i to r strongly defended the ro le 
of the High Court though admit t ing that the trend of i t s decisions had not 
always been consistent and l o g i c a l . In the process he made some comments 
on the basic problem caused by the d i v i s i on of powers -
"Po l i t i ca l sc ien t i s t s and economists th ink i t odd 
that the v a l i d i t y of social and economic measures 
should depend on such considerations but so long 
as we have a w r i t t en cons t i t u t i on under which 
sovereignty is div ided and r e s t r i c t i o n s are 
imposed upon power, the High Court must continue 
to be the forum in which the l e g i s l a t i v e 
expressions of p o l i t i c a l , economic and social 
philosophies e i the r gain quickened l i f e or are 
pronounced s t i l l - b o r n . . . Where legislative power 
over a single continent such as Australia is 
divided between coordinate governments, an 
effective balance rrrust be maintained between 
Cormonwealth and states even though the exigencies 
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"of time and circumstance make i t impossible for 
the balance to be kept fo r long at a state of 
perfect equ i l i b r ium" . 28 
At a conference whose t i t l e was "National Planning and Intergovernmental 
Relations" Else-Mitchel l opened wi th th i s statement -
"Central to the Const i tut ional and legal problems 
of national planning and intergovernmental 
relat ions is the d i v i s ion of powers under our 
federal system. This denies f u l l l e g i s l a t i v e 
authori ty to the Commonwealth in f i e l d s in which 
i t may consider national planning and develop-
ment to be warranted and at the same time deprives 
the states of the requ is i te funds to undertake 
those tasks themselves". 29 
Mathews has wr i t ten p r o l i f i c a l l y about the Austral ian federal system 
and on many occasions has addressed himself to the fundamental problems 
arising out of the d iv is ion of powers. Nowhere were these views put 
more forcibly than in a special 1977 issue on Austral ian federal ism in 
the renowned American journal Publius. Speaking about the st ra ins on 
the division of power caused by the growth of government a c t i v i t y in 
general, he commented -
"To those outside the p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t , i t had 
long been apparent that the growth and complexity 
of the public sector, the interdependence of the 
decisions taken by the d i f f e ren t planes of govern-
ment, dif ferences in the a v a i l a b i l i t y of information 
and in the degree of p o l i t i c a l responsiveness, and 
the need to accommodate a varying mixture of 
national, regional and local i n te res t s , were a l l 
combining to give decision making in the public 
sector an intergovernmental or mult iplane 
dimension. This made i t inappropriate fo r govern-
ments to base t h e i r actions on premises of 
coordinate or coercive federal ism, or even of 
cooperative federal ism where cooperations was 
regarded as an option fo r autonomous governments 
affecting only the po l icy f r i nges . 
28. The Hon. Mr. Just ice E lse -M i t che l l , Essays on the Australian Constitution 
(Sydney: Law Book Co., 1961), p p . x x v i i i - x x i x . 
29. Public Administration (Sydney), x x v i i i ( 1 ) , March 1969, p.20. 
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"In a federation such as Australia, the traditional 
vertical division of responsibility along 
functional lines must be replaced by a division 
along horizontal lines, in which each plane of 
government has responsibility for the decisions 
it is best qualified to make. Of course, this 
depends on such factors as its access to information 
sources, its ability to interpret and respond to 
community preferences, any spillover effects of its 
decisions in surrounding jurisdictions, and its 
accountability for decisions taken. Where decisions 
interact or overlap, some form of coordinating 
machinery is needed to facilitate harmonization 
of the decisions, minimize conflicts between 
policy objectives and implement decisions effect-
ively and efficiently. Divided responsibility 
must therefore give way to responsibility sharing, 
based on the coordination of taxation, borrowing 
arrangements, grants arrangements and expenditure 
decisions". 30 
Writing just a few years earlier Mathews had elaborated on why the 
original division of powers was no longer appropriate. 
"At the time the American, Canadian and 
Australian federal constitutions were devised, 
good government was weak government. It was 
considered that social and economic policies could 
be left to work themselves out within a framework 
of market forces and a spirit of laissez-faire. 
In such a situation it was relatively simple to 
devise a constitution in which powers were 
divided vertically along functional lines, giving 
the federal government responsibility for defence, 
foreign affairs, foreign and interstate trade and 
communications, along with the monetary and fiscal 
powers necessary to perform those functions, while 
leaving the state governments with responsibility 
for virtually everything else. 
There was very little overlap in the allocation 
of expenditure functions; such overlap as occurred in 
the Australian Constitution may be traced to the fact 
that by the 1890's governments were at last 
beginning to take an interest in social and economic 
questions, so that some functions such as invalid 
and old-age pensions, and conciliation and arbitration 
in relation to interstate industrial disputes, were 
designated as federal responsibilites. 
30. Publius, Summer 1977, Vol. 7, (3), pp. 16-17. 
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"Our federal constitutions were thus based very 
clearly on the concept of divided responsibility, 
of independent levels of government each exercising 
authority and providing services in functional 
fields that were designated by drawing vertical 
boundaries between jurisdictions. What has 
happened during recent years to change this 
situation? The main factors have been the 
extension of the range of government activities 
and the growth of the size of the public sector. 
These in turn have been occasioned by the growing 
strength and complexity of the economy and by 
community acceptance of the need for governments 
to provide greatly expanded social services and 
economic controls. 
...Associated with the grants has been the 
assumption by the federal government of some of 
the responsibility for state and local expenditures, 
thereby breaking down the vertical division of 
powers which was the distinguishing characteristic 
of the old-style federalism. 
Other influences were moving in the same direction, 
notably the growing belief that some of the powers 
that were formally reserved for state and local 
governments could only be exercised effectively and 
equitably at the federal level. It has long been 
generally accepted that economic management in a 
federal country, involving such matters as fiscal 
stabilization policies, monetary policy and balance 
of payments policy, all require action at the 
national level. 
It should also be accepted that if policy co-
ordination is needed within a particular level of 
government, say among the state governments 
themselves, in order to make policies effective, the 
level of government concerned has no right to be 
making the decisions in question and should hand 
over primary responsibility for them to a higher 
level of government. Despite all we have heard 
recently about the possibility of formulating 
prices and incomes policies through interstate 
co-operation, we should recognize that the spillover 
effects of any decisions that are made and the virtual 
impossibility of obtaining agreement about policy goals 
and instruments will combine to make such co-operation 
quite impracticable. In a country such as Australia, 
with its history of broken railway gauges, incompatible 
education systems, erosion of uniform company 
legislation, disagreement about trade practices 
legislation, failure to achieve uniform manufacturing 
and building standards, and arguments about the 
marketing of minerals and other primary products, 
it is surprising that we still give credence to the 
view that interstate co-operation can resolve 
national economic policy issues. The mere fact that 
such co-operation is needed is iipso facto proof that 
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"the decisions are better taken at the national 
level (albeit in consultation with the states 
because they have a vital interest in the out-
come of the decision). 
Most people are likely to agree that policies 
affecting the interpersonal distribution of 
income and wealth are also best left to federal 
governments. The growth in the quantity and 
range of public services at the state and local 
levels has itself created problems of equity, 
problems which can only be resolved by inter-
governmental equalization grants. Financial 
transfers in the form of equalization grants are 
of course themselves at variance with the notion 
of divided responsibility, even if the grants 
are provided as general supplements to the 
revenue of the recipient governments. They 
imply a particular kind of responsibility on 
the part of the higher level of government for 
the activities of the governments receiving the 
grants. 
On the expenditure side, there are other factors 
tending to break down the notion of a federal 
system as a vertical division of powers. In 
particular, there is a recognition that, even 
in functions of traditional state and local 
responsibility, spillover effects and superior 
information sources at the federal level 
necessitates federal intervention in those functions. 
In such fields as transport, education, health, 
housing, urban services and economic development, 
the traditional vertical division of powers is 
given way to a somewhat confused division along 
horizontal lines. 
Thus services which need to be provided nationally -
such as national highways, tertiary education and 
national health services which are more appropriately 
carried out at state and local levels. Because of 
the interconnexion between different levels of 
transport, education, health services, etc., however, 
a clear-cut horizontal division of responsibilities 
among governments cannot satisfactorily replace the 
old-style vertical division. What seems to be 
needed in a modern federal state is a sharing of 
responsibility at all levels so that governments 
come together for the purpose of developing 
integrated systems of transport, education, health, 
etc., followed by delegation to individual 
governments of responsibility for the decisions they 
are best qualified to make. 
...There are three essential conditons for 
responsibility sharing in a federal system, namely 
co-ordination of taxation (and borrowing) 
arrangements, revenue sharing and the sharing of 
responsibility for expenditure decisions. 
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"...It is this sharing of responsibility for 
expenditure decisions which is the third, and 
probably the most important, requirement for 
effective responsibility sharing in a federal 
system. It is also the most difficult condition 
to meet. I have already argued that horizontal 
co-operation, that is co-operating among the 
units of government, presents so many problems as 
to be impracticable. There is no reason to believe 
that vertical co-operation can be achieved easily. 
But whereas the former is an unnecessary and 
inefficient method of decision-making, some measure 
of vertical co-operation is essential if resource 
allocation decisions in a federal system are to 
reflect the priorities of each level of government. 
What form should such vertical co-operation take? 
Under existing notions of divided responsibility, 
there is a spectrum of possible decision-making 
combinations and financing arrangements for any 
two levels of federal government, say federal 
and state governments: 
(a) At one extreme, states make expenditure 
decisions independently and finance 
expenditures wholly from state sources 
of revenue. If there are no spillover 
effects and the states have the necessary 
information sources this can be an 
efficient method of making decisions. 
(b) A somewhat different situation results when 
states make expenditure decisions independ-
ently, but finance expenditures from 
general revenue grants received from the 
federal government. Inefficiency may 
result here because the link between 
expenditure decisions and financing 
decisions is broken; each government makes 
its own decisions independently and there 
is no balancing of financing effects 
against expenditure effects, 
(c) Moving further along the spectrum,there is 
the situation where states make expenditure 
decisions within broad limits specified by 
federal government, which provides block 
grants for the purpose. If the matching 
requirement is ignored, this is roughly the 
way Commonwealth aid roads grants have been 
administered in the past. More recently the 
states (and the federal opposition) have 
suggested that equalization grants for local 
governments should be dealt with by means of 
federal block grants to the states, individual 
states being left to make allocations 
within states in accordance with their own 
priorities. Where the two kinds of 
allocation decisions are interrelated, this 
procedure can result in a conflict between 
federal and state priorities and a failure 
to achieve either. If the same information 
sources can be used for both kinds of 
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"administration is likely to be 
wasteful in terms of resources. 
Nevertheless, there may be circum-
stances where such two-tier 
allocation processes will result in 
more effective decisions, by de-
volving responsibility upon levels 
of government which have superior 
information sources or which are 
more likely to seek improvements in 
the quality of services through 
innovation or experimentation. 
(d) A different kind of conflict occurs 
if federal priorities are super-
imposed on state priorities by 
means of either (i) specific 
purpose grants without matching 
conditions, or (ii) specific purpose 
grants subject to revenue-raising 
as well as expenditure conditions. 
In both cases there is the possibility 
of inconsistency between federal and 
state priorities, but where matching 
conditions are imposed the problem 
is compounded by the probability that 
state priorities in other fields of 
expenditure will also be distorted. 
(e) Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, 
the federal government undertakes 
direct expenditures through its own 
agencies, financing the expenditures from 
its own revenues. Constitutional 
constraints may not permit this 
approach, the efficiency of which in any 
case will depend on the extent to which 
national priorities are involved and on 
the availability of information to guide 
the decisions which are taken. 
It is clear that all of these decision-making combinations 
are based on the notion of divided responsibility and an 
assumption that federal and state priorities can be kept 
separate from each other. Where there is interaction 
between the two sets of decisions, priorities become 
confused and inefficiency results"?^ 
One of the most original perspectives on the division of powers 
question came, again out of the conference on planning and inter-
governmental relations, this time from R.J. May -
-^ R.L. Mathews, ed.,Fiscal Federalism: Retrospect and Prospect, 
Centre for the Research on Federal Financial Relations, Canberra, 
Research Monograph No. 8, pp.114-120. 
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"...The distinctive feature of federal systems is 
that public decision making is divided between two 
levels of government, neither of which can 
dictate the decisions of the other. But despite 
the formal division of government and those taken 
by the unit governments affect the same people and 
therefore affect one another, because of this 
interdependence the two levels of government, 
although they cannot dictate one another's 
decisions, can and do seek to persuade, influence, 
and bargain with one another. 
The decisions taken by the central government are 
determined by three main factors: (1) the demands 
of the central government's electorate, which 
largely determine the goals set; (2) the decisions 
taken by the unit governments, which, because they 
affect the same people on whom the impact of the 
central government's decisons fall, act as a 
constraint on the central government's scope for 
effective action; and (3) the central government's 
power vis-a-vis the units as determined by (i) the 
provisions of the constitution and other rules of 
the game which at any time provide the framework 
within which bargaining takes place, and (ii) the 
central government's bargaining capabilities, 
which depend on such factors as the number of 
units in the federation, the structure of the 
federal party system, and the role of particular 
personalities or groups. 
The decisions taken by each unit government, in a 
similar way, depend on four main factors: (1) the 
demands of its electorate; (2) the decisions taken 
by the central government; (3) the decisions taken 
by other unit governments; and (4) the unit 
government's power potential vis-a-vis other units 
and the central government. 
The total output of policies in a federation is 
thus a product not only of the bargaining which 
takes place within the central and each unit 
system (in which governments act as mediators in 
the conflict), but also of the bargaining which 
goes on in the federal system as a whole (in 
which governments act as participants). 
The extent of the bargaining which takes place 
between governments depends on two main factors: 
(1) the degree in which the decisions of 
governments affect one another, and (2) the extent 
to which governments' electorates make demands 
which cannot be satisfied by the governments 
without securing a modification of other 
governments' policies or a change in the division 
of decision-making powers between the central 
and unit governments. The outcome of the 
bargaining process depends mainly on the power 
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"potentials of the various governments: the rules 
of the game and bargaining capabilities. At the 
outset of federation the rules of the game 
defining relations between governments are 
embodied in the constitution, but after that the 
rules of the game themselves are subject to 
bargaining and negotiation". 32 
The texts of politics and public administration have also accorded 
the division of powers a prominent place and essential to an under-
standing of the functioning of the Australian political system. The 
first edition of Spann's Public Administration in Australia in 1959 and 
three subsequent editions have placed stress on this question. 
Examining federal relations in the constitutional and financial areas 
the book says -
"There are ... disputes about who should properly 
bear the responsibility for certain outlays or 
financial shortcomings, about what should be of 
purely state concern, and what of national 
concern. A state may seek Commonwealth assistance 
for its metropolitan transport system because of 
the national character of the work. The 
Commonwealth has refused to assist secondary 
education generally on the ground that it is a 
state function - then has given grants for school 
science and library facilities, and to independent 
schools. Dental care is treated as a matter for 
the states, though the Commonwealth has for years 
concerned itself with medical care. This seems 
silly; but no one stated any satisfyingly 
objective and operational criteria for distinguishing 
between matters of national, regional, and local 
concern; and what these criteria imply 'in 
administrative responsibility'".33 
Crisp believes that there was an ideological influence in the 
original division of powers by the founding fathers -
"One of the principal dilemmas confronting them 
was how many of the various heads of economic 
and commercial and financial power could, with 
advantage and without risk to the men of property, 
be transferred to the Commonwealth and how what 
touched directly the detailed operation of their 
enterprises might be retained for their local 
legislatures". 34 
32. Public Administration (Sydney), xxviii (1), March 1969, pp.38-42. 
^^- R.N. Spann, Public Administration in Australia (Sydney: Government 
Printer, 1973), pp.155-156. 
34. 
'••''• Crisp, Australian National Government (Melbourne: Longman, 1970), 
pp.14-15. 
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Labor wanted more national powers in the Const i tu t ion , he claims, and 
the social powers that were given, can be a t t r i bu ted to them. "But 
there was no f i n a l i t y about the a l l oca t ion of powers: the 
Constitution made more than one procedural provision for possible 
future real locat ion" . 
In the f i r s t ever p o l i t i c s textbook on federal ism in Aus t ra l ia , 
Holmes and Sharman state t he i r b e l i e f that in Austral ian p o l i t i c s 
the division of powers are as important as the separation of powers. 
In this they are supported by Sawer who observes that the d iv is ion 
of powers is related to the separation of powers at each level and 
"a matter can be of federal importance i f the in terna l separation 
of functions in the various federal un i ts i s d i ss im i la r because 
this dissimi lar i ty can then become the reason fo r pre fer r ing 
allocation of functions federally in one pattern rather than another". 
Holmes and Sharman add -
"In Aust ra l ia , the cons t i t u t i on provides fo r the 
sharing of author i ty between seven sovereign 
governments, and the po l icy formulat ion process 
is correspondingly fragmented by th is d iv i s ion 
of po l i t i ca l r espons ib i l i t y . . . . For each 
policy area is l i k e l y to have i t s own pol icy 
formulation ' s t y l e ' , depending on whether i t is 
a state or national government f unc t i on , because of 
the d i f fe rent complexion of the power-holders at 
each level of government. Welfare p o l i c i e s , 
or ig ina l ly a state concern, have tended to be 
incremental in s t y l e , fo r i t has proved almost 
impossible to cast o f f the legacy of the past. 
Economic policy-making which at the macro level 
is seen as a federal government concern has tended 
more to a ' r a t i o n a l ' s t y le of decision-making, 
and policy areas which require new l e g i s l a t i o n , 
both at the state and nat ional l e v e l , have been 
more l i ke l y to r e f l e c t group and party pressures. 
State policy i n i t i a t i v e s are also more l i k e l y to 
ref lect the preferences of the s tate-regional 
elected p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s , since t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e 
processes fol low the more conventional Westminster 
pattern, and national po l icy decisions are more 
l ike ly to include a strong bureaucrat ic component 
replacing more d i rec t e lec tora l inputs . Each 
level of government in Aus t ra l i a has tended to 
develop i t s own po l icy decision-making 'mix' wi th 
the national government, more d is tan t from the 
electorate displaying a ' r a t i o n a l ' s t y l e , 
modified by incremental h i s t o r i c a l residues, and 
state governments r e f l e c t i n g the more d i rec t 
relationships which are part of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
regional environment. 
"Yet intergovernmental communication is essential 
to policy-making in a federal system. I t is 
l ikely to have something in common with the 
strategies of diplomacy, arising out of the 
constitutional sovereignty of the co-ordinate 
units of government which gives nation-state 
parallels some relevance. Strategic policy 
processes, with their purposive emphasis on 
incentives and rewards have much in common with 
policy formulation in a federal system, and the 
stereotype of 'big brother' national government, 
crushing the 'poor l i t t l e states' over-emphasises 
the hierarchical aspects of the system. State 
governments have not hesitated to use their 
constitutional authority and po l i t i ca l autonomy 
to affect public policy outcomes. 
Nor can the tensions that surface in the federal 
policy formulation process be papered over by 
invoking the symbolism of co-operative federalism. 
Its persuasive rhetoric is much favoured by 
federal pol i t ic ians, but state premiers are less 
enamoured of i t s language. The following comments 
collected by Professor Gordon Reid in West 
Australia catch the flavour of their response: 
Trying to co-operate with the federal government 
is l ike trying to co-operate with a bag f u l l of 
snakes - Sir Charles Culter, New South Wales 
We certainly do not take kindly to big brother in 
Canberra spying on us - Sir Charles Court, West 
Australia 
Queensland w i l l always co-operate but not at the 
price of total surrender of our rights as 
Queenslanders - J. Bjelke-Petersen, Queensland 
The states have been l e f t without a feather to 
f ly with - Sir Henry Bolte, Victor ia. 
Co-operation is only one form of inter-action 
between the levels of government in Austral ia, and 
public policy formulation is jus t as l i ke ly to be 
the outcome of conf l ic t and diplomatic strategy 
ploys as of co-operation. Where central 
government policies threaten major state resources, 
such as their lands, th is aggressiveness w i l l almost 
inevitably be met with a defensive state response, 
as the Whitlam Labor government Lands Commission 
proposals showed, but where federal proposals 
relate to a policy area such as a i r transport, which 
has never been a state responsibi l i ty, then state 
government co-operation is usually forthcoming". 35 
171, 
35. Jean Holmes and Campbell Sharman, The Australian Federal System 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1977), pp. 192-193. 
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Apart from the texts already mentioned there have also been a number 
of polemics which have of fered qui te de f i n i t e views on the Austral ian 
division of powers. The best known of these is s t i l l probably 
Greenwood's The Future of Australian Federalism f i r s t published in 
1946 and heavily influenced by wartime events. He believed that a 
faulty division of powers was not unique to federat ions, that a un i f ied 
economy rendered the ex is t ing d i v i s ion of power inappropr iate, and that 
the division of powers not only hindered economic development but also 
created a "zone of anarchy" where industry was able to escape any 
government regulat ion. Af ter a lengthy ou t l i ne of other ev i l e f fects 
of the division of powers. Greenwood comes down wi th his own pronouncement 
on how the div is ion should be rearranged and bas ica l l y he is in favour of 
more powers being given to the central government but i ns i s t s that that 
government should carry out i t s po l ic ies in a decentral ized way, but 
he never elaborates on how th is w i l l be guaranteed. 
Richardson claims that the Austra l ian founding fathers supported 
the principle enunciated by Holder "To the state everything that is 
local and re lat ing to one s ta te , to the federal power everything that 
is national and of in te rs ta te importance" He of fers an opinion that 
although the Commonwealth had become heavi ly involved in expenditure 
on roads, education, water resources, and ra i lways, d i rec t Commonwealth 
powers in those areas excepting education would not necessari ly have 
resulted in more e f f i c i e n t ac t ion . Reid on the other hand, believes 
that " . . . claims to ult imate e f f i c iency in government, to economic 
balance, to proper or log ica l behaviour, to a national point of view, 
or to a c r i s i s , a l l need to be seen in the context of political 
conflict". Menzies equated the need fo r a d i v i s ion of powers with the 
same reasons which supported the argument fo r a federal form of 
government in Austral ia and although he admitted that the formal 
division of powers was fau l t y fo r modern times s t i l l declared -
" I am, pa r t i cu la r l y fo r a large continent wi th 
widely scattered communities, w i th great regional 
or local problems and understandable local prides 
and patr iot isms, a Federa l is t . At our present 
stage of development, and fo r a long time to 
come, state parliaments and governments are and 
w i l l be essent ia l . The Const i tu t ion i t s e l f 
contemplates the i r continued existence and 
respects the powers ' reserved' to them". 36 
36. Sir Robert Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth 
(London: Casse l l , 1967), p .24 . 
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We could go on recapitulating what various authors have had to say about 
the division of powers in the Australian federation, including such 
authors as F.A. Bland, Lowell-Harris, Harrison Moore, Starr, Leach, 
Rydon, Cranston, and even a group of concerned businessmen who regarded 
the division of powers as so great a hindrance that they wrote a 
37 
respectable monograph on the subject. But enough has been said to 
demonstrate that the very concept of a division of powers in general, 
and the Australian one in particular is tenuous. We go on now to 
look at some such specific difficulties which are identified in the 
literature. Since they will be confronted again later they are only 
summarized here. 
Specific Difficulties Caused by the Division of Powers: 
(a) The connection between expenditure and revenue: Many Australian 
authors are quick to point out that consideration of the division 
of government functions ought not proceed separately from a 
consideration of the allocation of revenue. Some would even go 
so far as to say that the allocation of functions should be 
determined largely by the allocation of revenue raising. We shall 
confront this aspect more directly in chapter five. 
(b) Legislative powers versus administrative powers in the division 
of functions: It has been suggested frequently that Australia 
might consider a different perspective on the division of power 
between levels of government and look at the possibility of 
allowing the national government more of the legislative power 
and having the states act more as administrative agents. The 
argument also takes the form of allowing the national government 
to set broad policies in most areas and having the states allocate 
37. See for example F.A. Bland, Planning the Modem State (Sydney: 
Angus & Robertson, 1945), pp. 218-219 and pp. 225-230; R.L. Mathews, 
ed.. Fiscal Federalism: Retrospect and Prospect, op.cit., pp. 210-215 
and pp. 218-221; Sir William Harrison Moore "Constitutional Develop-
ment in Australia", Australian Quarterly, June 1931, pp. 28-31; 
Graeme Starr, "Federalism without Washington"; Richard Leach, 
Interstate Relations in Australia, Lexington University of Kentucky 
Press, 1968; Joan Rydon, "Frustrations of Federalism", paper 
delivered to 1975 Conference of Australasian Political Students 
Association; Ross Cranston, "Uniform Laws in Australia", Public 
Administration (Sydney), xxx (3), Sept. 1971, p. 229; Committee for 
Economic Development of Australia, Fiscal Federalism - Some Problems 
and Options, Series No. 16, CEDA, Melbourne, March 1975, pp. 28-38, 
46-47. 
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resources within those priorities. Still others speak of 
the possibility of greater decentralization of authority and 
administration within each level of government but particularly 
within the national government (usually as a counter to the 
argument that the national government is too remote from the 
people). 
(c) The importance of the division of powers as a defence against 
centralization and totalitarianism: This theme is found mostly 
in the writings and utterances of politicians in sweeping 
unsupported generalizations but it has also been taken up more 
seriously by academic scholars. 
(d) The relationship between the size of the units of government 
and the federal division of powers: This aspect is confronted 
most often in relation to local government because, as is so 
often, pointed out, it is futile to discuss the allocation of 
functions to a unit of government whose present size (spatial 
or financial or numerical) would preclude it from being able to 
carry out that function. 
(e) The role of local government: By comparison with other aspects 
of Australian federalism, comparatively little has been written 
about the role of local government, per se, in the federal 
system and there are a number of authors who argue that this 
question ought to be resolved before any debate proceeds about 
the division of powers. 
(f) The confusion caused by regionalism: Both advocates and detractors 
from the concept of regional government and/or regional 
administration are quick to point out that any attempt by national 
or state or even local governments to operate their activities on 
a regional basis may bedevil traditional style debates concerning 
the division of powers between two (and sometimes three - when 
local government is included) levels of government. These sorts 
of arguments also arise during the occasional bursts of enthusiasm 
in Australia for the creation of new states. 
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Problems Encountered in particular Functional Areas 
Needless to say the division of powers has proved more practically 
troublesome in some areas than in others and the literature certainly 
identifies a number of difficult areas of public sector activity. 
Since we are concerned mainly with the broad allocation of resources 
and the determination of priorities over the government sector as a 
whole, and not special parts of it, we will not dwell on these aspects 
at length. However it would be foolish not to recognize that the 
public sector consists of a multitude of functional areas and any 
difficulties encountered in planning within any one of these areas will 
ultimately cause hindrances for planning within the public sector as a 
whole. So we will consider some of them superficially at least, 
(a) Industrial, Trade and Commerce Powers: There has probably 
been more written about the manner in which the division of 
powers affects this particular function of government than 
any other single function. The problems more often than not 
stem from the fact that, as noted in an earlier chapter, the 
constitution tries to allow both national and state levels of 
government some jurisdiction by dividing the power spatially. 
It is most interesting to read Menzies, an ardent federalist, 
on this aspect -
"Those who framed the Commonwealth Constitution had 
their picturesque moments, and in one of them they 
permitted themselves to envisage an interstate 
industrial dispute as a 'bush-fire, which overleaps 
geographical and political boundaries, and which, 
once it has passed beyond the limits of the states' 
authority, becomes a proper object of national 
treatment. This picture was not, having regard to 
some of the industrial troubles of the nineties, an 
entirely fanciful one. It told strongly in favour 
of some central legislative power. The emotions it 
created, however were countered and to some extent 
defeated by the additional reluctance to trust a new 
government with anything other than the most 
obvious legislative powers". 38 
38. G.V. Portus, ed. , op.cit., p.57. 
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In the areas of company and industrial law nobody has held the division 
of powers up to more ridicule than Sawer and he makes these unequivocal 
observations -
"It is utterly ridiculous that this country should have 
nine different Companies Acts, and for that matter nine 
different basic sets of law relating to contracts, 
property, trusts and so on. We should have a uniform 
system of civil law, and the sad history of the Committee 
of Attorney-Generals and of uniform law efforts, in 
particular the so-called Uniform Companies Act which I 
helped to draft, proves that we can get a national law 
and keep it uniform only by handing the subject over to 
the Commonwealth. The regulation of stock exchanges 
and stock brokers is another matter. I think many 
provisions of the Whitlam government's projected 
legislation on those topics were unconstitutional; there 
may be less bull-headed methods which would be upheld, 
but better still would be a reference of power from the 
states, and in any event decentralized administration 
is desirable. 
The federal industrial arbitration has become, if 
anything, more and more of a Serbonian bog since the 
days when Higgins J. so described it, not least during 
the past quarter century. The ludicrous doctrine of 
division of powers constructed by the High Court and 
confirmed by the Privy Council in Boilermakers , 1957 
(95 C.L.R.529), continues to bedevil the administration 
of the system. 
...considerable extension of the scope of s. 51(i) is 
highly desirable as an adjunct to the possibilities of 
s. 51 (xx), in order to achieve a national commercial law 
applicable to both corporate and non-corporate traders. 
Without some such development, we can have such a 
fragmentation of commercial law between Commonwealth 
and states that the average trader cannot safely pursue 
his business without a squad of constitutional lawyers 
to advise him and at the constant risk of becoming the 
victim of a leading case. Provided the powers of 
Commonwealth and state are concurrent, it is not difficult 
to pursue a planned course of federal intervention 
without achieving anarchy. There is, however, great 
danger in any attempts at marking out areas of exclusive 
Commonwealth power, as we have seen from the unfortunate 
and unnecessary decision of the High Court in the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Case 1975 (50 A.L.R.J. 218). 
Having declared the exclusive sovereignty of the 
Commonwealth over that territorial sea, the Court has 
had to indulge in contortions in order to preserve 
the necessary operation of various state laws in that 
area, 1976, (A.L.R. 289). In a federation such as ours, 
the central government requires paramount power but none 
should be exclusive". 39 
39. Geoffrey Sawer, "Seventy Five Years of Australian Federalism", 
Australian Journal of Public Administration, xxxvi (1), March 1977, 
PP.8-11. 
484. 
Others too have commented on d i f f i c u l t i e s in these areas including 
F.A. Bland who observed that fo r a l l the ta lk about federat ion 
encouraging experimentation, state l eg i s l a t i on was remarkably s imi la r 
and lacked innovation as witnessed by the area of regulat ion of 
industry where, he sa id , there had been a remarkable tendency fo r 
the states to fasten upon industr ies exclusively under state l eg i s l a t i ve 
control the determinations of the Commonwealth Arb i t ra t ion Court. A 
Royal Commission on the finances of South Aust ra l ia as affected by 
federation, in 1929, pointed out , in re la t ion to a r b i t r a t i o n , that when 
the state a rb i t ra t ion court issued an award covering wages and 
conditions af fect ing government departments, the state parliament had 
the inherent r igh t to say whether i t would approve or disapprove of the 
increased expenditure. But wi th an award made by the Federal 
Arbitration Court the contrary was the case. Whether or not a state 
arbitration court would have imposed a s imi la r burden was not possible 
to determine. "The e f fec t of the present anomalous posi t ion in which 
one Sovereign Author i ty is l e f t wi th the ob l igat ion to f i nd the money 
must, i f continued, lead to s t i l l greater confusion in the finances 
of South Austra l ia" . 
F.W. Eggleston, in 1930 in re la t ion to a coming referendum 
remarked that i f the federal arm of government should have any power 
over industry generally i t should have f u l l power. Those opposed, 
he said, should have to prove i t was bet ter fo r the states alone to 
have industrial power. However, in re la t i on to the trade and commerce 
power he observed that to give that power to the Commonwealth was to 
allow complete interference in the whole economic l i f e of the 
community and i t was doubtful i f the Commonwealth could do th i s in 
detail r ight across the whole continent because of the d i f f e ren t in terests 
of various parts of i t , and i t would probably be dominated by the largest 
states. Perhaps the real cause of these dilemmas and others, in the 
field of industr ia l trade and commerce powers was revealed by Robert 
Garran in 1932 when he lamented that the enumeration of Commonwealth 
powers by the founding fathers had not received the a t ten t ion i t 
deserved and there had been hardly any discussion about th is aspect. 
This was to be regre t ted , he f e l t , and could have saved a l o t of bother 
for example with the trade and commerce power which, he s ta ted, was 
simply borrowed from the United States. 
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(b) Navigation: The problem of providing for control of navigation 
is well known in most federations and in Australia it is similar 
in that there is a demarcation of jurisdiction between levels 
of government according to whether it is ocean navigation or 
aspects of navigation on internal waterways, not to nfiention 
the direct conflict between navigation and irrigation or land 
settlement together with powers over bridge and tunnel 
constructions, canals, dredging, safety at sea, and the very 
thorny question of the maintenance of law and order on vessels 
sailing both intrastate and interstate. 
(c) Airlines: There is now a large body of case law and some amazing 
legal decisions which arise from the simple fact that jurisdiction 
over the regulation of airlines, whilst basically a Commonwealth 
government function, requires the involvement of state governments 
when it is intrastate airlines being considered. 
(d) Transport: It is difficult enough to achieve coordination 
across Australia within the one mode of transport but the legal 
involvement of both national and state levels of government in 
regulating the transport sector makes the situation extremely 
complicated. In a persuasive article in 1968 Whitlam demonstrated 
how the division of powers prevented any sort of national transport 
plan for Australia. Internationally the best railways, he pointed 
out, were national railways, but Commonwealth offers to take over 
railways distressed state politicians and state officials. His 
explanation - "Many people would rather be on top of a two feet 
dung-hill than two feet up a six feet dung-hill". 
(e) Education: Numerous attempts have been made in the literature 
to argue whether education ought to be a national or sub-
national function. Many have pointed out the severe dislocation 
to mobility caused by different educational standards in 
different states from the mere difficulty of families moving 
interstate, to the restrictions in some professional areas upon 
people practising in a state if they have not been registered in 
that state, and such registration inevitably is based upon the 
education system of that state. The general consensus which seems 
to have emerged is that tertiary education is a national 
responsibility but other levels of education are more appropriately 
performed by the state governments. The argument seems to be 
that the research aspects and the high mobility associated with 
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higher education are the key factors. In one direct attempt 
to answer the question as to whether higher education should 
belong to the Commonwealth or the state Sanders observed that 
the states had been concerned mainly with a technical bias 
and a traditional curriculum and undergraduate teaching, but 
the Commonwealth was interested in defence needs, industrial 
scientific and agricultural research, independence for the 
country in scientific training research and national importance, 
(f) Health and Welfare: A similar debate to that occurring in 
relation to education, has been in evidence regarding health 
and welfare although this time it is the three levels of 
government which have been considered. Sidney Sax in a 
competent history and review of government provision of health 
services in Australia makes the following observation -
"The traditional view of the division of responsibility 
between Australian and state governments is that the 
provision of health services is mainly a state 
responsibility. This view has been substantially 
modified by the effect of Section 51 (xxiiia) of the 
Constitution Act and the involvement of the Australian 
Government in providing funds not only to the states 
but directly to voluntary agencies. In addition, 
services in the state are provided directly through 
the Repatriation medical and hospital system, the 
Department of Social Security rehabilitation service, 
and Health Department's laboratories. It seems that 
the constitutional amendment would permit the direct 
provision of public hospital services by the Australian 
Government. 
However, the independent construction of a major public 
hospital in each state would be inconsistent with the 
principles of co-ordinated and integrated development. 
Numerous expert committee reports have emphasized the 
degree of fragmentation now evident in our health 
service arrangements. They have been critical of 'ad 
hoc' decisions made by individual levels of government 
or by inadequate, or even any, consideration of the 
relationship between different elements of the system. 
What is done in regard to the construction, expansion 
or change in function of one hospital affects other 
hospitals in the region, and is affected by the 
provision and use of nursing homes, hostels, 
rehabilitation centres, diagnostic facilities, and 
community health services. All must be considered 
jointly. Each element needs to be assigned a degree 
of priority in an overall hospital and health 
facility program. 
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"All states have already taken, or are taking steps 
towards unification of their health and hospital 
authorities so that they will have a single agency 
responsible for the planning and implementation of 
state health programs. The Australian government 
could exert a far more productive influence on 
policymaking through funding mechanisms were it not 
for the strange separation of function and purpose 
among its own departments and agencies. Priority-
setting in the health field is difficult enough 
without the impediment of competition for scarce 
resources being obfuscated by a variety of Depart-
ments and Commissions pursuing independent 
objectives. 
However, within the limitations of our own 
awkward system, progress has been made in a most 
vital area - that which is concerned with federal/ 
state working relationships. Both levels of 
government must share in the responsibility and 
also in the credit for the health services 
provided to their citizens. We found that neither 
level could be held responsible for arbitrating 
between the taxpayer's resistance on one hand and 
those calling for more expenditures on the other 
hand. The states, directly carrying the odium 
for failure to provide services, constantly cried: 
'If the Commonwealth would give us the money, we 
could do the job' . But the Australian government, 
which carries the odium for increasing tax collections, 
could (and did) assert that general revenue grants 
and loan program allocations are adequate supplements 
to state revenues, and that it is entirely a state 
responsibility to ensure that funds are properly 
apportioned between hospitals and other services. 
The result was the worst one that could be designed 
with both state and federal governments disclaiming 
full responsibility for the adequacy of hospital and 
related services in the states. 
We have achieved a mechanism whereby the needs for 
capital funds for hospital facilities in each state 
are negotiated at variants of a Joint Hospital 
Works Council consisting of both Australian 
government and state government nominees. Each 
state has its own Council. It will meet at least 
twice a year, and officers are involved in varying 
degrees of joint analysis of needs between meetings. 
Members of the Council make recommendations to their 
respective governments. On the basis of recommend-
ations received from its nominees, the Australian 
Government determines the additional funds to be 
allocated in each State - provided that the state 
satisfies a baseline level of expenditure from its 
own resources. 
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"... The inference is that decisions about the allocation 
of resources should be based on the most detailed 
consultation with local communities about their own 
needs. This is our greatest challenge - to devise a 
mechanism for federal and state governments to respond 
to local needs, to find ways of identifying and 
evaluating those needs, to involve local people in 
that process, and to delegate the subsequent management 
of service programs as peripherally as is possible. 
That process would be assisted by the integration at 
federal level of those commissions and departments that 
are concerned with what we have come to recognise as 
health services. Incentives for the better management 
and scarce resources are an urgent requirement in this 
field; their introduction and supervision would be 
facilitated by a mechanism that ensures uniform policy 
development and continuous evaluation against the 
standards and criteria of one organisation rather 
than five". 40 
During the 1970's in Australia the Holmes and Bailey reports on 
coordination of various aspects of health and welfare were published and 
these established completely new concepts in intergovernmental 
relationships in this area. We shall examine those reports in more 
depth later. 
(g) Offshore resources: Apart from the above areas there are of 
course numerous others where there have been singularly 
frustrating events caused for governments by the division of 
powers. Many of them are related to the question of juris-
diction over off-shore resources. The fight about control 
over off-shore energy resources in the late 1960's and through 
the 1970's is well known, and has already been alluded to. 
If the above list were not sufficient Knight gives an illuminating 
catalogue of the administrative difficulties caused in practice by the 
division of powers ending with the pregnant comment -
"No doubt society is enriched by diversity of activity 
and ideas, and it may be that the federal system can 
be defended on various grounds. But administrative 
efficiency is not one of them". ^^ 
^0. Sidney Sax, "Australian Health Services - Development and Problems", 
Public Administration (Sydney), xxxiv (3), Sept 1975, pp.227-230. 
^^- R.L. Mathews, ed.,Intergovernmental Relations in Australia 
(Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1974), p.54. 
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B. CANADA: 
Perhaps the most far reaching review ever undertaken of any 
federal system was the Canadian Royal Commission on Dominion-
Provincial Relations, the Rowell-Sirois Commission, brought down 
in 1950. Commenting on the distribution of powers the Commission 
said -
"The vital core of a federal constitution is the 
division of legislative powers between the central 
authority and the competent states or provinces. 
This division represents the compromise between 
the forces which makes union possible and those 
which inhibit the formation of a close union. It 
marks the limits of what can be done by common 
agreement and the extent to which the separate 
states must be permitted to differ and work out 
their own destinies". 42 
In relation to the difficulty of interpreting the division of powers 
they make these salient points ^ 
" The Problem of Interpreting the Division of Legislative 
Powers 
No amount of care in phrasing the division of powers 
in a federal scheme will prevent difficulty when the 
division comes to be applied to the variety and 
complexity of social relationships. The different 
aspects of life in a society are not insulated from 
one another in such a way as to make possible 
mechanical application of the division of powers. 
There is nothing in human affairs which corresponds 
to the neat logical divisions found in the 
constitution. Therefore, attempts to exercise the 
powers allotted by the constitution frequently 
raise questions as to its meaning in relation to 
particular circumstances. 
The British North America Act has not escaped this 
difficulty. Manifestly, it would be difficult for 
the Dominion to make any law for the 'Peace, Order 
and good government of Canada' without affecting, 
in some way, one or other of the specific subjects 
in relation to which the provinces were given 
exclusive powers. On the other hand, laws made by 
the provinces under the heads of jurisdiction given 
by section 92 would frequently have direct 
implications for the 'Peace, order and good govern-
ment of Canada' or would bear in some unexpected way 
upon the enumerated classes of subjects in section 91 
over which the Dominion was given exclusive power. 
The implications and sometimes the express 
provisions of legislation would seem to cross the 
line which, in theory, divided the spheres of 
legislation assigned to the provinces and the 
2^. Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 
Book 1, Canada: 1867-1939, Ottawa, 1940, p. 30. 
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"Dominion. In a variety of circumstances, the problem 
of what amounted to an invasion of the field of one 
by the other would raise difficult questions of 
interpretation. 
The task of interpretation was complicated by the 
existence, in sections 91 and 92, of several general 
descriptions of the ambit of legislative power given 
to the Dominion and the provinces which lacked a clear, 
legal meaning. 'Peace, order and good government', 
'Regulation of Trade and Commerce', 'Property and 
Civil Rights in the Province' do not convey precise 
signification. Since 1867, the Privy Council has had 
the last word on the meaning of the British North 
America Act and has laid down rules of construction 
for determining when section 91 was to have primacy 
over section 92. By a process of textual criticism, 
it has given some concreteness to the general 
phrases just mentioned. In this way, it has 
elucidated the legal meaning of the constitution 
and imparted greater certainty to the division of 
powers than could have existed when the Act first 
came into operation This legal meaning is binding 
on all other courts and on the Dominion and 
provincial legislatures". 43 
The founding fathers had allocated functions expected to grow to the 
national government, the"great functions" of government like national 
security, national development, and fostering trade and commerce. By 
contrast provincial functions were not expected to grow in financial 
burden. Even education the largest provincial function was a rudimentary 
affair at that stage. There was a widespread feeling at confederation 
that the provinces would be like large scale municipalities. 
The Commission expressed the opinion that the dominion government, 
owing to historical events, no longer had the powers of control over 
the economy it should have, and did not have the direct responsibility 
for maintaining minimum standards in government services it should 
also have. Examining the areas of intergovernmental contact they 
found that the Dominion did enter the welfare territory of the 
provinces to maintain nationwide minimum standards. They had also 
cooperated in necessary industry regulation where powers were divided, 
e.g., agriculture. However this field of intergovernmental relations 
had produced a number of difficulties -
'^ 3. ibid., p.31. 
"...But Dominion and provincial governments are now 
embarked on the joint administration of projects 
which require positive and constructive co-operation 
if they are to be carried out efficiently. Two 
separate governments, neither one of which has any 
authority over the other, must agree on objectives, 
on the means of reaching them, and on the daily 
application fo these means to new situations. However, 
there are always a number of issues on which the 
interests of the Dominion and those of the separate 
province do not run side by side. These differences 
in interest lead to disagreements which cannot be 
solved by appeals to the courts because they do not 
involve questions of formal constitutional pov/er at 
all. They are disagreements about matters which the 
constitution intended that the appropriate government 
should handle separately in its own way. 
Accordingly, if the co-operative projects are to be 
continued, the governments involved must be their 
own arbitrators. Arbitration conducted solely by 
the interested parties leads to delay and sometimes 
to deadlock which is ruinous to administrative 
efficiency. It always leads in the end to a 
compromise. While compromise is inherent in the 
political process, it is rarely conducive to good 
administration. The evolution of political policies 
within the framework of the constitution is leading 
to joint activity between the Dominion and the 
provinces. This contrasts sharply with the original 
conception of federalism as a clear-cut division of 
powers to be exercised separately, and experience 
indicates that it is injurious both to sound public 
finance and to efficient administration. The 
problems raised by joint administration of activities 
where jurisdiction is divided between the provinces 
and Dominion may now be pointed out. The first step 
in any scheme of co-operation must generally be 
taken by the legislatures concerned. As indicated 
above, the divided legislative powers over the 
subject-matter in question could be pooled by one 
legislature delegating its share of power to the 
other if the constitutionality of such an expedient had 
not been rendered doubtful by the courts. If it were 
constitutionally possible and the province or 
Dominion, as the case may be were willing to delegate its 
powers in the specific instance, the act of delegation 
would complete the co-operation required. The 
legislature receiving the powers could then establish 
its regulations and provide for their enforcement 
just as if the entire matter had originally been 
within its jurisdiction. In such a case, no joint 
administration by province and Dominion would be 
involved and as long as the legislature delegating 
its powers was satisfied with the results obtained, 
through vicarious use of its powers, no further action 
by it would be required. 
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'In the past, the Dominion and provincial legislatures 
have had no serious difficulty in agreeing on this 
kind of co-operation. Nation-wide schemes for the 
compulsory grading of natural products under the 
administration of the Dominion government were set up 
and the provinces purported to extend the Dominion 
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act to disputes 
entirely within the jurisdiction of the provinces 
by essentially similar devices. The administration 
of the legislation was placed in the hands of a 
single government and the difficulty arising out of 
the division of legislative power over the subject 
matter was surmounted. The constitutionality of this 
procedure was, however, challenged by the courts in 
1935. As a result, the provinces have begun to 
abandon this method in favour of a more complicated 
one which escapes the constitutional difficulty but 
which involves joint administration. The new 
device requires that the province should enact 
legislation in substantially identical terms with 
that of the Dominion but covering intra-provincial 
as distinct from inter-provincial and export 
transactions. To be specific, in legislation 
providing for the compulsory grading of natural 
products, the province enacts the Dominion grades 
and regulations for enforcement and then appoints 
the Dominion graders and inspectors as provincial 
officials to enforce the provincial as well as the 
federal legislation. 
Close and continuous co-operation is necessary for 
success under this device. Any needed revision in the 
detailed regulations or definition of grades must be 
made by both the provincial and Dominion authorities 
concerned. They must be able to agree on the need 
fo'^  change and the exact nature of the change required. 
Moreover, the graders and inspectors are now subject to 
the control of two masters, the Dominion and provincial 
departments concerned. The intention, of course, is to 
leave the initiative and the general control of 
administration of grading legislation to the Dominion 
and thus far in the limited experience of the new device, 
this has been the practice. However, it can only be a 
matter of time until it is discovered that the 
principles of responsible government are being flouted 
when provincial legislation is administered by officials 
who get all their instructions from Ottawa. 
Administration will then become joint in substance as 
well as in form. 
Thus far, activities jointly administered by the 
Dominion and a province have not been of any significant 
magnitude or duration in Canada. As already remarked, 
however, the present division of legislative power and 
the present trend towards greater governmental 
regulation are rapidly leading in that direction. 
Although direct Canadian experience of joint administration 
is not available for assessing its probable efficiency, 
an appeal can be made to twenty years of experience in 
the administration of conditional grants in Canada. 
It has already been pointed out that, in the conditional 
grants made by the Dominion to the provinces to assist 
specific services, the Dominion attempts, by supervision 
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"and inspection of the provincial administration, to 
ensure that the grant is being properly applied to 
the purposes for which it was given. This involves 
a form of co-operation approaching joint admin-
istration and raises most of the problems involved 
in it. Before considering the manner in which 
conditional grants have worked in Canada, it is 
important to state some general considerations 
bearing upon all co-operative efforts in 
administration by separate governments. 
It is clear that failure of Dominion and provincial 
government departments to pull together in such 
co-operative ventures will have disastrous effects 
upon administration. The purposes of all 
administration, whether in government departments 
or in private enterprise, is to get something done, 
to unify the efforts of the personnel in reaching 
objectives laid down beforehand. One of the 
principal differences between government and 
business is that the objectives and policy of 
government, in democratic states, at any rate, are 
generally arrived at as a result of bargaining 
and compromise among a wide variety of interests 
concerned. But once a policy is agreed upon, it is 
a maxim of all good administration that concerted 
effort in pursuit of the policy should not be 
frustrated by a multitude of counsel on the best 
means of arriving at it. 
In business, unity of effort is secured by having a 
single manager responsible for administration as a 
whole. The Constitution of the United States aimed 
to reach the same result by concentrating all 
executive authority in the hands of the President. 
In the cabinet system of government, the 
conventions requiring unanimity and imposing 
collective responsibility are designed to secure 
a similar co-ordination of all administrative action. 
Where the Dominion and the provinces co-operate in 
the execution of a single policy, there is no single 
authority which can impose its will and decide what 
daily action shall be taken in pursuit of objectives. 
The Dominion and the provinces occupy exclusive 
spheres of power in which no one can over-ride the 
others. If unity and harmony of administration are 
to be maintained, it must be through voluntary 
agreement between Dominion and provincial personnel 
on the best means of advancing the policy. And this 
agreement must be reached without delay and without 
serious compromise watering down the vigour of the 
measures employed. 
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"It is one thing to get a legislature willing, at a 
single moment of time, to delegate some portion of 
its powers. Once the act of delegation is complete, 
it is not likely to reconsider to whom the power 
was delegated It 
is a quite different matter, however, to get 
sustained unanimity on the minutiae of administration 
from day to day. There are two main reasons for 
thinking it likely to break down from time to time".44 
These were the four basic rules which guided the Rowell-Sirois 
Commission in its determination of an appropriate division of powers. 45 
(a) the presumption that existing constitutional arrangements 
should not be disturbed except for compelling reasons; 
(b) existence of pronounced differences in social philosophy 
between different regions in Canada; 
(c) the need for economy and efficiency in administration; 
(d) the suitability of different jurisdictions for carrying 
the financial burdens involved. 46 
Two very pertinent studies were prepared for the Commission, one by 
D.G. Creighton and the other by J.A. Corry. The Corry report is of 
particular interest to us here because it dealt with the difficulties 
of divided jurisdiction especially in areas of administration where 
jurisdiction was shared or cooperation attempted. Corry lost no time 
in coming to the kernel of the problem -
"...The division of power in a federal state raises 
other problems of a governmental or administrative 
character. The constitution may expressly give 
concurrent powers to federal and provincial 
legislatures as in the case of agriculture and 
immigration under the British North America Act. 
Through oversights on the part of the framers, 
confusion on the part of the interpreters or the 
impact of economic and social change on rigid 
categories, we find ourselves in a position where 
the division of power splits several functions of 
government in two. As a result, performance of a 
particular function often requires co-operation 
between the provinces and the Dominion. There are 
two distinct aspects to the problem of co-operation 
in the performance of any single function. First, 
there is legislative co-operation - securing 
substantial agreement by ten legislatures as to 
44. ibid., pp.255-259. 
45. ibid.. Book II Recommendations, p.2^, 
46. ibid., pp. 13-73, passim. 
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'policy and the detailed means of advancing that 
policy. When agreement has been reached and 
uniform or 'meshing' legislative measures have 
been enacted that aspect of the co-operation 
is closed - for the moment, at least. The second 
problem then arises - how to secure and maintain 
administrative co-operation. In respect of some 
kinds of co-operative legislation, administrative 
co-operation may not be necessary. For example, 
uniform legislation on company law would presumably 
leave each of the ten units free to administer its 
own legislation. However, in functions such as 
the regulation of insurance companies, some degree 
of administrative co-ordination is desirable on 
grounds of economy and uniformity of regulation. 
In other functions again, such as enforcement 
of compulsory grading, packaging, and marking of 
natural products, efficiency as well as economy 
demands unity of operation if joint administration 
by province and Dominion is to be tolerably 
successful. 
That is to say, in those functions where power is 
at present divided and where active administration 
is necessary to make governmental policy successful 
(which seems increasingly true of the new functions 
of government), an acute problem of administrative 
co-operation is raised. It is raised because, 
under the British North America Act, the division 
of executive power follows the line of division of 
legislative power - except in executive enforcement 
of judicial decisions. Each government must provide 
its own officials to enforce its own laws. This 
problem of building an efficient administrative 
machine is a puzzle peculiar to federal systems. So 
far it has been dealt with in a hand-to-mouth fashion 
and little attention has been paid to the fundamental 
issues involved. It has been little explored by 
students of federalism and thoroughly tested results 
of experience are hard to find. In the remarks that 
follow, an attempt is made to set out the basic 
considerations and illustrate them with specific 
examples". 47 
Corry was basically averse to joint administration of government 
functions though admitting there would always be the necessity of it 
in a federation - "... friends and relatives should not be involved 
in too many intimate relationships if they are to remain friends". 
But it all depended on the scale of values he said -
47. J.A. Zorry,Difficulties of Divided Jurisdiction, A Study Prepared 
for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 
Appendix 7, 1939, p.7. 
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"There is no evidence that joint administration 
is more economical in terms of money cost. But 
it may be felt preferable to endure the jangling 
of joint administration than to pay the price 
of increased federal power". 48 
According to Corry these were two kinds of situation where administrative 
cooperation involving formal continuous relationships had either been 
attempted or had to be contemplated under the Constitution as it stood -
"...First, there are the fields of government action 
which have been cut in two by the interpretation of 
the courts. The most important of these are the 
marketing of natural products, fisheries, regulation 
of insurance companies, and investigation of labour 
disputes. So far there has been very little of what 
may be called joint administration in these fields. 
The technique which has been used in the past to 
evade joint administration has been declared 
unconstitutional by the courts and it seems probable 
that their view would be upheld by the Privy Council. 
If valid delegations of power by the province to 
the Dominion, or vice versa, cannot be made, more 
joint administration in these fields in the future 
must be expected in the absence of any revision of 
the British North America Act. 
Secondly, there are some fields of governmental action 
which are clearly provincial but which the provinces 
failed to cultivate, because of lack of financial 
resources or some other reason. The Dominion has been 
willing or anxious to assist the provinces in 
occupying these fields and has made grants for the 
promotion of specified activities. The reasons for 
giving these subventions have been mixed. One reason 
has been the feeling that important national interests 
were to be served by the uniform development of these 
aided activities throughout the country. Here there 
is an admission of some federal responsibility, even 
though vague and indirect. Another reason, which 
excludes any admission of federal responsibility, has 
been that some of the provinces need financial 
assistance and that a grant for a particular activity 
will release provincial resources for other purposes. 
From 1912 on, the Dominion has experimented with 
conditional grants to the provinces for agricultural 
instruction, employment service, highways, technical 
education, venereal disease, old age pensions, and 
unemployment and farm relief. All these grants, with 
the exception of the grants for employment service 
48. ibid., p.8. 
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"and old age pensions, were launched as temporary measures. 
At present, the grants to old age pensions, employment 
service, and unemployment relief are the only ones in 
force, if the unearned balances of Manitoba under the 
technical education grant be excepted". 49 
Interestingly, Corry also found Dominion-provincial difficulties of 
cooperation often involved "personalities" especially those of 
bureaucracies -
"...Officials engaged in Dominion-provincial co-operation 
generally attribute most of their difficulties to 
'personalities'. Any inquiry as to why there is a 
marked tendency for personalities to clash in these 
fields of divided jurisdiction raises a question which 
is fundamental to this study and which should be discussed 
first. Is it possible for two bureaucracies (using 
the word in a purely descriptive sense with none of the 
sinister connotations sometimes attached to it) 
responsible to separate and independent authorities, to 
co-operate efficiently and harmoniously over a long period 
of time? This is an underlying question in all activities 
which depend upon the sustained co-operation of Dominion 
and provincial officials. Unfortunately, it is a question 
to which it is impossible to give a conclusive answer by 
way of logical demonstration. There are, however, some 
reasons for thinking that two bureaucracies, so placed, 
tend to be 'rival centres of power' (an expression used 
by Professor E.S. Corwin) rather than eager co-operators 
for the fulfilment of a grand national purpose. 
The higher officials in any government department are 
presumably able men to whom their job is a career - or 
at least, their best present prospect for a career. They 
can scarcely be satisfactory civil servants unless they 
find, in their work, the main expression of their 
personality. We all try, in one way or another, to put 
our stamp in our environment. The readiest objective 
yardstick for reassuring ourselves and impressing our 
superiors is expansion of an activity for which we 
supply the driving power. Use of this measure was perfect, 
because, in all probability, unconsciously, exemplified 
by the Dominion official who said in his annual report, 
'Despite a heavy reduction in inspections under the 
Potato Export Regulations and a slight increase under the 
Requested Inspection Service, the total number of 
inspections compares very favourably with last year' . 
This bears directly on the subject of this study because, 
frequently, the most likely area for expansion is the 
borderland of the activity in which Dominion and pro-
vincial officials are supposed to be co-operating. The 
official employed by the province knows that his calculable 
future is in the hands of the province. (The same 
argument applies equally to the Dominion officials). If 
49. ihid., pp.8-9. 
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"he is capable and ambitious, he must try to master 
uncertainties which interfere with his control of 
the situation, "^he actions and attitudes of 
Dominion officials are among those uncertainties. 
Thus there is a powerful incentive for him to try 
to extend his authority as far as possible over 
any disputed borderland between them. He must use 
the faith that is in him to secure an administrative 
policy which furthers and vindicates his judgement. 
That is to say, when the ideas of the Dominion 
officials do not jibe with his, he must fight for 
the adoption of his own. If he merely assents to 
the proposals of Dominion officials, he is inviting 
the province to search for another official who will 
have originality. He wants credit for his 
contribution to the administration of the activity. 
The only way he can be certain of receiving it is to 
be able to show that he and his staff are really 
responsible for the achievement. Or the reverse -
when things go badly, there is a strong temptation 
to'passthe buck' and justify it to himself by 
saying that, if he had complete control, things 
would not have reached this condition. 
The whole situation seems to point to the probability 
of rivalry and friction. It is not to be charged 
to the perversity of civil servants. It might almost 
be said that the more zealous civil servants are, the 
more likely are difficulties of this kind to develop. 
It is at least certain that the only guarantee against 
it is that the officials at the top in the two 
services, which are required to co-operate, should 
have the same conception of ends and means and should 
be eager, above all things, to promote those ends. 
Given anything less than that - and considerably 
less must be regarded as normal - friction seems 
to be inherent in the situation. It is believed that 
this friction explains, in part, why it has been 
impossible to cut down overlapping in the regulation 
of insurance companies. It must be admitted that 
this analysis receives little confirmation from the 
many civil servants who have been asked about it. 
Almost without exception, they say that entirely 
satisfactory co-operation exists between Dominion 
and provincial officials in the fields where 
administrative co-operation is being tried. It is 
impossible to say how far this is an over-statement 
which they justify by a suspicion that, even if 
they revealed their difficulties, the nature of them 
would be misunderstood. At any rate, it is abundantly 
clear that they are, almost without exception, anxious 
to escape from a continuance of this co-operation and 
they are unanimous in saying that its success depends 
almost entirely on personalities. If the personalities 
did not 'click' they say, the situation would be 
intolerable". ^^  
ibid., pp.9-10. 
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In another study for the Commission Corry examined the growth of 
government activities in Canada. In the introduction he makes this 
pertinent statement -
"...Both Dominion and provincial governments have 
shared in this increase of state activity. Apart 
altogether from the intensification of financial 
difficulties involved, that fact has complicated 
the relationship between them. The rapid develop-
ment which followed Confederation has resulted 
in an integrated economic life across the whole 
Dominion. Local affairs have become intertwined 
with national affairs at many points and the public 
policy adopted towards economic matters in one 
province has repercussions in other provinces. The 
division of constitutional authority into ten 
separate spheres naturally puts difficulties in the 
way of governmental action, affecting our economic 
and social relationships, which stubbornly refuse 
to be compartmentalized. As a result, the different 
governments come across one another's paths in a 
way that was never expected at the time of Confederation. 
In devising and operating the makeshifts, which are 
needed to make effective many of the regulations now 
thought to be necessary, a high degree of co-operation 
is required and this, in turn, puts strain on the 
relations between the governments". ^1 
The Prime Minister of Canada, Lester Pearson, presented a document 
to a 1969 Constitutional Conference and dealing explicitly with the 
division of powers he made these remarks -
"...All of these differences are serious. And all of 
them stem from genuine differences of opinion over 
how the powers of government are or ought to be 
divided between the Parliament of Canada and the 
legislative assemblies of the provinces. The 
Government of Canada has concluded that the point 
has been reached where the federal and provincial 
governments should meet to discuss, formally and fully, 
the whole question as to how the powers of government 
should be divided in Canada. We should examine the 
claims that are made for the transfer or the clari-
fication of powers, the spending power, the residual 
power, and the power of delegation. But meetings on 
these questions would be preferable, in our opinion, 
to dealing with forever recurring disputes over 
particular powers, in a partial or a piecemeal fashion. 
'•• J.A. Corry, The Growth of Government Activities Since Confederation, 
A Study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial 
Relations (Ottawa:1939), p.6. 
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"Discussions on the division of powers should take 
place, in the opinion of the Government of Canada, 
after the constitutional conferences have considered 
the other principal elements of the Constitution -
the rights of individual Canadians, including 
linguistic rights, and the central institutions of 
federalism. We say this because provincial interests 
and the interests of Canada's two linguistic groups 
are not and cannot be represented simply through the 
device of transferring powers from the federal 
government to provincial governments. These interests 
are and must be reflected as well in constitutional 
guarantees and the central institutions of federalism. 
It follows that a balanced judgement as to the 
powers required by the provincial governments for the 
primary purpose of protecting linguistic or provincial 
interests can only be made in the perspective of the 
constitutional guarantees and the representation of 
such interests in the central organs of government. 
To jeopardize the capacity of the federal government 
to act for Canada, in the name of protecting linguistic 
and provincial rights, when what is essential could 
be accomplished through constitutional guarantees 
and the institutions of federalism, would be to serve 
Canadians badly. Furthermore, the division of powers 
between orders of government should be guided by 
principles of functional ism, and not by ethnic 
considerations. Such principles can best be applied 
after issues concerning the protection of linguistic 
rights have been settled. 
The Government of Canada would propose, therefore, that 
discussions on the division of powers take place at 
subsequent conferences. However, in anticipation of 
these discussions, and as a guide to the direction of 
the Government's thinking we believe we should place 
before the Conference some of the principles by which 
we feel we would have to be guided. 
First, we are committed to the view that Canada requires 
both a strong federal government and strong provincial 
governments. The field of government now is so wide, 
and the problems of government are so many, that it is not 
a contradiction to speak in these terms. Governments 
themselves confirm this view when they argue that 
their spending responsibilities exceed their ability to 
raise revenues. There is another reason for achieving 
a balance between the powers of the federal and 
provincial governments: the freedom of the individual is 
more likely to be safeguarded if neither order of 
government is able to acquire a preponderant power 
over the citizen. 
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"Secondly, the Government of Canada believes that there 
are certain areas of responsibility which must remain 
with the federal government if our country is to 
prosper in the modern world. The Parliament of Canada 
must have responsibility for the major and inextricably 
inter-related instruments of economic policy if it is 
to stimulate employment and control inflation. It 
must have control over monetary and credit policy, 
the balance-wheel role in fiscal policy, tariff policy, 
and balance of payments policy. It must be responsible 
for interprovincial and international trade. It must 
be able to undertake measures for stimulating the growth 
of the economy, some of which inevitably and some of 
which intentionally will affect regional economic growth. 
Without such powers Canada's federal government would 
be unable to contribute to many of the central objectives 
of federalism, including the reduction of regional 
disparity. 
We believe that the Government of Canada must have the power 
to redistribute income, between persons and between provinces 
if it is to equalize opportunity across the country. This 
would involve, as it does now, the rights to make payments 
to individuals, for the purpose of supporting their income 
levels - old age security pensions,unemployment insurance, 
family allowances - and the right to make payments to 
provinces, for the purpose of equalizing the level of 
provincial government services. It must involve, too, the 
powers of taxation which would enable the federal government 
to tax those best able to contribute to these equalization 
measures. Only in this way can the national government 
contribute to the equalization of opportunity in Canada, 
and thus supplement and support provincial measures to 
this end. 
The Government of Canada believes it must be able to speak 
for Canada, internationally, and that it must be able to 
act for Canada in strengthening the bonds of nationhood. 
We have said what we think this implies in international 
matters. Internally it seems to us to imply an active 
federal role in the cultural and technological developments 
which so characterize the 20th century. We acknowledge, 
of course, that the nourishment of Canada's cultural 
diversity requires imaginative provincial programmes, as 
well as federal ones. But there is a role for the 
Government of Canada, too; indeed cultural and technological 
developments across the country are as essential to 
nationhood today as tariffs and railways were one hundred 
years ago. 
The third principle which would guide the Government of 
Canada in discussions concerning the division of powers is 
that most services involving the most immediate contact 
between the citizen and the government, and those which 
contribute most directly to the traditions and heritages 
which are uniquely provincial, should generally be provided 
by Canada's provincial governments. Strong provincial 
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"governments, able to adapt public services to the 
particular needs of their people, are as essential to 
meet the facts of diversity in Canada as a strong 
federal government is to the preservation of 
Canadian unity. 
The governments of the provinces have responsibility 
for education, and their own power to support technological 
and cultural development - so often associated with educational 
institutions. These powers play an important part in the 
flourishing of Canada's linguistic groups, and of the diverse 
traditions to be found in our country. We acknowledge, 
of course, that many of the institutions involved serve the 
nation as well as the province but this fact should not 
be allowed to diminish the capacity of the provinces to 
perform their role. 
The Government of Canada believes that the provinces must 
have the power to provide health and welfare services. 
For instance, the provincial governments rather than the 
federal government should operate hospitals or public 
health clinics and determine the needs of persons 
requiring social assistance. Provincial administration 
of services to accord with local priorities. The role of 
the federal government should be to provide for those 
transfers of income between people and between provinces 
which generally support the incomes of people and the 
services of governments in the different provinces. 
The Government of Canada recognizes too that the provinces 
should continue to have the constitutional powers required 
to enable them to embark upon regional economic development 
programmes. Provincial programmes inevitably will affect 
national policies for economic growth, and vice versa, and 
the programmes of the several provinces may well be 
competitive with one another. But the aims and the 
expectations of people in the several provinces should find 
expression in provincial as well as federal economic measures. 
The provinces must continue, too, to have responsibility 
for the many intra-provincial matters which call for local 
rather than national action. 
The Government of Canada holds the view that in the 
exercise of these responsibilities - which under the present 
division of powers are at least as wide ranging as those of 
the federal government - each province should be able to 
develop its own unique approach. The range of powers we 
would expect the provinces to have would extend, as they do 
now, into the areas which are vital to the preservation of 
Canada's several cultural and regional identities. 
We believe, finally, that the provincial governments like 
the federal government must have taxing powers sufficient 
to enable them to finance their responsibilities. However, 
we suspect that in assigning to governments the power of 
taxation - the capacity for financing public services in 
Canada - the principle of access to tax powers will super-
cede the principle of an exact division of tax fields. 
We would do well to remember that it is as difficult to 
predict that technological or social or international 
changes will have increased the role of the provincial 
or federal governments in 30 years as it would have been to 
predict the changes between 1938 and 1968. 
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"The fourth generalization we would advance concerning 
the division of powers has to do with the effect each 
government's activities inevitably will have upon the 
activities of the others. This applies both to 
individual programmes and to the totality of government 
activity. For example, federal income redistribution 
measures inevitably have an effect upon provincial 
social welfare programmes and provincial resource 
development policies inevitably affect the rate of 
growth of the nation's economy. Similarly the 
aggregate use by the provinces of their spending and 
borrowing powers inevitably affects federal fiscal, 
and monetary and balance of payments policies, and 
the use of the federal spending power affects 
provincial policies in different ways. Obviously 
the total volume of spending by each order of 
government affects the priorities of the other. 
We question whether it is any longer realistic to 
expect that some neat compartmentalization of powers 
can be found to avoid this. Instead we suspect that 
the answer is to be found in the processes by which 
governments consult one another and by which they seek 
to influence each other before decisions are finally 
taken. This remedy has been prescribed so often as 
to appear commonplace. But there is much to be done even 
in coming to understand the processes of intergovern-
mental influence, to say nothing of perfecting the 
machinery by which intergovernmental consultation takes 
place. Nor will we find the 'participation' of 
provincial governments in federal government 
decisions, and vice versa, to be an easy answer to the 
problems of consultation. The federal government 
must remain responsible to Parliament, and the provincial 
governments to their legislatures: federal-provincial 
conferences must, it seems to us, occupy themselves 
with the art of influence rather than the power of 
decision-making. 
Both federal and provincial governments will recognize, too, 
the unresolved question as to whether there should be a 
federal government role when there is a 'national 
interest' in provincial programmes (or the lack of them), 
or whether there should be a provincial government role 
when there is a 'provincial interest' in national 
programmes (or lack of them). Examples abound: What 
the provinces do or do not do about urban development 
unquestionably affects the national interest, and what 
the federal government does or does not do about tariff 
policy affects the provincial interest. We have to 
consider seriously whether there should be a way for 
the federal government to seek to influence the provinces 
in cases where a national interest is involved, and a 
way for provincial governments to seek to influence the 
federal government when a provincial interest is involved. 
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"There are, we think, no easy solutions. What is 
required is a comprehensive review of the federal-
provincial conferences and committees which now 
exist, how they function, and how their work is 
co-ordinated. We must be prepared, it seems to 
the Government of Canada, to give more systematic 
recognition to these new forms of federalism. 
We must be prepared to consider new methods for 
bringing provincial influence to bear on developing 
federal policies, and federal influence on 
developing provincial policies, before decisions 
have finally been taken. We must be prepared for 
innovations in the machinery of government which 
will enable us to preserve the essence of Canada's 
two great governmental traditions - federalism and 
parliamentary government". 52 
As part of the most recent burst of Constitutional review in 
Canada, the federal government issued, in 1978 a policy paper 
entitled "A Time for Action" which admitted quite candidly that there 
should be a complete review of the division of powers in the Canadian 
federation. The paper said, inter alia -
"The experience of the past 110 years has shown 
that federal parliament has some powers which are not 
essential to ensure the development and proper 
working of the Federation as a whole, or which the 
provincial legislatures could use in a way that is 
better suited to the diversity of regional needs 
and aspirations. Conversely the provincial 
legislatures have some powers which they cannot 
exercise effectively. 
In other cases, legislative areas which are of 
prime importance today, but are not covered by the 
sections of the British North America Act of 1867 
bearing on the division of powers, have had to be 
dealt with by the Courts, because no provision 
existed whereby governments could determine how 
best these legislative areas could be allocated ... 
Lastly, some of the powers of the federal parliament, 
such as the spending power, have a very broad scope 
and could be more carefully delineated in order 
to better ensure the internal sovereignty of the 
two orders of government. 
...In any case, we will have to attach much greater 
importance than was required, in the circumstances 
of the Fathers of the Confederation in 1967, to how 
the respective powers of the two orders of government 
52. Right Honourable L.B. Pearson, Federalism for the Future 
(Ottawa: 1968), pp.32-44. 
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"should f i t together. I t i s not only the framework 
of the d iv i s ion of powers that must be examined and 
adapted to the needs of the hour, but also the 
jo in ts and hinges that ensure the in ter lock ing of 
federal and prov inc ia l powers." 53 
Apart from these Canadian attempts at a broad sweep across the question 
of the division of powers there have, of course, as in the Austral ian 
case been many others who have pointed to fundamental flaws in the 
division of powers. There seems to be no point in reproducing or 
referring to them a l l f o r t h i s would resu l t merely in repet i t ion of 
points made by Austral ian authors. We might pause to consider what 
the authors of two textbooks on Canadian government have to say about 
the matter. 
R. MacGregor-Dawson's c lass ic textbook through four edi t ions has 
maintained that the p r inc ip le that matters of a general in terest were 
to be given to the Dominion and matters of pa r t i cu la r or local in terest 
should be given to the provinces was not a d i s t r i b u t i o n of powers 
based on any prior reasoning. I t represented, he says, "the 
greatest common measure of agreement that could be formulated among 
conflicting interests at the time,and the primary tes t i t had to 
meet was the approval i t could command from the federat ing colonies".^'^ 
The historical evolution of the d i s t r i b u t i o n has been contrary to 
the intention of the founding fathers he says and adds that a mere 
statement of subject matter is not in i t s e l f decisive in determining 
jurisdiction. John A. Macdonald had overs impl i f ied things when he 
claimed that the fathers "had avoided a l l c o n f l i c t of j u r i s d i c t i o n 
and authority". Some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s Dawson out l ines are -
" . . . The d i s t r i bu t i on of power out l ined above is 
not nearly as simple as the enumeration might 
suggest, and even without touching upon other 
complications (some of which w i l l be discussed 
presently) i t is well a t th i s point to indicate 
a few d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
53. See also The Constitutional Amendment Bill Text and Explanatory Notes, 
(Ottawa: June 1978); Highlights of the Constitution Amendment Bill 1978 
Office of the Prime M i n i s t e r , Ottawa; News Release, Canadian High 
Commission Canberra, June 21s t 1978; The Constitution Amendment Bill 
^978 Explanatory Document^ Ottawa. 
54. R. MacGregor-Dawson, The Government of Canada ( U n i v e r s i t y o f Toronto 
Press, 1967), p.84. 
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'(a) There is in some instances a seeming 
incompatabi l i ty between grants of power 
to the province, for a number of the sub-
sections in sections 91 and 92 apparently 
overlap. This overlap does not necessari ly 
rule out the e f fec t i ve exercise of the 
stated powers by both a u t h o r i t i e s ; fo r 
clearly no actual c o n f l i c t was contemplated 
when the Act was d ra f ted , and i t must be 
interpreted, i f at a l l possib le, in such 
a way that any clash is avoided. 
Other clauses dealing wi th spec i f i c grants 
of power furn ish fu r the r i l l u s t r a t i o n s of 
apparent c o n f l i c t . Thus property and c i v i l 
r ights are given to the province; while banking, 
b i l l s of exchange, promissory notes, patents, 
and copyrights, are given to the Dominion, 
although these would a l l normally be included 
in property and c i v i l r i g h t s . 'These sections 
of enumeration', said Edward Blake, 'must be 
construed so as to avoid a c o n f l i c t ; and th i s is 
to be done by cu t t ing out of whatever may be the 
larger, the more general , the wider, the vaguer 
enumeration of one sec t ion , so much as is 
comprised in some narrower, more d e f i n i t e , more 
precise enumeration in the other section'. As, 
for example, in one section you f i nd 'property 
and c i v i l r igh ts ' , in the other ' b i l l s and notes' ; 
you excise from 'property and c i v i l r i gh ts ' so 
much as is comprised in ' b i l l s and notes. ' The 
same general p r inc ip le of i n te rp re ta t i on has 
been applied to other clauses wi th varying 
results. Thus the narrowly r es t r i c t ed meaning 
which has been attached to the Dominion's 
power over ' the regulat ion of trade and commerce' 
has been derived in no small measure from a 
similar attempt to reconci le and in te rp re t 
dif ferent but re lated parts of sections 91 and 92. 
(b) Legislat ion may be enacted by Dominion or 
province which may on the surface be w i th in i t s 
legal powers, but which may have the actual 
effect of trespassing on the t e r r i t o r y of the 
other. The courts w i l l always look to ' the 
pith and substance' of the s ta tu te and not to 
i ts superf ic ial character, and they w i l l not 
hesitate to declare ultra vires a law which in 
their opinion is only ostensib ly and not in fac t 
within the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the enacting body. 
(c) A par t icu lar subject may not be wholly 
under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of e i the r Dominion or 
province, but cer ta in aspects of the same subject 
may be under the one whi le other aspects are 
under the other. 'Subjects which in one aspect 
and for one purpose f a l l w i th in sect ion 9 2 ' , the 
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"Judicial Committee of the Privy Council frequently 
stated, 'may in another aspect and for another 
purpose fall within section 91'. An outstanding 
illustration is liquor legislation, a subject not 
explicitly mentioned in the British North America 
Act". 55 
J.R. Mallory in a text published in 1954 describes the manner in which 
powers were distributed as follows -
"...The division of powers in sections 91 and 92 of 
the British North America Act gave the federal govern-
ment control of the great apparatus of development -
the massive capital equipment which formed the bones 
of the economy, from canals and railroads to light-
houses and harbours. With it went the two sovereign 
functions of government - defence and the currency. 
Thus the full armed power of the state was 
centralized (with the obvious lesson of the American 
Civil War in mind) and, what is more important in 
peacetime, the control of banking, credit, currency, 
and bankruptcy, in fact of the whole range of 
relationships essential to the formation of capital 
was given to the Dominion, The rigid exclusion 
of the provinces from this field and the use of power 
of disallowance to protect the sanctity of contract 
in the years before 1890 show how important this 
step was. Its effect was to exclude the provinces 
from interfering with the direction, control, and 
operation of the economy. 
It is worth remembering that this division was one of 
principle. The Fathers of Confederation thought 
that they were giving to the Dominion control over the 
entire field of economic development, leaving to the 
provinces only such functions as were exclusively of 
local concern. The need for precision in statutory 
draftsmanship meant that they had to state in 
particular terms what they thought the division of 
powers was, and inevitably their specific definition 
reflected the understanding of the business of 
government in a mid-nineteenth century state which 
was largely agrarian, staple-producing, and non-
urban on the eve of a period when the functions of 
government were beginning to grow rapidly and to 
assume a variety of novel forms. It was just as 
inevitable, therefore, in view of the method of 
statutory interpretation which the courts were to 
apply to the British North America Act, that those 
actual enumerated functions should survive the division 
in principle". 56 
^^ - ibid., pp. 90-98. 
^6. J.R. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada 
(University of Toronto Press, 1954), p.25. 
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Apart from wr i t ings aimed at a consideration of the fundamental 
problems caused by the d iv i s ion of powers, a l l the other aspects which 
surfaced from the Austral ian l i t e r a t u r e are present as well in the 
Canadian, such as the expenditure-revenue connection, the l eg i s l a t i on -
administration dilemma, considerations of local government and 
regionalism, etc. There is also a s im i la r array of attempts to delve 
into particular funct ional areas of government to see how the d iv is ion 
of powers frustrates government a c t i v i t y in those areas including 
education, offshore resources, hea l th , and most importantly for 
Canadians - cul ture. 
As a f inal comment about Canadian l i t e r a t u r e we might observe 
that there is no shortage of suggestions fo r a rearrangement of the 
division of powers and, indeed, Canadians have given much more 
consideration to th is question than have Austra l ians. They seem to 
see i t as a major vehicle fo r the a l t e ra t i on of the balance of power 
between the national and sub-national levels of government, whereas 
Australians seem, from t h e i r l i t e r a t u r e and prac t ica l experience 
at least, much more inc l ined to regard the d iv i s ion of powers as 
unchangeable and place more emphasis on other mechanisms for a l te r ing 
the inter-level power balance, 
Canadians also state qui te emphatically that the need for in ter -
governmental conferences, condi t ional grants, and intergovernmental 
agreements are the outcome of a f au l t y d i v i s ion of powers - fau l ty in 
the sense of being awkwardly constructed and also in the sense that 
the division cannot contain in any precise way the growing a c t i v i t i e s 
of each level of government. I t may wel l be that th is directness of 
approach, ab i l i t y and wi l l ingness to i d e n t i f y such causal ef fects 
stems from the fact that the Canadian founding fathers in the i r wisdom 
or otherwise, actually l i s t e d heads of power fo r both the Dominion 
and provincial levels. Aus t ra l i a , having a cons t i tu t ion which 
specifically l i s t s head of power fo r only one level (the national 
level) has been less inc l ined to f i nd fundamental contradict ions 
staring them in the face. 
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F E D E R A L I S M P O L I C Y 
1 POWER, RESPONSIBILITY AND PEOPLE: 
Liberal and National Country Parties view as the main 
hective of government the creation of a society and an 
° ronment in which individuals may best fulf i l them-
selves. 
If this is to be achieved, individuals must be free to parti-
oate fully in government and the forms of government 
ust be decentralised to permit maximum response and 
involvement. Government must be brought as close as 
possible to the people. 
Accordingly, the Liberal and National Country Parties 
wholy support the concept of Federalism in which there 
are three areas of government — Federal, State and local — 
and in which the powers and functions are distributed to 
achieve continuous response and to provide an effective 
barrier against centralist authoritarian control. 
Inacrowded world of massive and growing complexities 
of laws and regulations, individual freedom is increasingly 
threatened unless the nature and shape of our democratic 
institutions adapt themselves to provide safeguards. 
Federalism, therefore, is not merely a structural concept. 
Its principal justification is a philosophical one. It aims to 
prevent dangerous concentration of power in a few hands. 
In so doing, it provides a guarantee of political and individual 
freedom. 
2, WORLD TRENDS: 
The Liberal and National Country Parties are keen to accept 
the challenge to achieve major and continuing democratic 
reforms. We are heartened by the significant advances in 
effective decentralisation already achieved in countries 
such as Canada, West Germany and America where centra-
list philosophies have been rejected as dangerous, inefficient 
and divisive. We are hastened in our endeavours by the 
onrush of centralist legislation and decision-making of the 
Whitlam Government. 
possible. There is equally a need to cater for those many 
functions which overlap governments and which demand 
co-operation and goodwill. 
What is needed is not merely a patching-up of the currently 
degenerated Federal system. We must recognise and provide 
for the growing demands of individuals and community 
groups to be heard and to participate meaningfully in the 
democratic process. 
4. RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: 
If government is to be effective, it must be accountable 
for its actions. It should raise the moneys which it spends. 
A practical solution to effective and responsible government 
must incorporate the following principles: 
1. It must be practical and long-term. 
2. It must give the States access to a fair tax-sharing 
programme. 
3. It must protect and maintain the position of the 
less populous States viz-a-viz New South Wales and 
Victoria, by providing an adequate equalisation 
mechanism. 
4. It must provide the minimum of inconvenience or 
additional burden to the community. 
5. It must maintain the authority of the Common-
wealth over economic management. 
6. A method of continuous review and up-dating must 
be provided. 
7. Provision must be made for the determination of 
functions, together with a mechanism for enforcing 
that determination. 
8. Local government must be given clearly defined func-
tions and a known share of national revenues. 
9. The taxpayer must be able to identify clearly his 
individual payments to Commonwealth, State and 
local authorities. 
3, VITAL PRINCIPLE: 
All experience, both in Australia and in other countries, 
underlines this vital principle: 
If effective government, geared to the needs of the 1980s 
and beyond, is to be achieved . . . if the great issues of 
national and local concern such as education, health, social 
welfare, housing and urban development are to receive 
maximum intelligent attention . . . if all our resources 
'"eluding human talents and local knowledge are to be 
'Wectively harnessed . . . if innovation, diversity and 
'"laginative reforms are to be encouraged . . . then we 
™st restructure our forms and institutions of government 
!" °"'attitudes of mind to achieve co-operation not con-
'™. partnership and not domination. 
^^ ''t'ue national concern to be achieved and maximised, 
^ must be done through a partnership effort by all forms 
dJ*""™" ' ' Canberra should not meddle with power-
9ty hands at levels where local knowledge and talents 
'^"P«^ form so much better. 
gover^nm^  ^ ^ ' ^ ' ° ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ' " ^ the functions of each form of 
^"t. particularly where such clear definition is 
5. A SUITABLE TAX: 
The question of a major tax or taxes suitable for revenue-
sharing purposes will be under constant review. 
At this moment, personal income tax is virtually self-
selective. 
The States will not be immutably tied to any one tax or 
taxes as their mam source of revenue. As trends in taxation 
change, the States and, indeed, local authorities will be free 
to argue for appropriate changes. 
6. TAX REFORM: 
We acknowledge the severity and distortion of existing 
income tax rates and are pledged to reform them. These 
reforms can be undertaken during the transition period and 
beyond without prejudice to the States. 
The Liberal and National Country Parties, in co-operation 
with the States, will undertake a thorough survey of all 
existing forms of taxation and charges currently imposed 
throughout Australia, with a view to progressive reform 
and rationalisation. 
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7 REVENUE-SHARING PROPOSALS: 
(ll Permanent Share of I ncome Tax -
The Liberal and National Country Parties propose to 
ensure the States permanent access to revenue-raising 
through personal income tax. In so doing, the existing 
rights of the less populous States will be fully pro-
tected. No State will be disadvantaged and the rela-
tive positions of the States will be preserved. 
The Commonwealth will be the sole collecting agency. 
There will be a standard tax form, embracing uniform 
concessional allowances. Commonwealth and State 
taxes will be separately identified on one assessment 
so that the taxpayer can see the amount being levied 
by each form of government. 
The new system is intended to ensure that the States 
will have substantially the financial capacity to meet 
their responsibilities. 
In exercising their revenue raising powers the States 
will be expected to accept responsibility to work in 
parallel with and not in negation of the overall econo-
mic management policies of the Commonwealth. 
(iv) Local Government -
The Liberal and National Country Parties also propose 
to earmark a fixed percentage of personal income tax 
for distribution through the States to local govern-
ment. This percentage will be shown on the tax form. 
The money is intended for two distinct purposes; 
(i) a per capita grant to ALL local government bodies, 
with a "weighted" formula in contemplation 
and (ii) an equalisation or "topping up" grant to be 
distributed through State Grants Commissions. 
This will be a vital new reform for local government. 
Under these proposals, municipalities and shires 
will have revenues of known dimensions to assist 
forward budgetting. At the same time, they will 
have very much greater independence of action. 
Artificial regions will NOT be forced on local authori-
ties from Canberra. Local bodies will be free to 
establish formal or informal groupings from time to 
time for particular functional purposes, but regions 
will not be used by the Commonwealth as centralist 
instruments to by-pass the States, to amalgamate 
areas or to impose Commonwealth policies. 
Transition to Flexibility -
A transition period will be provided, involving two 
main stages: 
Stage I: A calculation will be made of the percentage 
which in the previous year general revenue grants to 
the States bore to total personal income tax collec-
tions in that year. That percentage will be used to 
ascertain the share of personal income tax to the States 
in Year 1, and will also take into account the transfer 
of such Section 96 grants as should be absorbed into 
this base figure. In so doing, the relativities of the 
equalisation grants to the less populous States will be 
preserved. 
Stage II: In order to increase the budgetary indepen-
dence, responsibility and flexibility of the States, it is 
proposed that as soon as possible each State government 
will have discretion to impose a surcharge or allow a 
rebate on the total personal income tax of that State. 
Economic Management -
The proposals allow the Commonwealth to maintain 
and pursue its role in economic management. A whole 
armoury of fiscal and monetary weapons is available 
to the-government. It is generally accepted that the 
use of personal income tax for revenue-sharing pur-
poses will not weaken the Commonwealth's capacity. 
Apart from overall tax reform, the Commonwealth 
will retain the right to alter Commonwealth income 
tax upwards or downwards by surcharge or rebate. 
To ensure full understanding and effective co-opera-
tion, the Commonwealth will convene pre-Budget 
meetings of the Premiers' Conference in addition to 
other regular meetings of that body. 
8. EQUALISATION GRANTS: 
It is intended that the principle of equalisation and the 
current advantages accruing to the less populous States 
viz-a-viz New South Wales and Victoria shall be sustained 
at all stages. 
9. GRANTS COMMISSION: 
The Grants Commission will be fully retained with regard to 
its existing State functions. However, the responsibilities for 
local government inquiries will be transferred to State Grants 
Commissions. 
10. SPECIFIC PURPOSE GRANTS: 
The Whitlam Government has used its powers under Section 
96 of the Commonwealth Constitution to achieve its 
centralist goals. These grants now dominate State revenue. 
The coalition parties are convinced that national objectives 
can be fully asserted and social reforms achieved and main-
tained with a more selective use of such grants and without 
heavy-handed interference and duplication of functions. 
Many of the existing Section 96 grants are now part of well-
established and universally accepted programmes within the 
States. The moneys for such programmes could be trans-
ferred to general purpose revenue reimbursement and 
ultimately absorbed in the States' income tax revenue. 
Under such circumstances, the programmes would continue 
in full without prejudice. A Liberal-National Country Party 
Federal Government would seek agreement from the States 
that this would be so, prior to making the transfer. 
If a future initiative should prove necessary to maintain or 
to increase the programme, the Government would retain 
the initiative to invoke an appropriate special purpose 
grant. We would use such grants, where necessary, to ini-
tiate programmes in agreed areas of national need, to encou-
rage innovation and to meet special situations. 
512, 
F E D E R A L I S M P O L I C Y 
ntinuing review of all programmes would be main-
• I bv the relevant Federal Minister ond through him 
'Th the appropriate Council of Federal and State Mini-
suitable circumstancss, the principle of block grants 
I hich substantially increase the f lexibi l i ty and initiative 
oltheStates) would be used. 
such techniques, true national concern and involvement 
Jn be achieved far more effectively than at present. 
Indeed, Section 96 will be used as it v^as originally intended 
It should be used, namely to make grants to the States for 
snecial purposes and not to make inroads into the constitu-
tional responsibilities of the States. 
II COUNCIL FOP. I N T E R - G O V E R I M M E N T 
' RELATiONS: 
Asavital institution of co-operation within the various 
forms of government, we propose to establish a Council 
for Inter-government Relations. 
This will be an independent statutory body of major status. 
Its membership will include nominees to Federal, State and 
local governments and also a number of citizens. 
The Council will have wide-ranging advisory and investiga-
tory powers. By refe'-ence from either Federal, Sta^c or 
local government, it will exannine in depth the problems 
which emerge between the various branches of government 
and will consider the definition and rationalisation of 
functions. 
Its recommendations and reports will be available to all 
areas of government. 
12. P R E M I E R S ' C O M F E R E N C E : 
With the remcivai of the revenue reimbursement battle the 
Premiers' Conference wil l become a more realistic forum 
for general debate, particularly on broad economic matters 
and upon issues developed by the Council for inter-govern-
ment Relations. 
One of the first acts of the new government would be to 
convene a Premiers' Conference to discuss the implemen-
tation of the financial implications of this policy. 
13 . M I N I S T E R S FOR F E D E R A L A F F A I R S : 
The appointment by the non-Labor State Governments of 
special Ministers for Federal Affairs is a clear recognition 
by those States of the mounting problems and conflicts 
within the Federal structure. 
The establishment by the Federal Opposition of a Shadow 
Minister for Federalism and Inter-government Relations is 
a further acknowledgement of those trends and a practical 
desire to ensure a continuing mechanism for day-to-day 
co-operation and consultation. 
14. O T H E R M E C H A N I S M S : 
The Liberal and National Country Parties propose to 
acfiieve greater co-operation, including the strengthen-
ing of the functions of the various Councils of Ministers 
and consultative bodies (e.g., Australian Agricultural 
Council, Australian Minerals Council, etc). 
Our aim will be to maintain and assert national conce; n 
and to stimulate initiati^'e, while eliminating unnecessary 
overlapping, waste and interference. 
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tion of this coiinLr-y's federa!-prG\'incial 
iT.Iaaonsliip. It ii t h u s the pu rpose of this 
RE\"ir,\v to u )• to th row some useful l ight 
a n d persj>e''tivc on w h a t has now ac tu-
ally been acinevccl, first througJi a brief 
stones in the long h 's tory of inter- t r ac ing of s ignir icant histrjrical back-
a series of long and somet imes 
ions negotiations, the federal aivJ 
incial governments achieved agree-
it last December on w h a t is un-
btedly one of the most i m p o r t a n t 
jnmental financial a r rangements in 
ffluntry. The agreement, which has 
11 incorporated into federal leg-
ion, and took effect on April 1, 
linues a basic structure of h a r m o n -
g r c u n d , a n d t h t n t h r o u g h a discussion 
of souie of the key issues involved.* 
Cooper (if ion In (he TCLX System 
T h e present sysiern for levying a n d 
(initions and tax collecting ar- c o l l e c t i n g i n c o m e taxes in C a 
emeiits that was Ijeg'Ui over 3 J years 
it also preserves the e labora te 
tem of e q u a l i z a t i o n p a y m . e n t s 
ctedtowards the less fa\'oured pr(i\-
s;there arc rather complicated mea-
n a a a 
c a n be t raced back in large pa r t lo 
t h e \ \ ' a r t ime Tax R e n t a l Agreemen t s 
r eached Ijy t h e Go \ ' e rnmen t of C a n a d a 
::nd t h e provinces in 1941. T h o s e agree-
miCnts themselves represented a k ind of 
s to assure the relative stabil i ty of second efl'ort in this a rea as they followed 
lincial government revenues; a n d a n abor t ive federal -provincia l confer-
is particularly noteworthy in this ence t h a t i iad been cal led to consider the 
ance) it provides a major a n d m u c h - fa r - reach ing proposa ls of the Rcnveli-
dcd disentangling of tlrj rcsponsibi- Sirois C o m m i s s i o n . | W h a t emerged was 
Sand finaii'.ing for th r r t major so- a p r a g m a t i c a d j u s t m e n t to the prospec-
Iprograms m vvhn;;T there has been tive large recjuirements of the fecleta! 
wmal sharing of costs iHtwcen the g o v e r n m e n t for financing the Second 
™ and pinviaciiJ go--er n m c n t s : \Vcdd War. In ilu- l ight ol' previous 
ndy Hospital hisuranee, MccUcue 
iPosl-Secondary Eda.;aiion. 
Tiicnrwlegislation, wliic!) -;oes hv the 
f Jding title of il,e I'rdnairri'nnci^l 
ml haniinnenis and Ksiahii^hrd pro-
««/'iw;«^.4f/, /.;;/- is olr . iouslv a 
•'yramprchensive and complex affair. 
™"«ignilicaiuxTn;iv also have been 
*"«! by llvpoiiiie:d rhetoric which 
.i;ialmost inescapable feature of ne-
«i'Mis aim.,,.; eleven sets of ooliti-
''s^ •^'•ll as hy t!u-deeper oo'iilical 
„„ '!"!'•>' i'--'v.- i„,,.|, rai.sed !>> last III;' 
„,.,,, 'on in 0 , I C 1 H T . Vet t!ie 
"l.iblislied 
" • ' " • ' • • l i l i M l s u l u , 
; n . r m s iii;U can 
\*-i;liiii .mv IV.Ie-al s tale 
l-'eiaiion; and in 
'•'•^"•'';silK-,;ew C;an;\(li;Mi 
^ " ' ^ ' " ' ! ' • " - ' - i „ , l i e | „ „ g . v , . l a -
8"i'diH,iiiv 
friiinii 
' T h e p i c t u r e \ \ h i ; l i a Ra-irw c a n give ol' i!iis 
corapK N tWCTi. is iii'( cssari i) a broad-bru.<ih o n e . ! 'm 
rt-;ii:lcr inu- ics icd iji i l iillcr discuss: . .n of tlie 
backgroin. id is n - l c i n d lo ,-\ Mil t .on '^ lovrr , J . 
K a r v c y 'Vr i y .iiid D o n a l d !. J ' cach , 77;.' Fi^mnrni^ 
of Cartaduin Triirrnlifn: Tlir Ir-s! Iiiii:i!!,il rears, ('aii:',-
di . in i'.ix F o u n d a t i o n , Ti'.ror.lo, 19.)'); to JaiTic?; H . 
L-ynn /•'nlfir.'-l'inriiu'iul Fisrnl R:r:i!i!ini, ,i s t u d y for 
ill-.- Royal CaMiipnission on r;K:iti(>n, Quecn ' . s 
Pr i r . ' c r , (>-la\va, 19!i7; toCiroiL-c 1'-. C^a.-icr, C.cna-
;ii:tii (jnilithnn.i ChuiLs Since 'S'lil,! War ll. ' l : ;nad ian 
T.ix l ' '(>inu'ation. T U D I U . ' , l!)7i; . ;nd in Civ p.^i . t is 
on lVd(i-)l-pro\ iiici.ii r t l i i t ions t o n U i i n r d in ihc 
jiioi i-i-d/ij!',s ol llu- a n n u a l r o n \ e u ' , inns l a i d by i b r 
(^i ; i . i i l ian l . i \ i ' ou i i da i i on . K f c c n t d c v c l o p n i o n l s 
l i . iw bccT, c iM 1. (1 i;! m a l l ri.'.l publ isba-d l)\' ui .uiy 
o f t l i f i ; i ' \ri nn i ' -n l s i r , \o ! \c ( l . 
•|'l'li>-; (a)nni ' . i ss ion, foi inaUy k n o w n as t h e Royal 
Cainini ission ou ! )oni inMin- l ' ro \ incia l Rc-l.ilions, 
h a d b ' l ll si i u p as a result .i! ihc lina.uciai siLtins" 
ol' i h c l'.):Uis. I s u c o i u n i c n d a l i o n s u i ic no t ae-
Cipl i 'd bill ils i i scarcb . .\ui\ a ! i ,d \ s i s l i a w ni-
IhiCi" cd niiK'i' iaii I' t l i inLiiu; Oil l(-(li-i;\l-pio. u u a a l 
i c l a l i ons . 
•^'""" «K|,„„, , 
f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l d i s a g r e e m e n t s a n d 
provincial concerns not to forgo p e r m a -
nen t ly their r ights to the tax fields in-
volved, these first ag reemen t s were ex-
plici ty t e m p o r a r y in n a t u r e , schedu led 
to expire after the end of the war. 
T h u s , for a t ime , all provinces surren-
dered the i r cons t i tu t iona l r ight to im-
pose persona l i n c o m e taxes a n d direct 
taxes on corpora t ions . In re tu rn , the 
C o \ ' e r n m e n t of C a n a d a m a d e ren ta l 
p a y m e n t s , u n d e r se\'eral op t ions wh ich 
took some accoun t of the special finan-
cial neerJs of those provinces vvliose r c e -
n u e bases a n d d e b t loads \sTre i m d c r 
p a r t i c u l a r s train. 
A successor set of tax ren ta l a r r ange -
men t s , m u c h like the one reached d u r -
ing the emergency cont i i t ions of WBV-
t ime , was nego t i a t ed in 1947, a n d w i th 
some la ter revisions it lasted un t i l 1937. ' 
T h e s e t a x r e n t a l a g r e e m e n t s a g a i n 
were r eached as a second try after some 
of the proviiices h a d rejected a wide-
r a n g i n g set of federal proposals jMeso't-
cd m 1945-46 at federal-provincial con-
ferences on p o s t w a r recons t ruc t ion . 
Jn pa r t , t h e t h rus t b e h i n d tire changes 
ac tua l ly m a d e a t this t ime related to the 
new t h i n k i n g t h a t h a d developed a b o u t 
the act ive use of fiscal policy as a key 
i n s t r u m e n t in m a i n t a i n i n g a high !c\-ei 
of e m p l o y m e n t , i h i n k i n ^ w h i c h ' u -
c h i d e d a p p r o p r i a t e var ia t ions in iax 
rates as a task for a centra! goverriUK nt. 
T h e r e was federal eoncei ii, too, tha i ilic 
real benefits aeliieved unde r the w a r l i m c 
system by w;!\ of s t ;n ida id i / i i ig (Ulini-
t lons a n d t.^x b.ascs ;aross li;e o u n l r y 
shou ld no t be diss ipated. 
'I'hesi- rental (•.ayments \'yei'e ni.uic to 
, i g i ( - ing provinces on ilie l)asis ol ilirir 
(dioice oi' srvriad op t ions ivis.al (u, :hl-
I'eicnt mixinrc.; of | .er ia.[ii(;'. paMuents 
a n d of a nieasuie ol ' l ist.d c.ip.ua!'.' 
(i.e., the pivXiueiiveiiess of the ri'veini;-
M i i - i ; ' 
• i \ ' ; ' t i l l l a . i r ! . - l i i . ix l i . iM- h i s ! n i l o i t r 111 . - l i i i r i i ' i i i n . i l i . ipj i l i ' , . i l i . ' i i .11 ' i i^ I ' . t i w i a i ill l i v . - - u u i i ; ' . I n 
''a-.MK:;; i'>-i'.\K rMi.N i, C I M - K M , ( a i K :i, r i i i : u \ N K ta- N I ) \ ' . \ s c i riiA ! o k ( ).\ r o \i ai li'.'i. f '>N M ' \ 
- | . i 
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banc which the proviiuc wa.s Kurrcndcr-
IJUr)-However, not fill provinces wcie par-
lien to lh<'s<' af^reenieiibs. Cinefjcr never 
entered inh^ sueii an agn-ei/ieni; and 
Oiilario only (iileied into one in \'.)'.')2 
when an additional nime favcMrrable 
option was provided to it. 
P(;xpil(;Honie altraelivc' features, these 
agreements IKVCI seveiai drawbacks, In 
particular the ijrovinecs which signed 
up, and tliose whicii did not, could 
receive quite diliering treatment, iie-
twecn 1947 and V.}'')2, for exanipk:, nei-
tlier Ontario nor C.hirdx-c iin()o;;ed their 
own personal incoine taxes.* Yet neither 
province (nor their ti-ix|>ay(:rs) icceivcd 
any compensation for leaving this field 
as effectively open to the feflerai govern-
ment as had the agrc(;ing i^rovinees. 
After much political barg-aining, a 
major redesign was therefore marie with 
the Federal-Provincial Tax Sharing Act 
of 1957. These neg(jl)atif)ns px/duced a 
jystem which bcMis much elof.er leaeiu-
blancc to liic present one than did the; 
old tax rental agreements. The big step 
taken was the clear-cut dist inct ion 
drawn between tax rental payinents (to 
provinces coordinating tln-ir tax bases 
and collection systems with those of the 
Government of (Canada,) and federal 
equalization fi^iynients lo less favourcxl 
provinces. 
TWo alternative arrangements weie 
devised to faciliiale the joint oc; upalion 
of the major direct lax fields in v,'hich 
both federal und proviticial governnients 
have constitutional rights. Under the lax 
collection scheme the federal govern-
ment paid directly to each agreeing 
province (lirec "standard taxes"-lO'/p of 
federal personal income tax, 9% of cor-
porate taxable incornef and half of led-
oral estate taxes on its residenis. While 
the federal government administered tax 
collections for tlicse provinces frcte of 
charge, it also fixed their tax nit<'s and 
defined all the framework of their tax 
systems. l''or provinces which did not 
take part in the special tax collection 
lystem, the federal government |)n)vidcd 
for abatements corresponding t(» the 
"itandard laxt-,s," i,e, it irdiucd the sched-
ule of fedeiai lax rales iniposeil on their 
rciidents by tlu; a|)propriiiie amounts, 
Equrilization payinents (diseus.sed in 
moitdclail later) were upeeilieally sepa-
rated from these tax-shiuing arrange-
ments, Thus a pi'ovineial govenimenl 
ftiid ilH n-sidenls were as well ol" if the 
I'liill lIu'Ni' two |inis'ini'cn ri IVaiiii'd IVoiii lillini', 
[l'i« I'l'ilili' lii'ld prnvidi'ii a «li'ikini; iiuliiation of 
liiiiv iiuuii till' llnaiii'ial drniands on laoviiifiiil 
|iavonnii'ni» hnvr i;io\vii niiicc ilie lirsl /car.s ol i lu ' 
|iii"lu,ii|icrioil. 
tNalc tliiil lliiit Irail.slW' u;,s H'l'' of ciii'iviiraii' 
l'"'lll», mil ul'|a,'<i'S on (ni'iioialc iiKilil.s, 
province did not lai.e part in the- fe(l(i;d 
eolleetion an;uig/ar)eiiis a:s if it did; but 
against the (Veedfjm lo :;'•{ ils own rales 
and its own tax schedules a province had 
to weigh tlu; cost of setting up ils own 
eolleetion appar'alns and the extra bur-
den on its n;sidenis. 
C)ji<liec took full advantage of I he 
abalenierit (;(Ie)<:d and .set up its own 
com))l(-te (;(;lleelion system, Ontnric; en-
l<;red into a eolh-elion agreement only 
in respec;t of the personal ineomi! lax, 
lliougji it also adhered lo tlic rules that 
had been worked out by the federal 
goverrunenl and the agreeing pixjvinces 
for al local ing corpora te income a mongst 
jurisdictions. And afier some revisions to 
lhes(; rules, Quebec moved sever-al years 
later to rules which were for rno,sl pur-
poses th<! same as those apjiliefl by the 
other CJanadiaii jiirisdielicms,* T h u s 
CJanada has man;iged to avoid some of 
the manifold problems such as "discrimi-
nation, ex( essive costs of tax litigation, 
cosily er)mpliane.e and victimization of 
exposed businesses and non(X)inpliance 
by otlx'r businesses,"twhlcli lack of uni-
foirnily of stale corporate, income taxes 
has [jrodirced in the United Stal(;s, 
'i'lu; ,syKtern cstablislied in the 1957 
l(;gisl:ition has been arn(;nd(x! quite a 
bii over the twenty years which have 
followed, mostly in the, direction of a 
signific'uil fuiilier withdrawal of the 
fedei-al government iVoin the personal 
income lax field, Thi,s federal with-
drawal has undoubK'dly not been as big 
as many of the pr'ovinces would have 
liked, but it lias nevertheless helped lo 
accommoda te the provincial govciii-
menls in their effoits lo meet the lar-ge 
and growing demands for provincial and 
local expenditure < har'aeteristic of the 
postwar period. As well, pr-ovinces which 
lake advantage of the; federal govc;rn-
itxuit's willingness to administer the in-
come lax sysiern for thcni now have a 
good deal more flexibility than they did 
two dcxades ago. 
Much of the progress in these din:c-
tioiis came with the lOti'i Act and with 
furtlicr negotiations in the years imme-
diately following. As a res.ilt of the llUi'i 
Act (which <'ontinued IIK; pattern of 
renegotiations of feder'al-provincial fis-
cal arr'angemenls at five-year inler'vals), 
the leder.'il governmeni reduced its (ns'n 
share of total person,il income tax col-
leclions further. Tiie stnndai-d ;ibate-
•f>iic»t II, Sinilli ",\lliK'atln,i; In I'luvaiiecN the 
TaNablc' llieomi' of (loi |ioi',iii(ins; 1 low ihc fed-
eral I'liivincial iMIocilion ftliles I'.volved," (aula-
(lian lk\ JiiHiiial, Scplcinlxa-Oclobci' l!l7(i„ pp, 
,'"i IV/71 ijivcs a delaileil liiMory orilcvi4opni(aus in 
IIILH a i d . 
tjaiiics ;\, Ma.wscll and j . Kichard .Aronson, 
l''iiiii}ii'iii!i Sliiti' mill IMIII (liii'i'inini'iils, '.M idii ion, 
rii'ookii\tjs lii.sliuilioii, WashiiiiiUai, 1),(1,, 11)77, 
1) I•','•), ' 
nifnt of |)eisoria! income tax lo pro 
inees (wiiic 1; had riser; fnnn 10 ta 1 
percariage points in I9")8 iflera < harr 
(;f gov< rriinerU al the f(a|e,;i| level) n^  
from \") perfcnl to UJ jjcr'cent jji i!(i,. 
and fuillicr in(,reases (;f oiic );eree)ila:. 
ponit a year wax: scheduled for the nc^ 
four years, bringing the total planoe 
abatement lo 20 percentage points ; 
i"e<!er,al [xrsonal in.;ome lax by I')t<' 
And following another ehan/^e of go> 
ern men I a I the federal lev(;l it wr.s ;i 
ranged lo achl an additional |je,rm,ri)e! 
two pereeniage points to the abatemei 
in each of lf)G.^ ; and ]')(>('), bringing il i 
twenty-four percentage points in l'.i()(i 
In 1962 also there was a formal an 
partly symbolic move away Irom a la 
rental system which had made it dill 
cult for provinces to set their own rati 
Under the new arrangements, the (in 
ernment of Canada continued to abai 
to the provinces a specified ;ind slarrdai 
percentage of a notional I'cderal bas^ 
personal income lax. The federal g(i 
ernment collected for itself this notion, 
tax less the standard abalements rnad 
to the provinces (but plus certain su 
charges which were not part of feder; 
basic pei'sonal income lax). The fi-den 
governmeni also collected personal ii 
come taxes for the nine provinces whi( 
had collection agreements with it ; 
rates similarly specified as a percental' 
of the national federal basic person; 
income tax. But for the first time, tl' 
levels of taxes to be applied lo rcsideni 
of participating provinces were to be s( 
by the province in question. Thus agix. 
ing proviitces were free to sc; their ow 
tax I'ates, though the.se rates v,'ere i^  
ed'eet applied to personal income a 
defined ibr fedei-al tax pu.'jiosfs and to | 
.schedule laid down by the federal gov 
ernment. At the same time com'parabl 
ariangements were made in resi.)eci c 
corpoi"ate income taxes. 
Only two of the pr-ovinc(;s took ([uie 
advantage of ihriir n<-w ability to chaui, 
ta.\ rates while .staying wilhin the l'e<l( i 
tax collection system. Most of ihem, fi 
the shorter-term, pr(;l'errcd to devi-lc 
other lax fields. In the last few y<.ui 
iiowever, most provinces have varu i 
iheirlax r-ates. Now only ()iii;i!io, on! e 
the nine pi-ovinccs using the persor',' 
income ta,< collection facililies ol if 
fedei-al go\eirnner\l, has not done M 
And most of the pi-ovinccs for which ih 
feder-algoveraunent collects corporate m 
come taxes hiive adjusted these rates ;o. 
Since I9()2 there have 1H-II no funic 
wholly Mireondilional Iransfers i;l' "'•' 
room" to the provinces. An addition 
four pereeniage jioiiils of personal i!i 
c.orne lax and one ixrini ol' corpora;!.'; 
income were made a\'lilable to all i/f '' 
inees in 19li7, l)m liiis \sa.s related ' 
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d-cost spending in the field of Post-
Jjeondary Education. With the 1972 
]^however, there was a change in the 
basis upon which provincial personal 
income tax is calculated. From 1972, 
provincial income taxes were express-
-gjsa percentage of actual federal basic 
'*sonal income tax due (rather than 
^culated on the basis of a notional 
federal basic tax from which aba t e -
ments were subsequently subtracted). 
In part this change was to get around a 
possible implication of the abatement 
p^rocedure that there was a "standard" 
and therefore especially app ropr i a t e 
levd for provincial taxes. Also, in the 
wake of the Report of the Royal Com-
mission on Taxation (the Carter Com-
mission), the federal government's White 
Paper on Tax Reform and the long 
drawn-out process of discussion, a major 
reform of the income tax was instituted 
at the beginning of 1972. And to pro-
duce equivalent amounts of provincial 
revenue a technical rate adjustment was 
required. Thus the old standard federal 
abatement of 28 percentage points of 
federal basic personal income tax be-
came a provincial tax rate of 30.5% of 
federal tax payable from 1972 to 1976.* 
In 1972, also, it became possible for 
provinces using the tax collection facili-
ties of the federal government to make a 
variety of changes to the structure of the 
personal income taxes they impose. 
Thus a province may now impose cer-
tain kinds of special surchaiges or re-
bates on taxes above or below specified 
levds. And five of the nine provinces 
currently using the federal collection 
anangements for the personal incom.e 
tax have supplementary arrangements 
for special tax credit schemes, used for 
such purposes as cITsetting the regres-
sivity of provincial retail sales taxes. This 
kind of arrangement adds to the diver-
sity of the pei\sonal income tax across the 
country. But it satisfies the desires of 
provindal governments for flexibility to 
meet their own policy priorities without 
requiring additional filings by individu-
als or costing the Government of Can-
ada money or manoeuvrability. 
Rmnue Guarantees 
In all the tax agreem.ents made since 
1941 the federal government has pro-
vided some assurance of a reveime lloor 
to the provinces. In tlieir- modern form, 
Wi revenue stabilization efforts date 
W to the 19C7 arrangements. Over the 
yw'-sihis program has been extended in 
wopeand with the 1972 Act thei-e was 
N i l ? ! '','•''''''••• ' " " i'"-l>"l'-H Ml llu- L'i! 
'""l'nii(m,,|„n.,„„^,,._^ •i.:i:); of Icd-
provision for a deficiency payment to 
any province whose total revenues from 
all sources except the revenue stabiliza-
tion program itself fell below the level 
reached in the previous year (after an 
adjustment to exclude the effects of any 
changes in tax rates). Since then, how-
ever, there has been enormous upheaval 
in world oil markets, and a good deal of 
volatility in commodity markets gener-
ally. In consequence, a special proviso 
has been inserted in the 1977 version 
of the Act limiting the federal govern-
ment's exposure in the event of reduc-
tions in a province's revenues from natu-
ral resources. It is perhaps worth noting, 
however, that the federal government 
has never had to tnake any payments to 
provinces under the revenue stabiliza-
tion program since its introduction in 
1967. . 
T h e a r r angemen t now specifically 
known as the Revenue Guarantee dates 
back only to the major changes in the 
tax structure introduced in 1972. To 
encourage a continuing national uni-
formity of the basic income tax system, 
the federal government guaranteed that 
no province would have smaller total 
receipts from personal and corporate 
income taxes under the new tax struc-
ture than it would have had under the 
previous one. The original offer was a 
guarantee for three years but after nego-
tiations with the provinces it was ex-
tended for a full five-year period. This 
guarantee was later expanded to com-
pensate provinces for the cost of follow-
ing most federal changes to the income 
tax (a major exception being made for 
the indexing cf the personal income tax 
structure that began in 1974). Current 
estimates are that payments to the prov-
inces under the Revenue Guai"antee in 
respect of the 1976 tax year will amount 
to ai-ound S870 millions, about half of 
this due to changes in the federal tax 
structure since 1972. 
Not surprisingly, the futui'e of this 
Revenue Guarantee was a major issue in 
the latest round of negotiations on the 
new federal-provincial a r rangements . 
The GoverniTient of Canada argued that 
the Revenue Guarantee had explicitly 
been for a period of transition to the 
reformed tax system and that the prov-
inces now had the experience needed to 
fix rates at the levels needed to produce 
revenue in line with their requirements. 
The provincial governments, by con-
trast, were naturally very inteirsted in 
these unconditional funds being pro-
vided on a continuing basis so as to limit 
their recour-sc to explicit taxatiori of tlicir 
own residents. Initially the provinces 
formed a common front lo seek as com-
pensation for the end of the Cuiaiantee 
an abatement of fi)ur ixTcent of fedei-al 
personal income tax equalized to the 
yield in the highest province (i.e. with 
supplementary cash payments to nine 
provinces to make the per capita value 
of such an abatement in every prov-
ince equal to its value in the wealthiest 
province). 
The final result was one of the more 
interesting displays of public bargaining 
in Canada in recent years. In the end a 
last-minute compromise was reached. 
The federal government surrendered two 
percentage points of its personal income 
tax, half in cash and half as tax room 
(both equalized to the national average). 
The federal government presented this 
transfer as being in final settlement of all 
outstanding issues, but there can be no 
doubt that the Revenue Guarantee was 
the most important of these issues. A.s 
well, the federal government committed 
itself to pay for losses in provincial in-
come tax i-evenue arising when a prov-
ince follows a federal change in the 
personal income tax structure if the 
relevant provincial revenue loss is more 
than one per cent of basic federal tax in 
that province. This new guarantee ap-
plies only if the federal changes are 
announced after the beginning of a tax 
year to take efTect in that same year. 
This guarantee limits the exposure of 
provincial governments to unpredictable 
changes in their revenues arising from 
maintaining a uniform tax system. But 
it also limits the federal government's 
commitment to the first tax year in 
which a change is in efTect. Initially this 
guarantee was to be only to the nine 
provinces for which the federal govern-
ment collects personal income tax. After 
a request from Quebec, however, the 
guarantee was made available to that 
province also for instances when it 
changes its personal income tax in par-
allel with moves at the federal level. 
Equalization Payments 
For twenty years now, equalization 
payments have been made by the federal 
government to the provincial govera-
menls having lesser abilities to raise 
revenues from their own economies. Th.e 
objective has been to facilitate the pro-
vision of a reasonably adequate level of 
public services across the country with-
out some provinces needing to resort to 
levels of taxation which are excessively 
stringent by the standards of the richei 
provinces. Table 1 shows the current 
importance of these payments to tlu 
recipient provinces. 
Tlie equalization system is now baseC 
on a sophisticated "lepr-esenlative \)vo-
vincial tax system" v%hich takes ali jjio-
vincial sources of re\enue inlf> act (nml 
Even local school taxes are iiu-lude<i ii 
recognition of a peiveivcd national inter 
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• THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA'S 
EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS 1977-78 
Total 
($ million) 
269 
70 
349 
276 
1262 
201 
39 
2467 
Mentsjo;. 
NewloniidlaiKl 
Prince Edward Island 
Nov3 Scotia 
New Brunswick 
Quebec 
Manitoba 
SaskaWenan 
TOTAL 
tarn IrasBiyBiia'il. Federal tipciidiliiiu Plan: Hon your tax 
* Erisspefi l ,01ia.a. l9H,Tahlc2?. 
MB II Table: 
ICiwponenl figures ilo nor arid prscissly Is lolai because ol 
rDiinding. 
irtitoresa'e eslimeles oi pavmciits in lespcct cf l977-7f!, 
nlher lliin final lijmes and dc nol include adjuslrtients lo bu 
mine daring 19!/78 m respe-t cf paymonls in previous years. 
Per Capita 
31— 
479 -
57? 
416 
394 
200 
194 
41 
St in having children in lower-income 
tovinces able to enjoy reasonable stan-
Us of public education, A province 
iihose per capita revenue receipts from 
lich a representative system are less than 
bnational average per capita yield re-
leives special federal payments equal 
to the per capita shortfall multiplied 
fcy its population. 
This procedure was amended in 1974 
after the escalation of world oil prices. Tn 
recognition of the windl'all additions to 
the oil and gas revenues of producing 
provinces and in light of disruptions 
iWore developing to the existing ar-
rangements, the equalization formula 
was changed so •that only one-third of 
inmases in oil and gas revenues above 
1973-74 levels would be taken into ac-
count. With the 1977 .Act a second 
amendment was made. The volatility 
of markets for resource products is 
now recognized in a m.ore consistent 
manner, with only half of provincial r-ev-
cnues from ail non-renewable natural 
resources being included in the equali-
zation formula. 
The uncondi t ior)a i -"no s t r ings -
attached"-natur'e of equalization pay-
ments is worth emphasizing. T!ie equa-
lization system, as well, is based on the 
measufied ability of a province to raise 
revenues, rather than orr the vigour with 
which it actually docs tax its residents. A 
piwince could both have an unproduc-
tive iwcnuc base and use that base 
relativdy lightly by average s tandards-
though the less alliuent iMovirices ger\er-
allydohaveivlalisely high, tax nites. 
Eqiiali/ation payments can be con-
sidered as desceiiclants of the uncondi-
tional "Naiiorral .\il)UMment Grants" 
proposed in 1910 bv the Rouell-Sirois 
Commission. One dillerenee is tiiat iliese 
glints weir to in- bi.sed on comparisons 
of both ahiliiv to niise rvvenues and 
cost of proviiling serviies with the na-
tional avcr'ai^ e (ilioiii'li fli(- (-est of pn)-
viclinl,'a\rr•a^e.services uoiild h.rve been 
mncmoly dillierill to mcrsme). A .sec-
ond important difference is that the 
Rowell-Sirois Commission's recommen-
dations were rejected by the three prov-
inces which would not have received 
National Adjustment Grants v/hereas 
equa l iza t ion payments are generally 
accepted today as an integral part of 
Canadian federalism. 
Shared-Cost Programs 
The final important area covered by 
the new legislation is the financing of 
some of the big programs whose fund-
ing is shared by federal and provincial 
govei-nments-Hospital Insurance, Med-
icare, and Post-Secondary Education. 
Shared-cost programs have been used in 
a wide variety of fields, from tiansporta-
tion and agriculture to education and 
welfare, and have become one of the 
distinctive features of Canadian federal-
ism. Indeed a comprehensive catalogue 
of federal-provincial programs and ac-
tivities, the great bulk of which are 
shared-cost programs, is around one and 
one-quarter inches thick and more than 
500 pages long.* However, much the 
largest part of activity under' shared-cost 
arrangements is accounted for by the 
three programs covered by the new Act 
and by the Canada Assistance Plan 
(a welfare program whose future is 
currently the subject of negotiations 
between the federal and provincial 
governments). 
The Government of'Canada's position 
on shared-cost programs has genei-ally 
reflected a broad perception of the na-
tional interest.f Part of the rationale for 
the expansion in 1967 of federal pro-
grams supporting Post-Secondary Edu-
cation, for example, was bringing the 
superior resources and credit standing 
of the federal government to bear in 
an area where heavy financial pressures 
wei~e developing on provincial govern-
micnts. A part of the background to the 
federal pi-esence in Hospital Insurance 
and in Medicare was a conceim kiT such 
national standards as portability of cov-
erage across provincial boundaries. A 
more general argument, too, has been 
that, because other pi'ovinces or the 
nation as a whole may bear some of the 
social and economic costs produced by 
a shortfall of public services in a partic-
ular province, ther-e is a broad national 
inter-est in certain minimum services 
being provided in all provinces. 
•.I Ihsrii/iliir hnriiloiT of Fei/.-ral-I'niriminl Prii<;raiiu 
iiiiil Artivilies, I'Vdcrwl-l'iDviiniiil Relatidiis Ollicf 
{•)'•} Snaiks Si., t^liawa). 
iFei/ini/l'riivincial Giantt- anil the Sjieiia'im; I'uwer of 
I'arliiimeiil. ( ) t l a ' . \ , i , Q i i r c n V r i i i u c r , I'liiO, a wciik-
iiir', |)a|KT |IIIK1IICCII a.s b a e k u r o i i n d In llic I!)li9-
71 iicnii. ' ialioiis (111 llu: CiOii.stinilinu, rli.sius.scs 
.sli . irnl. i i isl progl'a.iiis li-oiii a IciK-ial p o m i ol view 
a m i nixes .siMiu- i r l c i v i n c s lo (lie r-oiislil i i l ioiial 
l i r c i a l i i i c . 
The public views of most provincial 
governments on shared-cost progi'ams 
have been more mixed.* There have 
been objections (notably but not exclu-
sively '"rom successive governments of 
Quebec) about the appropriateness of 
federal spending in areas which for the 
most part the B.N.A. Act placed under 
provincial jurisdiction.! Much of die 
c o m m e n t by p rov inc i a l s p o k e s m e n , 
however, has focussed on the need for 
adequate consultation and on concerns 
about the distortions to provincial pri-
orities wliich shared-cost pr-ograms can 
introduce. There have also been un-
happy provincial comments on the 
administrative rigidities which shared-
cost pr-ograms can involve. Detailed fed-
eral audits of provincial spending have 
been an irritant as well as a less-than-
effective use of resources. Sometimes, 
too, particular kinds of outlays have 
been "shai-able" but other closely r'clated 
and more economical kinds of spending 
have not been sharable. (It is ironic 
though, that many of these items on the 
list of provincial complaints about the 
federal government are repeated in 
munic ipa l discussions of provincial-
municipal relations). 
Analysts outside official circles, too 
have had mixed feelings about shared-
cost programs and one of the biggest 
concerns has been about the blurring of 
the lines of official responsibility and 
accouniability to the electorate. 
In all of. the four big shared-cost 
programs as they were set up through the 
late 1950s and the 1960s, the federal 
government essentially matched total 
provincial outlays on a dollar-for-dollar 
basis, despite variations in the exact 
arrangement from program to program. 
In both the Canada Assistance Plan and 
the Post-Secondary Education Arrange-
ments, the shai-ing has been explicitly 
50-50 on eligible oullays.ij: And for Hos-
pital Insurance and Medicare the pay-
ments to provinces were calculated on a 
formula which takes national average 
per capita outlays into account. This 
*SupplemetUaty Papers on Federal-Provincial Finance, 
presented to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario 
on March 28, 1972 alone; with that vcar s biult;et 
and prepared by the Ministry of Tpoastiry, i'-eo-
noniics and Intef^ovcrnmental .^ Xflairs, 'I'axation 
and Fiscal Policy branch provides some prnvinei.il 
perspective on these questions as does the .-ne ol 
Budget I'apers presented as part of the !!'77 
Ontario lUidgct, 
fin the 1930s, in fact, Quebec refused to ;iilo\v its 
universities to accept dii-ect gi-auls from ifie frderal 
govermueni, education beini; an area ofproviii' lal 
jurisdiction. .'\nd recos;nitiou of proviiuia.l con-
cerns on tliis point exph'.ins \v!iy binds noini; to 
provinces :is niatchiii!; contribtuions Irom the 
Covcinnieia of C^anada lor their spending on 
l^isi-,Secontlarv '".ducation have lieen iicscribrd 
foiiualK as uiicondilioual irranls, even tboiigh 
cost-sharliu; conliibuiions are usually litkcu :o be 
svnonommis with coiulititinal granls. 
( |see footnv)lc oveileaO l o 
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ffercnce, however, did not alter the 
Lcnded nature of the commitments 
|ch the federal government had 
^^cspecial "contracting out" mecha-
„, negotiated in the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s 
lugh which Quebec has participated 
yeral shared-cost programs (notably 
jpital Insurance and the Canada As-
ance Plan) also did not make a sig-
ficant difference to this pa t te rn ,* 
_ these arrangements Quebec re-
d additional abatements of per-
il income tax plus special adjusting 
1 payments to bring its total receipts 
what they would have been if it 
tidpaled in these shared-cost pro-
ms in the same way as the other 
vinces. But these abatements of lax 
nts and cash adjustment payments 
K made to Quebec on conditions 
ch as those covering sharability of 
lays and reporting requirements) op-
ionally the same as those agreed 
inby the federal government and the 
ernine provinces. 
nfter these programs had got under 
the federal government became 
easingly concerned about both the 
d growth in its outlays under them 
'the open-ended nature of its com-
ments. More and more federal ofia-
icame to be aware of some of the 
ifbacks to the matching payments 
knism, particularly that each pro-
ial administration bore only about 
of the burden of erowth of its 
c^ 
iding in the major share-cost pro-
ms. There still was a vieiv that open-
ed matching payments might have 
unimportant element in the first 
ts of a share-cost program. They v/ere 
led on as having been useful in 
Duraging the provinces to enter these 
{rams and perhaps necessary in the 
od when levels of program, activity 
iNic big part of the federal contribution to 
•SjCondary Education was in the form of t;tx 
tacnts, there wtire adjustina cash paynients 
Wig total provincial receipts np to the 50% 
j^ Thr one point of corporate income abated 
iprovinces for Post.Seeondary Ixlueation is 
™ijig of a historical relic. Orifiuallv one 
111 01 corporate income had been abated to 
Wm I960 as a sulretiuite for the direct 
Wgrams made to univei-sities in the other 
S " "'i« cxleuded lo all provinces in the 
HJiOswhon the federal i;o...;.rnmerit mmrd to 
«l US lolal stipperl of post-secondary educa-
Whitimonizi- lis support of universities and 
itoms of posi-second.uv educalion; and 
» U ' ; ! ' f "^•'••' r ^ 'PP« l , The peisonal 
™ ll...^ , luiv.vver, been loiind moiv suitable 
2 ' * ' ;™i« ' il- ^ield is nol as cvclicallv 
™bt IMS a.sUun.Kerunderlyii,i; trend of 
;"Ml'<••<-|«il.^M.ul"a.•rangcmenl:.vve,•e 
• 'Meniponuy; ,, permanent ix-.sol,,. 
! • ".'^ .ld.ived by lax relorm and bv 
t ^ ' T ' " "I*- '«l<'''^'' )t<'ve.-n,ne,.( and 
and Costs were still being established. 
But the situation was thought different 
for a "mature" program wh.crc costs were 
known with some degree of precision, 
where adequate levels of services were 
being provided and where provinces 
would continue to provide them. In 
these circumstances, the thirrking was 
that the matching payments mecha-
n i s m - a n d the so-called 'Tifty-cent 
dollar"—could well unbalance the prior-
ities of provincial governments as be-
tween shared-cost items and other spend-
ing fields. It diminished the incentives 
for a provincial government to exercise 
the same care in controlling exoenses in 
areas covered by shar-ed-cost programs as 
was shown in other areas of activity. 
At the same time, hovi^ever, the Gov-
ernment of Canada could not simply 
^valk away from, its role of financially 
assisting provincial act ivi ty in these 
areas. It had, after all, encouraged prov-
inces to move into some of them in the 
first place and there was a continuing 
desire to maintain some of the nation-
al standards—such as portability across 
provincial boim.daries—which originally 
had encouraged l"ederal participation. 
On several occasions in the last decade, 
therefore, the Government of Canada 
put proposals to the provinces which 
would remove the explicit linkage be-
tween provincial spending and federal 
cont r ibu t ions for some of the big 
shared-cost programs. The general idea 
was to relate growth in its grants to 
growth in some measure of the size of 
the econom.y or returns from the tax 
system. 
One such proposal about transfers for 
Post-Secondary Education was made 
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during the negotiations preceding the 
1972 Act. The provinces did not accept 
it, largely as the result of unease about 
their pot'-ntial exposure to rising pro-
gram costs. The federal government, 
therefore, chose an alternative tack; and 
a limit of 15% to the increase in any 
one year of total federal contributions 
(abatements plus cash) for Post-Second-
ary Education was part of the package 
eventually emerging from the bargain-
ing sessions. This limit has in fact put a 
ceiling on federal contributions in recent 
years. 
Much the same sequence of events 
repeated itself in the fields of Hospital 
Insurance and Medicare. No agreement 
was reached in 1974 about analogous 
proposals for different arrangeiTients for 
federal support of these programs. In 
1975, therefore, the federal government 
amended the Medical Care Act to place 
upper limits on the annual increases in 
its contributions; and it gave five years 
notice (as required by the Hospital 
Insurance Act) of its intention to ter-
minate the Hospital Insurance agree-
ments with provinces in 1980. These uni-
lateral federal measures were a big 
factor in the background to the recent 
federal-provincial negotiations. 
With the limits on annual increases 
in its cont r ibu t ions the Government 
of Canada had partly dealt with prob-
lems of rapid growth in its spending on 
Post-Secondary Education and on Med-
icare. Yet the Hospital Insurance scheme 
still remained to be renegotiated. The 
method of arbitrary limits on increases 
in total federal contributions could pro-
duce inequit ies amongst the various 
provinces. In these circumstances it was 
Table 2. 
Payments lo: 
FEDERAL SHARE OF ESTABLISHED PROGR/i.MS FINANCING, 1977-78 
mill ion 
Cash Payments Tax Transle/s 
Hospital 
Insurance Medicsre 
Post-
Secondary 
Education Subtotal Direct Equalizalion Sub-lolal TOTAL 
Enlendpd 
Health 
Care 
Transfer 
GRAND 
TOTAL 
"lies |,|„ 
"11 llie-ic s,iaie programs. 
Newloundland 
Prince Edward Island 
Nova Scotia 
New Brunswick 
Quebec 
Ontario 
Manitoba 
Saskatchewan 
Alberta 
British Columbia 
TOTAL 
35 
7 
56 
44 
470 
522 
69 
6! 
130 
147 
12 
3 
20 
15 
157 
196 
25 • 
22 
46 
52 
23 
5 
37 
28 
305 
358 
45 
39 
85 
96 
71 
14 
113 
87 
94) 
1106 
139 
122 
251 
• 295 
39 
8 
74 
55 
731 
1300 
114 
100 
256 
385 
35 
8 
36 
37 
92 
22 
24 
74 
16 
110 
91 
823 
300 
136 
124 
256 
385 
144 
30 
223 
179 
1764 
2406 
275 
246 
518 
680 
11 
2 
17 
14 
125 
169 
21 
19 
37 
51 
156 
33 
240 
193 
1890 
2575 
295 
255 
555 
731 
3315 6465 467 6932 1572 , 558 1020 3150 3061 254 
Sources: Treasury Board. Federal Expenditure Plan: How your lax dollar is spenl, OUawa, 1577. Table 22. 
Minutes of Proceediniis and Evidence ol Standing Conmiillce ol House of Commons on Finance. 
Tr.ide and Economic Allairs. IVlaicli 8, 1977, Apiiindu "nE 12". 
Notes lo table: 
1. Component figures rn.iy not add ex,ully to lolals because ol loundmj. 
2. Under the new arranteincnls loi fnuincnig cslsbhdi.'d pioRianis. Hie federal government's contribution is nol spccilically liii'.ed lo riiovinci.il oiill.ivs 
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,ANK OF NON A sex/I) A 
dthal negotiated ari-angements 
> (-lear the air for future federal 
Lgs with the provinces. And there 
Jeeling that it would be desirable 
ave some sort of a per capita ele-
|in the federal contributions to 
Litd-cost programs, partly to take 
£nal account of the position of 
less prosperous provinces. 
pe of the provinces, too, came to 
bargaining table with specific aims 
Bind. Since the 1960s, a number of 
Bhad become more interested in a 
BCturing of the major share-cost 
[ams under which they would take 
lort of the polic/-making and ad-
krative responsibilities, in return 
txtra tax room.* The hope was that 
'minces would be enabled to man-
these programs (especially health 
jfams) more effectively with such 
ancement of their authority. The 
Lacli to a reworking of the shared-
[anangements did, of course, vary 
ji province to province. Some of the 
E affluent provinces focussed espe-
lyon tax room whereas some of the 
affluent ones were rather more inter-
U in cash payments from the federal 
tminent. But at the meetings of First 
listers in the summer of 1976 more 
n half of the provinces expressed 
jr interest in greater responsibilities 
pled with increased federal tax 
lements, 
(Xao Financing 
\(m^ements 
[was out of all these considerations 
Ian agreement was reached last De-
iberon new financing arrangements 
the major shared-cost programs other 
inthe Canada Assistance Plan. Con-
u^tionsfrom the Governm.ent of Can-
bill no longer be directly related to 
piiicial expenditures, but instead will 
Nith the growth of the economy. 
Iversdy, the provincial governments' 
Japtsin respect of these programs will 
I longer be tied to their outlays in the 
pic areas concerned, although the 
pvinccs have committed themselves to 
tanue to meet certain standards in 
te key respects. 
iAbouthalf of the federal contribution 
jwwillbein cash with the rest to be in 
Wed lax I'oorn. In time the cash, pay-
fiiUoeach province will come to be 
temined by a formula using half of 
It national average per capita federal 
lymcnts in a 1975-7G base period, 
t'liatcdby a moving a\cragc of growtli 
J^  for per capita Gross National 
Wucl, For the shorter term, there will 
f'^ mctcmporarv iKijustmcnts to bring 
!*vcio il uniform scale of pa\-menls 
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into effect gradually. And in addition, 
the basic cash payments will be supple-
mented by a further unconditional pay-
ment equivalent lo one percentage point 
of personal income tax and, where ap-
plicable, associated equalization. 
As for the tax portion of the fedeml 
contribution, it is to consist of 13.5 
percentage points of federal personal 
income tax plus one point of corporate 
income, as well as associated equaliza-
tion where this is applicable.* In addi-
tion, because transfers of tax rights have 
a below-average value in some provinces, 
the federal governm.ent v/ill make special 
transitional payments. Therefore each 
province will receive at least as much 
revenue transfer as it would have were 
the transfers all worked out on the cash 
basis discussed above (rather than being 
half tax and half cash). 
Eventually receipts from transferred 
tax room should catch up with the value 
of the cash payments since personal tajc 
revermes grow faster than the economy 
as a whole, the escalator used for the 
cash transfers. During the interim period 
when the transitional support payments 
are being made, however, the wealthier 
provinces vv-ill enjoy faster growth in 
their net receipts from Established Pro-
grams Financing, 
It is also worth noting that the sup-
p l e m e n t a r y cash paym.ent ( t h a t is 
equivalent to one percentage point of 
personal income tax) and one of the 
percentage points of abated personal 
l a x - b o t h of them formally ascribed to 
Est3.blished Programs Financing-are in 
fact the same two percentage points of 
persona! income tax which, as discussed 
earlier, were traded off at the December 
meetings in settlement for the ending of 
the full Revenue Guarantee provision 
and for other outstanding issues. 
Fina Ily a special af rangement has been 
devised to provide the provinces wnth 
cash paymen t s unde r an Ex tended 
Health Service Program. The purpose of 
these payments (to be made on a per 
capita basis and to be escalated by 
growth in per capita GNP) is to assist the 
provinces in providing supplementary 
kinds of services in the health care field, 
such as home care or residential care, to 
complement the other kinds of services 
which in the past were financed under 
Hospital Insurance and Medicare. This 
new program updates a federal oiler 
made during earlier discussions about 
me thods of control l ing heal th care 
costs; in part payments irnder it Vvill re-
place federal shared-cost contributioms 
*'rii!S<- ;ib;iti-tvcius thus iiicl'.ulc IIH' •:.:5.'')7 vicr-
i"', loi 
"•""I'ls, ill'' Oniaru. do.UT; irnts cncd 
Cfnl:i!'r points of |x-is.>n;\l i iuomc t:ix aiul onc 
pcMVi-iU;!•;<• p,)iiit of cO'lKinito inionir |>!(vici'islv 
in.ulc iivriilabic lo the provituv.s for P()sl-,S(Voii-
dary lui iuation. 
for the provision of such .services to per-
sons in need under the Canada Assis-
tance Plan, 
A Sumhdng Up 
If only these changes to shared-cost 
arrangements are taken into account, 
the dollars and cents position of the 
provinces as a group has improved sub-
stantial ly. Coun t i ng the equal iza t ion 
payments associated v.'ith the transferred 
tax points, the federal contribution for 
1977-78 wiU be S924 millions higher 
than it would have been if the old rules 
had remained in eflect; and the dif-
ference will grow overtime. Against this, 
at least some of the provinces would set 
the end of the Revenue Guai 'antee-al-
most $900 millions in 1976-which they 
had hoped to keep operative. Thus the 
new agreement can be interpreted as 
being pretty much a saw-off. It is also 
true that the old rules for shared-cost 
programs would not always have been as 
favourable to the provinces as they have 
till now. The federal government, after 
all, had given notice of its intention to 
end the previous agreement for Hospital 
Insurance in 1980. At that time a new 
agreement placing some constraints on 
growth in the Government of Canada's 
contributions would have been likely. 
In other ways, the new arrangements 
are distinctly more satisfactory for both 
federal and provincial governments. The 
Government of Canada now has clearly-
defined obligations for its contributions 
in support of three of the major shared-
cost programs, and these obligations are 
the result of a bargaining process rather 
than an imposed solution. It also has the 
assurance that the provinces will con-
tinue to maintain standards in such 
facets of these programs as portability 
and degree of coverage. 
Each province has a good deal more 
scope for defining its own programs 
without forcing them to fit exactly into 
rigid categories found acceptable by the 
["ederal-provincial bargaining process. 
The mixture of income taxes and cash 
payments gives an assurance of continu-
ity and predictability in provincial re-
ceipts and reflects the interests of both 
the wealthier and the less prosperous 
provinces. There will no lo.nger be de-
tailed federal monitoring and auditing 
of provincial outlays. And because then; 
is no longer dol lar-for-dol lar federal 
matching of provincial spending, any 
progress a provincial government is able 
to make in containing the gr-owlli of its 
spending in these shared-cost areas will 
be completely, rather than half, reflected 
in a betterment of ils (i.scal position. Ail 
told, llie new ariangmcnts arc an entry 
on ihc constructive side of the national 
ledger, 
ISSN! lii'tl-'i':'" 
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